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The activity of translating something into a monetary amount – the price - is central 
to markets. Yet we know remarkably little about the practice of pricing beyond 
theories of economic rationale or market positioning and, as a construct, price has 
remained largely within the economists’ domain. This research pushes for and 
contributes towards the need for more substantive studies of pricing. With particular 
emphasis on money-meanings, this research applies prior socio-economic research in 
an examination of discourses of the pricing process in order to better understand 
pricing as a social and meaning-full activity. In its focus on pricers this research 
contributes to the call for more studies of supply-side meaning-making within 
markets, and addresses the consumer-focussed imbalance in previously published 
price research. 
This research works within the recent surge in ethnographic and language-centred 
marketing research which has hitherto been focussed on social and cultural elements 
of consumer practices and market meaning-making, and turns this lens to focus on 
pricing practices and discourses in order to examine pricing as an embedded 
practice, and to examine the widespread assumption that money is treated by pricers 
as neutral or meaning-less.  
It builds on previously published money-categorisation literature and the currently 
small body of ethnographic and discursive work which construes pricers as socially 
embedded. Synthesising insights from these two strands this study examines 
ethnographic data collected over three years’ deep immersion in a pricing context – 
the local art world. This short-chain pricing context involves pricers with a range of 
socio-demographics and objects, and who have no overarching organisational pricing 
rules.   The research considers whether, how and why interpretations of money, 




This research finds that pricers within this study treat money as a meaning-full, 
rather than neutral, entity, and that this theoretical lens is a useful way of 
understanding apparently ‘irrational’ pricing practices. Importantly, categorisations 
of money by source (the object being priced and the buyer), form, holder and 
earmarking were used within pricing discourses to signal and maintain social 
relations and social position, as were rituals of category change. 
The research shows that money’s social meanings affect pricing discourses and 
choices. Importantly, pricing is shaped by varied understandings of ‘how it is done 






CHAPTER 1.    INTRODUCTION: The problem of  price and pricing 
Despite the speed with which the layman defines price as “supply and demand, isn’t 
it?” or “what the market will take”, or “enough to cover costs and make a profit on 
top”, when asked to discuss how they arrive at a price pricers frequently have a 
rather different, and slower, response: “It’s difficult, isn’t it?”.  This research 
examines the very different ways a group of pricers within a particular field 
approach, talk about and perform pricing. It is an attempt to say something about 
price that has not been said before, or said in the same way. In observing and 
analysing price discourses
1
 through the theoretical lens of money-meanings, I hope 
to reveal things about pricing which are interesting, and potentially both important 
and useful.  
It is an overriding assumption of our time that price is ultimately the outcome of 
supply and demand, an abstract economic model, and that those doing the pricing are 
economically driven, economically rational, and evolutionarily advanced beyond the 
irrational consumer (Poundstone 2010, p.73). Criticism of the increase in 
commoditisation and commercialisation of our world has been underpinned by the 
assumption that producers are driven by economic motives at the expense of social 
considerations. Pricing, a central element of market activities, is seen as something 
which undermines or is threatened by social ties and relationships. 
Within Marketing, where price is elevated to one of the four key elements in the 
marketing mix, we discuss then put aside economic price models, agree that pricing 
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 By ‘discourse’ I mean the spoken word (and its variation in tone, pitch, speed and accompanying 
body-language), and also other forms of communication used by the research participants, such as 
associated artefacts (e.g. pricing labels, lighting, and choice of venue) and behaviours (e.g. attendance 




is difficult (Mercer 1996),  but do little pricing research. What research there is 
focusses on consumers’ interpretations of price and value; for example there is a 
large stream of work flowing from  Zeithaml’s (1988) influential paper which 
examines consumer constructions of price, and the ‘indistinct and elusive’ constructs 
of value and quality. This thesis is not an attempt to resolve the problematic 
relationship between value and price, which Zeithaml and others (including 
Holbrook and Simmel) have struggled with. Instead, it focusses on the money 
elements of pricers’ discourses of price.  
There is a paucity of research looking at how the pricers understand price, and how 
they apply that knowledge. Whilst it has been recognised that commensuration ‘has a 
long history as an instrument of social thought’, and it has been suggested that 
commensuration may be considered to be a social process and a mode of power 
(Espeland and Stevens 1998), pricing has remained largely within the economists’ 
rather than sociologists’ domain, and is a very under-researched area.   
The question is whether or not pricers approach pricing in a way which conforms to 
economic and marketing models. The standard answer would be yes, but an 
examination of previously published research such as Morton and Podolny’s paper 
‘Love or Money?’ gives insights which contest that assumption.  
Morton and Podolny’s (2002) study of the pricing practices of  Californian wine 
producers points out that the hobbyist producers within the research context have a 
pricing practice that is different from and less economically rational than the 
commercial pricing in that context. They suggest that the hobbyist pricers may be 
getting ‘utility’ from the production of wine in addition to the economic benefit from 
the sale of the wine. They only briefly suggest what that utility is, and do not 
examine how it is constructed as utility, or why it affects pricing practice, but their 
research provides a useful example of shared ‘irrational’ pricing practices. The 




Sometimes the sources of a particular pricing approach appear quite clear; for 
example MacKenzie’s (2006) study of the Chicago Stock Exchange shows the 
influence of specific people, their championing of specific academic papers, and the 
importance of social networks in determining market interpretations and pricing 
practice. It is possible that in other contexts the complexity of communication may 
make sources of explicit ‘know that’ and tacit ‘how to’ knowledge  (Schau, Muniz Jr 
et al. 2009)  harder to discern. However the foundational idea that pricers are socially 
embedded
2
 is key, as is the corollary suggestion that what are considered to be 
‘appropriate’ pricing approaches and interpretations are learnt, and socially 
constructed.  
What neither Morton and Podolny (2002)  nor MacKenzie (2006) consider is the 
central element of pricing: money. As long as we think of money as always the same 
– a dollar is a dollar is a dollar (Zelizer 1994)  – then it can be ignored, and largely 
has been. However, it has been shown that dollars are not all the same for 
consumers, and that the categorisation is important in determining both how money 
is used (Thaler 1985; Zelizer 1994; Thaler 1999) and in the social positioning of the 
holder and receiver (Zelizer 1994; 1998; Venkatesh 2006; Zelizer 2008; 2008). 
Earlier anthropological work on primitive cultures has shown that the unit of 
currency matters in particular pricing contexts (Douglas 1982), in that some goods 
can only be priced in a particular currency. Although in that primitive-context 
research the currencies were physically different (raffia vs. coins), the modern 
                                                 
 
2
 Note, whereas ‘old school’ socio-economic research construed economics as something which 
happens within a shell of society, New Socio-economics attempts to ‘identify social processes and 
social relations at the very heart of economic activity’ and offer a ‘truly alternative, socially based 
description and explanation of economic activity.’ Zelizer, V. A. (2007). "Pasts and Futures of 
Economic Sociology." American Behavioral Scientist 50(8): 1056-1069.. It is this new socio-




practice of separation of ostensibly identical monies into non-fungible accounts 
through mental or ‘tin-can’ accounting explored by Thaler and Zelizer suggests that 
the primitive practices may have resonance in contemporary pricing contexts.  It is 
therefore important to consider the possibility that modern pricing practices may be 
linked to particular categories of money – that is, that pricers may see money 
differently depending on source, form, and earmarking, and variation in the meaning 
of different monies might affect pricing  
This study focusses on the money aspect of pricing. In order to contain the research, 
it is not a study of the very complex concept of value, nor of its relationship to price, 
although the findings may be of interest to those intrigued by value. This research 
proposes that pricers’ categorisations of money may vary, echoing the variations 
found in studies of consumers’ money meanings and categorisations. Display of 
categorisations and associated behaviours could be used by pricers as social symbols 
in much the same way as ‘correctly’ categorising and handling tips, birthday money, 
or savings are used in social positioning. In the case of pricing, what may be at stake 
is being able to ‘correctly’ categorise, talk about and handle money earned through 
pricing and selling one’s product. Building on prior money, pricing, and 
consumption-practice research, I ask the questions: Do money categorisations affect 
pricing practice? How and why do pricers make distinctions between monies? What 
insights are gained by using this approach to examining pricing practice? 
In the Literature Review (Chapter 2) I examine in more depth the literature 
mentioned above and other theories of price, pricing, and money, in order to 
investigate what insights gained so far may be used to answer those questions, and to 





CHAPTER 2.   LITERATURE REVIEW:  Price and pricing 
Introduction 
Although price is a very important element of marketing and a necessary part of 
most market exchanges, little attention has been paid hitherto to the analysis of 
contemporary pricing practice. Given the paucity of research regarding pricing, I 
begin this literature review with a brief review of approaches to price:  
Section 2.1 begins with the dominant model of price: the abstract economic theory of 
the supply and demand (S&D) mechanism. I then move on to the ‘how to price’ 
literature aimed at practitioners. This includes a brief overview of approaches to 
pricing within Finance then within Marketing, where the focus of prior research is on 
consumer understandings of price.  Importantly, within this literature money is 
treated as neutral. 
In section 2.2 I propose an alternative way of considering price, in which pricing is 
construed as involving an active commensurative process of comparing object (and 
its meaning) with money (and its meaning), and an interpretation of the ‘rules’ 
surrounding that particular comparison and translation.  
Within this alternative view pricing is construed as a culturally and socially 
embedded practice.  I discuss two literature streams which examine economic 
practices as ‘lived’ human practices: behavioural economics, and socio-economics, 
and in section 2.3 focus on the small but very useful body of money-practice 
research within these two literature streams. Here the main thrust is that money is not 
always treated as neutral and fungible, and that money-practices may be 
economically irrational.  
In section 2.4 I compare the insights and approaches of behavioural economics and 
socio-economics with current research in Consumer Culture Theory to suggest that 




categorisations and pricing practices as they have been found to be in consumption 
behaviours.  
Finally, in section 2.5 I examine literature which considers pricing within the 
research context – the art world.  
Synthesising insights from the related literature discussed in this chapter, I then 
move on to the next chapter and outline the research agenda of this research project. 
2.1 Pricing: A Mainstream Approach  
Introduction 
In this section I review the main pricing concepts from economic, finance and 
marketing theory. In each of these areas money is considered a neutral entity, and 
although the consumer may, in some models, be considered to be socially embedded, 
the pricer is assumed to be abstracted, and focussed on maximising economic gain. 
The key ideas within the price-related literature are that, from the supply-side, price 
is a rational outcome of economic or strategic goals. It can be understood as a 
combination of the supply and demand model, as a means of covering costs and 
generating profit, as a signal, and as a means of realising a market strategy such as 
skimming or penetration. On the consumption side, which is the main focus within 
marketing literature, consumers are construed as understanding price differently 
depending on how they categorise the product, and to an extent, how they categorise 
the money they would use to buy that product.  Whereas consumers are increasingly 
understood as socially embedded, and therefore likely to have different and changing 
interpretations and ways of using market activities, pricers are seen as economically 




The emphasis in much of the trade press and academic marketing literature is on 
teaching or confirming particular ways of understanding and doing price. Whilst 
useful, these price approaches neglect an examination of the pricers as socially 
embedded, and therefore as having potentially varied understandings of appropriate 
pricing options and of the money gained from pricing and selling a particular 
product. 
2.1.1    Neo-classical economics 
 ‘the paradigm of economic theory is to first characterize the solution to some 
problem, and then to assume the relevant agents (on average) act 
accordingly’ 
(Thaler 2008 [1985] , reprint of 1985 article, p.15) 
The vast majority of price-related literature uses the abstracted and aggregated neo-
classical economics Supply and Demand theoretical model, often in combination 
with management-relevant costs-plus-profit considerations.  These are discussed 
below.  
‘The tool in the economist’s bag in which most economists place the greatest 
trust is the supply and demand analysis of simple commodity markets. The 
theory stipulates that prices adjust over time until supply equals demand.’   
(Thaler 2008 [1985] , reprint of 1985 article, p.22) 
What is perhaps most important to remember about the supply and demand model is 
that it is a characterisation of abstracted (as opposed to embedded in society/culture) 
aggregated optimal behaviour. Although it may be useful as a baseline way of 
understanding price, it was never intended to be used as a ‘how to’ tool for an 
individual pricer, even if that is how it is frequently spoken of by the layman. 
The supply and demand (S&D) model assumes perfect knowledge and free 
movement, and assumes that profit maximisation is the main purpose of firms, an 




Podolny 2002, p.432). In this model price is both an outcome of the intersection of 
the supply and demand lines (prices adjust until supply is equal to demand), and a 
driver for change in supply and demand. If demand exceeds supply prices are high, 
so supply will increase until price is stabilised at a lower level. The reverse also 
happens: where supply exceeds demand, price will fall until demand increases to 
meet supply, and some of the supply may be reduced. 
 
Figure 1: Supply and demand 
The supply and demand lines may be drawn as straight lines or as curves, as in the 
diagram above. 
The effect that changes in price have on demand is called the elasticity of demand. 
The elasticity varies from zero (where demand remains the same regardless of 
changes in price) to one (where a 10% increase in price leads to a 10% decrease in 
demand), to greater than one (where a 10% increase in price would lead to a greater 
than 10% decrease in demand). In its use as a tool for the price management of 
products and services the degree of price elasticity of demand is thought to vary with 




In theory a free market should lead to optimal uses of resources – what Adam Smith 
termed ‘the invisible hand of the market’ (Smith 1776). However, there may be 
political, social or capital-requirement reasons why markets do not in practice 
behave rationally or optimally.  
In terms of its application to real markets, four assumptions within the S&D model 
are particularly awkward. These are the assumptions of perfect knowledge, global 
relevance, free movement, and assumption of conformity. 
Awkward Assumption: perfect knowledge. 
Perfect knowledge is when everyone involved is aware of all the pertinent 
information at the earliest and same time. Although it is fundamental to the S&D 
model, this is generally recognised as a dubious assumption. Instead, there is 
recognition that knowledge cannot be perfect, and that barriers and costs of 
knowledge-acquisition matter in determining prices and successful sales. This has 
been explored in for example, Akerlof’s influential Nobel Prize-winning paper ‘The 
Market for “Lemons”’ (1970), in which he discusses the effect of knowledge 
asymmetry on micro-exchanges and the used-car and labour markets.  
Awkward Assumption: global relevance 
Although it was designed as a model for understanding simple commodity markets, 
the S&D model is frequently assumed relevant to all types of market. With a 
moment’s reflection one can think of examples where the S&D model does not 
appear to work, e.g. the case of luxury/status goods, where according to Veblen 
(1899) demand would be expected to go up rather than down, as price increases.  
Awkward Assumption: free movement 
According to the S&D model all agents are free to enter and leave markets whenever 
they like with no penalties, and can change to an alternative production/purchase if 




There are tangible and intangible costs, restrictions and benefits to entering or 
leaving markets or particular trading relationships.  
Awkward Assumption: Conformity 
As Thaler pointed out in 1985, ‘the paradigm of economic theory is to first 
characterize the solution to some problem, and then to assume the relevant agents 
(on average) act accordingly’ (2008 [1985] reprint p.15). The S&D model is a 
theoretical aggregated macro model, and the assumption that individual agents act 
‘on average’ like the model does not appear to reflect reality at a micro level. This is 
perhaps due to variations in knowledge, product, and context. The S&D model often 
does not work at a macro level either, although the assumption still seems to be that 
it should. For example, in a recent exchange with an independent financial advisor I 
was told  
“these companies’ share price movements are closely correlated to 
fluctuations in commodity and oil prices which are increasingly driven by 
speculative trading rather than simple supply and demand dynamics” 
(SJR) 
Although Grampp’s aim in Pricing the Priceless (1989) is to demonstrate why the 
neo-classical economic theory of supply, exchange, and demand and the assumption 
of maximisation can be used to explain art pricing by including conceptions such as 
taste and social capital within the economic idea of ‘utility’, there is an increasing 
interest in using micro-research to critique rather than support the normative 
economic models. This is discussed in the section An Alternative Approach. 
To summarise, mainstream basic economic theory assumes perfect knowledge, no 
restrictions to trade, and a goal of economic maximisation at both a macro and micro 
level. The supply and demand model dominates discussions of price within lay 
theory and price literature even though it is built on contentious assumptions and is 




Observable differences between economic theory and real life have led to an 
increasing interest in understanding actual economic practices, leading to areas of 
research such as behavioural economics, consumer research, and socio-economics. 
These alternative approaches are discussed in more detail after a brief discussion of 
the Finance approach to price, which uses the S&D model to build pricing models 
and inform pricing practice, and an overview of the main pricing approaches within 
Marketing. 
2.1.2    Finance 
Within finance theory price is about covering costs and ideally generating profit. The 
two main approaches are to work forward from costs towards price, or to work back 
from a desired-profit target in a process known as break-even analysis.  
Break-even analysis assumes a significance of demand in terms of the price/volume 
implications. Hypothetical demand curves which allow for estimated elasticity of 
demand at different prices are laid over various cost/volume curves, then final price 
decisions are made by comparing the profit implications of different prices in 
relation to the estimated volumes that would be sold and the costs at different 
production volumes (this generally includes a consideration of fixed and marginal 
costs).  
Given that the break-even model uses many estimates and a choice of method re the 
costs (what should be included, as well as different ideas regarding how these should 
be calculated), it is important to consider that although it is often presented as a 
‘rational’ model, the model’s inputs and interpretations – and therefore pricing 
practice - will be informed by the user’s understandings of what are reasonable 
assumptions, what is ‘standard practice’, and their understandings of ‘how it is done 




2.1.3    Marketing 
Although the underlying assumption within marketing price theory is that prices 
must cover costs, so all pricing systems are to that extent cost-related, from a 
marketing point of view pricing to cover costs is only a beginning: if only costs and 
desired-profit are considered there is a danger of setting prices which do not fit the 
market or marketing strategy.  
Within Marketing price is generally considered as one element of the Marketing Mix 
or 4Ps, first proposed by E. Jerome McCarthy. Although considered by some to be 
an oversimplification the 4Ps is still considered to be a core conceptual tool 
(Yudelson 1999). Within this model the four elements, Product, Place, Price, and 
Promotion, should ideally work together to create a cohesive message. What is 
important therefore about price is its fit with the other elements in terms of its 
communication potential: how do consumers understand the price message? Is it 
consistent with the message given by the other three elements?  
Market-related pricing systems take both consumers and competitors into account, 
and can be grouped into five main areas. They are: perceived (Zeithaml 1988) 
pricing; psychological pricing; promotional pricing; skimming, competitor-related 
pricing (Scott and Jones 1999).  
Perceived value pricing 
Prices are determined using assumptions regarding what customers are willing to pay 
for, and how much they are willing to pay for it. This is a frequent topic within the 
work of market research practitioners, and within academic research as can be seen 
in the stream of marketing literature stemming in particular from Zeithaml’s (1988) 
hugely influential paper in which she offers definitions and methodological protocol 






This approach uses consumer understandings of price, and includes concepts such as 
conspicuous consumption or the Veblen effect, where price is raised as an indicator 
of prestige & quality (Shapiro 1983). That is, an item (particularly those positioned 
as luxury items) is thought to become more rather than less desirable as price goes 
up. For example, perfume may sell better at £30 a bottle than at £15.  
Psychological pricing also includes concepts such as framing (Tversky and 
Kahneman 1981; Thaler 2008 [1985]), where price perception is informed by related 
information such as categorisation of type of expenditure. This is linked to what 
Marketers call anchoring – where another product/price is used as a reference, 
making the primary product more desirable. For example, luxury handbag prices are 
seen as ‘reasonable’ when they are contextualised by a more expensive clothing 
range, or as another example, a high Recommended Retail Price (RRP) may be 
stated to allow for the perception of deep discounting in the actual retail price.  
 
Other psychological approaches to price include the use of pricing points, such as 
£9.99 rather than £10.00, and discounts. Discounts might include offers such as Buy 
One Get One Free (BOGOF), or 20% Free; sometimes these may be from artificially 
high starting prices. 
 
Promotional pricing  
Prices are set low to generate increased sales volume – perhaps to clear excess 
stocks, or to increase consumer awareness and grow market share (penetration 
pricing). 
Skimming 
Prices are set high (premium price) for new entry with a perceived high value, e.g. 
Apple’s latest i-player, which will be superseded by competitor entrants or the 
company’s own next offer. Prices are progressively reduced as competition 





The emphasis here is on ‘the going rate’, rather than on demand or costs. 
Importantly, but not mentioned in the pricing literature, what is considered the going 
rate will depend on perceptions of field, sector, market leader, available options and 
their likely effect. White (1981) points out that  producers are more likely to look at 
other producers than at consumers when deciding how to act, reinforcing the 
argument that what one does is shaped by the idea that ‘this is how people (or 
organisations) like us do it’. Whereas White was writing at the firm level, 
MacKenzie (2006) emphasises the idea that firms are made up of individuals whose 
culturally-informed interpretation of others’ market behaviours and ‘the way it is’ 
will necessarily vary. This is discussed in more detail in the section ‘An Alternative 
Approach’ 
‘The way it is’ within a particular field may seem solid to those involved, but the 
status quo and ‘way it is done’ is fluid and can be contested. For example consider 
the relatively recent entry of budget airlines and their challenge to extant airline 
pricing repertoires through a separation of elements (what Thaler called the 
segregation principle) rather than following the industry norm of integrated pricing. 
The new arrivals challenged existing ideas of what a passenger can reasonably 
expect to be part of the flight-price package. Now one may have to choose to pay for 
or do without previously included elements such as various payment options, 
baggage allowance, and in-flight food.  
The practitioner ‘how to price’ literature (either the implicit teaching as in articles in 
the trade press, or explicit teaching material such as MBA texts and ‘how to’ articles 
and books) appears to be informed by the research literature, which focuses on how 
consumers understand and react to prices. The literature on consumer understandings 
of price often includes the important but nebulous culturally-informed concept of 
value, and much of it is informed by Zeithaml’s previously-mentioned influential 




concepts of price, perceived quality and perceived value of a product from the 
consumers’ perspective, and the relationship between the concepts.  
Zeithaml proposes 'A Means-End Model Relating Price, Quality and Value' based on 
a synthesis of extant literature and a study of primary data gathered from an 
exploratory study. This involved a focus group and in-depth interviews with thirty 
consumers, and in-depth interviews with five senior company staff. The focus of the 
research is the consumer perceptions of value, as can be seen in the proportions of 
type of participant, and in the focus of the interviews with the company staff.  
However, she points out that managers' views (here, about what is important in 
quality perceptions) may differ considerably from consumers' or dealers’ views. 
'In-depth interviews were held with the marketing research director, the 
senior product manager for juices, two company strategic planners, and the 
president of the company's advertising agency. Open-ended questions 
pertained to issues such as company knowledge about quality and value 
perceptions of consumers, ways the company determined those perceptions, 
and how quality and value were communicated to consumers.'  
(Zeithaml 1988, p.3) 
The model Zeithaml proposes is ‘an adaptation of a model first proposed by Dodds 
and Monroe (1985) (and) affords an overview of the relationships among the 
concepts of price, perceived quality, and perceived value' (Zeithaml 1988, p.4).  Here 
the means-end is defined as  
Product Functional benefit Practical benefitEmotional pay-off 
(Zeithaml 1988, p.5) 
In Zeithaml’s model price is divided into 4 parts: objective price, perceived 
monetary price, perceived non-monetary price, and perceived sacrifice. That is, 




example) consumer perceptions of price include time costs, search costs and psychic 
costs as well as the monetary aspect of price. 
Because Zeithaml is focussing on the consumers’ perspective, Price is defined as a 
‘give’, not the ‘get’ it would be for a pricer. That is, in Zeithaml’s model price is 
‘what is given up or sacrificed’ (p.10). 'Objective price', one of the four parts of 
price, is seen as a 'Lower level attribute', and the three other parts are categorised as 
'Perceptions of lower-level attributes'. She states (p. 8) that prior literature suggests 
that monetary price is used by consumers as an indicator of quality where there is 
little other information, but where there are other cues such as packaging and 
advertising price becomes secondary in interpretation of quality. Also, she suggests, 
the use of price as a quality indicator varies with product type (p.12). 
Using previously-published literature, Zeithaml points out that many consumers 
encode the objective price, so that  whilst some may remember a specific price such 
as $1.69 for a six-pack of soft drink, another consumer may remember ‘cheap’ or 
‘expensive’, whilst others may not encode the price at all. Encoding relies on having 
clear price information, on having relevant references, and on the desire to encode. 
Encoding appears to vary with type of product, and by demographic group. I suggest 
that although Zeithaml does not mention this, encoding also relies on an idea of what 
type of reference or framing is ‘appropriate’ when encoding. That is, encoding as 
‘cheap’ or ‘expensive’ may be informed by considerations of social positioning and 
perceptions of desirable response in both the data-collection process and in the 
participant’s normal practice.  
Prior research regarding perceived and actual relationship between price and quality 
has given very mixed results (Zeithaml 1988, p.11), and she suggests that a greater 
understanding of quality cues is needed. She also points out that ‘what constitutes 
value – even in a single product category – appears to be highly personal and 
idiosyncratic’ (p. 13), and that there are differences in the attributes 
pricers/manufacturers think consumers pay attention to, and those the consumers say 




synchronicity in interpretation of quality/value cues it may be because 
understandings of product attributes and their interpretation are created across 
markets in a dialogical process, as well as within producer/consumer silos. 
Despite such high-profile work discussing the difficulty of reaching a predictive 
model of consumer perceptions of price, value and quality, within the practitioner-
facing pricing literature there seems to be an assumption that amongst consumers 
and amongst those doing the pricing there will be a shared range of interpretive 
repertoires and associated practices (e.g. higher price will be interpreted as more 
desirable, if it is a luxury product such as perfume).  However, just as consumer 
interpretations are complex and varied, it seems feasible that pricers’ interpretations 
and ensuing pricing discourses may be complex and varied. Also, pricers’ 
assumptions and understandings may be different from consumers’ assumptions and 
understandings. I suggest that pricers’ discourses of price may involve a significant 
element of socially-constructed shared assumptions and understandings of ‘the way 
it is done around here’ which is overlooked within the pricing literature. Whilst the 
economic, finance and marketing models are very useful in providing pricing 
heuristics, our understanding of price and how it is understood by those doing the 
pricing can be enriched by considering the social element of the pricing context, and, 
as in Zeithaml’s study, by talking to those involved in the process. 
2.1.4    Why do we need an alternative approach to pricing? 
The neo-classical economic theoretical model of supply and demand dominates 
mainstream price literature, and may be a useful framework for understanding macro 
prices. Financial considerations such as ‘costs plus profit’ are similarly common and 
generally found to be useful when considering how pricing could be done. Within 
Marketing price is one of the four elements of what is known as ‘the Marketing 
Mix’, but is often treated as a less important element within the Ps : ‘Perhaps 
influenced by economics, Price is split off as an element worthy of separate 




(Mercer 1996, p.28). Where it is given attention, pricing theory in marketing is 
focussed on maximising sales through deeper understandings of consumer responses 
to prices.   
What is not mentioned in the economic, financial or marketing price literature is that 
pricers’ knowledge and interpretation of pricing systems and assumptions regarding 
how consumers will understand them are learnt and may vary, as may pricers’ 
understandings of whether a particular strategy or price discourse is appropriate for a 
particular product/context.   
However, whereas pricers’ varied understandings of the meanings of price remains 
largely unexamined, there is a growing body of work looking at how individual 
consumers understand prices and money, given that the theoretical assumption of 
economic rationality does not reflect actual consumption practices. This body of 
literature is important as it may shed light on pricers’ practices, and is discussed in 
the next section.  
The two main approaches discussed in the next section can be described as 
Behavioural Economics, and Socio-economics. Broadly, the former assumes a 
shared set of price/money understandings, whereas the latter explores differences 





2.2 Pricing: An Alternative Approach 
Introduction 
This section should perhaps be better titled Economic Action: An Alternative 
Approach, as the literature gives insights into various economic actions which are 
helpful in understanding pricing, rather than focussing on pricing. As previously 
discussed, the body of literature which focusses on pricing (as opposed to price) is 
very small.   In this section I move away from economic, financial and marketing 
pricing models (discussed in the previous section) in which money is treated as 
neutral and the pricer is assumed to be using an economic or marketing rationale. I 
propose a different model with which to consider price and pricing, and examine the 
related literatures.  
In this alternative model, rather than considering price as the outcome of supply and 
demand or cost-plus considerations, or as an element in a strategic marketing plan, I 
suggest that at its most basic pricing involves a consideration of the object and of 
money, and the process of comparing one with the other. Whilst there is literature on 
each part of the model (object, money, and the commensurative process) there is 
little which connects the constitutive parts. 
 




In this alternative model what is important is the idea that each element is 
constructed, and has meanings which, whilst often treated as obvious, are not 
inherently true or ‘nature’ (Barthes 1972). In this I am making a small but important 
step in synthesising literature from different disciplines to suggest that pricing 
involves how the object is understood or categorised, and that this will vary from 
person to person (a key idea from Consumer Culture Theory), and that how money is 
understood will similarly vary (a key idea from socio-economics, notably Zelizer 
(1994), which is discussed in more detail later).  Although the naturalness of 
particular modes and rules of commensuration may be taken for granted, Espeland 
and Stevens (1998) point out commensuration - the process of deciding whether 
items are equal in measure or extent - is a social, not natural process.  
In this section I concentrate on the idea of commensuration as a social process, and 
that in the case of most market exchanges commensuration involves deciding what 
type or quantity of an object is equal to how much of what type of money.  
There has been a great deal of work exploring the social construction of ‘object’, its 
categorisation and its desirability (Barthes 1972; Bourdieu 1984; Appadurai 1986), 
but what Espeland and Stevens point out is that the idea of relative values of object 
and money is also a social construction and a source of power. That is, as Callon and 
Muniesa (2005) point out, in order to be calculated, goods must be deemed to be 
calculable, and as Espeland and Stevens emphasise, one’s view of whether or not a 
good is or could be calculable is constructed (see also Zelizer 1994). Knowing 
whether and how an item is commensurable, or how it can become commensurable, 
matters socially and economically. 
Although there is little literature regarding relative values of object and money, work 
by Thaler, Ariely, Koptyoff, Epp and Price gives some potentially useful insights 
regarding particular ways of construing objects and commensurative rules. In 
particular, they discuss the effect of ownership. I begin with two behavioural 




Thaler touches upon the potential importance of ownership in pricing practice in his 
exploration of what he calls the ‘endowment effect’. This is where ‘people generally 
will demand more to sell an item they own than they would be willing to pay to 
acquire the same item  (Thaler 2008 [1985], p.201). This is an interesting idea when 
considering pricing of objects, as a basic assumption is that anyone pricing and 
selling an object owns the object, or is acting as an agent for the owner (e.g. as an 
employee of a firm). 
Ariely’s research considers a particular type of ownership, where the owner has been 
involved in the construction of the object. He calls this ‘the IKEA effect’: if you 
build something, pride and sentimental attachment are likely to give you an inflated 
sense of its quality  (Ariely 2010). Although Ariely does not use the word 
‘singularity’, the link with Kopytoff’s concept is strong in that by building the item, 
it becomes different from those built by someone else, i.e. it becomes singular. 
Although Ariely’s focus is on how the consumer values the item they have 
constructed, and assumes that ownership (rather than sale) is the endpoint, the idea 
that something would be valued more highly because of involvement in its 
production could be pertinent when considering pricing practice, especially in 
contexts where the pricer has made the item, or is closely tied to the production. 
Kopytoff (1986) considers the effect of object categorisation and associated pricing 
when discussing the example of the sale of an heirloom. He suggests there is an 
inflation of value, caused not so much by production effort (as in Ariely’s IKEA 
effect) but by the pride and sentimental attachment of ownership (the endowment 
effect). He also suggests that there is a possibility of multiple categorisations (and 
associated commensurative rules and values) of the object at the point of pricing:  
'What to me is an heirloom is, of course, a commodity to the jeweller, and the 
fact that I am not divorced from the jeweller's culture is apparent in my 
willingness to price my priceless heirloom (and invariably overestimate its 




values: that of the marketplace and that of the closed sphere of personally 
singularized things, both of which happen to converge on the object at hand.' 
(Kopytoff 1986, p.80).  
The model of rational economic activity and sentiment/personal relationships as 
separate spheres or hostile worlds is strongly critiqued by the new socio-economics.  
As Zelizer (2007, p.1059) points out, in new socio-economics economic action is 
seen as inextricably intertwined with social, relational and cultural concerns, rather 
than as two separate areas of activity, and close contact between the spheres will not 
result in contamination and disorder. However, the idea that practitioners may use a 
contaminating construal is potentially important. 
In the example above Kopytoff suggests that categorisation of object, as well as 
interpretation of overlap, has an impact on pricing practice and interpretation of 
appropriate price. Importantly, in Kopytoff’s example, the buyer (jeweller) and seller 
(himself) categorise the item differently, but he assumes that the two parties 
understand that the other has different categorisation rules and associated pricing 
practices. That is, Kopytoff suggest that amongst those involved there is an 
awareness that different meaning-making is possible, and an awareness of what the 
other party’s repertoires might be. 
This idea of the possibility of multiple and co-existing categorisations and meanings 
of objects and associated commensurative practices is an important one. This prior 
research suggests that categorisation of an object, such as whether it should be 
considered an inalienable good (Epp and Price 2010) or a sell-able item, and the 
process of movement between categorising the object as a singularised or 
commoditised good may be important in pricing practice. The focus of Epp and 
Price’s study is the categorisation of an object and the use of the categorisation and 
object in family relationships and identity projects. Although identity projects are not 
considered in my study, what is of interest for my research is the idea that object-
categorisation and understanding of consequences of that categorisation vary, are 




Within marketing (especially within the CCT literature) we are used to considering 
consumers’ categorisations of object as socially-constructed, but what the findings of 
Thaler, Ariely, Kopytoff and the singularised/commoditised literature suggests is 
that those doing the selling may be doing something similar too. Rather than using 
economic rationale, or a marketing strategy, there appears to be some shared but 
fluid societal rules about how someone ‘like you’ would/should/might think about 
and price (or refuse to price) an object ‘like that’. 
How one construes and discusses the commensurative process in a particular context 
is informed by one’s cultural capital, and being able to construct something as more 
or less valuable, or perhaps as incommensurable, can be seen as an important social 
tool.  
Summary 
Pricing involves a consideration of the object, the money, and an awareness of 
commensurative rules. Although there is a good deal of literature within the 
marketing canon regarding construction of object meanings, money-meanings and 
construction of commensuration rules are largely ignored. 
Espeland and Stevens (1998)  draw attention to the socially-informed nature of 
commensuration, but they, like Appadurai, treat money as a simple element in the 
comparison or conversion process. However, money has become a topic of 
sociological research in its own right (Baker and Jimerson 1992).  
It is to this body of work I now turn, starting with a brief discussion of the two main 






Alternative approaches to neo-classical economic 
models:     Behavioural Economics / Socio-economics 
Introduction 
Although the aggregated abstracted models of economic theory have been widely 
used for many decades, there has been an increase in critiques of and alternatives to 
neoclassical models of economics. These include behavioural economics, socio-
economics, feminist economics, organizational economics, institutional economics, 
household dynamics and, more recently, neuroeconomics (Zelizer 2007). For the 
purposes of exploring money-meanings and money-practices within pricing for my 
research the two main approaches are behavioural economics, building on Tversky 
and Kahneman and Thaler, and socio-economics, building on work by Granovetter. 
Although there is overlap between the two areas the main differences between the 
two approaches are outlined below. In this section I give a brief overview of the two 
approaches, then in the next section I explore the money-practice insights from each. 
2.2.1    Behavioural economics 
Mainstream economic theory - neo-classical economics - is ‘a set of ideas that 
explains how people conduct themselves in order to get as much as they can from 
what they have. (It) is about sensible and self-interested behaviour’ (Grampp 1989, 
p.3), where ‘sensible’ is judged by a criterion of economic rationality based in 
expected utility theory. In contrast, the main driver behind the growing area of 
research known as behavioural economics is the idea that ‘there are instances when 
consumers act in a manner which is inconsistent with economic theory’ (Sewell 
2007/2010).  
From Tversky and Kahneman in the 1970s, Thaler in the 1980s, to Ariely (2010) 




assumption within neo-classical economics that, where finance is concerned, humans 
behave in an economically rational way (Langreth 2010).  There are increasing calls 
from behavioural economists to collect economic data through laboratory studies or 
out in the field rather than accept models based on theoretical assumptions.  
Behavioural economics builds in particular on Tversky and Kahneman’s 1970s 
Nobel prize-winning research. Although their prize was for economics, both were 
psychologists, interested in how people make decisions under situations of 
uncertainty. Uncertainty or risk, as discussed in the Economics section above, is a 
more accurate reflection of the reality of most purchasing (and pricing) situations, 
than is the perfect knowledge assumed by the S&D model.  
In their hugely influential 1979 work on prospect theory Tversky and Kahneman 
offered an alternative theory of choice to what had been (and is still) a dominant 
economic concept: expected utility theory. Rather than assuming that ‘all reasonable 
people would wish to obey the axioms of [expected utility theory]’ (1979, p.263), in 
which the utilities of outcomes are weighted by their probabilities, Tversky and 
Kahneman proposed that the pervasive tendency for people to make irrational and 
varying choices when the same options were framed differently, or when outcomes 
were probable rather than certain, could be better explained by assigning values to 
gains and losses separately, rather than looking at the overall outcome. This was 
further developed by Thaler, who in 1985 introduced the concepts of transaction 
utility and mental accounting as an alternative to normative economic theory (p15 of 
the 2008 reprint). This important development is discussed in more detail in the 
section Money: mental accounting. 
The behavioural economics challenge to existing economic theory has focussed on 
but is not restricted to consumption behaviours. There is a small but growing pool of 
production-side literature. For example, in a challenge to the Supply & Demand  
assumption rooted in the classic writings of Smith, Marx and Weber that profit-
maximisation is the main purpose of firms Morton and Podolny (2002, p.432) use 




characteristics of the market, in fact supplier-push and supplier motivation can also 
be important where suppliers are willing to sacrifice profit. In an echo of the point 
that Douglas and Isherwood  (1996, p.8) make about the need to consider production 
(‘labor’) as ‘an end in itself’, Morton and Podolny suggest that the non-profit-
maximising production by Californian hobbyists could be because ‘producers can 
gain utility from aspects of production’. They suggest that for this group of pricing 
producers the ‘strong non-financial returns’ (p.432) outweigh economic logic. In 
other words, the wine producers gain something by being wine producers, perhaps 
especially if they can be good-wine producers with lower profit margins: Morton and 
Podolny found that ‘wineries scoring high on the love factor have higher prices’ (p. 
451), and that the price premium ‘declines with length of time the owner’s family 
has owned the winery, which we interpret as evidence of learning-by-doing’ (p.432). 
A more sociological interpretation of Morton and Podolny’s research would suggest 
that producers’ market actions and prices could be understood as both a signal and a 
result of particular taste or cultural capital. Their research could be extended to 
consider Barthes’ suggestions (1972, p.58) that one should consider why there might 
be utility in being a wine producer, a good-wine producer, and then a good-wine 
producer choosing low prices (when adjusted for quality), and how this is understood 
and constructed by the wine producers. It is these sociological, relational, and 
cultural aspects of pricing that my research addresses. 
A paper which straddles the behavioural and social economics approach to pricing 
behaviour is Becker’s (1991) work on restaurant and theatre pricing. This is 
discussed in more detail in the section How it is Done Around Here. 
2.2.2    Socio-economics 
Whilst there is what Zelizer terms a ‘sparkling’ body of behavioural economics 
literature (e.g. Thaler, Ariely), which concentrates on the shared psychological 
elements of consumers’ economic behaviour, my research is more closely aligned 




movement within marketing in that it considers social and cultural aspects of market 
behaviours.  
Twenty years ago economic sociology was more closely aligned to mainstream 
economics (Zelizer 2007, p.1056). What is sometimes called New Socio-economic 
theory is built on the Polanyian ‘double movement’ of embedding and re-embedding 
markets in society, and on Granovetter’s seminal (Swedberg 1997) paper ‘Economic 
Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness’ (1985). Socio-
economic research draws on foundational literature from Weber and Marx (SASE 
2009 conference proceedings), and recognises similarities with Bourdieu’s approach 
and findings (‘moving in the same direction’). As previously mentioned, whereas 
‘old school’ socio-economic research construed economics as something which 
happens within a shell of society, New Socio-economics attempts to ‘identify social 
processes and social relations at the very heart of economic activity’ and offer a 
‘truly alternative, socially based description and explanation of economic activity.’ 
(Zelizer 2007, p.1058). It is this second, dialogical, interpretation of the term 
‘embedded’ which I use throughout this document. 
Although working in different disciplines on a variety of topics, socio-economists 
such as Zelizer and CCT theorists share a focus on the cultural and relational 
underpinnings and uses of market artefacts and behaviours, and draw on similar 
foundational literature.  Along with Zelizer’s  (1994) book The Social Meaning of 
Money, Mackenzie’s (2006) An Engine Not at Camera  inspired my research, 
opening windows onto ways of thinking about a familiar but puzzling market 
practice.  
An Engine Not a Camera is an exploration of the performative elements of market 
practices within the workings of the Chicago stock exchange. Rather than seeing the 
stock exchange as an aggregated and economically optimising entity, which is the 
more common way of thinking about stock markets, here it is construed as a 
collection of individuals whose actions are informed by who they know and what 




seen as notable for their ability to influence behaviour and shape overall trading. 
MacKenzie’s work demonstrates how ‘economics has grown up around corporations 
and markets but by its very development has reshaped those corporations and 
markets in its own image’ (Zelizer 2007, p.1066)   In particular, MacKenzie looks at 
the impact of the publication and effect of shared interpretations of the Black, 
Scholes, Merton model of options markets, showing that even in this supposedly 
extremely rational market the ‘how it is done’ of economic action is learnt, not 
nature. Rather than theory reflecting reality (a camera not an engine, Marx 
suggested), MacKenzie shows how academic theory can drive market behaviours. 
That is, economic agents are embedded in their world, not abstracted, and theories 
shape relationships and practices as well as being shaped by them: The Black, 
Scholes, Merton model ‘worked’ because so many actors used it as a ‘how to’ script, 
sharing interpretations and resultant behaviours. The idea of scripts, interpretations 
and performativity is an important one in the development of my research. 
The ‘growing economic literature that recognizes the influence on consumers and 
workers of the social world they live in’ (Becker 1991, p.1116) is rooted in the idea 
that individual economic actors are embedded within social contexts and 
relationships. This is in contrast to economic theory, which assumes that economic 
actors are somehow abstracted whenever they consider or are involved in 
economic/financial actions.  
Although as with the marketing research the focus within socio-economic research is 
largely on the consumer, what is important for my research is the idea that market 
activities are performed, understood and shaped by people whose understandings of 
‘how it is done’ include more than economic maximisation. Economic practices – 






2.2.3    Pricing as practice 
Research from both behavioural- and socio-economics provide powerful insights 
into how economic action, money and prices are understood by consumers, which 
provides a useful launch pad for looking at how those  doing the pricing might 
understand money, prices and the activity of engaging with the market. Whereas 
behavioural economics appears to be more interested in looking for broad 
similarities with predictive potential, socio-economics appears to be more interested 
in raising awareness of social and cultural aspects of economic actions.  
In the next section I narrow the focus to examine the money-related insights gained 




2.3 Money: Mental Accounting and Social Meanings of 
Money 
Introduction 
Having discussed the difference between abstracted aggregated neo-classical 
economic theory and behavioural economics and socio-economics, and explained 
why these latter approaches are more useful to this research in that they consider 
economic actions as embedded actions performed by individual people, in this 
section I draw on literature from behavioural economics and socio-economics 
(including anthropological work by Douglas) which focuses on money. 
I focus on money because pricing something means thinking about it in money 
terms. Whilst an obvious point, this has been ignored by the vast majority of price 
research to date.  
Kopytoff suggests that at the point of exchange anything that can be bought for 
money becomes a commodity:  
‘a thing that has use value and that can be exchanged in a discrete transaction 
for a counterpart, the very fact of exchange indicating that the counterpart 
has, in the immediate context, an equivalent value. The counterpart is by the 
same token also a commodity at the time of exchange. The exchange can be 
direct or it can be achieved indirectly by of money, one of whose functions is 
as a means of exchange. Hence, anything that can be bought for money is at 
that point a commodity, whatever the fate that is reserved for it after that 
transaction has been made’        




In this conceptualisation money, whilst not being essential in an exchange of goods, 
is seen as performing a useful function in enabling the exchange of goods. However, 
the involvement of money is seen to change the categorisation of the object, even if 
only for the time of the exchange, from something else (perhaps a singularised good) 
to a commodity, from whence it can be re-categorised. Kopytoff suggested that 
'shifts and differences in whether and when a thing is a commodity reveal a moral 
economy that stands behind the objective economy of visible transactions'  (1986, 
p.64.  See also Hornborg 1999).  The idea of an underlying moral issue therefore 
appears to be closely linked with the involvement of money in the transaction, which 
it necessarily is in a pricing context. That is, money matters in pricing. 
Whereas in the economics, finance and marketing literature the money aspect of 
pricing is treated as a simple element, money-centred research from behavioural 
economics, socio-economics and anthropology suggests people categorise and 
handle money differently depending on source, holder, form and earmarking. I 
suggest that the idea that money is far from simple and can have multiple 
categorisations and associated ‘rules’ may be important when trying to understand 
pricing practices.   
Socio-economic and anthropological research suggests that far from being a neutral 
entity as suggested by Simmel (1978 [1907]/1900), money has many meanings and 
is used to shape and confirm relationships. However, it is perhaps important to note 
that whereas the neutrality of money suggested by Simmel is understood to be 
‘greying’ and relationship-eroding by Zelizer (1994), which implies a negative effect 
of neutrality, Simmel (1978 [1907]/1900) suggested that the neutrality of money is 
beneficial, in that it removes the kinships ties and obligations which had hitherto 
constrained exchange, and that from this point of view the neutrality of money is a 
step towards (desirable) equality. However, for socio-economists, money is seen as a 
medium of social relations, in that rather than removing ties and obligations, money 




maintenance of relationships, culture and social structure (Douglas 1982; 
Granovetter 1985; Baker and Jimerson 1992; Venkatesh 2006; Zelizer 2007). 
This social and meaning-full way of construing money is a significant alternative 
view of money, and begs the question whether modern (i.e. Western contemporary) 
pricers use varied money categories, and whether category choices affect pricing 
decisions in a manner similar to the variation in money-related practices hoped for 
by Hornborg (1999), and exhibited by contemporary consumers (as suggested by for 
example Thaler and Zelizer) and ‘primitive’ pricers (as suggested by Douglas 1982). 
This question was not answered within the extant literature. 
As there is a paucity of work exploring pricers’ money-related practices, in this 
section I turn first to consumer-focussed work where money is a central, rather than 
incidental topic. I then address the smaller body of work on producers’ money-
categorisations. Although my interest is primarily in sociological money and market 
research, Thaler’s behavioural economics concept of mental accounting  is included 
here as important work which supports the idea of different monies and associated 
behaviours. 
2.3.1    Mental accounting   
Unlike expected utility theory, which is still a dominant if contested economic model 
of market behaviours (Sewell 2007/2010, p.7), Thaler’s concept of mental 
accounting gives a descriptive and predictive model of consumer behaviour, not a 
characterisation of optimal behaviour. Combining cognitive psychology and 
microeconomics, mental accounting is a model of a ‘set of cognitive operations used 
by individuals and households to organize, evaluate and keep track of financial 
activities’ (Sewell 2007/2010, p.3).  
Building on Kahneman and Tversky’s Nobel Prize-winning work on prospect theory, 
which they offered as an alternative to expected utility theory, what Thaler found 
from a series of laboratory studies is that ‘(implicit or explicit) accounting systems 




For the purposes of this research, the main findings are that consumers mentally 
allocate money into different ‘pots’, and that these have related calculative heuristics 
and accounting systems. That is, although money may generally be thought of as a 
neutral fungible entity, people do not in fact treat money as the same in all instances.  
‘Each of the components of mental accounting violates the economic 
principle of fungibility [in which a dollar is a dollar is a dollar]. As a result, 
mental accounting influences choice, that is, it matters.’ 
(Thaler 2008 [1985] (1985)).  
According to Thaler, once assigned to a particular pot the money becomes non-
fungible, i.e. it is generally not transferrable to another pot – the monies are not 
equal. According to Thaler, these practices of money categorisation , associated 
heuristics, and non-fungibility may mean (and often do mean) that consumers make 
economically irrational choices. 
Thaler’s findings are important in that they show that consumers treat money in a 
variety of ways, and this affects their consumption practices. As Thaler pointed out, 
how consumers think about and allocate money has direct relevance to marketers, 
especially in terms of their pricing strategy, in that marketers can use concepts such 
as framing to encourage consumers to see the money they would be spending as 
belonging to a particular pot, and therefore associated with a particular mental 
accounting practice. I suggest that if one turns the focus from examining consumers’ 
accounting practices to examine pricers’ practices, Thaler’s findings might provide 
insights into if and how mental accounting practices are used by pricers. That is, do 
pricers mentally allocate money from a particular source (object or buyer) into 
particular pots, and if so, what meanings and accounting practices are associated 
with that categorisation?  If mental accounting is thought to affect consumption 





2.3.2    Social meanings of money 
Modern money has meaning and power only through ‘recognition and validation by 
the interacting participants’ (Perinbanayagam 2011, p.133). 
‘money should be viewed as an element in the communicative system of the 
human agent as a dialogic creature, a creature who is primarily a symbol-
making and symbol-using entity’   
(Perinbanayagam 2011, p.133) 
To Dyer (1989), money’s ‘most elemental social function is the creation of a shared 
experience, within which capitalism may function’ (Wennerlind 2001).  To 
Perinbanayagam money is a necessary part of the ‘coinage of the self’ through the 
amount owned:  
‘A person can have money in abundance, or more than enough, possibly just 
enough, or not enough, or even no money at all, and in each case the money 
will define one’s presence in the world as a person, a self, as an agent and a 
being.’  
(ibid  p.133) 
and the way it is spent: 
Money is  ‘encapsulated power’, in that ‘every act of using and spending 
money is an expression of the power of the self, an assertion of power’  
(ibid  p.133) 
However, to other researchers, whilst money ownership and spending may indeed be 
important elements of identity construction, this is only one aspect of money 
practice. From both a Consumer Culture Theory and a socio-economic construal of 
market practices, repertoires of product and money categorisations and 
interpretations of the appropriateness of the use of a particular interpretation are seen 




understanding of an object, its desirability and its social use is constructed rather 
than nature, so are understandings of the money one might use to buy it, or the 
money one might gain in selling it. From this point of view money categories have 
meanings which are socially constructed, which inform money practices, and which 
serve a social purpose.  
Although Perinbanayagam treats all money as the same, so that only quantity is 
important and type is irrelevant, the idea that money has different forms and these 
forms have particular context-specific meanings is not new – there are many 
examples within economic anthropology of ‘primitive’ peoples using currencies such 
as shells or pigs for particular transactions.  For example, anthropologist Douglas  
(1982) wrote about how the Lele people used two different forms of money: woven 
raffia mats and coins, and that each  form was understood to have its own specific 
range of appropriate exchanges and behaviours.  However, the idea that 
contemporary Western actors might mentally shape modern money into different 
forms is a relatively novel one.  In her chapter on Primitive Rationing (originally 
published in 1967) Douglas draws on her own experience and that of friends to show 
how we too ‘primitivize’ (sic) money by categorising it and treating it as different 
(‘limited purpose’) monies. Yet rather than see how these practices might be used 
within relationships (as she had found with the Lele), she limits her interpretation of 
her own money practices and suggests that ‘All these practices are but clumsy 
attempts to control the all too liquid state of money’ (Douglas 1982, p.74). Later 
research suggests that whilst controlling liquidity may be a reason for particular 
contemporary money practices, it is not necessarily the only reason. For example in 
an echo of Douglas’ findings regarding the Lele’s social rules limiting the use of 
their two currencies mats and coins, Hornborg (1999) suggests that we need the 
introduction of a new limited purpose local currency to run alongside and reduce the 
impact of what he sees as the eco-destroying abstracting global currency which has 




Drawing on Durkheim, Belk and Wallendorf (1990) concentrate on an exploration of 
the idea that money is esteemed, yet it is condemned. They suggest that rather than 
money being necessarily tainting, it  may be categorised as either sacred or profane, 
where what is considered sacred is ‘extraordinary, totally unique, and set apart from 
and opposed to the ordinary profane world’ (p. 38), and ‘profane’ is associated with 
idea of ‘everyday functional use’ (p. 39). As discussed by Carruthers and Espeland 
(1998, p.1397), money both ‘acquires and bestows meaning’ through the process of 
monetarization. For example, Espeland (1984) argued that ‘the profanity of money 
alters the sacred character of blood, and people who sell their blood must manage the 
stigma associated with doing so’ (Baker and Jimerson 1992). Although Belk and 
Wallendorf’s focus is on consumption practices (p. 52), and their literature review 
‘reveals that the focus of almost all prior work has been on the uses [rather than 
sources] of money’ (p.52) usefully for my search for insights into money 
categorisation associated with pricing, Belk and Wallendorf concur with Zelizer’s 
point that ‘certain sources hypothecate certain uses’, and consider the source of the 
money to be important. They state that ‘sources and uses of money are inseparably 
connected in determining the sacred or profane nature of this money’ (p. 55), whilst 
pointing out that 
‘the focus of almost all prior work has been on the uses of money. This 
accurately reflects the greater influences of money uses (versus money 
sources) in establishing its sacred or profane nature, but it overlooks the still-
important effect of the sources of money'   (Belk and Wallendorf 
1990, p.52).  
Belk and Wallendorf suggest that whilst in the conventional economic view money 
may be considered a ‘utilitarian commodity that acts as a medium of exchange, a 
unit of account, a store of value, and a standard of deferred payment’, and 
‘increasingly abstract and devoid of meaning’, money also has ‘emotional, 
qualitative’ meanings. So whereas Perinbanayagam (2011) suggests that ownership 
of a large quantity of money will always be regarded positively, others may construe 




quantity of it less favourably. Belk and Wallendorf suggest that money may be 
considered to have sacred power, containing both a positive (‘the almighty dollar’, 
beneficient sacred) and negative (‘filthy lucre’, evil sacred) antithesis. They point out 
that an examination of the kratophanous tensions within the sacredness of particular 
monies may be helpful in explaining what appear to be irrational money behaviours, 
and suggest that  
‘In order to better understand people's use of money, it is necessary to 
consider the non-economic sacred functions that money may well have 
originally served and often continues to serve in modern economies. The 
thesis that modern money can be sacred and that it is sacralized by certain 
processes offers insight into some of the more puzzling ways in which people 
behave toward money.’  
 
Belk and Wallendorf’s examination of ethnographic data collected for a variety of 
purposes during the fieldwork from the Consumer Behaviour Odyssey (p. 37) is 
particularly useful in that it not only considers that there may be variation in 
categorisation of money (‘the sacred or profane nature of object is not inherent. 
Instead, it is socially and individually defined’ p.43), but also that the categorisation 
may affect how the money is treated and used, and that people may use rituals and 
processes to signal particular categorisation and to perform re-categorisation. 
Importantly, Belk and Wallendorf suggest that whereas Kopytoff states that all 
objects become commodities at the point of exchange, meaning that they become 
fungible rather than singular, sacred or inalienable, if the money involved is 
categorised as sacred rather than profane then even when being priced, sold and 
bought the object may retain its sacred categorisation. Referencing prior work by 
Zelizer (1989) (a precursor to her 1994 book), they suggest that ‘if money is itself 
sometimes considered sacred rather than utilitarian, its presence may not necessarily 
profane the objects and people it touches’ (Belk and Wallendorf 1990, p.41). This is 




experienced by some pricers when pricing objects generally categorised as ‘sacred’ 
or ideally separate from the market, and for the rituals of money categorisation 
which may accompany such pricing. 
Whereas Belk and Wallendorf focus on a sacred/profane polarity Zelizer explores 
the idea of money categorisations more widely. Zelizer’s work examines in more 
depth the effect of source on money-categorisation and use, and she is also interested 
in the money form and how categories are learnt, used and changed. Although she 
usefully discusses the myriad ways in which we create new forms of money (echoed 
in Perinbanayagam’s example of currencies created in prison) what is particularly 
useful for this research is her examination of how money forms may be ‘made’ 
different through mental categorisation or specific practices, and that understandings 
of these monies and associations are socially-shaped and perform a social function. 
In other words, even when money is in one form - standard legal tender - it is not 
treated as though it is the same. Where it comes from, how it is spent, and the 
relationships between the different parties matter in the categorisation of the money. 
Zelizer gives the example of tips and ‘birthday money’ as different forms of money 
which have specific exchange rituals that are shaped by and reinforce particular 
relationships. As an illustration  of categorisation by source and earmarking Zelizer 
(1994) gives an example of prostitutes who earmarked money from the government 
for bills, and the money earned through their work was earmarked as to be spent on 
clothes, alcohol, and going out.  
The idea that prostitutes handled the money provided by the government in a 
different way to money earned through prostitution is reminiscent of Belk and 
Wallendorf’s (1990) work on sacred and profane money, but one should not assume 
that the government money was necessarily classed by the prostitutes as more 
‘sacred’ or clean than money earned through prostitution. The assumption is 
dangerous, as what is considered dirt, dirty, and contaminating is learnt, not nature 




Despite the possibility of varied construals of money and its effects, the 
transformation from the sacred into the profane by money is a dominant theme in 
Marx and is implicit within many criticisms of ‘the market’ and its effect. An 
example of the widespread assumption that money is tainted and tainting include the 
currently dominant artworld Romantic myth that art, to be good, should be beyond 
the market; another is the uproar caused by the debate whether wives should be paid 
for doing housework, and if so, how much. Money, how it is categorised, and 
assumptions about its effects matter. 
In their study of the non-economic functions money serves in contemporary society 
Belk and Wallendorf ‘find that the interpretation of money as either sacred or 
profane depends on its sources and uses’. This can be applied to Zelizer’s cited 
example of prostitutes, but is problematic: Using etic rather than emic 
categorisations, on one hand the prostitutes cited by Zelizer could be said to separate 
the sacred, or clean money sourced from the government, which is used in a ‘clean’ 
way (bills), from their profane or dirty money earned from prostitution, which they 
use in a dirty way – to have fun, rather than to (for example) build up a pension. Or 
they could be said to categorise the bills as a demand for profane money, using Belk 
and Wallendorf’s suggestion that what is considered profane is the mundane, the 
utilitarian, the repetitive – ‘A profane commodity is not valued beyond its economic 
worth and is usually fungible; it is easily and acceptably replaceable with a similar 
object’ (Belk and Wallendorf 1990, p.41). It is possible that the earmarking of 
money earned from prostitution as ‘fun’ money could be used as a way of changing 
the prostitution money into sacred money. There are many ways in which their 
money practices could be interpreted. Although the links between source and 
earmarking in this example are stated by the participants, the categorisations the 
participants used are not clear, and one should be wary of assuming that one knows 
their context-specific categorisation and corollary rules. 
In his exploration of actual money practices Venkatesh (2006) discusses the 




hanging-out in a poor largely black community in the Chicago slums, which he calls 
Maquis Park. Within these ‘hard circumstances’ he saw ‘a vast structure in place, a 
set of rules that defined who traded with whom, who could work on a street corner or 
park bench, and what prices could be set and what revenue could be earned’ (p. xv). 
Venkatesh does not use terms such as ‘sacred’ or ‘profane’, but his anthropological 
study within a contemporary Western setting offers many examples of categorisation 
of economic activities and artefacts, and of differences in categorisation. For 
example, although he was wary of being involved in certain types of mediation 
activity, ‘most people [in the context] laughed when I argued that fixing cars and 
prostitution were not the same thing’ (p. xvii). That is, whereas Venkatesh put the 
two ‘objects’ being priced (car repair and prostitution) in different categories, and 
was wary of mediating in the prostitution pricing context, others did not categorise 
the pricing of prostitution as any more or less ‘sacred’ or ‘profane’ than the pricing 
of car repairs.  
The idea that sacred or profane categorisations can be understood as given or shared 
categories must include an awareness of the cultural construction of categories 
(Douglas 1966). Categorisation as sacred or profane, as with other categorisations, is 
not nature, instead it will vary from person to person, context to context, and 
therefore emic categorisation may be different from etic. Whereas Richard Thaler’s 
laboratory-based research promotes the idea that there are shared money categories 
and associated accounting practices, implying that if one knows how someone has 
categorised some money one can predict their mental accounting practice for that 
money, field work by Douglas and Zelizer suggest that these are learnt associations, 
and therefore whilst there may indeed be shared practices, these are not necessarily 
shared by all, nor will they be shared in all instances. 
This key difference between Thaler’s work and Zelizer’s probably lies in the 
research questions and methodology chosen. Thaler’s work is based on laboratory 
studies and questionnaires, that is, they are short-term, abstracted studies, aiming for 




what he terms ‘casual observation and some informal survey evidence’ (p.24). This 
is very different from the more anthropological approach used by Zelizer, which he 
might refer to as small studies which ‘will not withstand statistical tests’ (p. 25). 
Zelizer uses a much longer time-frame than Thaler, and gathers qualitative data from 
socially-embedded research settings through observation and analysis of a wide 
range of materials such as magazines and diaries.  
From these very different types of data different conclusions were drawn: whereas 
Thaler suggests that once allocated to a particular pot the money is treated as non-
fungible by that user, Zelizer suggests that money categorisation is not necessarily 
fixed: categories are contingent, and money can move between pots. That is, 
category changes do not only happen when money moves from one holder to another 
– e.g.  when what is one person’s wages becomes another person’s pocket-money, or 
when relief money becomes personal income – but the category and degree of 
fungibility can also change within the course of a conversation, depending on the 
uses to which categorisation can be put, who one is talking to, what their view is, and 
their degree of influence.  
Zelizer gives many examples of ritual of category change and the perceptions of the 
social need for them. For example, in an article on etiquette a magazine advised that 
gifts of money might be seen as being in bad taste. Instead, the gift should be 
disguised and made more palatable, perhaps by using a crisp new note and a 
beautiful card, or (as in one case) by organising a ‘check’ tea party, in which all the 
decorations were gingham and plaid, and therefore the cheques hidden in the teapot 
should be considered a clever pun which could not possibly be objected to. Another 
alternative suggested by the magazine was to give a token rather than cash, and the 
readers were reassured that this was an acceptable practice.  
In contrast to Zelizer’s emphasis on the importance of the link between money 
source and earmarking and the associated rituals of category change, Venkatesh 
(2006) appears to suggest that in certain circumstances, such as the poverty in 




where it comes from. Zelizer (2008) queries this finding, given that other research to 
date suggests that source does inform categorisation and earmarking. She suggests 
that further research would be useful to explore Venkatesh’s finding that when 
money is very tight such practices disappear, even amongst those one might expect 
to maintain such distinctions, such as the clergy (as discussed in his chapter The 
Politics of Donations). In his research church elders knowingly received and 
sometimes actively sought ways to earn what would in many other circumstances be 
deemed ‘dirty’ money.  
Zelizer (1994) points out that money is usually categorised, but that monies may not 
necessarily fall cleanly into one category or another. For example, ‘pin money’, 
which is a particularly gendered example, and ‘pocket-money’, which is an age-
related one, do not universally fit into either a sacred or profane category, nor is it 
clear-cut what the associated accounting practice would or should be.  Money 
categories belong to a particular context, and may suggest particular relationships 
between original source and new holder, and may indicate expectations re 
earmarking practices. As Zelizer illustrates in her example of aid-workers charged 
with instructing immigrants how to shop and budget ‘correctly’, there may well be 
problems when there are differences between the expectations of those providing the 
money and those receiving it in terms of what the associated practices should be. The 
meanings of money and its associated rules are a site of contention and power 
struggle, as well as a means of integrating and signalling group membership. 
Amongst academics there is some disagreement about the effect of money on social 
relations, or the use of money in social relations.  For example, Hornborg (1999, 
p.160, Note 3) states that “Although more less exotic exceptions can certainly be 
found, (…), they do little to invalidate the long-standing sociological conclusion 
that, by and large, modern money has had a tendency to render social relations 
increasingly abstract’.  However, in concentrating on the idea that the current 
‘economic signalling system’ is most closely linked to the ‘general-purpose market 




destroying the ‘the material conditions of the species which devised it’ Hornborg has 
perhaps under-socialised the modern individual in treating him as alienated and 
disembedded through an all-pervasive logic of commoditization. Had Hornborg 
consulted Baker and Jimerson’s (1992) overview of the sociological money research, 
his view of modern society might have been rather less fraught. 
 
Baker and Jimerson show that there has been prior sociological research which 
shows that money ‘is not as colorless, neutral, fungible and objective as economists 
contend.  Money is shaped by objective social relations (social structure) and 
cognitive classifications and evocative meanings (culture).’ (Baker and Jimerson 
1992, p.680. Added emphasis)  They discuss micro-level cultural research by 
important writers such as Simmel, Zelizer and Douglas which suggests that the 
meaning of money matters at the individual and context-specific level, as well as at 
the collective level. The effect of money need not be to render social relations 
increasingly abstract, but instead money may be used within relations. What matters 
is how the use of money is interpreted. 
 
Whilst Rose and Orr (2007)  and Perinbanayagam (2011) concentrate on the 
relations and social positions created through the meaning of ownership of particular 
amounts of money, Carruthers and Babb point out that money, its meanings and 
effects ‘depends on people’s expectations rather than upon its intrinsic or material 
characteristics….…money is a social convention, and, as such, people’s response to 
it is determined by what they collectively think everyone else’s response will be’ 







2.3.3    Pricers and their money practices 
Although seen as a neutral element within the vast majority of pricing literature, 
there is a growing body of work within behavioural economics and socio-economics 
showing that money is construed in a variety of ways, and that these affect fiscal 
practices.  
Rather than seeing money as a neutral entity – a dollar is a dollar is a dollar – or 
perhaps as a destroyer of culture and relationships (as suggested by Marx and 
Simmel), the idea that money has varied and fluid meanings and categorisation is of 
growing interest to those intrigued by market behaviours. The focus so far has been 
primarily on consumers’ understandings of money.  
Within behavioural economics, building on work by Thaler, once money is 
categorised as belonging to a particular pot (i.e. is earmarked), the money is treated 
differently from money in other pots, and it becomes non-fungible. This common 
practice of categorisation of monies is important because it affects calculations and 
choice, leading to economically irrational or sub-optimal decision making. The 
emphasis within the behavioural economics research is on shared money-
categorisation practices, and shared associated mental accounting practices. 
Within the micro socio-economic money literature (see Baker and Jimerson 1992 for 
a very useful overview of the macro and micro socio-economic money literature) the 
focus is on differences in money categorisations and behaviours, why there are 
differences, and how money categorisations and differences in categorisation are 
informed by and used as a medium of social relations (Douglas 1982p. viii). Money 
has social importance as well as being a tool of exchange, as Zelizer (1994) and 
Baker and Jimerson (1992) point out.  
Research by Zelizer (1994)  and Belk and Wallendorf (1990), suggests that the 
source of money may be as important in its categorisation and associated practices as 
the earmarking, which was Thaler’s focus. Another key difference between Zelizer’s 




practices, from a socio-economic perspective culture and structure are integral to 
money practices and vice versa, and therefore there will be variation in those 
practices. Zelizer’s work (see also Venkatesh 2006) suggests that although the idea 
that money has varied meanings holds across contexts, and there may be shared 
practices, the specific categorisations, interpretations and associated rules may vary 
with context such as class, rôle, and geo-temporal location. For example, the degree 
of fungibility between particular categories or pots cannot be assumed to be the same 
– in some cases the categorisation (and non-fungibility) is fiercely defended, whereas 
in others it is less of an issue. 
Zelizer found that money categorisation and associated rules vary, and are learnt 
from a variety of sources such as advice from magazines, social-workers, family and 
peers, in what could be termed an apprenticeship. Demonstration of understandings 
of money categorisation and rules are interpreted as signals of understandings, and 
therefore of membership or otherwise.  
After reading Zelizer’s example of prostitutes and their categorisation of monies, 
what I wanted to know is whether their money categorisation by source and 
earmarking had affected the prostitutes’ pricing decisions, and what the social 
elements of talking about their money practices in this way might be. This extension 
into pricing is not discussed, but the questions raised by Zelizer’s example made me 
wonder about pricing decisions in other contexts. Although the literature discussed 
above suggests possible answers I have been unable to find any literature which 
specifically addresses these pricing-focussed queries.  
Although the micro- money research has focused on consumers’ money-meanings 
and how they inform consumption practices, I suggest that pricers may categorise 
the money potentially earned, and that there may be varied associated mental 
accounting practices depending on source, form, and earmarking. This has not yet 
been the focus of any pricing research, but given the perceived importance of money 





Rather than being an abstracted economic practice, prior research in behavioural 
economics and socio-economics suggests the possibility that pricing may be 
informed by money-meanings, and that these meanings, like the meanings of 






2.4 Pricing Practice and Pricers’ Money Categories 
Introduction 
In the previous sections I considered extant theories of price from economics, 
finance and marketing, in which money is assumed to be neutral and pricers are 
assumed to be abstracted. I then discussed alternative approaches to economic 
practices in which money categorisations and socially-embedded meaning-making 
are seen as important. As discussed, much of this previously published research 
concentrates on consumers’ practices, whereas my study focusses on pricers’ 
practices. 
In this section I concentrate on the small body of literature which suggests that price 
and money-related repertoires and interpretations of what is appropriate / desirable 
may vary for pricers, as well as for consumers. 
2.4.1    ‘Irrational’ pricing practice 
Not only is saleability itself not inherent in goods, knowledge of such 
saleability is not given to those who trade such goods.  Saleability is 
ultimately determined by the mental processes of market actors, and the 
discovery of degrees of saleability is a process of drawing out and 
interpreting accessible traces of the contextual knowledge of those other 
minds, rather than uncovering some objective (outside the human mind) 
piece of information. 
(Horwitz 1992, p.196, drawing on Menger) 
Poundstone (2010) suggests that consumers’ ‘irrational’ responses to prices are the 




evolutionary advantages and behave rationally, by which he appears to mean that 
pricers do obey the axioms of expected utility theory and aim to maximise economic 
returns.  I suggest it is unlikely that producers have a different evolutionary path to 
consumers. Instead, pricers/producers, like consumers, should be considered both 
limited and enabled by their cultural capital and interpretive repertoire. 
It is possible that pricers, not just consumers, may be using a variety of money 
categorisations each with particular associated heuristics, rather than using 
economically optimal decision-making heuristics in which money is treated as 
neutral. There is a small body of literature noting the apparently irrational pricing 
practices of some contemporary Western producers, and these are discussed below. 
None focuses on money-categorisations, but their findings suggest that this could be 
a fruitful avenue to explore, building on Douglas’ observation of the Lele and their 
use of alternative monies and rates of exchange. 
In her study of the Lele, Douglas (1982)  pointed out that 'To suppose that prices 
should be highly responsive to supply and demand is to assume that they are 
operating in a free and perfect market. But such markets are rare in primitive 
conditions.'   Recent research (e.g. Becker 1991; Morton and Podolny 2002; Velthuis 
2005; MacKenzie 2006) suggests that free and perfect markets, and their influence 
on price, are also rare in modern Western conditions. Instead, as with the Lele, 
within contemporary Western markets it is possible that the 'issue of social policy 
restricts the freedom of the market' (Douglas 1982, p.79).  
By ‘social policy’ Douglas is talking not about governmental policies, but about the 
various patterns of obligation and privilege within the community, and the associated 
rates of exchange for raffia depending on the transaction:  
'The Lele operated three exchange rates for raffia: one applied to internal 
transactions when raffia was the standard of value but did not actually 
intervene; another rate, 10-20 percent higher, was applied internally when 




raffia with francs, but it was prohibitively high. Thus they kept internal prices 
in terms of raffia low and discriminated against Belgian Congo francs so as 
to prevent francs displacing raffia. In such transactions there is an appearance 
of centrally imposed control, but it is deceptive. No central governing body 
imposes the rates of exchange. The exchange control emerges by the 
decisions of individuals striving to hold to their position of advantage in a 
particular social structure.’  
(Douglas 1982, p.79)   
It is not clear whether the example of the Lele could be said to support Simmel’s 
view that the introduction of money freed people from obligations and market 
restrictions other than those imposed by not having sufficient money. Although the 
Lele appeared to be wary that this might be the case (they ‘discriminated against 
Belgian Congo francs so as to prevent francs displacing raffia’), the Lele were using 
money (Belgian Congo francs) alongside raffia, and used both within existing 
relationships to reaffirm or test social positioning and ties, and to maintain the ‘how 
it is done around here’. Their pricing varied depending on perceptions of the type of 
money, the relationship between parties, and the appropriateness of particular 
exchange practices. That is, amongst the Lele prices (and choice of currency) varied 
depending on socially constructed rules of ‘how it is done’, and these rules seem to 
be constructed in such a way that Belgian Congo francs were incorporated in the 
maintenance of the established order. 
In a more contemporary setting, Morton and Podolny (2002) used a combination of 
mailed surveys and telephone interviews to collect data on the pricing practices of 
Californian wine producers, in order to take a useful step in the exploration of the 
possible importance of non-economic drivers within contemporary Western pricing 
practice. The focus of their research was on seeking an explanation for the structure 
of that wine market, where the higher quality end of the market (which they expected 




prices for their wine than they could. Morton and Podolny suggest that the 
hobbyists’ pricing practice has forced commercial suppliers to leave that sector.   
Morton and Podolny’s observations of hobbyist wine producers and the way they do 
pricing is intriguing and useful in that they conclude that some pricers regard overall 
utility rather than simply economic returns when deciding what to produce and how 
to set prices. They suggest that this overall utility may include utility gained from 
some aspects of production, as suggested earlier by Douglas and Isherwood (1996, 
p.8).  Morton and Podolny suggest that  
‘if the firm produces a high quality product, the owner may value the 
association with the product. Or, if the firm’s activities further some social 
cause, the owner may derive utility from the cause’s advancement. If the 
additional utility derived from the inefficient features of the firm is greater 
than the disutility from the lower return, then the owner is willing to 
subsidize the firm and it can survive in the market.’ 
 (Morton and Podolny 2002, p.432) 
The utility-maximising (UM) pricing of the hobbyists is framed by Morton and 
Podolny as being ‘not like’ another group’s (profit-maximising, PM) pricing 
practice. This suggests that pricing practices may have group membership uses. In 
addition, their findings suggest that the money earned from selling wine may have a 
special rather than neutral categorisation for those hobbyist producers. They point 
out that UM wine producers within their sample did not talk about quantity, instead 
they talked about making enough good wine to supply and impress their friends, 
restaurants, and competitions (p.437).  That is, being a UM rather than a PM 
producer is constructed by these participants as desirable. Their data suggests that 
the utility may include social cachet and group membership, and might be 
constructed through interpretations of the meanings of wine production, wine 




In an earlier paper, an observation of similar lack of conformity to economic logic 
had inspired Nobel prize-winner Becker to examine the pricing practices of 
restaurants, theatres, and sporting events (Becker 1991). Becker’s research was 
prompted by the inability of pure economics to provide a satisfactory answer to an 
observable pricing anomaly. A restaurant he knows well was experiencing high 
demand but increased neither its prices nor its capacity. At the same time a 
neighbouring restaurant was offering the same product (bar the utility of standing in 
a queue to get in), and for the same price as the popular restaurant, but was nearly 
empty, and it had not reduced prices to stimulate demand. 
In his search for an explanation for these economically irrational practices Becker 
examines his own response, which prompts him to examine social aspects of the 
consumption experience, particularly the utility of a queue. He suggests that visible 
demand from other customers reassures each customer that their taste and choice is 
acceptable and that the item being queued for is desirable (at that price). That is, 
Becker focuses on consumers’ understandings of price, and assumes that ‘demand by 
a typical consumer is positively related to quantities demanded by other consumers’ 
(p. 1109).  
Although this is a useful way of considering pricing, intriguingly Becker does not 
seem to have asked any of the restaurateurs or theatre managers why they are pricing 
in the way they are. Becker’s hypotheses rely on an extrapolation of his experience 
as a customer, and that the restaurant/theatre owners share these interpretations and 
logics. Although it is possible that this is the case, it might be useful to test his 
theories by asking the pricers themselves. For a study which focuses on social 
aspects of pricing and does so by talking to pricers, one needs to look at Velthuis’ 
research on the pricing discourses of art gallery owners.. 
In his research Velthuis (2005) has concentrated on the symbolic importance of art 
gallery owners’ discourses of price and how this extends beyond the economic 
realm. It is the only body of research of which I am aware which focuses on 




practice. Here the participants’ money categories are implicit, rather than made 
explicit in his findings. 
Velthuis (2003; 2005) set out to understand how art dealers in New York and 
Amsterdam set prices for contemporary works of art. Initially frustrated by the 
difficulty in getting respondents to answer his questionnaire, he began to realise that 
instead of the expected economic logics, what he was witnessing was a specific set 
of richly-textured pricing practices and discourses which specifically prescribed 
avoidance of what might be considered ‘normal’ market or economic topics such as 
profit or desire for sales. That is, to be seen to be interested in money appears to be 
seen as absolutely inappropriate in this art-pricing context: money from art is 
categorised as something which should not be discussed. This chimes with Belk and 
Wallendorf’s (1990) discussion of sacred and profane money, particularly in their 
suggestion that ‘profane’ money needs to be separated from ‘sacred’ art.   There also 
appears to be a particular ritual of money re-categorisation (Zelizer 1994) implicit 
within Velthuis’ gallery-owners practices. 
In Belk and Wallendorf’s paper the ‘necessary’ separation between art and 
money/commerce is created by a sculptor’s sister doing the pricing and selling, 
rather than the artist, who, they found, used another approach to separating his art 
from commerce: he ‘would just as soon give his work away to those who showed an 
interest’ (Belk and Wallendorf 1990, p.37). In Velthuis’ study the pricing is similarly 
delegated, in that the artwork is being priced by the gallery owner, not the artist, and 
it is the gallery owners who create the distance between art and commerce.  
Whereas in Belk and Wallendorf’s paper the sister appears to be using explicit 
market discourses and practices (‘his sister insisted on achieving the best possible 
price for each piece’(Belk and Wallendorf 1990, p.37)), these discourses are less 
visible in Velthuis’ study of more elite art-sales practitioners. That is, rather than 
simply relying on delegation to create separation between art and commerce, the 
person doing the selling and pricing – the gallery owners -  displayed determined 




the gallery owners created a physical separation of money and art. For example, 
Velthuis found that no prices were visible in the galleries, no prices are discussed 
near the art, and the money-handling happens in a different room to the one(s) in 
which the art is displayed. This physical separation echoes Belk and Wallendorf’s 
example of current US dentistry practice, where payment is made to an administrator 
at Reception, not to the dentist themselves in the surgery. Dyer (1989) proposed that 
one of the main impacts of comparing an object with money (which is a necessary 
part of pricing) is to change the way the object is categorised: ‘the practice of 
naming-or representing- objects or experiences in terms of money prompts us to act 
as if such facets of reality are actually commodities proper’ (Wennerlind 2001, 
p.563).   It is possible that how one views the ‘commoditization’ of the object may 
inform degrees of comfort with explicit commensuration, and inform pricing 
discourses. 
 
That the distancing-from-money practice observed by Velthuis and Belk and 
Wallendorf is used in other fields, but not shared by all art-sellers suggests that rules 
of what is appropriate may vary within a field (e.g. art), perhaps to show status, and 
that there may be similar rules across different fields (e.g. art and dentistry). The 
rules shaping pricing and money-related practices are not in fact rigid, even if they 
may seem to be so.  
As mentioned above, Velthuis’ focus is on the symbolic nature of the price 
discourses in terms of their signalling of group membership through a display of 
particular cultural capital, rather than on money categorisations. However, his 
findings suggest that art money may be categorised as ‘dirty money’, and there are 
particular discourses used to negotiate money re-categorisation. 
Within his data one can see that the buyer, as holder of the money, is part of the 
money-source categorisation. As an example of a re-categorisation practice if the 




mitigate the profane taint the money might otherwise have.  Although Velthuis does 
not draw out this point, the gallery-owners’ repeated emphasis in their vetting of 
particular buyers so that the art is sold only to ‘the right kind of buyer’ appears to be 
what Zelizer calls a ritual of money category transfer.  The success of the 
discourse/ritual in achieving category transfer depends on shared interpretation and 
validation by the other parties.  
Within other artworld literature as well as within my data there is much evidence of 
collusion in this particular ‘good home’ money-cleaning artworld ritual. For 
example, Sarah Thornton (2008) discusses how buyers are at pains to display how 
appropriate they would be as the buyer for the art object.  Here, as in Velthuis’ study, 
the categorising of self as ‘a good home’ appears to be important in both the 
collusion regarding object categorisation and in collusion surrounding the associated 
money categorisation.  The importance of collusion in object categorisation in 
facilitating object exchange has been explored in for example, work on inalienable 
goods and singularized objects (Kopytoff 1986; Arnould and Epp 2006; Epp and 
Price 2010).  The idea of price-related collusion, shared expectations, and shared 
interpretations is potentially important, in that what might from the outside appear to 
be irrational pricing practices may from the inside appear to be obviously correct and 
desirable. That is, interpretation depends on interpretive repertoire and knowledge of 
‘how it is done’. 
2.4.2    Economic logic is not the only logic used by pricers 
Whilst there is socio-economic research which moves away from assumptions of 
economic rationale and studies the cultural and relational uses and underpinnings of 
consumers’ money-meanings, there is a paucity of work focussing on cultural and 
meaning-making aspects of producers’ money categorisations and pricing practice. 
Morton and Podolny’s (2002) work on wine-pricing, and Becker’s (1991) work on 
restaurant and theatre pricing whets the appetite, in that their exploration of actual 




not necessarily always economically-led. However, as they point out, there is need 
for much more work in this area. 
Extrapolation from pricing-practice work by Morton and Podolny, and Becker, and 
in particular from Velthuis’ (2005)  gallery-pricing research suggests that money and 
object categories and the rituals of category transfer may be important in enabling 
and constraining pricing practice. They appear to be potentially important elements 
of price discourse, and discourses of price are used as a way of displaying a shared 
cultural capital or knowledge - what Schau et al (2009) refer to as context-specific 
‘know that’ and ‘how to’. I turn now to a discussion of the literature of ‘know that’ 
and ‘how to’ within art pricing.  
2.5 How It Is Done Around Here: The social function of 
market discourses 
Introduction 
Instead of considering pricing as something done by abstracted individuals, pricing 
may be considered as being shaped by understandings of how it is done around here. 
This builds on the underpinning idea that economic actors are necessarily also social 
actors, and is linked to Consumer Culture Theory research which shows that 
consumption practice ‘know that’ and ‘how to’ perform social functions. I 
hypothesise that pricing ‘know that’ and ‘how to’ perform social functions, and this 
consideration of social function may play a significant in pricers’ choice. That is, 
pricing discourses are a demonstration of interpretation of ‘How someone like me 
prices an object like this, in a context like this.’ 
In this section I consider literature which sheds light on the contextual ‘around here’ 
aspect of pricing, which in this research is a small section of the art world (Becker 




important membership-enabling function of artworld market discourses is supported 
in work by for example, Alan Bradshaw (2006; 2007), Elizabeth Currid (2007) and 
Sarah Thornton (2008). This literature demonstrates and discusses how the choice of 
what is said, when, and how, is used as a way of separating, grouping, and sifting 
people into ‘like me/us’, and ‘not like me/us’.   
I begin with a small section which looks at pertinent but non-art literature which 
considers the idea of ‘how it is done around here’. I then move onto a consideration 
of the art world and art object, in order to explore extant understandings of  ‘How it 
is done around here with an object like this’. 
2.5.1    How it is done around here 
Resonating with CCT research regarding the social importance of market-related 
‘know that’ and ‘how to’ (Schau, Muniz Jr et al. 2009), Venkatesh’s study of the 
underground economy in a Chicago ghetto found that there ‘were codes in place’, 
and ‘regulations which had existed for decades’ (Venkatesh 2006, p.376). These 
‘unwritten standards’ shaped which transactions were carried out, and how. 
Venkatesh also found that there were social and economic penalties for those who 
transgressed ‘this code of conduct’ (2006, p.155).   
Although Venkatesh did not look closely at the unwritten standards of pricing within 
his research context, work by Velthuis’ (2005) and Morton and Podolny (2002), 
suggests that within various contexts there may be shared ideas of ‘how pricing is 
done around here by someone like me’. Whilst there is little work looking 
specifically at pricing practice, there is a large body of work exploring other 
economic actions as embedded rather than abstracted practice, and these provide 
useful suggestions re the positioning and group-membership uses of market 
practices. As argued within the canon of CCT and socio-economics literature, e.g. 
Bourdieu, Weber, Arnould and Thompson, Douglas, and Venkatesh amongst others, 
economic actions appear to be informed by social aims, knowledge, and the specific 




practices. Indeed, in some circumstances seeking economic maximisation may lead 
to being ostracised or even physical harm (Venkatesh 2006). 
Whereas some socio-economic approaches concentrate on the networks within 
which the economic action takes place (for example, see MacKenzie cited earlier,  
and the Actor Network Theorists, in which non-human elements are also 
considered), here I am interested in the related topic of the social and cultural aspects 
of the actors’ milieu, particularly the idea that ‘Culture sets limits to economic 
rationality’ and ‘provides scripts for applying different strategies to different classes 
of exchange’ (Zukin 1990).    According to Bourdieu (1984), these scripts are learnt 
and shared over time, they are fluid and negotiated, and are interpreted as signals of 
particular habitus and class. Extending this idea suggests that pricing practices and 
discourses of price could also be considered to be learnt scripts which could be seen 
as signals of habitus and class – and therefore of group membership. Rather than 
every pricer choosing from the same range of options and interpretations, members 
of different groups will have different understandings of ‘the way it is done around 
here’, and these will be constantly subject to negotiation. That is, the effects of ‘the 
class condition’ on market practices may extend beyond consumption. 
As Veblen and later Bourdieu suggested, ‘preferences are determined socially in 
relation to the positions of individuals in the social hierarchy’ (Trigg 2001, p.99). I 
suggest that it is possible that pricing preferences and discourses may be determined 
socially in relation to the positions of individuals in the social hierarchy. Distinction 
and group membership may be achieved through demonstration of a disposition 
towards and appreciation of certain pricing practices and discourses in particular 
contexts. Differentiation could be expressed through criticism or distancing of self 
from other’s pricing practices, as in the Morton and Podolny (2002) study. I suggest 
that interpretation of ‘how pricing is done around here by people like me with a 
product like this’ is a potentially key aspect of what is generally considered an 




Cultural consumer research (e.g. Arnould and Thompson 2005; Arnould and 
Thompson 2005; Luedicke 2006) suggests that market practice choices are learnt and 
often emulative/aspirational, and are chosen through exposure to a variety of options 
and interpretations. As Bourdieu (1984) and Trigg (2001)  point out, the sending, 
learning and interpretations of codes and practices are mostly unconscious acts, and 
depend to an extent on upbringing: those who get it ‘wrong’ may lack the social 
upbringing and contact that is required for a thorough appreciation of the potential 
nuances of various approaches. What is considered ‘right’ by one person in a 
particular situation may be considered ‘wrong’ in another situation, or by someone 
else. Practices appear to be shaped by unconsciously felt social pressure- an idea of 
what is expected – as much as by conscious decision-making or logic. Practices (and 
I suggest these may including pricing), and the interpretations of those practices have 
to be learnt, they are not ‘natural’. 
Practices such as adopting the rôles and relationships of seller and buyer, producer 
and customer, are performed and recognised through shared understandings and 
normative rituals. Money classification and discourses of price can be part of these 
rituals. For example, as Zelizer (1994) showed, tips or the Christmas bonus are 
rituals of hierarchy and rôle maintenance – the money categorisation is both shaped 
by and shapes understandings of the rôle and social position of the different parties 
involved. 
The idea that money practices can be seen as meaning-full social actions is 
important. Although a competitor-related pricing strategy (as discussed in the first 
section) is based on ‘the going rate’, rather than on demand or costs, what is not 
mentioned in the teaching literature is that what is considered the going rate and 
whether it is understood as relevant will depend on interpretations of field, sector, 
market leader, available options and their likely effect. Both Bourdieu and Kopytoff 
suggested that producers are more likely to look at other producers than at 




even whether it is called a strategy) may be shaped by the idea that ‘this is how 
people (or organisations) like us do it’. 
As previously discussed, Morton and Podolny (2002) suggest that the reason for the 
economically irrational pricing practice of hobbyist wine producers is that they are 
getting some utility other than profit from taking part in that market. This is an 
important finding for their purpose – an exploration of market composition – but it 
could be usefully extended, in that their research suggests that the hobbyists price in 
the way hobbyists round here do. That is, as with Velthuis’ gallery-owners, the wine 
producers’ choice of production and pricing practice signals membership of a 
particular and desirable group of producers. Importantly, Morton and Podolny’s 
research suggests that the hobbyists are economically constrained by their 
understanding of what is the appropriate way for people like me with a product like 
this to do pricing around here. This seems particularly likely given that Morton and 
Podolny found that prices (when adjusted for quality) decreased over time, which 
suggests that new hobbyists learnt that their original high prices were not ‘how it is 
done around here’ (p.432).  
In the case of the wine producers the choice of pricing approach could be its use in 
group membership, defined by distancing from commercial producers, in part by not 
pricing to maximise profits, which is categorised as pricing in the way commercial 
producers do. The choice of pricing approach could also be used as a signal of 
cultural capital – through a lower price the pricer is suggesting that their family has 
owned the winery for some time, so they have accrued ‘know that’ and ‘know how’ 
(Morton and Podolny 2002, p.432), and that their ability to recognise and produce a 
good wine (Barthes 1972; Bourdieu 1984; 1993) is more important to them than 
economic gain.  
I suggest that, just as with Velthuis’ study, there would be an element of social 
positioning and consideration of desirable response involved in the responses to the 
Morton and Podolny questionnaire and interviews. The product, the related 




by the wine producers to create the ‘utility’ of distinction and group membership, 
which suggests that these aspects within pricing are worth further investigation.  
In Becker’s (1991) work on why restaurant and theatre pricing does not appear to 
vary in response to visible changes in demand, Becker says that  ‘along with many 
others, I have continued to be puzzled by such [apparently irrational] pricing 
behavior’. I suggest that in his research context particular pricing practices appear to 
have become ‘the way it is done around here’, but rather than enabling economic 
profit, which an economist would assume would be the motivation for engaging in 
the market, the practices appear to constrain maximisation of resources. 
Whereas Thaler suggests that consumers consider acquisition utility and transaction 
utility, where the ‘former depends on the value of the good received compared to the 
outlay, [and] the latter depends solely on the perceived merits of the ‘deal’’ (2008 
[1985] (1985), p.19), I suggest that those doing the pricing may have similar 
considerations – that is, that the ‘deal’ can have merits beyond economic 
considerations -  and that, as suggested in the consumption literature there may be 
other considerations, constraints and benefits surrounding the transaction. Whereas 
in economic theory the catch-all concept of ‘utility’ is often enough, in socio-
economics and marketing theory this is the beginning – what is interesting is how 
what is considered utility varies, and how it is constructed. 
Summary 
Insights from Consumer Culture Theory and Socio-economics suggest that ‘the way 
it is done around here’ in pricing practice and discourse will involve categorisation 
of object, money, and commensuration, and that this will be informed by existing 
group membership and desired group membership. Importantly, understandings of 
‘appropriate’ action and interpretation are learnt, not necessarily through formal 
study, but rather through prolonged exposure and observation (Bourdieu 1984; 
Venkatesh 2006, p. 162, p. 401). They therefore depend to a large extent on 




Although an exploration of market behaviours and discourse-meanings as 
hierarchy/membership-centred practices is central to CCT research, and has begun to 
be applied to producer research ((Peñaloza 2000; Peñaloza and Venkatesh 2006; 
Thompson and Tian 2008; Parsons 2010) this approach is as yet notably lacking in 
the pricing literature. However, previously published literature (notably Morton and 
Podolny 2002; Velthuis 2005)  suggests that pricing and money discourses and 
interpretation can be used and seen as a signal of desired or actual membership and 
non-membership, and that this is an avenue worth exploring further. 
In the next section I consider what we know about ‘how it is done’ within the 





2.5.2    Pricing the art object 
Introduction 
Having considered the literature on money and commensuration, and the idea that 
economic action may be informed by understandings of ‘how it is done around here’, 
here I consider the construction of the specific type of ‘object’ being priced, and the 
‘how it is done around here’ for pricing that type of object.  
I have already touched on the importance of Consumer Culture Theory and the work 
of foundational writers such as Bourdieu in considering the social and cultural 
construction of object. Here, in order to focus on the construction of the types of 
object being considered in this study, I move away from pricing and money in 
general to consider what has already been written about art pricing and prices. 
Pricing Art 
The art world may be considered an extreme example of a pricing context. However, 
it is important to consider four points which might apply to any pricing context: 
The first point is that the definition of art, as with the definition of other cultural 
objects, is socially constructed. That is, ‘art’ and ‘not art’ are not inherent properties 
of the object. The dominant Romantic categorisation of the object being priced as 
sacred or incommensurable (in large part because it is viewed as containing the artist 
– and perhaps because it is understood as having been ‘made from the impossible 
exchange of signifier and signified’ (Baudrillard 2001, p.126)) is a construction, and 
therefore subject to alternative interpretations and change. 
Secondly, the object may dip in and out of categories. Kopytoff (1986, p.69) 
suggests that items can fall into multiple categories at any one time, and that all 




The third point is that for any object being priced there may be corollary ‘rules’ or 
consequences of a particular objet categorisation, and these rules are also a 
construction. For example, the rules of the ‘correct’ degree of overlap or separation 
from the market, and the associated money categories are socially constructed, learnt 
and negotiated, they are not inherent properties of the object, money or the exchange.  
Finally, being able to use the ‘correct’ categorisation and commensurative practices 
and discourses for that category object may be a source of power. Being able to 
dictate what is the ‘correct’ way is even more so. 
Art as incommensurable sacred object 
The ‘sacredness’ of art is not unique - other items can be constructed as 
singular/inalienable/sacred at any time. The idea that art is a special type of object, 
even a ‘holy’ (Abbing 2002) or sacred object, which should be treated differently 
from other objects is often taken for granted, yet is a construction, it is not nature. 
Although the dominant construal of ‘art’ currently involves some degree of 
uniqueness and removal from the market, this is a construction, not fixed.  So, whilst 
Velthuis’ (2005) and Belk and Wallendorf’s (1990) discussion of sacred art and 
profane money are very useful examples of the dominant view, particularly in their 
suggestion that art world practitioners treat ‘profane’ money as ideally treated as 
separate from ‘sacred’ art, it is important to consider that the categorisation of the 
object (art) and money and the ‘naturalness’ of the corollary rule that they should be 
separate is  potentially subject to challenge from other interpretations. 
The dominance of the contemporary Romantic view that the arts should be outside or 
beyond the market is well documented - (Hadjinicolaou 1973/ 1978 trans; Becker 
1982; Kopytoff 1986; Warnock and Wallinger 2000; Abbing 2002; Harris 2004; 
Stallabrass 2004; Bradshaw, McDonagh et al. 2006; Bradshaw and Holbrook 2007; 
Grenfell 2007; Thompson 2008; Thornton 2008). Although it is dominant, this does 
not mean that it is not contested, as demonstrated by academics such as Gramp 




In his study of art pricing Grampp tests and dismisses the theory of ideal separation, 
other art-pricing researchers assume distance is the appropriate relationship with the 
market. I begin with Grampp’s dismissal:  
In Grampp’s (1989) application of neo-classical economic theory of economic 
maximisation to explain art prices he states that making his case convincing is 
‘uphill work’. This difficulty, he says, is because the Romantic myth that art is 
outside the market is what people believe; however, his analysis shows that it is not 
what they do. Gaining acceptance for his suggestion that economic maximisation is 
the underlying principal in pricing art is uphill work because   
‘it seems to go against the grain - the grain being the anti-market mentality, a 
subdivision of the anti-materialist view of how people ought to behave. A 
noticeable part of this book is about the anti-materialist view because it has 
affected much of what has been said about art.’         However,   
‘The view has had much less effect, if any at all, on what most painters, 
collectors, dealers, museologists, and government functionaries actually have 
done and continue to do than it has had on what they say.’ 
(Grampp 1989, p.9) 
Whereas Grampp finding that the anti-materialist view has had little effect on what 
pricers actually do is based in secondary data and a dismissal of ‘what they say’, 
field-based research such as Thornton’s (2008) or Velthuis’ (2005) suggests anti-
materialist aspects within what pricers say is very much a part of what they do, and 
such discourses are an important part of pricing practice.   
Grampp suggests that art is treated in the same way as any other commodity, and that 
although art may be spoken of as separate from market aims in fact materialist aims 
are the norm. Kopytoff however has a different approach. Kopytoff (1986) explains 
that although within contemporary Western culture art is (or should be seen as) a 
singularized object and therefore kept separate from the marketplace, this is a 




way of understanding which is shared by many, but not necessarily for ever, nor held 
by everyone now. As Espeland  and Steven (1998) point out, commensuration, 
including the idea that something is ‘priceless’, i.e. separate from the market, is a 
mode of power. This suggests that perpetuation of the anti-materialist ‘sacredness’ of 
art as a desirable discourse is and continues to be of benefit to some people, and that 
the beneficiaries, like the more powerful Lele individuals in Douglas’ study (1982, 
p.79) may seek to dissuade others from using alternative interpretations and 
practices. 
The question Velthuis (2005) asks is why an anti-materialist ‘sacred art’ discourse is 
seen as appropriate amongst the gallery owners he interviewed. Whereas he points to 
group membership and signalling uses of price discourse choice, Hatton and 
Walker’s (2003) socialist (and not necessarily conflicting) reading of the context 
emphasises the hierarchical and economic power aspects of group membership. They 
suggest that maintenance of a set of rules regarding what is art and how it should be 
treated and sold enables the superstructure (in particular key artworld members such 
as Charles Saatchi) to make profit from the micro-economic base (the artists). Hatton 
and Walker suggest that it is to Saatchi’s economic and social benefit and to the 
benefit of people like him, that the hierarchy in which he has achieved an elevated 
influential position is maintained.  
In order for the hierarchy to be maintained one needs others to apply a similar 
discourse and interpretive repertoire.  In trying to understand why artists would 
choose to use the discourses which prevent them from earning money and which 
therefore continue to restrict their place in the economic and social hierarchy, 
Abbing (2002) suggests that artists and economists speak different languages as a 
result of differences in cultural capital – the economists know more about 
economics, and the artists know more about art.  
Whilst economists and artists may indeed have a different range of knowledge, their 
choice of discourse is also linked to their interpretive repertoire. That is, choice of 




appropriate, desirable or ‘rational’ in a given circumstance. The artists choose to use 
and perpetuate the mythology of art as something ‘holy’, rather than use economic 
logic because it is the ‘right’ thing to do. It is ‘how it is done around here’, and 
implies membership of a desirable group. Although when viewed from the outside 
the artists have made a discursive choice, and therefore choice is possible, the 
dominance of the Romantic myth which gives a template of ‘this is how it is done’ 
appears to be largely uncontested. However, ‘One hundred years ago this tendency 
[to deny any market involvement or interest] was less evident, and perhaps this style 
of denial has already passed its zenith. Whether it has or not, this kind of denial will 
continue to influence the economy of the arts for a long time to come.’ (Abbing, 
www.hansabbing.nl/DOCeconomist/SUMMARY.pdf). 
In an art context the use of the ideal anti-materialist discourse is a signal of particular 
group membership. It is a demonstration of cultural capital and habitus, which are 
part of the class condition (Bourdieu 1984), and whilst the users may declare lack of 
interest in economic gain, other interpretations are possible. Using an interpretation 
based in the marketing mix, one could say that Velhuis’ gallery owners are using 
discourses of price as a promotional tool to position the product and the place within 
a particular luxury segment, supporting the price asked. In this the gallery owners are 
informed by and tap into particular shared interpretations of the meanings of the 
discourses and practices. At the same time the gallery owners are active in 
confirming the validity and desirability of that discourse, and in shaping future 
interpretations. The discourses work as a positioning signal, whose meaning is fluid 
and negotiable but shared (or at least sufficiently shared) by the target audience. 
Hierarchy of art objects  
Although for ease of communication there may be a tendency to treat art as one type 
of object, it is a broad category, and there is, as within other markets, a perceived 
hierarchy and a variety of ways of constructing and interpreting the hierarchy. 
Although positional specifics appear to be context-dependent, the idea of hierarchy 




that prices differ according to the aesthetic value attached to the objects, but the 
construction of the aesthetic hierarchy and positions within it are subjective (Grampp 
1989, p.16). As he and later Hatton and Walker (2003) point out, echoing Bourdieu 
(1984), opinions re what is ‘good’ and what is not are frequently stated as fact, and 
the power of specific taste-makers cannot be ignored.  
Velthuis’ (2005)  study gives another insight re the relationship between aesthetics 
and price: Amongst Velthuis’ gallery owners there appears to be a pricing logic 
based on objective factors which is nestled inside the subjective aesthetic framework. 
As in studies by Thornton (2008) and D. Thompson (2008), Velthuis’ gallery owners 
mentioned size and materials as key factors, rather than aesthetics. According to 
Velthuis even if one picture is seen by the gallery owner as being notably ‘better’ 
than others of the same size it may not be priced differently, as that could be 
understood to suggest that the other pictures are less good. Velthuis discusses how 
within each artist’s oeuvre there is a price rationale based on objective relationships. 
That is, price varies with size and the materials. For example, price goes up with size 
and oils are more expensive than watercolours, for example. Within the artworld this 
objective and culturally constructed as relevant rationale is seen as ‘natural’. 
Importantly, Velthuis (2005) found that the starting point, or the framework within 
which the prices ranged, was not discussed, and the gallery owners appeared to 
actively avoid discussions with him regarding a comparison of the aesthetic or 
‘sacred’ aspect of one picture versus another.  
Importantly, the tastes and assessment of relative value by taste-makers such as civic 
galleries, private collectors, commercial gallery owners and art critics are subject to 
change and influence. Tastes and interpretations of whether one object is ‘better’ 
than another is learnt and will vary from person to person, and over time: 
‘One could in fact posit that two people whose habitus are different and who 
have not been exposed to the same conditions and stimulations (because they 
construct them differently) do not hear the same music and do not see the 




(Bourdieu 1987, p.209). 
Intriguingly, Benjamin seems to ignore the effect of taste-makers such as critics 
when discussing the reactions of the masses to non-reproduced works of art 
(‘Although paintings began to be publicly exhibited in galleries and salons, there was 
no way for the masses to organize and control themselves in their reception. Thus the 
same public which responds in a progressive manner toward a grotesque film is 
bound to respond in a reactionary manner to surrealism' (Benjamin 1999 (1936), 
p.228). Instead, he suggests that the ‘mechanical reproduction of art changes the 
reaction of the masses toward art.  The reactionary attitude toward a Picasso painting 
changes into the progressive reaction toward a Chaplin movie. (….) The 
conventional is uncritically enjoyed, and the truly new is criticized with aversion’ 
(ibid. p.227).   There is, however, a significant body of literature highlighting and 
discussing the role of particularly influential individuals in constructing desirability 
within the art market. These range from for example research documenting the 
influences on and influence of sixteenth and seventeenth century royalty on the 
development of contemporary arts  (Millar 1972), to literature discussing the power 
of contemporary critics and collectors such as Charles Saatchi (Becker 1982; Hatton 
and Walker 2003; Thompson 2008).  As Currid (2007) puts it,  
‘Cultural value is not just an economic act but instead part of an intense 
social process of valorization and legitimization. Art/culture is socially 
consumed and socially aware. Economic value is determined by intangible 
(and ephemeral) social value formed from and within specific contexts by 
particular people, the 'scene', so to speak.’  
 
That is, despite the theoretical multiplicity of possibilities for idiosyncrasies of taste, 
tastes can be broadly shared amongst groups of people, as Bourdieu’s (1984) study 
of class distinction through aesthetic appreciation demonstrated. 
As Velthuis’ (2005) gallery-owners point out, reputation – the result of approval by 




Therefore influencing taste and through this influencing markets is an issue of 
power. Benjamin suggests that new forms of art production – photography and in 
particular cinema – were a challenge to the extant power structures, in part because 
they could be thought of as having transformed the function of art:  
‘For the first time in world history, mechanical reproduction emancipates the 
work of art from its parasitical dependence on ritual.  To an ever greater 
degree the work of art reproduced becomes the work of art designed for 
reproducibility.  From a photographic negative, for example, one can make 
any number of prints; to ask for the ‘authentic’ print makes no sense.  But the 
instant the criterion of authenticity ceases to be applicable to artistic 
production, the total function of art is reversed.  Instead of being based on 
ritual, it begins to be based on another practice – politics.’ 
(Benjamin 1999 (1936), p.218) 
That is, whilst hitherto the function of art had revolved around cult or ritual use, in 
which the art object is largely hidden from the masses, the integral reproducibility of 
photography and film means that it can be seen by all: this type of work is eminently 
fit for exhibition. However, ‘cult value does not give way without resistance’ (ibid, 
p.219) 
Whilst there have been debates regarding the ‘legitimacy’ of photography as an art 
form since the nineteenth century, ‘the primary question – whether the very 
invention of photography had not transformed the entire nature of art -was not 
raised’ (Benjamin 1999 (1936), p.220). Instead, the fight for artistic legitimacy for 
photography and cinema has, he argued, tended to concentrate on showing how 
photography and cinema meet the ‘ritual elements’ criteria of art, rather than 
challenging the criteria.  
As Stallabrass (2004) shows in his discussion of the control which big business, 
roaming curators, and art critics have on prices and on what is considered ‘art’, the 




is not only the rules of commensurability and commensuration (as in Espeland and 
Stevens (1998)) which are fought over, but also the closely related right to decree 
what is and what is not ‘art’, and what is and what is not ‘good’.  
Texts such as Barthes’ Camera Lucida (Barthes 2000 (1980)), and Benjamin’s The 
Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction (Benjamin 1999 (1936)) may 
influence and inform not just art makers, but also those higher up the artworld 
hierarchy. If those with influence approve, this trickles down, so that art tutors 
recommend and request that their students should read these texts. Being a winner in 
the validating and taste-making hierarchy gives the power to influence what gets 
read, what gets made, and what get shown and seen in galleries and biennales 
(Stallabrass 2004), which has a knock-on effect on prices.  
Summary 
Following the suggestion that within contemporary Western contexts art seen as 
sacred  and the market as tainting  (an idea which is explored or implicit in the vast 
majority of art-related texts and discourses I have examined during this research, 
such as Grampp (1989) and Belk and Wallendorf (1990)) , then the idea that culture 
‘proscribes or limits market exchange in sacred objects and relations . . . or between 
ritually classified groups’ (Zukin 1990) becomes particularly pertinent. However, it 
seems worth exploring whether art is always seen as sacred within pricing contexts, 
and whether there is variety in the ways that market exchange is proscribed or 
limited.  
Not only is the object and its desirability culturally constructed, but the ‘purpose’ of 
art and the appropriate relationship to the market is too. As Bourdieu (1984) and 
much CCT research suggests the way one experiences and interprets market artefacts 
and practices are socially informed, and I suggest that market artefacts and practices 
such as money, price and pricing are similarly socially-informed. One would 




market than others, and the perception of distance, whether it matters, and the rules 
associated with the position will vary. 
2.5.3    Practitioner-led art-pricing literature 
Given that the literature discussed above suggests that interpretations and discourses 
– including those to do with price and pricing - are learnt, not nature, in this section I 
move away from consideration of literature which observes artworld pricing 
practices to look at the ‘how to do pricing’ approaches within literature easily 
available to the research participants.  
Within the research context there is limited literature aimed at teaching artists and 
gallery owners how to price. Where available the pricing advice appears very similar 
to that for other retail products in its emphasis on the need to consider and cover 
costs, to use a consistent strategy, and to be aware of competitor pricing practice. 
This comparison is emphasised, even though the idea of one piece of art being 
comparable to another is anathema to many artists, as a prime requirement of ‘art’ is 
that it is unique. To give a representative example, the section below is from 
Annabel Ruston’s book Starting up a Gallery and Frame Shop  (2007), which I 
found on a display stand in the Quiet Room at the local university’s arts faculty 
library. I include the title rather than simply citing the date, as the title is a useful 
indicator of the target audience and content, in that it considers a variety of types of 
art and art-related items.  
Ruston is an editor for the Fine Art Trade Guild publications, and gives advice to 
guild members directly and through trade journals. She could be considered an 
‘expert’ in the field, endorsed (at least to some extent) by the university’s profiling 
of her book. Here she states that: 
‘There are three basic types of pricing strategy: 
1. High end - prices are set above market levels because of exclusive 




reputation for style and upmarket appeal. Profits rely on good margins rather 
than high turnover. 
2. Medium - the retailer sticks to average recommended retail prices and wins 
customers on the basis of location, product range, friendly atmosphere etc. 
Turnover and margins are balanced. 
3. Low end - prices are below market levels to compete for higher volumes of 
sales. This requires tight stock control, clever buying policies, low overheads 
etc. 
Whatever your pricing niche, you (and your staff) need to feel confident that 
your prices are 'fair'. If high, you need to know that your customer really is 
getting the added value, if low you need to make a profit and know that your 
customer is getting a good deal. If your prices are higher than those of 
competitors you must make it absolutely clear why, and what type of value 
your customers are getting for the added price they are paying.’ 
(Ruston 2007) 
This pricing advice is based on comparison with other art galleries, and aimed at 
those who are buying in and selling on stock, and assumes that profit maximisation 
or consideration, rather than on what Morton and Podolny term ‘utility’ 
maximisation, is the primary aim. To this extent it treats art as a profane commodity, 
comparable with other art objects, and considers how the price might be interpreted 
from the consumer’s point of view. Although at first glance this seems useful advice, 
the central concept of ‘value’ is a nebulous one. She gives a number of examples of 
what might be included in this for each category of gallery, such as excellent service, 
location, atmosphere, and ‘good deal’. These are themselves culturally constructed, 
and culturally constructed as appropriate and relevant. 
Ruston points out that the decision regarding how visible to make the prices is an 
important one (p.191), however, the price-discourse rules followed by Velthuis’ 
gallery owners are not taught in this book.  Whereas Velthuis’ gallery owners go to 




suggests (see quote below) that the decision to remove pricing information from the 
art work is for a more commercial reason: the practice of pricing discretely (‘how it 
is done’) is because consumers will ‘be frightened away’ if they see the price without 
explanation. However, she acknowledges that there may be alternative 
interpretations of the pricing practice: 
‘top-end art galleries often do not display prices at all, because they want to 
engage people in conversation about price and are worried that if they see a 
price tag without guidance from gallery staff they might be frightened away. 
Some people dislike this technique and feel that if the prices were reasonable 
the gallery need not be afraid to display them, so this practice might alienate 
some customers. If prices are not clearly displayed people are more likely to 
presume that they are negotiable, which is, in fact, often the case with 
expensive works of art.’ 
(Ruston 2007, p.191) 
In their conversations with Velthuis the gallery owners suggested that they want to 
engage gallery visitors in conversation in order to see whether they are ‘the right 
sort’ (that is, they will use similar discourses and through this maintain both the 
sacred status of art and the desirability of that discourse), whereas in her ‘how to’ 
lesson Ruston suggests that the lack of visible prices is a high-end practice and a 
commercial ruse, used specifically in order to engage in a price-centred 
conversation. What ‘guidance’ the gallery owners might provide, and how it should 
be done, is unclear in Ruston’s account, although the inference is that it involves 
teaching the ‘correct’ interpretation of the price.  
As well as price varying with category of work (for example Ruston divides objects 
into, for example, original artwork, artists’ prints, prints), the availability and type of 
pricing advice appears to vary by type of art being priced. For example, in the 
university library used by many local artists including many of the research 
participants there were a number of books aimed at artworld practitioners such as 




designers, and animators, and these included clear business advice, but there were 
very few books aimed at ‘artists’.  
The books aimed at artists tended to focus on how to make money in aligned spheres 
such as curating, art writing, or by getting a grant or artist-in-residence position, 
rather than on pricing their output/art work itself.  I suggest that this variation in 
availability of how-to-price-art information is a performance of a particular ideology, 
the Romantic myth, in which art should be from the soul, not tainted by commerce. 
The dominance of this myth, and the importance of ‘correctly’ negotiating it has 
been the topic of a number of art market studies (Bradshaw, McDonagh et al. 2006; 
Bradshaw and Holbrook 2007; Thornton 2008). However, ‘how to’ rules are subject 
to flux, as discussed in John Harrington’s book on photography pricing: 
In Best Business Practices for Photographers, John  Harrington points out that 
‘Although ten years ago resources were few and far between to help you come to 
reasonable and logical conclusions about rates, they are abundantly available now 
in books, online, and in software specially designed for photographer’ (Harrington 
2007, p.41, my emphasis).  
He then points to sites such as the National Press Photographer’s Association online 
CODB (cost of doing business) calculator, which pre-populates the page with 
various cost categories.  This representative example of the photographic pricing 
literature is a very explicit demonstration of ways in which rationales for reasonable 
and logical rates are shared and constructed, and is in direct contrast to Ruston’s far 
less specific art-pricing advice. In The Visual Artist’s Guide to Surviving and 
Thriving (Butler and Padwick 1992) there is no pricing advice, despite the 
acknowledgement that ‘sales are obviously important or essential to cover the costs 
of preparing for the exhibition and to bring in some kind of income for your work as 
an artist.’ (p37).  




Although some of the practitioner-facing how-to-price literature for this field is in 
many ways very similar to general pricing literature in its exhortation to cover costs, 
make a profit, and to ‘become thoroughly familiar with typical mark-ups in your 
field’ (Ruston 2007, p.124), some of the literature is notably fey about price and 
pricing, avoiding even the objective parameter ‘know-hows’ and ‘know thats’ 
(Schau, Muniz Jr et al. 2009)’ such as size and materials that are part of the 
widespread arbitrary cohesiveness of art pricing.  
Discursive know-how is not mentioned explicitly, but different approaches are 
implicit in the examples of the texts, and are part of the enculturation in which 
certain scripts or schemes of thinking and acting become regarded as the right way to 
do pricing in a particular context, and they become understood as the obvious way to 
act.  Velthuis’(2005) study of gallery owners suggests that pricing ‘know how’ and 
‘know that’  discursive displays are very important in terms of signalling one’s 
position and testing or educating the customer, but although the importance of 
educating customers is mentioned by Ruston, what they are to be educated in, and 
how to do this is not. 
In contrast to Velthuis’ findings from discussions with gallery owners, Ruston’s 
(2007) and Harrington’s (2007) approach to pricing has more in common with the 
other marketing or financial literature, in that their ‘how to price art’ guides treat 
money as neutral. That is, ‘money-from-art’ is treated as non-problematic, and there 
is no discussion of ‘the right sort of buyer’ – although there is a discussion re 
different sorts of buyer and their price-related preferences. In both Ruston and 
Harrington, money earned is earmarked to cover costs and make a profit. This is in 
contrast to Velthuis’ findings, which suggest that money from art and from the art-
buyer falls into a special category or categories, and therefore requires specific 
discourses. Whether money from art is treated as problematic or not may be used as 
a positioning device, and the discourses Ruston uses in her gallery or in conversation 





2.5.4    Pricing as socially meaning-full practice 
Previously published research suggests that understandings of ‘how it is done around 
here’ inform consumption practices, and appear to matter in some production-side 
behaviours too. Importantly, the small body of research looking at pricing as a 
practice (e.g. Morton and Podolny 2002; Velthuis 2005) suggests that the ‘how it is 
done’ aspect of pricing is worth examining further, as there appear to be learnt 
meaning-full shared ways of ‘doing’ price. That is, not only is the object and its 
desirability socially constructed, but the appropriate relationship to the market and 
money is also socially constructed and socially meaningful. 
In this section I examined the literature surrounding the construction of the art object 
and its relationship to the market and price. I then compared this with the artworld 
‘how to’ literature and advice locally available to the research participants. 
Within the practitioner-focussed ‘how to’ literature money is ostensibly treated as 
neutral, yet the degree to which money and pricing is ignored or explicitly mentioned 
within the literature suggests that it is far from neutral in this field, and that there are 
implicit rules which participants are expected to know or register. 
Although there may be dominant discourses of ‘how to do art pricing’, as in 
Velthuis’ study, it seems likely that access to and interest in particular ‘know how’ 
and ‘how to’ information will vary amongst pricers in this and in any field, as 
pricers, like consumers, are socially and culturally embedded (Barthes 1972; 
Bourdieu 1984). It is this potential for socially-led variation in pricing discourse that 
is the focus of this research, building on and extending Zelizer’s work on the social 




Key Terms: a definition and differentiation of the key theoretical 
terms that this project draws upon. 
The key terms discussed in this extended glossary are Price, Money, Value, 
Exchange, and Meaning. It draws on the literature above with the addition of a 
broader literature which was not discussed earlier in order to maintain the thrust of 
the thesis, but which warrants reference, notably the literature on gift exchange, 
cultural theories of exchange/value, and semiotics of price. 
Price 
This thesis explores the discourses of producers as they talk about choosing a price 
for their objects. Following the practice of Venkatesh (2006), Zelizer (1994; 1994) 
and Velthuis  (2005) in which price is used to mean ‘explicit money measurement’ 
(Velthuis 2005, p.2), in this study price is the ‘precise and (..) public number’ 
(Simmel, cited in Carruthers and Espeland 1998, p.1388) chosen by the participants 
for their items in advance of the selling moment. That is, it is a money price such as 
£4.99 attached to an item by placing a price sticker on the item itself, or on the wall 
or shelf edge on which the item is displayed, or by supplying a price list. The price 
could be said to be a direct reference to commerce, in that it signals that the object is 
for sale, and for that amount of money. 
Beyond the idea that price is a precise and public (money) number, prices can be 
understood as saying something: they ‘differ along quantitative but also along 
qualitative lines’ (Velthuis 2005, p.8).  That is,  
'To monetarize means to attach monetary value to something. Another way 
that money acquires and bestows meaning relates to the consequences of 
monetarization. Sometimes, these consequences are deeply symbolic.'   




Whereas Perinbanayagam (2011, p.117),  suggested that money bestows meaning on 
a person through their ownership of particular quantities of money Carruthers and 
Espeland suggest that money may bestow and acquire meaning in many more ways, 
particularly through pricing.  Putting a price on something makes the connection of 
object with money explicit. This explicit connection, and the process of considering 
how much money should be associated with the object, may be far from neutral to 
those involved in the process of pricing, because money may be understood as 
having, acquiring, and bestowing meaning. 
Previous research has explored some areas in which the act of monetarization is seen 
as very meaningful, notably where a connection with money is seen as inappropriate, 
and this inappropriate linkage is reflected onto those involved as well as onto the 
object being priced and the money itself. For example, Espeland (1984)  discusses 
the symbolism of the pricing of human blood and organs, Zelizer (1994) explores the 
symbolism involved in ‘pricing the priceless child’, Kemp and Bury (1999) discuss 
selling friendship, Hornborg (1999) deplores the destruction of the biosphere 
because of our willingness to price what we should treat as a priceless 
(incommensurable) environment, and Bradshaw and Holbrook (2007 discusses the 
Romantic anti-commerce ideal within the arts.  In this study I examine pricers’ 
discourses of monetarising or choosing a ‘precise and public number’ within the 
context of pricing art objects, in order to explore the social meanings of pricing. 
As discussed in the Price chapter of the literature review, there are many ways of 
understanding and arriving at money prices, such as the costs-plus-profit model or 
the arbitrary cohesiveness of pricing ‘scripts’ and reference pricing. Prices are part of 
a wide, co-constitutive system of meaning, or a ‘complex of cultural values’ because, 
as Marx (1970 [1859], p.66)  suggested, ‘Goods are not only signs of currency 
values, but also of other goods’ (Rey 1987, p.35) – that is, prices show something 
about the perceived relationship between all things.   Simmel suggested that a price 
is decided by the pricer ‘in accordance with his own or the average interest in the 




pricer will have some means with which to assess their own interest in the object, 
and perhaps compare it with their assessment of average interest, and the second, 
that they will be able to convert ‘interest in the object’ into monetary terms. 
 
Importantly, prices may also be understood to be ‘the product of conflicts of interest 
and of compromises; they thus result from power constellations’ (Weber,1978 
[1922], p. 108, in Baker and Jimerson). An assumption associated with the supply 
and demand model is that the conflicts of interest and power constellations being 
considered are those of buyer and seller, and that each will act as individualistic 
maximisers. However, work by Weber (Swedberg 1998) and Bourdieu (2000) 
suggests that there may be power constellations amongst pricers, and amongst 
buyers, as well as between buyers and suppliers, and that social (perhaps more than 
economic) considerations may influence interpretations of pricing practices as ‘right’ 
or ‘wrong’. 
Although perceptions of whether a price is ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ vary, Simmel suggests 
that to those who sell or buy the price is always right, because an exchange will only 
take place if both parties perceive that they are better off after the exchange than 
they were before it (Simmel 1978 [1907], p. 93). However, whatever the views of 
those involved, others may categorise the price differently. For example, Simmel 
suggests that ‘wrong’ prices are chosen by people too impulsive, uneducated, 
primitive or childlike to make a rational pricing decision.  
The idea that a perceived lack of pricing ‘know-how’ is a signal of lack of 
knowledge and experience, and is associated with low status (‘childlike’ and 
‘primitive’) is an important one. It suggests that some ways of pricing are perceived 
as better than others, and that these ways of pricing (and their assessment) are learnt 
(because they are not childlike, and not primitive). That is, pricing may be construed 




interpretations of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ ways to price. Those who decree the ‘right’ or 
‘wrong’ do so from an assumed position of higher status.  
Although this research focusses on the prices which are set, not on the prices at 
which an exchange has taken place, the move from a consideration of the abstracted 
exchange of object and money to the consideration of the specific parties and the 
exchange (and therefore interpretations of the price) as embedded in a particular 
context and system of interpretations is central to this study. Following Velthuis, 
within this thesis prices and discourses of price are understood as having meanings, 









As discussed in the Money section of the Literature Review, what is thought of as 
money varies with academic discipline (Baker and Jimerson 1992, p.678). To 
Baudrillard money is an abstraction, even a fetish, something which substitutes for 
and perhaps exceeds the thing it stands for,  ‘connected now not with exchange-
value, but with the unexchangeable’ (Baudrillard 2001, p.129), which echoes 
Simmel’s point that  
‘money has been defined as ‘abstract value’.  As a visible object, money is 
the substance that embodies abstract economic value, in a similar fashion to 
the sound of words which is an acoustic-physiological occurrence but has 
significance for us only through representation that it bears or symbolizes’ 
(Simmel 1978 [1907], p.120) 
Although money has no intrinsic value, few would regard it as unexchangeable. 
Instead, one of its primary attributes in facilitating trade is that it is exchangeable.  
The term ‘modern money’ is used throughout the marketing, behavioural economic 
and anthropological literature to distinguish it from ‘primitive’ money such as shells 
and beads etc. (Douglas 1982, Ch. 3). In this thesis I, like Belk and Wallendorf 
(1990, p.35) use ‘money’ to mean ‘contemporary’ or ‘modern’ money, but, 
following Zelizer (1994) I broaden it to incorporate other items such as the vouchers 
introduced by one of the art trails. 
In their very useful overview of the sociological money literature, Baker and 
Jimerson (1992) state,:  
 ‘(…) sociologists, like economists, almost exclusively study modern money 
– marks, yen, dollars, pounds, rubles, francs and so on.  Most sociologists do 
not look beyond cash, currency, and demand deposits as “money”.  




financial assets that are more or less substitutable for cash, such as overnight 
repurchase agreements, money market mutual fund shares, commercial 
paper, bankers’ acceptances, liquid treasury obligations and even financial 
futures and options. (…)  
Economic anthropologists, in contrast to both sociologists and economists, 
focus on primitive money, the money-stuff that appears in noncapitalist, 
nonmarket economies, such as woodpecker scalps, pigs, cows, seashells, and 
dogs’ teeth (Dalton, 1967; Hogendorn and Johnson, 1986).  
  Money, primitive or modern, can be understood only in its context. 
Modern and primitive monies derive their definitive bundle of traits 
from the socioeconomic organization of the societies in which they 
appear.’  
(Baker and Jimerson 1992, p.678, added emphasis) 
 This last point is important, as it emphasises the idea that money has meanings: 
modern money, as with primitive money, is understood, and those 
understandings/interpretations are context-specific. The functions money is allowed 
to perform, and how interpretations of those functions are shaped and shared is 
through social agreement.  Although ‘Economists focus only on the limited bundle 
of impersonal and neutral traits conferred [on money] by market integration: a 
medium of exchange, a means of payment, a store of value, a unit of account and 
standard for deferred payment (Dalton, 1967, pp. 256-259). Sociologists recognize 
such money uses but consider a much broader range, especially the use of money as 
power.’ (Baker and Jimerson 1992, p.680) 
Hornborg (1999) states that the meanings of money within the current social 
agreement have led to us rapidly destroying the physical world upon which our 
economy is built. Because money is understood as enabling comparison and 
therefore exchange of unlike for unlike, and money accumulation is understood as a 
goal in its own right, we are willing and able to trade short term profit and trade for 




what Hornborg sees as the rise of fetishized global market money, is seen as the root 
of this problem. This seems linked to Baudrillard’s criticism of the ‘doubly abstract 
passion for money, [in which] this becomes the object of a higher fetishism, 
connected now not with exchange-value, but with the unexchangeable’ (Baudrillard 
2001, p.129). 
 
Baudrillard (2001, p.127) suggests that  
‘This fetishism of money, before which all activities are equivalent, expresses 
the fact that none of these activities any longer has any distinct end-goal.  
Money then becomes the universal transcription of a world bereft of 
meaning.’  
 
To Marx, commodities are made because they can be exchanged for money (they 
have exchange value for the producer, rather than use-value), and money has become 
an end in itself. However, as money has no intrinsic value, it can be seen as a fetish, 
something which substitutes for and perhaps exceeds the thing it stands for.  
However, although a primary function of money is to be a means of 
commensuration, that is, it to enable comparison and equivalencies and thereby the 
exchange of unlike with unlike, money performs other functions too: 
‘Consider the standard economics textbook definition of modern money: 
Money functions as a medium of exchange, measure and store of value, 
means of payment and unit of account. Because many things can perform 
these functions, it is more accurate to speak of monies rather than to assume 
that money is a singular, unitary thing’   
(Carruthers and Espeland 1998, p.1388).  
Whereas according to this economic perspective money is a ‘utilitarian commodity’ 




socio-economist Viviana Zelizer (1994), like Carruthers and Espeland (above), treats 
this as a narrow interpretation. Rather than simply using ‘monies’ to convey that 
there are many things which can be used to fulfil the economic functions of money, 
Zelizer states that even when it may look like standard modern money people 
separate it into different categories, and the category and associated practices inform 
and are shaped by social relations. Far from money being the ‘universal transcription 
of a world bereft of meaning’ as Baudrillard (2001) suggests, according to Zelizer 
money is meaning-full, and used in meaning-full social interactions.  
That is, echoing Douglas’ finding that the Lele use money categorisations and 
practices as a medium of social relations, work by Zelizer, Thaler, and others shows 
that this also holds true in modern Western contexts in which modern money is used: 
‘money should be viewed as an element in the communicative system of the 
human agent as a dialogic creature, a creature who is primarily a symbol-
making and symbol-using entity.’ 
 (Perinbanayagam 2011, p.107)  
Perinbanayagam (2011) concentrates on the ways in which the ownership of 
different quantities of money inform social position, relations and identity (‘the 
coinage of the self’), whereas Zelizer focusses on the ways in which interpretations 
of the quality or categorisation of monies informs and is informed by social position 
and social relations.  My study focuses on this socially-meaningful aspect of money 
within discourses of price. 
Perinbanayagam concludes by saying that the importance of money is largely 
derived from the role it plays in relationships. However, whereas Zelizer shows how 
different types of money and money practice are used in different social 
relationships, and in this way ‘money is attached to a variety of social relations’, to 
Perinbanayagam it is the amount of money one owns which informs relations with 
our significant others: ‘if we do not have the necessary money to maintain relations 




the erosion of our social relations, there always occurs simultaneously a 
diminishment of our powers of agency and the moral character of our selves’ 
(Perinbanayagam 2011, p.133).   His encouragement to acquire money in order to 
save our moral character has almost religious overtones, suggesting that one has a 
duty to go and earn money.  
 
If we all shared the idea that one has a moral duty to go and earn money in order to 
have status and maintain a positive sense of self through desirable social relations, 
then pricing (and charging high prices) would always be socially desirable. 
However, it is possible that pricing could be seen to suggest that one needs money, 
that is, that one does not have enough. If this were the case, only those pricers who 
can demonstrate clearly that they already have ‘enough’ money would feel 
comfortable about pricing.  Extending this idea, one might expect that those with less 
money would seek to create and maintain other non-monetary (perhaps anti-







 ‘ “Value”, in the economic sense [is] the degree to which objects are desired, 
particularly, as measured by how much others are willing to give up to get them.’                 
(Graeber 2001, p.1) 
From this demand-led definition (which echoes Simmel’s (1978 [1907])), and begs 
the question ‘how much of what?’ – the implication is ‘how much money’ -  it is 
perhaps not surprising that ‘value’ and ‘price’ are often used interchangeably in 
economic and marketing literature and conversations. In this study price and value 
are thought of as related, but not synonymous. 
Within the price and money literature reviewed in this study ‘value’ is used in many 
ways, and although a topic of research in its own right, it has proved to be a complex 
and difficult to define concept (see for example Graeber 2001; Hutter 2008). As 
Zeithaml (1988) states, value is an ‘indistinct and elusive’ construct.  Whilst 
containing economic elements, the construct also includes at least two other streams 
of thought: ‘value’ in sociological sense (‘conceptions of what is ultimately good, 
proper, or desirable in human life’, and in the linguistic (Saussurean) sense of 
‘meaningful difference (Graeber 2001, p.2)3.   
 To Holbrook (1999, p5), whose focus, like Zeithaml’s, is on consumer perceptions, 
consumer value is an ‘interactive relativistic preference experience’, in which each 
                                                 
 
3
 Intriguingly, in Graeber’s Toward an Anthropological Theory of Value  there is no index entry for 
‘price’ or ‘pricing’, although one might expect there to be a referenced discussion of the frequent 





of the facets (interactivity, relativism, affectivity, and a grounding in the 
consumption experience) is ‘intimately interrelated with the other three. Using these 
facets, and building on insights gained during his decades of research and 
introspection re axiology, he proposes a framework to distinguish eight key types of 
consumer value.   
Addressing each of the three facets in turn Holbrook says that by interactive he 
means that there is a subject (the consumer) and an object (which could be a 
manufactured item, a holiday destination, a service, for example). Whereas extreme 
subjectivism would suggest that value lies only in the eye of the beholder, an 
extreme objectivist position would suggest that value resides in the object itself. 
Holbrook proposes that an intermediate position is most useful. 
By relativistic (p.6) he means that consumer value is ‘(a) comparative (involving 
preferences among objects; (b) personal (varying across people); and (c) situational 
(specific to the context). 
Finally, by experience (p.8) he means that consumer value resides not in the product 
purchased, not in the brand chosen, not in the object possessed, but rather in the 
consumption experience(s) derived therefrom.’ 
Holbrook then (p9) adds what he calls ‘three key dimensions of consumer value’: 
Extrinsic versus intrinsic value; Self-oriented versus other-oriented value; and Active 
versus reactive value.   These are combined into a 2x2x2 cross-classification, 
producing an eight-cell Typology of Consumer Value. These cells are populated by: 
efficiency, excellence, status, esteem, play, aesthetics, ethics, and spirituality, and 
that these outcomes are of value to the consumer. 
Intriguingly, although in common perception price and value are often conflated, 
price is not listed in the index of his edited book (a collection of papers given at an 
ACR special session to explore his typology), and if and how price and perceptions 
of value are related is not a central topic. However, Richard Oliver, one of the 




above), and points out that ‘Perhaps the easiest rendition of value in lay terms is the 
singular notion of worth. Price and quality, taken separately, would fit this category.  
Often this is referred to as a “utility” definition, but it is more accurate to refer to it 
as cardinal utility’ (p.45).  Although the ratio of what is received to its price is often 
expressed as the ‘value for money’ (in, for example, Consumer Reports) (p50) ‘price 
and value are not necessarily congruent’ (p46).  
That is, price and value may be seen to be related, but perceptions of the relationship 
will depend on conceptions of value used. For example, is status created by high 
prices, or are high prices a reflection of high status? Is the object more beautiful, or 
more esteemed, if it is more highly priced, or vice versa? Whilst it is entirely 
possible that producers assess the value of their object using a mixture of dimensions 
similar to those proposed by Holbrook, and the dimensions may play an important 
part in their categorisation of their object, it is not at all clear how the pricers might 
translate this into price.  
Baudrillard  suggests that we have lost all idea of the real, because we are reliant on 
what he calls ‘maps’ or ‘models’, which have become so dominant that they now 
determine the real. We have lost our ability to distinguish between what is real, and 
what are simulacra, which are themselves a form of reality and will have a bearing 
on our practices and our values. 
To expand, he says that there are three ‘orders of simulacra’. In the first order of 
simulacra (associated with the pre-modern period), the image is a clear counterfeit of 
the real; the image – such as a picture of the king -  is recognized as just an illusion, 
a place marker for the real. 
In the second, (associated with the industrial revolution of the nineteenth century), 
the distinctions between the image and the representation begin to break down 
because of mass production and the proliferation of copies – e.g. in photography. 




well, thus threatening to replace it.  However, there is still a belief that, through 
critique or effective political action, one can still access the hidden fact of the real.  
In the third order of simulacra (associated with the postmodern age), we are 
confronted with what he calls a precession of simulacra; that is, the 
representation precedes and determines the real. Whereas in the first stage the image 
reflects the real, the second masks and perverts basic reality, and the third hides that 
there is no real, the fourth ‘bears no relation to any reality whatever; it is its own 
pure simulacrum.’ (Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulations, 1998). 
 There is no longer any distinction between reality and its representation; there is 
only the simulacrum. How then can one determine the value of anything? What is of 
value, if exchange value is as meaningless as Baudrillard suggests, yet ‘use value’ is 
tied up with socially-constructed meanings which are shaped by media culture and 
multinational capitalism? What is the ‘thing’ that one is valuing? What is the system 
of meanings within which one is acting? If money has become a “universal 
equivalent” which has destroyed our connection with the real, what else could be 
used in exchange/pricing? 
Baudrillard (1993, p.60) suggests four registers of value in relation to a system of 
objects: ‘1. The functional logic of use value. 2. The economic logic of exchange 
value. 3. The differential logic of sign value. 4. The logic of symbolic exchange. 
They have for their respective principles: utility, equivalence, difference and 
ambivalence.’ Here, through ambivalence and reversibility, symbolic exchange 
undermines the ‘fixity’ of this system: ‘It puts an end to…economic exchange and 
accumulation’.  That is, Baudrillard provocatively proposes that we should challenge 
the values or ‘meaning’ of the capitalist system by adopting expenditure, giving, 
sacrifice, and destruction (suggested by his reading of Bataille and of Mauss re the 
gift and counter gift of potlatch), and in so doing escape determination by the 
existing market-led definitions of utility. Rather than seek value and meaning (which 





However, others are less nihilistic. To Graeber (2001), conceptions of value (in its 
widest sense) are visible through an anthropological study of actions, particularly the 
choice of which action to make.  It is likely therefore that although value is not the 
focus of this research, pricers’ conceptions of value will be suggested by the findings 
of this anthropological study of the discourses of price.  
This thesis focusses on discourses of price, which was associated by the participants 
with a precise monetary amount, and therefore might be thought to be most closely 
linked to the economic interpretation of value, rather than the more nebulous 
sociological concept of value. However, within this research, following the 
precedent of Bourdieu (1984), CCT research in general, and socio-economic 
research by Zelizer, pricers’ categorisations of object and money and other elements 
of pricing discourses are treated as potentially being treated by the participants as 
more or less appropriate and desirable, and these are sociological considerations.  
A key theory of value, Marx’s labour theory of value, was not meant to be a theory 
of prices (Graeber 2001, p.55) (see Capital Vol 1, in which Marx refers to prices 
diverging from values, and Parts I and II of Vol III which are ‘occupied with 
demonstrating how and why prices of production diverge from values in a systematic 
and demonstrable way’). Instead, the purpose of his analysis was to encourage 
change in the status quo, not to make a predictive tool which would help perpetuate 
it. Unlike Ricardo’s proposal that what is something is worth is the number of man-
hours involved in the making and distribution of it, in his labour theory of value 
Marx (1970 [1859], p.66) proposed that value is based on the proportion of labour 
(creative energy) spent in the production of the object compared to the total amount 
of labour in the system as a whole, and that the maker should have the right to 
determine the value of an object.  
Marx ‘by no means assumed that price paid for something was an accurate reflection 
of its worth’ (Graeber 2001, p.55), instead there are homogenizing forces acting on 




exchange, rather than solely by the maker’s assessment of worth. In this conception, 
pricing requires a convergence of perhaps conflicting systems of value.  
Like language, value, or the meaning of goods, is socially constructed. The 
interpretation of price inherent in the choice of price ‘says’ something about the 
values of the pricer, as does the interpretation of potential ‘readers’ of that price. 
However, as Rey pointed out,  ‘value and the economic goods themselves are 
indexical signs of social work, but (..) they are not normally understood as such’ 
(Rey 1987, p.33).  That is,  ‘The transformation of useful objects into values is a 
product of society in the same way as language.’ (Rey 1987, p.33, quoting Das 
Kapital [1867]).  
 Simmel suggests that value is ‘the epigone of price’ (Simmel 1978 [1907], p.94) .i.e. 
that value is of a later generation than price, and that ‘the statement that they must be 
identical is a tautology’. However, importantly, he also says that we  
‘should not forget that the objective and just equivalence of value and price, which 
we regard as the norm for actual particular cases, is valid only under specific 
historical and technical conditions and collapses immediately with a change in these 
conditions’ (Simmel 1978 [1907], p.95) .  
It is this context-specificity that may be the crux of the difficulty in maintaining a 
perceived equivalence of price and value.  Price, as discussed earlier, is ‘precise and 
public’, and therefore to an extent fixed, whereas value is a personal, nebulous and 
fluid conception (Zeithaml 1988, p.13), perhaps consisting of conflicting 
connotations (Graeber 2001).   Whereas conceptions of value vary, in most instances 
the price of an object is not adjusted for every condition such as change in customer, 
although used-car salesmen are able to use this flexibility to their advantage. It is 
therefore feasible that a price may be construed by the pricer as equivalent to the 
object’s value in one situation, but not equivalent in another.   
The idea that a money price ‘“condenses” and summarizes value’ (Carruthers and 




expressing constructs or preferences (Horwitz 1992, p.206), and given that there is a 
‘multiplicity of dimensions’ (Hutter 2008, p.17) involved in constructions of value, 
or, as Simmel puts it, ‘many specific presuppositions and considerations’ underlying 
‘the unitary concept’ (Simmel 1978 [1907], p.196), a price is not the summary of 
value, instead it could be seen as one of many possible summaries of values.  
In his discussion of ‘Monetary Exchange as an Extra-linguistic Social 
Communication Process’ Horwitz (1992, p.208) builds on Gadamer ‘to advance on 
Menger and Simmel’ in order to suggest that just as we rely on ‘pre-established 
words which have their universal meaning’ but which are also subject to ‘a constant 
process of concept formation by means of which the life a language develops’, 
market actors ‘must rely on “pre-established” prices to inform their actions, but the 
results of those actions are changes in the array of prices – “enriched by the[ir] 
particular view of an object.”’ 
Because from a sociological perspective values are ‘conceptions of what is 
ultimately good, proper, or desirable in human life’(Graeber 2001, p.1), price, as 
well as perhaps being understood as a condensing of considerations such as costs 
plus profits and ‘the going rate’, may also be understood as having been shaped by 
the values and cultural capital of the pricer. In this study only one precise and public 
price is chosen per object, but it may be the product of multiple (and perhaps 
conflicting) interpretations of the object, the money, and of how the pricing of a 
particular object in a particular context ‘should’ be done.  
'Value is an addition to the completely determined objective being, like light 
and shade, which are not inherent in it but come from a different source. 
However, we should avoid one misinterpretation; namely, that the formation 
of value concepts, as a psychological fact, is quite distinct from the natural 
process. (...) The meaning of value concepts is denied to nature as a 
mechanical causal system, while at the same time the psychic experiences 
that make values a part of our consciousness themselves belong to the natural 




world; but what we mean by valuation, its conceptual meaning, is 
something independent of this world; is not part of it, but is rather the 
whole world viewed from a particular vantage point.’  
(Simmel 1978 [1907], p.60, added emphases) 
This idea of vantage point and the potential for varied vantage points from which to 
construe value is similar to Bourdieu’s concept of habitus (Bourdieu 1984). That is, 
price may be understood as the ‘money equivalent of personal values’ (Simmel 1978 
[1907], p.355) because the calculation of a money-equivalent is shaped by values, 
which are informed by one’s upbringing and cultural capital. How one understands 
and values something is context-specific and depends on the valuer as much as the 
object, because, as discussed above, value is not an integral property of the object.  
Importantly, although the system of values used will be personal and fluid, they are 
not arbitrary: they are linked to the class condition (Bourdieu 1984), and therefore 
whilst varied they will not be infinitely varied or absolutely idiosyncratic, as 
illustrated by Kopytoff in his example of the negotiation of the price of a family 
heirloom with a jeweller (Kopytoff 1986, p.80): 
 
In this example Kopytoff suggests that he and the jeweller are using different 
systems of value, and that each of party recognises that the other is using a different 
system. That is, there is a shared idea that a jeweller (not just this jeweller) might use 
one system of value (whatever that system is), and that a customer (not just this 
customer) might use another system of value (whatever that system is).  Kopytoff 
suggests that a jeweller would use a ‘market’ or ‘commodity’ system of value and 
that this is different from the personal singularised-object valuations he, Kopytoff, 
used. 
Rey suggests that ‘value and the economic goods themselves are indexical signs of 
social work, but (..) they are not normally understood as such’ (Rey 1987, p.33)  




the same way as language.’ (Rey 1987, p.33, quoting Das Kapital [1867]). That is, 
like language, value, or the meaning of goods, is socially constructed. The 
interpretation of price inherent in the choice of price ‘says’ something about the 
values of the pricer, as does the interpretation of potential ‘readers’ of that price.  
The idea of a precise and public number is a simple one, although how one reaches it 
is not, and is the topic of this research. The concept of value is a thorny one (Hutter 
2008), and the relationship between the concept of value and price continue to be 
problematic (Zeithaml 1988; Graeber 2001) (see also Frisby’s discussion of 
Altmann’s review of The Philosophy of Money (Simmel 1978 [1907], p.xix)).  
Rather than focussing on pricers’ conceptions of value, which would have involved a 
different literature and a different analysis of the data, the focus of this price research 
is restricted to the exploration of pricers’ categorisations and interpretations of 
object, money, and commensuration. I did not ask “What do you think about when 
you think about the value of your work?”, I asked the related but different question: 
“What do you think about when you think about pricing your work?”  
 
Exchange 
 ‘v.t. to give or give up in return for something else: to give and take 
mutually: to barter.… n. the giving and taking of one thing for another’.  
Chambers Concise 20th Century Dictionary 
Within the research context, a price may be understood as a signal that the 
pricer/producer is willing to exchange their object (here a painting, or a sculpture, for 
example) for a specific amount of money, to anyone who has that amount of money. 
Therefore, pricing can be understood as being about exchange. 
The concept of exchange may be broadly divided into two main types: market (or 




involving different types of object, different time scales, and having very different 
social uses and effects.  
In his examination of The Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies, 
Mauss (1954) suggested that gift exchange was the second of three stages in the 
evolution of the economy. First there is ‘total prestations’, then gift exchange, then 
the commodity economy.  However, Mauss makes it clear that economic markets 
existed ‘before the institution of traders and before their main invention – proper 
money’(Mauss 1954 p.4), and that the morality and organization of gift exchange 
‘still function in our own societies, in unchanging fashion and, so to speak hidden, 
below the surface’ (ibid).  In modern contexts, as in all gift exchanges, ‘even when, 
in the gesture accompanying the transaction, there is only a polite fiction, formalism, 
and social deceit (..) really there is obligation and economic self-interest’ (p3). 
In Mauss’ positivist analysis gift exchanges have a number of attributes:  
They are associated with inalienable goods -  that is, ‘a gift is always seen to contain 
something of the giver’ (Graeber 2001, p.35). However, Mauss points out that 
objects which are sold do not necessarily become alienable;  
Gifts usually involve a time-delay rather than direct exchange. For example, French 
social insurance is construed by Mauss as a delayed repayment of the debt created by 
a worker in the gift he gave to society of his labour and contributions during his 
working life (Mauss 1954, p.67));  
Gift exchanges are relational, they are to do with social bonds. According to Mauss 
“A gift that does nothing to enhance solidarity is a contradiction" (Mauss 1954). Gift 
exchange may be used to create a ‘stable system of statuses’, or an ‘escalating 
contest for honour’ (Douglas, in Mauss 1954, p.viii)). That is, the relational aspect of 
gift exchange is not necessarily positive. Instead, gifts are ‘wounding’ in that they 
create a debt which must be repaid or the recipient will lose face. Gift exchanges are 




In contrast, market exchanges are associated with alienable goods (the property is 
alienated in that all rights in it are detached from one owner and vested in another). 
However, Mauss points out that in a market exchange the connection with the 
maker/previous owner may be reinstated, and perhaps be protected through 
legislation, as in ‘the French law of September 1923 that gives to the artist and his 
inheritors a ‘right of succession’ over the series of additional gains made during the 
successive sales of their works’ (Mauss 1954,  p.67). 
Market exchange involves direct exchange (no delay), and is often treated as though 
it is an isolated act, removed - by the use of money - from social relations and social 
considerations. That is, market exchange is construed as impersonal (free from 
relationships) and abstracted.  Within neo-classical economics this type of exchange 
is understood as a good thing, in that it helps to free the market to work optimally 
and therefore achieve best use of resources and optimal prices (Simmel 1978 
[1907]).  
Market exchanges involve money, they are about buying and selling, which, 
according to Mauss,  may be construed as involving ‘a tradesman morality’, which is 
concerned with venal value only and is therefore of lower status (Mauss 1954,  p.65). 
This pejorative categorisation of exchanges involving money is echoed by 
participants in Douglas’ work with the Lele, and in Bourdieu’s Algerian study   
(Douglas 1982; Bourdieu 2000). However, although market and gift exchange are 
posited as opposites, Mauss clearly suggests that the distinction between market and 
gift exchange may not necessarily be clear cut – instead the researchers’ and 
participants’ categorisation of an exchange involves interpretation of the exchange 
and the terms. 
Because pricing is generally deemed to be a ‘market exchange’ activity, with 
associations of abstraction and individual maximisation, in the section below I 
discuss gift exchange in a little more detail, as some of the gift exchange aspects 
may, as Mauss suggests, be present in a contemporary market pricing context such as 




Data from archaic societies suggests that in contrast to market exchange, gift giving 
is used to create or maintain a hierarchical position (i.e. power imbalance) through 
shared understandings of the hierarchical ranking of the parties and of the objects 
being exchanged (Gregory 1982, p.47).  As Gregory, Mauss and Douglas point out, 
this continues in contemporary settings. Gift giving is not necessarily about goodwill 
and altruism, instead it may be about ‘wounding’ the other, and include agonistic 
exchange, or the gift as contest, where each party tries to ‘out-do’ the other in the 
scale of their giving.  
‘Giving money [or surrogates for money] away has three dimensions related 
to the perception of the relative status of the participants: first, gifts between 
people who are of more or less equal status that involve the equal exchange 
of gifts; second, the gift from a superior to the subordinate that does not 
entail a return gift; third, a gift from a subordinate to a superior that is really a 
bribe for services to be received, a tribute, or a tax.’   (Perinbanayagam 2011, 
p.130) 
 
Here gifts, whether of money or of money surrogates (objects) are used in relations. 
There is no example of an altruistic gift with no expectation of a return, either in the 
form of a similar gift, or in status-affirmation. 
From his study of prior anthropological research (particularly that of Mauss) and his 
own field work in Papua New Guinea, Gregory suggests that:  
“The difference between a commodity-exchange relation and a gift-exchange 
relation can be summed up as the difference between 'value' and 'rank'. 
Commodity exchange - the exchange of unlike-for-unlike - established a 
relation of equality between the objects exchanged. When A and B exchange 
x and y as commodities of equal value, a relation of the form x=y is 
established.  In a commodity economy, because of the operation of the law of 
value, two heterogeneous things are treated as equivalent and the problem is 




    Gift exchange - the exchange of like-for-like - establishes an unequal 
relationship of domination between the transactors.  This comes about 
because the giver usually is regarded as superior to the receiver (A.J. 
Strathern, 1971, p.10).  This is a feature that is common to gift exchange 
systems all over the world.  But as Strathern (p.10) notes: "Whether this 
superiority implies political control over the recipient or whether it merely 
indicates a gain in prestige on the part of the giver are matters in which 
individual systems vary". The precise meaning of 'domination' is an empirical 
question; for the subsequent exposition it is sufficient that it implies that the 
giver has some kind of superiority. 
   Thus when A and B exchange x and y, A is superior to B because he gives 
him an x; but B is superior to A because he gives him a y. So who is superior 
to whom? This is the problem of rank and the answer to the question 
depends, in the first instance, on the rank of the objects, ie their exchange-
order.  Objects as gifts have this exchange-order rather than exchange-value, 
because the relationship between them is ordinal rather than cardinal. 
(Gregory 1982, p.47) 
 
For the purposes of this thesis there are three important points to draw out here:  
First, the assumption that commodity exchanges are about equivalence between the 
things being exchanged. The idea that what is required is to find ‘the common 
measure’ focusses on equivalence between objects, not the necessary first step, the 
calculation of equivalence between the objects and the common measure (money). In 
the case of pricing (which is this first step) Gregory’s statement suggests that the 
money price would be perceived as being equal to the object. Here, the calculation of 
equivalence between money and object(s) is treated as possible and necessary, and 




This leads to the second point: Gregory states that ‘Objects as gifts have this 
exchange-order rather than exchange value’. However, whether something is 
construed as having exchange order or exchange value (ie subject to ordinal or 
cardinal ranking) is a construction not an innate property of the object. The 
possibility of variation in construal is recognised by Gregory and Strathern (cited by 
Gregory, above), in that they highlight the importance of context in understanding 
exchange, and emphasise the need for an empirical grounding when seeking to 
understand the domination and superiority created by an exchange. I suggest that the 
empirical grounding is also required when trying to understand categorisations of the 
object and the exchange, because what criteria are considered important in the 
categorisation process will vary with context. In turn, construals of what types of 
objects (or practices) are considered comparable, and in what way, will vary. 
 
In the literature discussed above, an exchange is treated as either a gift or a 
commodity exchange, and therefore as either money-free, but with some idea of 
delayed reciprocation and on-going relationship or as involving money and as a self-
contained exchange. However, a pricer’s categorisation may not always be that clear 
cut, or involve the same connotations. A participant’s categorisation of the exchange 
as ‘market’ rather than ‘gift’ may be understood as a means of avoiding or reducing 
associations of loss of face, when ‘the whole tendency of our morality is to strive to 
do away with the unconscious and injurious patronage of the rich almsgiver’ (Mauss 
1954 p.65), but at the same time  the pricer may prefer to associate the exchange 
with the positive relational aspects of gift exchange rather than the impersonal aspect 
of market exchange, because market exchanges (ie those involving money) may be 
associated with ‘a tradesman morality’ (ibid) which, to Mauss, has negative 
connotations of involving ‘consistent, icy, utilitarian calculation’ (p.76). Although 
Mauss suspects that homo economicus lies ahead of us (and Hornborg (1999) 
suggests we have already gone too far down that evolutionary route), we have not 




relational associations) remains a key part of our social system, and may be visible 
within discourses of pricing. 
An examination of one’s own experience suggests that there are likely to be many 
exchanges which involve the exchange of object for money which contain relational 
elements between buyer and seller. For example, there are exchanges involving 
‘mates rates’, in which the seller gives a lower price because the buyer is a friend; In 
other instances a buyer may make a purchase and perhaps pay a higher price than 
they might otherwise because the seller is a friend or the buyer wishes to 
demonstrate a particular supportive or power relationship. In other cases an item 
might be bought in the expectation that in the future the roles will be reversed. As 
the growth in relational marketing and brand research demonstrates, the potential for 
a relational aspect within ostensibly market exchanges is not restricted to short-chain 
exchanges. Producers and retailers in what might have been taken as a neutral 
‘market’ or ‘commodity’ long-chain markets are increasingly leveraging 
relationship-building opportunities: see for example the encouragement of online 
consumer groups through Facebook and Twitter links on FMCG websites.  
The idea that an exchange can be categorised and contrasted as either gift exchange 
or market exchange is, as Mauss points out (p.73) more an analytic tool than 
necessarily a reflection of the continuum and variation in categorisation and its 
implications which exists in practice. Whilst gift exchange is often treated as 
altruistic, work by Mauss, Gregory and Douglas shows that it is not. Work by 
Zelizer, McKenzie and Douglas shows that market exchange is not necessarily 
individualistic and abstracted, although ‘market exchange’ is often used as shorthand 
to suggest that it is. Instead of treating them as opposites, both gift and market 
exchange may be understood as means of achieving social relations, and, as Mauss 
suggested, selling an object (market exchange) does not mean that it become 
alienable (Mauss 1954 p.66/7). Finally, although Mauss talks of the joy and pleasure 
of giving (p.69), he also states that gift exchange is generally as equally calculating 





Exchange and object categorisation 
The terms market exchange and commodity exchange are often used 
interchangeably, the type of object defined by the type of exchange, and the type of 
exchange defined by the type of object. This intertwining may stem from Marx’s use 
of ‘commodity’ to mean anything which is made to be sold on a commercial market, 
rather than made to be used by the maker. Gregory states that Marx defined a 
commodity exchange as  
‘an exchange of alienable things between transactors who are in a state of 
reciprocal independence’ and that ‘The corollary of this is that non-
commodity (gift) exchange is an exchange of inalienable things between 
transactors who are in a state of reciprocal dependence’  
(Gregory 1982, p.12).  
 
In a context in which singularity and relationships are understood as desirable, 
categorising an object as a commodity is therefore to treat it as something of lesser 
status, although the fact that it is made for sale and bought suggests that it is 
understood to be desirable. Within the writings of the Political Economists,  
‘A commodity is defined as a socially desirable thing with a use-value and an 
exchange value. The use-value of a commodity is an intrinsic property of 
thing desired or discovered by society at different stages in its historical 
evolution (…). ‘Exchange-value’ on the other hand is an extrinsic property, 
and is the defining characteristic of a commodity. ‘Exchange value’ refers to 
the quantitative proportion in which use-values of one sort are exchanged for 
those of another sort.’   




However, work by Bourdieu and CCT researchers suggests that the intrinsic use-
value of an object (Gregory gives the example of magnetic properties of materials) 
may be of less importance than the cultural use-value, which, like exchange-value, is 
an extrinsic property of the thing. Categorisation of one’s object as a ‘commodity’ 
may be informed by understandings of the implications of the term (ie commodities 
may have different cultural use-value), and may affect pricing practice. 
A money price could be thought to imply ‘commodity’, with associations of object-
equivalence and money-equivalence, detachment, alienability, and market exchange. 
Therefore if singularity is understood as a more desirable categorisation for the 
pricer’s type of object, pricing may be understood as a negative practice, and this 
may inform pricing practice and discourse. That is, the maker may prefer to 
construct the exchange as more of a ‘gift exchange’. 
According to Mauss, in a gift exchange the object always belongs to the giver. That 
is, it is inalienable because the giver is a part of the concept of the object. In this 
conception, the object’s biography (Kopytoff 1986) is part of the object. However, 
objects exchanged for money (i.e. market exchange) may also be considered as 
inalienable in that they too may be always construed as containing the maker (Mauss 
1954, p.67) or subsequent owners, as they too may be included in the idea of the 
biography or provenance (a term regularly used in art and antiques fields) of the 
object.  
In contrast, according to Perinbanayagam (2011), buying something ‘is a way of 
appropriating an object to one’s self, analogous to the Adamic role of gaining 
mastery by naming.’ That is, the maker or previous owner is supplanted. 
Here Perinbanayagam has drawn on Simmel’s example of someone who said that he 
bought things in order to ‘set the stamp of his personality upon them’ (Simmel 1978, 
p.32, in Perinbanayagam 2011, p.130). Buying, therefore, is a way of ‘assigning 
one’s ownership to the object in question, one’s identity in fact’ (ibid). The idea of a 




goods, in which the concept of the object includes the owner, but here the maker or 
previous owner has been supplanted by the new owner, because the act of selling 
their object opens up that possibility.  
The idea that a market exchange could be seen as an opportunity for the removal and 
supplanting of the maker/previous owner from the object could conceivably be part 
of a pricer’s consideration of whether and how to price their object, particularly if 
they construe pricing/selling as having this effect, and whether they see this 
possibility as undesirable.  
If a pricer were to share Perinbanayagam’s interpretation, then pricing the object 
could be understood to mean that they are willing to give up some or all of their part 
in the object, and allow another person to take that space. That is, in pricing and 
selling the object they could be construed to be allowing, perhaps even encouraging, 
the supplanting.  If, on the other hand, a producer/maker were to give their object 
away rather than sell it, the object might be construed as still belonging to or as 
containing the producer, as according to Maussian gift theory they would still be an 
integral part of the object. Therefore, if a producer wishes to make a sale but wishes 
to avoid the implication of alienation associated with a sale there are a number of 
practices which may be interpreted as changing the categorisation of the exchange. 
For example, the seller could encourage a delay in the second half of the transaction, 
as delay is associated with ‘gift’ rather than ‘sale’; and/or the money half of the 
exchange could be categorised as a gift, a type of ‘special money’, so that the whole 
exchange could be understood as an exchange of gifts rather than a market 
transaction.  Whether a supplanting of the producer within the concept of the object 
is understood as possible, and whether it is understood as desirable or undesirable, 







Exchange and money 
What is termed ‘market exchange’ appears to be defined largely by the use of money 
within the exchange. The historical rise of the use of money within exchanges is seen 
as both freeing exchange from social obligations and restrictions (a positive 
interpretation of the removal of social relations from exchange) and as neutralising, 
greying, and abstracting the personal and social from exchange (a negative 
interpretation of the abstracting effect of money). On the whole, ‘market’ exchanges 
or exchanges involving money are frequently understood to imply impersonal 
exchange (e.g. Fiske 1992), despite research which shows the opposite (e.g. Douglas 
1982; Zelizer 1994). 
Baudrillard (2001) says that the moment of exchange of object for money (he uses 
the example of the wife for $1m, in the film An Indecent Proposal) is the moment at 
which simulacra become unique:  
‘Once the moment of the transfiguration of money has passed, the moment of 
the reversibility of sign and thing – the million dollars metamorphosed into a 
unique woman, a unique sign – everything falls back into, and is lost in, a 
banal exchange of an amorous or sexual kind’ 
(Baudrillard 2001, p.125).  
Here Baudrillard’s interpretation of the categorisation of the goods at various stages 
in the exchange seems quite different from Kopytoff’s (1986). Whereas Baudrillard 
gives the money and woman uniqueness only at the moment of exchange, Kopytoff 
suggests that at the moment of exchange for money all things become commodities 
(and therefore more banal), but immediately before and after the transactions the 
objects may be construed as singular. That Baudrillard and Kopytoff construe the 
changes in categorisation through exchange differently highlights the point that it is 
important to investigate, rather than assume that one understands categorisations, as 





'how the forces of commoditization and singularization are intertwined in 
ways far more subtle than our ideal model can show, how one breaks the 
rules by moving between spheres that are supposed to be insulated from each 
other, how one converts what is formally unconvertable, how one masks 
these actions and with whose connivance, and, not least, how the spheres are 
re-organized and things reshuffled between them in the course of a society's 
history.'  
(Kopytoff 1986, p.88) 
As has been discussed by foundational sociologists such as Weber, Marx, and 
Simmel, and more contemporary academics such as Zelizer and Douglas, far from 
having a greying, neutralising or destroying effect on social relations, money is used 
in exchange ‘as a medium of social relations’(Douglas 1982, p.viii). Zelizer (1994) 
similarly strongly argues that the use of money is not neutralising, or abstracting. 









‘the world has less and less meaning (it has never had any, it has never been 
exchangeable for anything whatever, but today it is increasingly difficult to 
find a substitute equivalent for it: the only equivalent we can find for it is a 
virtual one).  We are thus torn between the imagining of meaning, the 
demand for truth, and the increasingly probable hypothesis that the world has 
no final truth, that it is a definitive illusion.  Do we absolutely have to choose 
between meaning and non-meaning? But the point is precisely that we do not 
want to.  The absence of meaning is no doubt intolerable, but it would be just 
as intolerable to see the world assume a definitive meaning. And this is where 
the miracle of money comes in.  Money is what allows us not to choose 
between meaning and non-meaning, and so to find a universal compromise.  
It functions as a universal substitute finality, just as the fetish serves as a 
substitute sex object.’  
(Baudrillard 2001, p.128) 
Baudrillard’s radical rejection of the existence of meaning appears to hinge on the 
idea that to have meaning something must have an equivalent, it must be 
exchangeable. He suggests that money – which is, he says, meaningless - in being 
the means of commensuration between unlike things creates a form of equivalency, 
and therefore, it must be assumed, meanings, but because the money economy is 
simulacra, the meanings are also simulacra.   
In contrast, Carruthers and Espeland build on Wittgenstein’s theory of language to 
suggest that 
‘The meaning of money, like the meaning of words, cannot be reduced to that 
which it represents. Thus, it is misguided to try and identify universally 
representational properties of money and to link these to its meaning.  The 




all money. Instead, its meaning depends on what people in a particular 
context do with it.’    (Carruthers and Espeland 1998, p.1387) 
 
That is, as in Zelizer’s work The Social Meaning of Money, meaning is treated as 
being visible through practices, and as ‘real’, even if, as Baudrillard suggests, the 
things which money or a word represent are not necessarily ‘real’.  
As mentioned in the Money section of Key Terms, to Baudrillard money is an 
abstraction, even a fetish, something which substitutes for and perhaps exceeds the 
thing it stands for,  ‘connected now not with exchange-value, but with the 
unexchangeable’ (Baudrillard 2001, p.129),  echoing Simmel’s point that  
‘money has been defined as ‘abstract value’.  As a visible object, money is 
the substance that embodies abstract economic value, in a similar fashion to 
the sound of words which is an acoustic-physiological occurrence but has 
significance for us only through representation that it bears or symbolizes’ 
(Simmel 1978 [1907], p.120) 
Horwitz also draws an analogy between money and language, drawing on Gadamer’s 
theory of language:  
‘we cannot judge the appropriateness of words by seeing how they 
correspond to something “else”, because there is nothing “else” we can know 
outside of the word-systems we use to identify and understand things.  If 
money is the analog to language, then price is the analog to word. A market 
price embodies knowledge made available by exchanges through the medium 
of money, just as a word is knowledge made available by speaking or writing 
in a language.  Therefore, just as a word does not correspond to some 
objective thought or meaning, so does a price not correspond to some 
objective quality of the object being bought or sold, or some objectively 
measurable cost.’ 





The ‘language’ of the sign demands a form of literacy so that, to be able to 
participate appropriately in the conversation of consumerism, consumers 
must understand ‘the code’ (Baudrillard, 1996 [1968]), that is the coherent 
but dynamic arrangement of arbitrary meanings attached to objects.' 
(Newholm and Hopkinson 2009, p.441) 
Whilst a total absence of meaning, and the epistemological problem of the gap 
between signifier and signified continues to be a major topic of semiotic research, 
Barthes points out that in practice it is often difficult to separate the signified from 
the signifier because the object and its meaning are intertwined. For example, he 
suggests that we cannot see a red rose without seeing a ‘passionified’ rose (Barthes 
1972), we cannot see a red traffic light without seeing ‘stop’.  
Semiotics is the study of meaning in which rather than being an inherent attribute, 
meaning is treated as something which is assigned, and makes sense only within a 
system of meanings. Although the study of signs, symbols and communication began 
with Hippocrates, Plato and Aristotle, semiotics began at the turn of the twentieth 
century as the structuralist study of written and spoken language, and is rooted in the 
work of C.S. Peirce, F. de Saussure, and arguably, Gadamer’s hermeneutic research. 
Lévi-Strauss’s anthropological studies of social structure and cultural myths (1963; 
1987)  further extended its application.  The inclusion of semiotics in marketing 
research methodology might be said to have formally taken off in the 1980’s, at the 
1986 First International Conference on Marketing and Semiotics (Umiker-Sebeok 
1987), although it had already been recognised as a potentially useful underpinning 
theory for research examining symbolic elements of consumer behaviours (Mick 
1986).   
Within marketing the semiotic approach has been applied particularly to the analysis 
of advertising and consumption practices, although not always explicitly. The 




semiotic analysis (as in, for example, Xin and Belk 2008) is a relatively small but 
potentially important element within market research, and foundational CCT authors 
such as Barthes (1972) and Baudrillard explicitly used semiotic analysis in their 
critiques of the  perpetuation of power and construction of ‘reality’. In contrast, 
Bourdieu’s (1984) hugely influential work on the exposure of systems of meaning as 
signals of class position has been retrospectively discussed as semiotic and 
apparently built on Saussurian relational logic ( Schinkel and Tacq 2004). As Miller 
notes:  
‘Douglas and Isherwood (1978), working within the paradigm of semiotics, 
saw commodities as a system for communication which makes visible and 
stable the categories of culture, with an emphasis upon social difference, 
exclusion and inclusion. Others such as Baudrillard (1981; also Sahlins 1976) 
attempted a semiotic mapping in which objects come to represent specific 
social positions. The fullest exposition of this particular anthropological 
perspective was given by Bourdieu (1984) in his analysis of taste, where it 
was the classification of class position that was deemed fundamental.’ 
(Miller 1998, p.139)  
Wennerlind (2001) explains that although ‘there are important differences between 
the various semiotic theories, they share certain unifying themes:  
‘Semioticians seek ways to establish - or crystalize – the existence of 
meaning, experience, and knowledge communicated through symbols so that 
this transference of culturally defining information may be studied in a 
meaningful manner. 
Systems of signs are understood as being constituted by the complex 
meaning/experience relations between one sign and others. (…) a symbol’s 
meaning can only be understood in a mutually contextualizing relation with 




 Signs often have multiple meanings.  A distinction is frequently made 
between denotation, the definitional and literal meaning, and connotation, the 
socio-cultural association. 
(….)  In general, semiotic methodologies do not try to establish the one true 
meaning or find the symbol’s nature or essence.  The search is most often for 
a multiplicity of meanings – denotative and connotative – condensed in a 
symbol. 
(…) 
Uncovering the connotative meaning of a symbol may contribute to the 
process of questioning and challenging the dominant meaning of symbols, 
undermining universalizing, normalizing, and legitimizing sign systems.  In 
this sense, semiotics radically critiques the ideological elements of a cultural 
order.’ 
(Wennerlind 2001, p.559) 
Although in his paper “Money talks, but what is it saying?” Wennerlind gives a very 
useful overview of literature using various semiotic approaches to money, 
Perinbanayagam criticises Wennerlind (2001) for drawing on the semiotic 
implications of work by Gadamer and Hume, rather than rooting his analysis in a 
specific semiotic theory in order to answer his question (Perinbanayagam 2011, 
p.112) . However, the themes outlined by Wennerlind (above) are key to much 
interpretive marketing research (although the research is rarely explicitly semiotic), 
where the focus is frequently on the multiplicity of meanings of market objects and 
practices and how these may be used by consumers in identity construction projects 
and social positioning. It is perhaps not surprising that Wennerlind’s case for using 
semiotics for future money research seems more appealing to me than 
Perinbanayagam’s semiotic approach which focusses more on the framework than on 
examining the complexity of actual practice. The authors whose work underpin this 
thesis - notably Zelizer (1994), Velthuis (2005), and Bourdieu (1984) - focus on 




Peirceian) semiotic theory, nor explicitly on semiotic theory. Instead, their work 
reveals how different groups use the meanings of practices within social relations. 
Although in this research I do not draw on semiotic theory, it seems useful to discuss 
semiotics in a little more detail, and show how a semiotic theory of money might 
differ from that of the other ‘meaning’ research underpinning my study. 
The idea that objects and practices are understood as having meanings is central to 
interpretive marketing research such as Consumer Culture Theory, and is implicit in 
core marketing theory such as the core model of the 4Ps (Product, Place, Price, 
Promotion). This model implicitly contains the idea that each ‘P’ has meaning(s) and 
can be understood within a code (a set of rules for linking symbols with meanings), 
in that each element and the sum of the elements is seen as a communication 
between consumers and suppliers, and as such are subject to interpretation (Rey 
1987, p.35).  
In their overview of key interpretivist debates within current consumer research, 
Hogg and Maclaran (2008) show that the varied methodological approaches build on 
two epistemological views. The first, constructivism,  
‘rejects the view that there is objective truth waiting for us to discover’, 
rather:  
‘[…] truth, or meaning, comes into existence in and out of our engagement 
with the realities of our world [..] meaning is not discovered but constructed 
[…] in this view of things, subject and object emerge as partners in the 
generation of meaning’.   
Secondly, subjectivism (relevant to structuralist, post-structuralist and post-
modernist forms of thoughts), where:  
‘meaning does not come out of an interplay between subject and object but is 
imposed on the object by the subject.  Here, the object as such makes no 
contribution to the generation of meaning’.  




Saussure, one of the fathers of semiotics, suggested that meaning is not inherent in a 
unit of analysis (in his case, a unit of language, e.g. a word), but is attributed to it. 
From this view, for something to be understood as meaningful (a sign), it has both a 
signifier (the thing or word) which is relatively stable, and a signified, which is 
created by the interpreter and changes with context.   
Saussure’s work had an enormous effect on the twentieth century study of linguistics 
and other systems within a variety of disciplines, including anthropology (Graeber 
2001, p.13). Saussure’s crucial point was that meanings are understood within a 
larger system: ‘the meaning of one element makes sense only in terms of contrast 
with other possible elements within the same system’ (Graeber 2001, p.14).  
Whilst hugely influential, Saussure’s ideas have been critiqued and developed, rather 
than necessarily adopted wholesale. For example, Barthes felt that Saussure’s work 
concentrated primarily on the concept of denotative meanings, whereas what was 
important was to explore the cultural specificity of connotative meanings, in large 
part because there is no such thing as a denotative or neutral meaning, apart from the 
example of mathematics. That is, in mathematics 1,2,3 are ‘value-free’, so 1+2=3 is 
a neutral, objective, denotative statement.  But, Barthes states, beyond mathematics, 
what in practice is thought of as the denotational meaning or ‘nature’ is simply that 
which is understood to be the most widely accepted, and the denotative signified is 
therefore simply the most recent connotative signified (Barthes 1974, p.9).  
Meanings are sources of power, they are controlled within hierarchies. Those which 
are treated as self-evident, rational or correct are ‘myths’ –  they are the dominant 
ideology of our/the time, a series of associations which are taken for granted - but 
they are merely the product of history, not essentially correct. Rather than accepting 
what are  culturally- and historically-specific common meanings, Barthes (1972) 
encourages all of us to examine and contest them, as blind acceptance of meanings 
will merely perpetuate existing power structures and their ideologies. However, one 




As Barthes points out, connotations are not ‘nature’, and neither are they 
idiosyncratic – you need to know the code, which is a ‘coherent but dynamic 
arrangement of arbitrary meanings attached to objects’ (Newholm and Hopkinson 
2009, p.441). There are multiple codes within the ‘complex of cultural values’ (Rey 
1987, p.35), and codes or interpretive repertoires are learnt.  Interpretations of 
meaning are therefore determined by the codes to which the interpreter has access, 
and knowledge of which one to use when and how – or, to use Bourdieu’s term, 
interpretation depends on the interpreter’s habitus. Use of a particular interpretation 
signals access to know-that and know-how knowledge, and therefore signals social 
group.  In his critique of the unquestioning adoption of the ‘falsely obvious’ 
attribution of meanings Barthes (1972) suggests that unquestioning adoption of 
interpretive codes is a type of constraint, and a means of perpetuating inequalities.  
This constriction and the need to challenge ‘taken for granted’ and ‘falsely obvious’ 
interpretations is something that many Fine Art artists are aware of, and incorporate 
in their practice, so that their art becomes an embodiment of  ‘revolutionary demand 
in the politics of art’ (Benjamin 1999 (1936), p.212) . For example:  
‘Their projects simultaneously address and undermine the common narratives 
and mythologies of the world which control both political and artistic 
discourses - creating unstable intermedial scenarios that build up temporary 
credibility in order to infect society with new narratives and open up new 
avenues of thinking.’   
 (Promotional email from artists Anders Bojen and Kristoffer Ørum) 
In Barthes’ semiotic analysis meaning ‘slides’, that is, meaning is linked to other 
meanings within the rest of the text and includes a consideration of the context – 
indeed, the context is part of the text. This emphasis on the need to consider the 
whole, and on the fluidity of meanings, is shared by hermeneutics.  However 
whereas historically the aim of hermeneutics was to use what might be called the 
‘copy’ approach, in which one would try to fathom the writer’s intent as this was 




aim was to understand the meaning intended by God), in more recent hermeneutic 
studies (e.g. Lavoie 1991) following Gadamer meaning is seen as an interpretation 
which is constructed dialogically: the ‘reader’ is seen as unavoidably engaged in the 
meaning-making, the reader is also the writer (Barthes 1972).  
 
Within the interpretive research arena there is an on-going agency-structure debate. 
To some, consumers are understood as ‘practicing semioticians, with a considerable 
expertise in reading and manipulating the meanings circulating in their society’ 
(Umiker-Sebeok 1987, p.xi), whereas others contest the degree of agency. That is, 
there are varied understandings of the extent to which one can influence meanings, ie 
have agency (Newholm and Hopkinson 2009, p.441): Firat and Schultz (1997) and 
Firat and Venkatesh (1995) suggest that agency is possible, if not boundless. Others, 
such as Simmel (1972), Baudrillard (1998 [1970]) and Bourdieu (1984) suggest that 
meanings are dictated by pre-existing institutional ‘rules’, as in the concept of class 
habitus, although rules and habituses change over time, which suggests that a degree 
of agency does exist.  
However, whilst the degree to which consumers are understood as have agency in 
manipulating meaning varies, within the marketing literature producers are more 
often understood to have these semiotic skills in order to manipulate them for 
marketing/economic ends (e.g. see Thompson and Tian (2008)). Within the 
marketing literature producers are rarely understood as operating within institutional 
meaning-making systems, in which they, like consumers, have specific habituses and 
limited agency, and that they too may be using meanings in identity projects and 
social positioning.   
Building on the CCT focus on consumers’ interpretations and uses of the meanings 
of objects and practices so that ‘consumption functions as a language’ (Newholm 
and Hopkinson 2009, p.441), in this research I turn away from consumers to 




themselves, and the money involved, have meanings for pricers. Perhaps, as Rey 
suggests, prices are part of a wide, co-constitutive system of meaning, or a ‘complex 
of cultural values’ because ‘Goods are not only signs of currency values, but also of 
other goods’ (Rey 1987, p.35) – that is, prices show something about the perceived 
relationship between all things.   Precedent set by Zelizer (1994), Velthuis (2005), 
and Bourdieu (1984) suggests that it is possible to usefully focus on the relations and 
meanings revealed through discourses of price without drawing explicitly on 
semiotic theory.  
 
Meaning and money: 
Although modern money has no intrinsic value, it is a social convention which 
functions because it has meaning(s). In Dyer’s semiotic analysis, it is the medium of 
exchange function that is the most important meaning of money. He argues that that 
the two important roles, that of producer and consumer, ‘reflect a world named by 
money, organized through purchase and sale, and geared to profits [the store of value 
function of money]’ (Dyer 1989, p.506) 
Money, its effectiveness as a means of facilitating exchange, its effectiveness as a 
relational tool, and as a source of power, depends on these socially-constructed and 
shared meanings. Importantly, ‘meaning of money, like other forms of meaning, is 
enacted in use’ (Carruthers and Espeland 1998, p.1385).   
As discussed earlier, the concept that objects and market practices are 
communicative phenomena and therefore have varied meanings and social uses 
underpins interpretive, symbolic marketing research. Therefore within the marketing 
research stream although the idea that money should be understood as having 
meanings is unusual, it is not to treat it as a special case – it is an obvious extension.  




‘According to this economic perspective, money arose as a convenience to 
facilitate trade and has become increasingly abstract and devoid of meaning, 
except in its capacity for facilitating exchange. The economic view then, is 
that money is ordinary, mundane, and profane; it acts as a convenient means 
to other ends. It has only quantitative meaning. This view may be pragmatic 
and rigorous, but it fails to offer an understanding of the more emotional, 
qualitative meanings of money.’  
(Belk and Wallendorf 1990, p.35).  
It is these ‘emotional’ and ‘qualitative’ meanings of money which also interested 
Douglas: in her collection of essays In the Active Voice, she states that 'Goods, 
money and food are here all treated as media in which people make statements about 
their life’ (Douglas 1982, p. x). That is, just as goods are understood as having 
meanings for those choosing and using them, within her research Douglas examines 
the ways in which money and money practices are chosen and used. It is this 
qualitative ‘money-meanings’ aspect of pricing practices that is the focus of this 
thesis. As Dyer suggests  
 ‘It is only by trivializing money's role as a symbol that one can view it as a 
mere expedient for transferring economic energy between independent 
agents.’ 
(Dyer 1989, p.503) 
Some of the ‘meaning of money’ research concentrates on the meanings linked to the 
quantity of money rather more than the quality of the money. For example, Rose and 
Orr  (2007), and later Perinbanayagam (2011) explore the idea that a volume of 
money may be understood as a ‘marker of accomplishment or prestige’, or ‘the 
means of protection from an uncertain future’, rather than on the idea that money can 
be understood to have different qualities or meanings depending on (for example) its 
source, or form, and that these qualities might be interpreted differently by different 




denotative meanings are merely the dominant connotative meaning, and therefore 
subject to change. 
In his semiotic analysis of the meaning of money Perinbanayagam draws on 
Peirceian semiotic theory to discuss money as a complex sign which is a qualisign, 
sinsign and legisign. It may also be categorised as an icon, an index, and a symbolic 
sign (Perinbanayagam 2011, p.112-115).  
He categorises money as a qualsign, because it is always embodied (as coins, notes, 
or credit, for example). As an embodied qualsign, money  
‘can move from the high born to the low born, from the master to the slaves, from 
patricians to plebeians and in reverse, readily and easily without losing its qualities’ 
(Perinbanayagam 2011, p.113).  
This is in contrast to research by for example Zelizer (1994), Carruthers and 
Espeland (1998), Belk and Wallendorf (1990), or Thaler’s (1985) work on mental 
accounting practices in which they show that money may be treated differently 
depending on its form and other factors such as source and earmarking. That is, their 
research suggests that the quality or meaning of the money does change with the 
form it takes and its movement. Here, money from a master to a slave is different to 
money from a slave to a master:  
‘sources  and  uses  of  money  are  inseparably  connected  in  determining  
the  sacred  or  profane  nature  of  this  money.  The  source  of money  may  
also  shape  the  way  it  is  used  as  a  means  of  affecting  its sacred  or  
profane  status.’   
(Belk and Wallendorf 1990, p.55) 
Perinbanayagam then says that money is a sinsign, in that it becomes an “actual 
existent thing or event”, and that ‘The greater the amount, the more definitive is its 
existential and “thing-like character”. Again, whilst the authors listed above (Zelizer, 




contest the “thing”-ness of money, the idea that it becomes more meaningful with 
increased quantity does not necessarily follow. Instead other aspects, such as the 
ceremony and history surrounding the civic award of $24 in the example given by 
Carruthers and Espeland (1998), may give the money meaning far beyond that which  
one might expect if using Perinbanayagam’s theory. At the other end of the 
spectrum, huge sums of money are sometimes treated as ‘unreal’, or ‘enchanted’, 
perhaps even ‘meaningless’, because they are beyond the scope of most people’s 
imagination.  
Money is also a legisign, argues Perinbanayagam, in that it is a ‘conventional sign, 
not a unique object’, which is ‘made significant by common agreement and is 
attested to by a higher authority. (..) In all its manifestations, each unit is equal to 
another’ (Perinbanayagam 2011, p.113). However, this idea of equality is hotly 
contested. The alternative view is that money ‘has meaning that depends on its use 
and context. Such uses are not, however, idiosyncratic. Nor is context ad hoc.  Both 
are socially structured in patterned ways we can discern’ (Carruthers and Espeland 
1998, p.1386).  
As Hornborg points out, the importance of context to meaning-making is a 
‘thoroughly semiotic concept’. However, in contrast to Carruthers and Espeland and 
to Granovetter’s (1985) seminal paper on embeddedness of contemporary economic 
practices,  Hornborg suggests that money and a money economy are a disembedding 
decontextualizing force (Hornborg 1999, p.148), rather than that (as proposed by 
Granovetter and Zelizer) money is treated as meaningful by embedded economic 
actors. He suggests that the concept of disembedding, ‘in signifying the alienation of 
person, objects or concepts from the contexts from which they have previously 
derived their meaning (ibid, p.149) means that because ‘meanings emerge in 
contexts’, an abstraction from context gives rise to increasingly empty signs ‘which 
can stand for anything to anybody’ and therefore propagate the destruction of 




Whilst Dyer proposed that it is the exchange that is re-categorised -  that is, ‘naming 
the environment as a gift rather than as a commodity would encourage social 
bonding through means other than the search for private profits’ because (echoing 
Mauss) a gift ‘embodies specific obligations and responsibilities to the community’ 
(Dyer 1989, p.509), a decade later Hornborg argues that the solution to 
environmental destruction is to have two types of money, because a ‘uni-centric 
economy (ie one based on the use of a single, general-purpose currency) renders 
money itself incapable of conveying meaning’ (p.152).  
Because of his assumption of abstraction, Hornborg finds the suggestion made by 
Polanyi and others (e.g. Codere) that money can be understood as a parallel to 
language very unsatisfying, and suggests that ‘in order to qualify as a cultural 
domain, the category of abstract exchange value would have to be internally 
differentiated so as to exhibit some kind of structure. This was indeed the case in 
traditional, multi-centric economies documented by anthropologists’ (ibid. p.154). 
However, as discussed elsewhere, work by hugely influential writers such as 
behavioural economist Richard Thaler and socio-economist Zelizer shows that far 
from being the preserve of ‘traditional’ economies, internal differentiation is 
common practice in contemporary American society.  
Whereas Hornborg claims that ‘In order to achieve sustainability, the money sign 
will have to be re-equipped with a certain capacity for discrimination’, major writers 
such as Thaler, Zelizer, Belk and Wallendorf and Carruthers and Espeland show that 
in practice the money sign is already equipped with multiple meanings, distinctions 
and discriminations. It may be, however, that in order to achieve Hornborg’s 
revolutionary ends the (what he sees as) dominant meanings of money need to 
change:  
‘because of money’s role in making the world known in a certain way, the 
kind of change involved in creating a post-pecuniary culture will be a change 
in the semiotic code and symbols through which economic and social life are 




creating new codes and symbols through which new social actors and 
personalities are created [Rosenberg 1983, pp.36, 200-204]’  
(Dyer 1989, p.508) 
Using Peirces’ definition of an icon as a “sign which refers to the object that it 
denotes merely by virtue of characters of its own, and which it possesses just the 
same, whether any such object actually exists or not” , Perinbanayagam says that 
money is an iconic sign ‘as it can be exchanged on an equal basis: a 10-dollar bill 
can be exchanged for another set of one dollar bills, or a check for hundred dollars 
can be exchanged for a 100-dollar note’ (Perinbanayagam 2011, p.114). However, 
because it relies on shared understanding of meaning, if the money was rejected as 
worthless or irrelevant it would cease to have iconic status (p.115).    
Money is an indexical sign ‘through its capacity to indicate an “object” and thus 
affect the object. Moreover, as a precisely quantifiable sign, it can indicate, affect, 
and define an object in precise terms.’ (p.114). Perinbanayagam is most interested in 
the idea that money-ownership indicates the self: ‘possession and control over 
[money] defines and indicates a “wealthy person”, a “poor person,” a bankrupt,” a 
“mendicant,” etc.’, and a responsible or irresponsible member of society. Again 
building on Peirce, Perinbanayagam says that power and social position depend on 
physical, mental, discursive and social skills, and that these are enhanced by the 
possession of money. Interestingly, whereas within the CCT literature and Zelizer’s 
work consumption and money practices are understood as a form of discourse, here 
Perinbanayagam limits discourse to the use of words, and money-ownership as a 
supporting act. Whilst he says that the construction of the self depends on one’s 
discursive power, which requires a ‘command of the language or his or her social 
circles, its peculiarities of usage in the local contexts and situation, and know 
nuances and subtleties of usage, to be able to enjoy this sense of power.’ 
(Perinbanayagam 2011, p.117), within this research the concept of discourse extends 
more widely, and includes money practices, in particular pricing. These are 




not simply money-ownership which gives and reflects power and sense of self, as 
Perinbanayagam suggests (as in the phrase ‘without money you are nothing’), but  as 
demonstrated in Bourdieu’s (1984) examination of the close links between economic 
capital and cultural and social capital which in turn inform money practices, other 
money-related discourses are also related to social position. 
For the purposes of this thesis a very important aspect of meanings of money is that 
the interpretations of the meanings of money may be considered to be a source and a 
reflection of social stratification. This is important, because it raises the possibility 
that pricing, which necessarily involves a consideration of money, may be informed 






CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH AGENDA: Money Meanings and Price   
 ‘the so-called 'rational' economic agent is the product of quite particular 
historical conditions’ 
(Bourdieu 2000, p.18) 
‘We are just beginning to realize the extent to which the modern market 
is still imbedded in personal and social meanings’  
(Belk and Wallendorf 1990, p.62) 
 
Much of the previously published price literature assumes that pricing is somehow 
abstracted from its social milieu, its demands and influences. The received wisdom is 
that producers who are entering a market domain (by pricing their object) are 
economically driven , but, as suggested in Morton and Podolny’s (2002) wine-
producer research, Becker’s (1991) work on restaurant pricing and Velthuis’ (2005) 
examination of the pricing practices of art gallery owners, this may not always be the 
case. Although abstraction and theoretical models are useful aids to understanding 
price, an expansion of the exploration of pricing as a practice performed by 
embedded economic agents is also required if a richer and more nuanced 
understanding is to be achieved. 
The recognition of the need for context-specific ethnographic detail of market 
behaviours has led to a significant and growing body of work concerned with the 
importance of historical conditions and culture in consumers’ actions and meaning-
making. However, we are only just beginning to turn a cultural lens on the meaning-
making practices of those on the supply-side (Peñaloza and Venkatesh 2006). I 
suggest that pricing - a central function of the supply-side – can usefully be 





Based on the literature review, I propose a model in which pricing is construed as a 
socially meaningful commensurative process involving a comparison of constructed 
object with constructed money. The model integrates two previous research 
frameworks: the Consumer Culture Theory (CCT) model of consumption behaviours 
which highlights social and cultural aspects of market behaviours, including the 
social positioning effects and uses of object-related interpretive repertoires and 
practices (cf. Arnould (2005; 2005)), and Zelizer’s (1994)  model of meanings of 
money, which highlights the importance and social function of money categorisation. 
Construction of ‘object’ is a central topic of research within CCT, and may be as 
important a part of pricing practice as it is in consumption practice. Money, a type of 
market object and a central aspect of price and market exchanges, is only just 
beginning to be a topic of interest. Rather than being a fungible neutral entity, recent 
research suggests that within contemporary Western culture money has a variety of 
meanings which inform how it is used. I suggest that the meanings of money may 
matter in pricing practice. For example, the idea that ‘Money is esteemed yet it is 
condemned’(Belk and Wallendorf 1990, p.50) and the corollary idea that to be rich is 
to be admired yet to be seen to want money is not, potentially pose a problem if one 
is pricing something.  
Because the meanings of object, money and commensuration are constructed rather 
nature, there is variation. The possibility for varied interpretations means that 
constructs may be used in power struggles, and should be examined rather than 
simply accepted (Barthes 1972). Importantly previous research shows that the three 
constructs used in the proposed pricing model - object/money/commensuration -  are 
used in legitimation and power struggles (see Bourdieu 1984; 1993; Zelizer 1994; 
Espeland and Stevens 1998). Building on this CCT and socio-economic precedent, 
this study moves beyond assumptions of economic rationale to examine substantive 
pricing data – discourses of price - in order to gain a better understanding of the 
variety of pricers’ categories and interpretations, and how and why particular 





Building on the literature review, the purpose of this research is to extend prior 
knowledge of pricing practices and money-meanings by closely examining pricers’ 
discourses of price, in an attempt to enrich our understanding of the pricing as an 
embedded, rather than abstracted, economic action.   
The focus of the research is an examination of variations in money categorisations 
and interpretations within discourses of price, in order to make more visible what 
Bourdieu called ‘the contingent and arbitrary character of these ordinary behaviours 
that we perform every day in the ordinary course of our economic practices and that 
we experience as the most natural things’ (Bourdieu 2000, p.23). The research 
considers how and why interpretations of money, object and commensurative rules 
are shared, given credence or rejected. 
The research questions therefore are 
RQ1: Are the social meanings of money involved in pricing practice? 
RQ2: What (if any) are the effects of the social meanings of money on the price 
chosen, and what (if any) are the links between social position and the use of 
particular discourses of price? 
 
Contribution 
This research differs from and contributes to extant marketing price literature in that 
it moves the focus to consider the pricer rather than the consumer, and in doing so 
enriches consumer-led price research. Secondly, the research extends the literature 
relating to Bourdieu and social practices in that it examines the social/cultural 
aspects in pricing practice. This is also an addition to abstracted supply and demand, 
cost-plus or marketing-mix-based models of price. And finally, the research 




both the previously published money research and the previously published pricing 
research. Although the possible connection between money-meanings, pricing and 






CHAPTER 4.   METHODOLOGY 
Introduction 
Methodology is both the method used to collect and analyse data, and assumptions 
regarding the validity or worth of particular types of knowledge and the means of 
arriving at that knowledge. The research questions and the means of answering them 
are shaped by methodogical predilection and choice. 
Research questions 
Although there is a large body of work regarding abstracted conceptions of price and 
marketing price strategies, pricing as embedded economic action has hitherto been 
largely ignored. The aim of this research is to enrich extant price and market-practice 
literature through an exploration of pricing as an active socialised process, building 
on Zelizer’s programme for the study of social money. The questions asked were: 
RQ1: Are the social meanings of money involved in pricing practice? 
and 
RQ2: What (if any) are the effects of the social meanings of money on the price 
chosen, and what (if any) are the links between social position and the use of 
particular discourses of price? 
The discourses of price of the research participants include not just the spoken word, 
with its changes in tone, pace and pitch and accompanying body language, but also 
their other choices of communication such as their choice of venue, material 
artefacts such as price tags, and their accompanying behaviours. This research 






4.1    Ontology 
‘To consider the ontological status of something is to ask whether it is real or 
illusory’ (Johnson and Duberley 2000, p.66). A realist ontology assumes that there is 
a social and natural reality ‘out there’ that exists whether or not we can imagine or 
‘gain cognitive access’ to it. That is, Kant’s noumenal reality/realm exists, although 
we can never gain access to it. A subjectivist ontology, on the other hand, assumes 
that what is ‘out there’ is a creation of our cognitive action, and has no independent 
status. As the out-there exists only through our cognition for the realist as well as the 
subjectivist, the question of whether this is a realist or subjectivist research is largely 
moot. However, from that sentence alone this research is clearly based on 
subjectivist ontology. The underlying assumption of this study is that ‘Knowledge is 
variably constituted according to the paradigm and metaphor deployed….. we 
always engage with the world via our socialized pre-understandings’ (Johnson and 
Duberley 2000, p.66). 
4.2    Episteme 
As detailed by Arnould and Thompson (2005), Guillen, Collins et al (2002) and 
Zelizer (2007) in their reviews of work to date, interpretive research within 
marketing and socio-economics has demonstrated that it is capable of developing a 
distinctive and exciting body of theoretical knowledge about meaningful 
interpersonal aspects of consumption and other marketplace behaviours. 
Knowledge-generation through ethnographic interpretive research has long been 
defended and supported within marketing, with a major push for acceptance by the 
consumer research community in 2005 by Arnould and Thompson. As Hogg and 
Maclaren (2008) suggest, despite some resistance to theories generated by qualitative 
techniques, the increasing visibility of interpretive research within highly regarded 
journals such as The Journal of Consumer Research suggests that this methodology 




practitioners and academics (Elliott and Jankel-Elliott 2003; Venkatesh 2005)  in the 
sociocultural, experiential, symbolic, and ideological aspects of market behaviours. 
As it is precisely these aspects of pricing that I wish to explore, and it is the 
methodology used in the research I wish to build on, ethnography is an apt 
methodological choice for this research.  
Following the methodology of Consumer Culture Theory (CCT) researchers such as 
Luedicke (2006), Penaloza (2000) and Parsons (2010), and socio-economic 
researchers such as  MacKenzie (2006) and Venkatesh (2006) , this research is an 
ethnographic study of pricing as embedded economic action. As Denny and 
Sunderland (in Venkatesh 2005) detail, within marketing ethnography is  ‘The 
traditional anthropological method used to illuminate cultural categories, cultural 
domains, and cultural practices.’ That is, for anthropologists in marketing, 
ethnography is grounded in cultural analysis.  
It is important to note that although some ethnographic work privileges the 
researcher as a neutral observer of participants’ interpretive processes, within the 
Bourdieusian critical tradition the researcher does not claim neutrality. Instead, there 
is recognition of the researcher’s implicit and explicit effect on the context, the data 
collection and the analysis. The researcher’s understanding of the context and data is 
necessarily an interpretation. Within this tradition data collection, coding and 
analysis is mediated by the researcher’s presence and interpretations, as discussed in 
Thompson’s explicit use of both etic and emic categorisations in consumer research 
(Thompson 1996), and Venkatesh’s iterated process of reflexion regarding his 
involvement and possible effects on the research participants during his long 
immersive socio-economic study of money practices in Chicago’s Southside 
(Venkatesh 2006).   
Following CCT and socio-economic precedent, ethnography is a pertinent research 
methodology for an examination of whether and how money is involved in pricing 
practice. As Zelizer points out, ethnographic methodology ‘reveals a great deal of 




trivial feature of money. As Bourdieu and Heilbron (2005) said, that is how money 
works’ (Zelizer 2007 p.1063 ).  Although largely ignored in the price literature 
hitherto, this social negotiation and production of money meanings may also be an 
important aspect of how pricing works.  
It has been noted that much consumption-behaviour research implicitly uses semiotic 
methodology, and there have been calls for it to be used both more explicitly and 
more rigorously (Mick 1986).  Yet whilst there has been growing interest in 
investigating the co-construction of meaning, key CCT authors continue to cite other 
methodologies in their exploration of meaning-making as a social practice.  
In 1982 Douglas suggested that semiotics potentially has a great deal to offer in 
solving what she perceived as the  
‘lack of a methodologically satisfactory way of relating the cognizing 
individual to his cognized social environment, accounting for the feedbacks 
and reinforcements each gets from the other. ‘ 
(Douglas 1982p.201) 
  
However, in what has been cited as ‘one of the best treatments’ of this subject [the 
difficulty and importance of analysis and interpretation in qualitative market 
research] (Price 2004, p.489),Craig Thompson, a founder of what is called Consumer 
Culture Theory, chose to use hermeneutic interpretive framework rather than 
semiotic analysis to examine  how  
‘Personalized consumption meanings then express a co-constituting (or 
dialectical) relationship between the social conditions and identity issues 
salient to a given consumer and a broader legacy of historically available 
frames of reference, rather than being purely subjective or idiosyncratic 
constructions.’ 




Whereas the focus on semiotics is on exploring what meaning is, and how meanings 
are made, that is, on the meaning process, within the core literature on which I draw 
the focus is on exploring what meanings are made, and by whom, and what these 
meanings do.   
As Mick (1986) explains,  
‘Semiotics takes two forms: (1) a general semiotics that to seeks to answer, 
“What is the nature of meaning?” and (2) a specific semiotics that asks, 
“How does our reality  - words, gestures, myths, products/services, theories – 
acquire meaning?” (Ransdell 1977)’.  To address these questions, 
semioticians investigate the sign systems or codes essential to all types of 
communication for the latent rules that facilitate sign production and 
interpretive responses. 
(Mick 1986, p.197) 
Barthes’ critique of ideological elements of cultural order (which is built on semiotic 
theory) was hugely influential during the process of writing this thesis, but apart 
from this, my underpinning literature did not explicitly use semiotic theory. Within 
Key Terms section Meaning I discussed semiotics and ‘meaning’, and examine 
literature which considers money (and to a smaller extent price) from an explicitly 
semiotic point of view.  
Within this body of work the emphasis could be seen to lie primarily on using 
Saussurean or Peirceian frameworks to describe and categorise how money might be 
understood (e.g. by Perinbanayagam as a qualsign, sinsign, icon  etc) – or was 
criticised because it did not do so sufficiently clearly (cf Perinbanayagam’s critique 
of Wennerlind). The semiotic literature contains very useful considerations of money 
as a form of (albeit impoverished) language, however the conclusions regarding the 
effects of money meanings, or how meanings were used in social relations, were 
often far more restricted than in the money-meaning research by Zelizer and 




As I am interested in whether and how meanings of money inform pricing discourses 
and whether and how these discourses are used in social relations, I have followed 
the methodological precedent set by those latter authors. 
  
4.3    Research process 
Following research conventions which underpin most interpretivist research in 
contemporary consumer research (Hogg and Maclaran 2008, p.132) discourse is 
‘treated as a potent action-orientated medium’ (Potter and Wetherell 1987, p.160).  
Within this research the text under analysis - the discourse - is the spoken word and 
its variation in tone, pitch, speed and accompanying body-language, or its absence. It 
also includes other forms of communication, such as choice of venue and associated 
material artefacts (e.g. emails, price lists, pricing labels, prices, marketing materials, 
lighting) and behaviours (e.g. attendance at certain lectures, art shows and classes). 
Secondary data includes media articles and sources referenced by participants, and 
sources of field-specific ‘know how’ easily available to participants through 
frequently-accessed local institutions such as university art faculties and galleries. 
The data was collected through anthropological study over a 3 year period of deep 
immersion or ‘deep hanging out’ (Elliott and Jankel-Elliott 2003, citing Wolcott 
1999) in the context. Observation and semi-structured interviews were used to 
collect discourses of price and pricing from a meaningful and manageable array of 
participants in the local artworld.  The aim was to gain an insider’s perspective on 
pricing practices, whilst simultaneously seeking to maintain an outsider’s analytical 
eye. Although I was already familiar with some artworld vocabulary and practices, 
through a ‘long series of often infinitesimal experiences’ (Bourdieu 2000, p.23) of 
artists’ market-related practices and discourses I began to realise that what I had 
thought were self-evident, natural, necessary, and therefore rational approaches to 




The discrepancy between my understanding of ‘how to do price’, which I had learnt 
through years of business-school study (BSc and MBA)  and years of working in 
industry,  and the practices of the research participants  ‘made me feel (…) in 
sensible and concrete fashion the contingent and arbitrary character of these ordinary 
behaviours that we perform every day in the ordinary course of our economic 
practices and that we experience as the most natural things...’ (Bourdieu 2000, p.23), 
and I became particularly interested in the power-relations that were produced, 
maintained, and challenged by the use of particular versions of ‘how pricing is 
done’.  
Following the precedent of Thompson’s (2004) immersive approach in his study of 
natural health market-place myths, ideological agendas and power structures, and 
Venkatesh’s (2006) study of ‘hard circumstances’ money practices, an immersive 
approach was used in order to acquire fluency in the context-specific vocabularies 
and repertoires, to systematically collect pricers’ discourses of price and pricing, 
including where possible the haptic elements of those discourses, and to ground the 
analysis. As in Thompson’s study, I too have been involved in the research 
community – here the art community - for about ten years, and have been intensively 
studying this pricing context for the last three. Throughout the research I was 
mindful of the importance of ‘the looser qualities of ethnography (such as participant 
observation) which are (…) its core strengths’, (Norman Stolzoff, in Vekantesh 
2005, p.348). 
The three years of intense study of pricing practices within the context focused on 
improving my fluency in the art world market-related discourses in order to better 
understand the variations in meanings and the tensions within the discourses. To this 
end I was engaged in the organisation of two art trails, participated in one (as a 
venue-owner, not artist), and visited five or six trails each year. I read all price-
related literature available in the local art institutions, and attended a wide variety of 
art lessons and art lectures throughout the research period. This varied involvement 




conversations with those pricing their work, and provided a variety of routes to 
recruitment for more formal interviews. 
4.4    Context  
The context of the research is the Bristol Art Trails, a rapidly-growing short-chain 
market phenomenon in which local artists are pricing their own work, and selling 
directly to the public.  By looking at what might be termed an extreme example of a 
pricing context, it was possible to identify behaviours which would possibly be less 
visible in a more mainstream pricing context.  
The art trails began in 2000, and are generally held as annual events, with each art 
trail lasting for a weekend, sometimes with a Private View on the preceding Friday 
night. As discussed above, throughout the research process I was able to gain access 
to a wide range of pricers and situations in which discussions took place. These data-
collection opportunities included the art trails themselves, art trail meetings, art 
classes and lectures, artists’ studios, and conversations at their houses and mine.  
There are now 8 trails in Bristol, spread between April and November. Although run 
by different committees, the trail format is fairly consistent, and each involves about 
100 artists, some exhibiting in more than one trail. Most work shown in the trails is 
for sale, and is priced.  
The trails are organised by the artists by committee, on a voluntary basis. Subs are 
charged primarily to cover promotional costs, and vary from £5 to £45per year. 
Trails include some community-based activities (e.g. an exhibition of work by local 
school children, and free art-related workshops) and include some public venues 
such as church halls, shops, cafes, pubs and restaurants. The emphasis of every trail 
is on the art produced by the trail artists, which is generally shown from their own 
homes or that of a friend. It is widely acknowledged that many of the trail visitors 




The art trails are very local events, as is reflected in their names: ‘Art on the Hill’ is 
the trail in the part of Bristol called Windmill Hill. ‘Southbank’ is a trail held on the 
southern side of Bristol’s central waterways, and so on. I have collected data from 5 
trails. The localisation enables data collection across areas with a variety of 
sociodemographics, which I had thought might be of interest in the analysis. Socio-
demographic census data were also used to support interpretations of each trail area 
(see Appendix for example). 
4.5    Data collection and data 
Data collection:  
Following Potter and Wetherell, each data-gathering opportunity was seen as ‘a 
conversational encounter’, and even when eaves-dropping my part is understood as 
active and constructive, not neutral (Potter and Wetherell 1987, p.165). The word 
‘interview’ alarmed many potential and actual respondents, whereas ‘chat’ seemed 
both more fruitful and more in keeping with an active and constructive philosophy of 
data-gathering. However, I use the word interview throughout the discussion below, 
reflecting the purposeful nature of those chats. 
The data collection involved immersive participant observation activities throughout 
the intense three year research period and included both formal and informal 
contexts. Activities included visiting art trails (2days x 5 trails x 3 years), attending 
c25 art trail meetings (spread over the 5 trails), and opening my house as a venue on 
one of the trails for three years. I also frequently visited other local art contexts such 
as art classes and lectures, which a substantial number of art trail participants are 
involved in. I had formal and informal conversations with over a hundred artworld 
participants – artists, art trail visitors, art institute faculty and students -  and 
recorded and transcribed twenty-six interviews with pricers, each lasting between 
one and three hours.  
Participants range in age from early 20s to late 60s, produce a variety of type of 




of occupations and histories from ‘working on the bins’ (i.e. refuse collection) to 
senior faculty of the Royal Academy School of Art, London. Stepping a little further 
away than Bourdieu’s recruitment approach in Distinction, (Bourdieu 1984, p.74) 
where interviewees ‘were often a relation or acquaintance of the interviewer’, the 
majority of respondents in my research were acquaintances with varying degrees of 
separation, or strangers. One is a close friend, whose discourses of price and pricing 
often surprised me.  
Data: 
The data consists of field notes, recorded interviews, material artefacts, reference 
materials, and secondary data such as radio programmes and newspaper stories. An 
example of the type of supporting socio-economic data I accessed is provided in the 
Appendix. 
Field notes:  
The field notes included instigated and overheard conversations related to price and 
pricing, haptic elements of those communications, observations of pricing practice, 
price data, and my reflexions. The field notes and research journal were an important 
part of my data collection, analysis and development of theory. 
Many conversations were held opportunistically during the trails or other arts-related 
events, and as my pilot studies suggested that recording was seen as intrusive in 
these situations, field notes were made as soon as possible after the event, generally 
within minutes of parting. The conversations were short, and where possible were 
used to elicit a longer recorded interview at a later date, to be held in a venue of the 
artist’s choice. This was generally the artist’s house, sometimes mine, and on rare 
occasions, a public space. 
Interviews:  
26 semi-structured interviews were conducted, recorded and transcribed in detail 




journal notes. Most interviews were collected individually. Two recorded interviews 
were with two artists, and I also recorded one focus group. This consisted of four 
participants - 3 artists and 1 frequent art-buyer, who met weekly as a friendship 
group. They were intrigued by my research, and were willing to discuss their art-
pricing thoughts and experiences in that forum.  
Initially the interviews were open (“Tell me about your involvement in the art 
trails”), and became more explicitly focussed on price and pricing. On average the 
recorded interviews lasted an hour, some as long as 3 hours. Questions included 
respondents’ involvement in a trail, their type of work, and their experiences of 
pricing it.  
Transcription of recorded conversations is verbatim, and indicates pauses, overlaps, 
variations in pace, and emphases. Time references are given once or twice per page 
of transcript to enable easy revisiting of the audio data.  
Other data include resource material available at local institutions, emails sent by art 
trail organisers, official minutes and notes I took during art trail meetings, and the 
analysis of feedback forms which artists had completed at the end of a trail. Material 
artefacts include artist price lists, art trail marketing material, and press reports which 
are aimed primarily at those unfamiliar with the trails. The copy was usually written 
by the Promotions volunteer within each trail committee, and most emphasise the 
production element of the trails, which is in contrast to the literature associated with 
most other contemporary cultural venues (Peñaloza 2000, p.91).  
4.6    Coding and analysis 
The coding and analysis of the data was an iterative emergent process. As Venkatesh 
(2005) pointed out, in interpretive praxis ‘action and reflection (…) occur 
simultaneously’. The data collection, coding, analysis, hypothesis-development and 
testing involved frequent looping between the field, data and theory, in an attempt to 




talking about pricing. I was mindful of the clear warning within much of the socio-
economic literature not to shoe-horn empirical findings into theoretical models, as 
reality tends to be rather more  messy (Crouch 2005, ex-President of the Society for 
the Advancement of Socio-Economics), as well as Bourdieu’s call for reflexion and 
critical analysis of 'the very form and content of what we think' (Bourdieu, 2000: 
49).  
As is appropriate to an interpretive approach, coding of instances of a particular 
category has been hermeneutic, involving multiple iterations within each record and 
across records, and a consideration of meaning within the whole, rather than of parts 
in isolation (Lavoie 1991; Thompson 1997).  The emphasis was on understanding 
the situated meaning or narratives, and in acknowledging that different parties are all 
co-creators in the hermeneutic process of determining the context-specific meaning 
of the discourses of price. That is, meaning-making is considered to be a dynamic 
process, contingent on the historical moment of production, and a dialectic process, 
in that all texts are considered to be ‘writerly texts’ (Barthes 1972). As Barthes 
suggests, the ‘reader’ is also the ‘writer’ of the meaning, and will have their own 
interpretive repertoire and precedents with which to interpret, test and assess the 
‘speaker’s’ discourse and categorisations of money and object.   
The analytical aim was to identify key categorisations and patterns of meanings that 
emerged across records and within records. Following Thompson’s (1997) 
hermeneutic methodology, there were two levels of interpretation: (1) discerning the 
key patterns of meanings expressed by a given participant in the texts of his or her 
pricing-related stories, (2) identifying key patterns of meaning that emerge across the 
price-related stories expressed by different participants.  
Working at the two levels simultaneously encouraged a deeper understanding of the 
complexities of category meaning-making and its uses, and enabled the construction 
of broad categories. It facilitated the building of a bank of instances for each 
category, and the search for patterns of variability (of content and form) and 




 Following Penaloza (2000, p.87) and Velthuis (2005)  I looked for and categorized 
emergent dominant themes and interpretive repertoires within and across discourses, 
using both emic and etic categorisations (Thompson 1996). The analytic unit was 
then refined in order to examine more narrow occurrences, regularities, and their 
hierarchical arrangement (Potter and Wetherell 1987, p.157). The process is 
necessarily a cyclical one of moving between the research context, analysis and 
coding, looking for the ‘nuance, contradiction, and areas of vagueness’ (Potter and 
Wetherell 1987, p.168) in texts. I was also mindful of the need to be critically aware 
of my own sense-making, although that is more easily said than done.  
The analysis was also concerned with function and consequence. Based on the 
hypothesis that discourses are important because they do something (Potter and 
Wetherell 1987, p.160), in this case can be used as a means of positioning the 
participant, the second phase was a search for linguistic evidence of this.  
The process of transcription of audio recordings was slow, and useful – the 
participant’s voice becomes embedded in one’s mind, keeping the tonal and pacing 
nuances of their speech alive. I found it useful to annotate transcripts in the style 
used in many school English Literature text books: I arranged the screen into two 
pages, with two documents running side by side. On each double-page spread I had 
text (the interview transcript) on the left side, and my notes on the right. This 
allowed room for detailed notes where required.   
As each transcript was completed (generally soon after recording, and therefore 
sequentially) I printed out hard copies and used a variety of colour-coding 
frameworks in order to gain a feeling for variations in content and degrees of 
emphasis within and across discourses. What was coded, and how, developed 
throughout the iterative process of analysis as I accumulated data and gained a 
deeper knowledge of the context and data, and was able to recognise regularities and 




4.7    Limitations 
Method: The study is limited to one researcher, and the combination of detachment 
and involvement required by the methodology can be awkward (Douglas 1982; 
Venkatesh 2006). It is important to acknowledge the unconscious ethnocentric 
prejudices which affect all aspects of the research process. However, as respected 
academics from Douglas to Arnould (1994; 2005)  to Venkatesh have found, these 
are unavoidable, and  despite these difficulties the immersion integral to 
ethnographic research is a useful way of collecting and grounding the interpretation 
of rich data which allows deeper understanding of culturally-informed market 
behaviours. 
Context and scale: The research was limited by its focus on a small geographical 
area, its relatively short time-scale, the choice of one pricing field, and a specific 
group of pricers, the art trail participants. However, context specificity is understood 
as a fundamental element of ethnographic research. Whilst necessarily restricted in 
scale, this research was able to examine the discourses of price used by a varied and 
accessible group of pricers working within the same field. A small amount of 
exploratory research was carried out with pricers in other fields, and suggests that an 
examination of the embedded nature of discourses of price in other pricing contexts 





4.8    Summary 
In this research I conceptualise pricing as involving considerations of money, and, 
according to Zelizer (1994), money phenomena consist of and depend on social 
practices. In order to look hard at pricing as a social monetary practice embedded 
within other social practices it is necessary to collect data within, rather than 
abstracted from, the context, and at a micro rather than macro level. Following the 
example of respected and influential Consumer Culture Theory and socio-economic 
researchers such as Thompson and Venkatesh an interpretive ethnographic 
methodology was used to form the research questions, data collection method and 
analysis. 
In short, this is ethnographic research, which used three years of deep hanging-out to 
collect data through semi-structured interviews and participant-observation. The 
participants are artists pricing their work within the Bristol art trails, which are a 
form of short-chain market. I used constant comparative coding within & across 
records, in the hermeneutic analysis of discourse repertoires that circulate in this 
artworld marketplace. I was looking for patterns of variability and consistency of 
content and form between accounts. 
The research involved formal and informal conversations with over a hundred 
artworld participants, twenty-six recorded interviews with pricers (each lasting 
between one and three hours) and participation in a wide range of art classes, 
lectures, art trail meetings and art trails.  
Other data collected include art trail emails, and lecture notes and classroom 
conversations from a local university art faculty and local schools of art, as a large 




It also included material artefacts such as artists’ price lists and exhibition blurb, 
media articles mentioned by research participants, art trail marketing materials, and 
resource materials available at the local libraries. 
The aim was to gain an overview of the repertoires that circulate within the art trail 
context, to examine the price-specific content of these discourses, to explore money 
meanings within these discourses, and to consider how choice of discourse appeared 
to be used as a positioning device, whilst maintaining a non-paralysing degree of 
critical reflexive practice and awareness of subjectivity.  
Following standard anthropological practice, I regularly tested my understanding and 
developing theories with pricers by getting it ‘right’, and seeing if I was ‘rewarded’, 
and by getting it ‘wrong’ and seeing whether there were sanctions or negative 
reactions (Fox 2004) . I also tested my on-going research with academics through 
informal discussions and formal presentations such as at the annual conference for 
the Society for the Advancement of Socio-economics (SASE), and the annual 









CHAPTER 5   FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION: Pricing and the research 
context 
Introduction 
In the art trail context, as in most pricing contexts except barter, thinking about price 
involves thinking about money. Although generally ignored within economic and 
marketing price theory, an explicit recognition of the centrality of money within 
pricing is important, as is the recognition of the embeddedness of those doing the 
pricing. Importantly, what are considered to be right and wrong ways to do price 
seem to be informed by construals of money meanings and their social uses, rather 
than purely economic considerations.  
Prior work by Zelizer (1994), Belk and Wallendorf (1990) and Douglas (1982) 
suggests that money is a cultural object and, rather than being neutral, and may be 
interpreted in a number of ways. The ethnographic data collected in this research 
suggests that pricers, as well as consumers, interpret money in a variety of ways, and 
that these meanings matter: they shape how pricing is talked about and performed, 
because some ways of talking about pricing and money are seen as more apt or 
desirable than others. 
Following Consumer Culture Theory precedent in which market practices are seen as 
social cultural practices (Arnould and Thompson 2005), this research suggests that 
pricing should be considered as much a socially-informed action as consumption is.  
If one construes pricing to be an embedded rather than abstracted action, it means 
that one understands it as being performed and discussed in a social context. By 
collecting data which includes the social and cultural aspects of the economic action 
of pricing it is possible to examine variations in interpretations of money meanings, 
and to try to understand why  “the embarrassment of selling” (RJC, 33) may be 




The idea that selling may be spoken of as embarrassing seems to be linked to the 
categorisation of money earned through selling and pricing as tainting or dirty. The 
participants’ categorisation is context-specific – it is not money in general which is 
dirty, it is an interpretation expressed in a particular context (e.g. an interview with 
me, or at the point of sale), of money gained by selling their art object, perhaps to a 
particular buyer. That is, it is a contextualised interpretation of money from a 
particular source. 
Zelizer (1994) showed that people treat money differently depending on its source, 
form, holder, and earmarking, and that choice of interpretation re what money means 
in a particular context, and how it should be treated, varies from person to person.  In 
contrast to assumptions that money and social relations should be kept separate and 
that overlap may be damaging to both the relationship (intimacy) and to economic 
efficiency, Zelizer’s main theme is that money meanings are used within, rather than 
to negate, social relations (Zelizer 2007). Meanings of money, as with meanings of 
other cultural objects, are subject to negotiation, and display of particular 
interpretations may be used (consciously or unconsciously) in confirming and 
shaping social relations and relative position. This research explores how social 
meanings of money may inform pricing and how these uses reinforce social relations 
and social position. The research findings are divided into three chapters: 
In Chapter 5 I discuss the embedded nature of pricing practice, as this underpins the 
other findings and discussions from this research.  
In Chapter 6 I examine in depth the way in which varied conceptions of money 
appear and are used within the discourses. Comparing the findings with prior 
research by Thaler (2008 [1985]), Zelizer (1994), Belk and Wallendorf (1990), and 
Douglas (1982), I explore the variety of money forms, categories and rituals of 
category change within the price-discourse data.  
Chapter 7 focuses on the social uses of the meanings of money within pricing 




discourses as affiliation signals, and examine the social and economic effects of 
getting right and getting it wrong. I explore ideas of the legitimacy of particular 
categorisations and interpretations before looking at how interpretations are learnt, 
contested and shared. 
In the section ‘Community imposes constraints’ I consider the idea that ‘getting it 
right’ may not be economically advantageous. 





5.1    Pricing as embedded social action 
‘Prices that end in 99p or 95p could annoy buyers of luxury goods and 
might be more appropriate to groceries’ 
(Ruston 2007, p.125) 
The idea of appropriateness of a particular way of pricing is not necessarily to do 
with economics, it is to do with shared ways of creating and understanding 
categories of good (luxury goods /groceries) and categories of ‘reader’ (here ‘buyers 
of luxury goods’). What -99p or -95p prices mean is not an inherent property or 
‘nature’, instead meanings are socially constructed. That is, how to understand and 
therefore how to do price is learnt. Importantly, some interpretations are seen as 
more apt than others, depending on context.  
Although economic, financial and marketing pricing assumptions and heuristics may 
be used by pricers, whether they are or not appears to depend not just on whether the 
pricer knows that heuristic, but also on whether they feel it is appropriate. The 
research data strongly suggests that economic maximisation is not necessarily the 
primary goal for all pricers, and it is clear that the pricers are not abstracted from 
society when performing pricing. 
Market activity is intensely social (Granovetter 1985; MacKenzie 2006; 2009), and 
as discussed in the Literature Review, there is a growing swell in work within 
Marketing which focusses on exploring the cultural and social uses of consumption 
practices. My research makes a small step in addressing the calls to balance the 
currently consumer-centric approach by considering meanings as constructed across 
markets rather than being constructed solely or primarily on the consumers’ side of 
the market (Peñaloza and Venkatesh 2006). For Penaloza and Venkatesh, 
Granovetter and MacKenzie, production/supply is conceptualised as potentially as 




abstracted economic rationale. Following their lead, in this research I conceptualise 
the market activity of pricing as being potentially as intensely social as consumption. 
The difference in the way pricing and consumption is conceptualised in the extant 
literature is substantial and perhaps surprising. That is, the idea that consumption 
behaviour is driven purely by economic rationale would be deemed extraordinary in 
current consumption research, yet the vast majority of pricing literature seems to 
assume that pricers act in a social vacuum, and share a limited economically-
focussed pricing repertoire. However, from this research data it is clear that the 
participants in this research are not necessarily economically maximising. Instead 
they are constrained by a dominant interpretation of ‘how it is done’:  
‘This Romantic myth of the bohemian artist is so deeply imprinted in our 
culture, that we feel quite resentful if an artist lives a normal, moderately 
prosperous, monogamous life outside the lunatic asylum.'  
(O'Toole 1994, p.181) 
That is, the shared repertoire is non-economically maximising. However, the 
participants are not pricing in a vacuum, instead they are situated within a wider 
artworld and wider social world in which there are a variety of understandings of 
‘how it is done’, notwithstanding the dominant Romantic myth. The research 
participants have families and friends, they have jobs, they are consumers, they read 
newspapers, listen to radio programmes, attend art classes and groups, and many 
attend or have attended the local university arts faculty and/or the local school of art.  
These pricers are socially embedded, and, to reiterate, this does not mean that 
economic action is necessarily subjugated inside a social ‘shell’, instead economic 
and social actions are intertwined, each informing the other.  
I suggest that the pricing is as socially embedded as Consumer Culture Theory 
research would assume the participants’ consumption practices to be. From this 
perspective, pricing is informed by what one has learnt from all of one’s sources of 




this research supports the idea that people do not stop being socially embedded 
simply because they are pricing. Instead, people use pricing and discourses of price 
within their social relations, and the range of ways of interpreting and using price is 
informed by their cultural capital and actual or desired group membership.   
From a rational economic theory point of view the aim of pricing is to cover costs 
and maximise profits. It is assumed that pricers will charge the highest price they can 
for their work, that they will charge ‘what the market will take’ and will use every 
trick in the book to part consumers from as much money as they can.  This 
conception of the pricer as a maximising economic agent is widespread, and 
reinforced by books such as Poundstone’s bestseller: Priceless: The Myth of Fair 
Value (2010). Here, consumers are constructed as ‘irrational fools’, and pricers are 
construed as having ‘evolutionary advantages’, and indeed some pricers may like 
that idea of themselves. However, from my many years of experience of pricing and 
conversations with others who do pricing, once beyond the glib ‘Its supply and 
demand, isn’t it?’ response pricers tend to say that pricing can be difficult. 
My experience of pricing and the difficulties experienced by pricers prior to this 
research project had been gained from working within departments which are 
responsible for pricing a wide range of products in a wide range of industries and 
size of organisation, ranging from health food to timber to electronic consultancy. 
The difficulty of pricing is not simply because it is difficult to know how best to 
maximise economic gain. Instead the difficulty appears to be because the pricer is 
aware of a number of different (and sometimes conflicting) possible ways of 
understanding price and pricing, but it is not always clear which is the ‘correct’ way 
to do or talk about price in a particular context.  
In the research context simply engaging with the market was often construed as 




“And now, the idea of producing stuff that I think is going to sell is a 
completely different concept!..........And one which I’m, I’m, having,… a bit a 
bit of difficulty with. Because… you know, …you have to compromise.” 
(RJ) 
Throughout the core study and the pilot studies, when I asked pricers what they think 
about when they think about pricing their work, the initial response (especially 
amongst tradesmen) was often something economically bullish “What you can get!”, 
or, as many respondents glibly responded: “its supply and demand, isn’t it?” This 
mythical equilibrium price was mentioned at the start of interviews by many pricers 
across a wide range of fields. However, the participants then tended to move on to a 
description of their pricing practice framed as ‘this is how people like me with a 
product like this do price’, for example “In Bristol this is the rate all successful and 
busy solicitors (like me) charge.” (MJs, excerpt from email).   Sometimes this was 
simplified to a statement which, through use of rhetoric, suggests ‘This is how it is 
done’, such as “It’s very formulaic, isn’t it?” (MRf). 
What is important is that although MRf spoke of a formula, which suggests 
mathematical logic, on probing the formula contained inconsistencies and 
tautologies. Also, the formula was possibly different to that used by other pricers 
within his field (if they felt they had one, that is), yet MRf, like MJs, constructed his 
pricing logic and discourse as normal and desirable. ‘There is a right way to do it, 
and I know how it is done’ is the implicit message. 
Other pricers explained how they priced by talking about what they did not do. I was 
told: ‘Some people may do it like this, but I don’t, I’m not like that’:  
 
“the other maybe three or four dozen people…who had pictures on the 
Trail, I’m sure were mostly trying to unload their work, either graphic or 3D. 




cheaper, and you can see the prices, but you, you’ve got something you 
could actually afford, and walk away with on the day, whereas…(slowing 
down: ) I was trying to not let go of my precious babies”  
(ML, 11) 
The use of distancing and group-membership sentiments such as these within 
discourses of price strongly support the suggestion that whatever side of the market 
exchange we are on, we are embedded economic agents: economic action is social 
action (Granovetter 1985; Peñaloza and Venkatesh 2006). Within the data one can 
see how participants use discourses of price to shape and support relations and group 





5.2    Stratification within the context  
Introduction 
As discussed in the literature review, pricing involves a categorisation of the object, 
categorisation of the money, and an interpretation of the associated commensurative 
rules. 
In order to provide a contextualisation for the rest of the Findings and Discussion, in 
this section I introduce the ideas of the categorisation of the art object (a brief 
overview of the history of the Western art market is included in the Appendix), the 
dominant hierarchy by object category, and the variety of perceived pricing and 
money implications associated with a particular object categorisation.  
 
Figure 3: Relationship between constructs 
 
Separate Spheres / Overlapping Spheres 
In order to examine the categorisation of the object as ‘art’, or ‘not art’, I use 
Kopytoff’s (1986) suggestion that the ideal Romantic discourse of art can be thought 
of as involving a separation of the spheres of Art and Commerce.  Examination of 




separate the art and commerce spheres relates to object categorisation and perceived 
hierarchical position within the field by type of work.  
Using Kopytoff’s conceptualisation of ‘art’ as one sphere, and ‘commerce’ (which is 
associated with concepts such as pricing, money and sales), as another, in the 
diagram below one can see the two extremes. On the left there are ‘separate spheres’ 
(higher status, Romantic ideal) discourses and on the right there are ‘overlapping 
spheres’ (lower status, contaminated) discourses.  
 
Figure 3: Art and Commerce as ideally separated/insulated (higher status Romantic discourse), 
and as overlapping/contamination model (lower status discourse). 
Whereas all of Velthuis’(2005) participants used the high status Romantic ideal 
discourses of separate spheres, participants within this research used a variety of 
discourses both within and across records, displaying a range of interpretations of 
acceptability/desirability of degrees of separation and overlap. The participants’ 
discourses and their socially constructed meanings as having higher or lower status, 
or as being appropriate or inappropriate, appear to be a key tool in the participants’ 
placing of object, self and other within the field, and inform categorisation of money 
and the pricing of the objects. 
Within the research context high status is generally constructed through separation 
from commerce, using (Zelizer 2007, p.1059)a ‘hostile worlds’ perspective (Zelizer 
2007, p.1059), in that money is interpreted as damaging. The key attribute of the 
context’s Fine Art (highest) construct is that it comes from the soul, emotion, or 
mind. It is constructed as ‘therefore’ incommensurable, and is thereby separate from 




“FW: I can’t paint something because it will sell! 
DW: Selling your soul” 
(They both grimace.) 
(FW, DW Field notes) 
 For some participants putting their work in an art market creates a tension between 
the wider capitalist construct that financial success is a good thing, and the artworld 
construct that financial success is a result of ‘selling out’. ‘Commercial’ therefore 
becomes a negative term.  As a participant explained, 
“the discussion always was about making money versus creative art: what 
made money and what didn’t and so on and so forth and  how on earth 
were they ever going to make…have integrity in that without going dead 
with making just pot after pot after pot…” 
(RM) 
As well as an indication of the importance of the separate spheres model - “the 
discussion always was about” – the excerpt above contains the three key elements of 
the dominant Romantic conception of the field: 
First, there is tension between making money and making art – they are constructed 
as opposites: “money versus creative art” (added emphasis); Secondly, creative art 
(which doesn’t make money) has “integrity”, and making other work which does sell 
would be “going dead”; and thirdly, iteration (“pot after pot after pot”) is the 
opposite of creative art: uniqueness is an important, maybe necessary, attribute of 
art. 
The excerpt is also a good example of a discourse being used to manage hierarchical 
position through negotiation and display. “They” [the speaker’s parents] temper 
interpretations of their involvement with the market by displaying their knowledge 




made their living through selling their art (overlap with commerce), through 
discourses such as this they and the speaker are able to persuade others and 
themselves that they maintain a high position. 
Within the data one can see a range of discursive repertoires enabling any connection 
between the spheres to be negotiated, masked, & rejected in accordance with one’s 
perceived or desired position, and the degree of what could be called ‘know that’ and 
‘know how’ (e.g.Schau, Muniz Jr et al. 2009). This is closely linked to Bourdieu’s 
idea of cultural capital, in that the discourse which is chosen will depend upon the 
participant’s knowledge of the range of possible discourses, how and when to use 
them, and knowledge of how particular discourses might be read by others.  
Example of separate-spheres discourse: 
“You can't base [the price] on the time and materials, but how do you put a 
value on the angst and torment that has gone in?” 
(CP, field notes)  
Here CP states that “You can’t base [the price] on the time and materials”, which is 
an explicit rejection of a standard economic cost-plus approach to pricing. This 
rejection signals acceptance and reinforcement of the (Romantic) way it is done 
round here. They then ask “but how do you put a value on the angst and torment 
that has gone in?” which positions the object even more firmly in the Romantic 
category. The two elements of the sentence work together to construct the desired 
‘separate spheres’ discourse:  to try to price the object is equivalent to trying to price 
emotion, and just as inappropriate. Art is incommensurable, and objective measures 
are inapplicable.   Compare the Romantic market-rejecting discourse above with the 
discourse below:  
Example of overlapping spheres discourse: 
“I had a picture that size, A4, an oil painting..I think I sold one for about 40 




considering the work gone into it, and the materials. Whereas now I’d 
probably charge 150 same size.” 
(DK) 
Here price and pricing is non-problematic: the object is understood as 
commensurable. DK uses a cost-based approach without any hesitation, and what 
‘has gone into’ the painting is “the work (...) and the materials” (oil paints) and a 
particular sized canvas (A4), not “angst and torment”.  
As Abbing (2002) pointed out, the current practice of masking or avoiding 
discourses of money and price by artists is shaped by historical precedent. Although 
there will be some variation, there is broad consensus regarding what is desirable or 
appropriate and what is not.  The continued practice of avoiding or masking the 
involvement of money and price by those with high status in the field confirms the 
desirability of the avoidance discourse, and promotes its continued use as a 
positioning tool. Overlapping spheres, or the ‘contamination model’ (Zelizer 1994; 
Velthuis 2005) is thereby constructed as lower status. 
Importantly, interpretations of ‘how it is’, and what is considered an appropriate 
discourse varies with knowledge of available discourses and their meanings, and a 
consideration of the likely interpretation by the listener. A significant variable in 
choice of discourse appears to be categorisation of the particular type of work 
produced, and its perceived or desired position within the art hierarchy. This is 
discussed more fully below. 
Art and Craft 
The terms ‘art’ and ‘craft’ are constructed within the research context as competing 
descriptions heavy with associations, value-systems, and membership categories 
(e.g. “but I’d call that craft”, or “There were a few interesting pictures there, but 
most of them were illustration”). What is considered ‘art’ or ‘not art’ is a social 




critics, dealers, curators,   is embedded in history (Stallabrass 2004), and is therefore 
subject to change. Importantly for this research, the terms ‘art’ and ‘craft’ are 
connected to and reinforced by particular interpretations of appropriate money and 
pricing discourses.  
Throughout this document I use the terms art and craft as opposite ends of the 
hierarchy as a reflection of the way the field is constructed within the research 
context. The distinction between art and craft is a sensitive one because it has social 
as well as economic implications. For example, when discussing the possibility of an 
interview, a gallery owner asked me with great delicacy, choosing her word 
carefully, whether I too was “a maker”. It is a reflection of the strength of the local 
ranking system that although the gallery-owner’s choice of words ostensibly avoided 
making the distinction between art and craft, it left me feeling slightly put out, 
wondering why she thought it unlikely I could be an artist. It was notable that the use 
of the term ‘maker’ increased during the research period, perhaps due to public use 
by high-status artworld organisations such as the Jerwood Foundation. An alternative 
term used within the research context is “a creative”, as in  
“If you’re thinking about joining the civil service (pause for body language 
“Yeah right!”. Audience laughs) then you need to be careful about what you 
put out there. But creatives see each other in all sorts of situations, (laughs, 
shared by some of the audience), generally involving alcohol.”  
Implication – that’s how it is done in OUR gang. Us creatives and Them civil 
servants. We’re not like them.    
(Notes from lecture, discussion re use of Facebook and other social networking sites) 
Apart from one instance (“I’m more of a technician, not a creative”), the term was 
not used by any of the research participants during their interviews. Within the local 
context the term ‘creatives’ includes a wide variety of type of activity and 
participant, as illustrated in the local publication which profiles advertising agencies 




 Although from a romantic point of view a rose may smell as sweet whatever it is 
called, how the pricer categorises their or someone else’s object does matter, as the 
‘art’ or ‘craft’ categorisation informs their pricing discourse, pricing expectations, 
and indicates their understanding of the hierarchy and place in it. One participant 
(MP) described this as the “vortex of value”, explaining that if you can persuade 
influential others that your work is good then its place in the ‘art’ hierarchy and its 
‘appropriate’ price will head upwards in a virtuous spiral, whereas if the art or your 
discourse is disliked by influential parties it’s place and price can spiral inexorably 
downwards. A participant who holds particularly high art-world status compared to 
others in the study warned strongly about the dangers of putting one’s work into the 
view of high-status taste-makers for exactly this reason: although the rewards might 
be great, the risk was too high. 
As an example of object categorisation and its association with particular status and 
price, a participant told me: 
“(I’m) moving from being ‘just an illustrator’ [the quotes are audible] to 
being an artist. I have struggled with this for years. People look down their 
noses [at illustration]. 
 
BUT! ‘jobbing illustrator’ has put a roof over our heads, and paid [for my 
children to go] all the way up to and through university!” 
(MC)  
Here MC was complaining about the dominant view that illustration is of lower 
status than art, given that illustration has demonstrably been an economically 
successful occupation whilst those who deride it (notably university lecturers and 
others in the intelligentsia) have had to find sources of income other than their art as 
their art has been (using a commercial criteria) unsuccessful. And yet their view was 




The emic object/sector categorisations and price discourses drive and reinforce one 
another, which means that the hierarchical positions are maintained.  For example, 
despite using the same materials (e.g. paint, or ink) as much of the work in the higher 
categories, illustration is seen as lower in the hierarchy because of its close link with 
commerce - it is done to a paying brief, not from the artist’s soul (ideal discourse, 
used to suggest incommensurability). Because illustration is seen as lower in the 
hierarchy an overlapping discourse is the norm and a separate spheres or ‘hostile 
worlds’ one would be inappropriate. The result is that ‘I talk & price like this 
because my work is in a lower hierarchical position, and at the same time it is in a 
lower position because I talk & price like this’. That is, the relationship between 
object categorisation and pricing discourse is dialectic and co-constitutive, not one-
directional. 
Some craft participants had removed themselves from the marketplace because of 
the apparently expected degrading effect of being driven by the market. For example, 
one told me that she now only does photography “for donations, you know, because 
I don’t want to be a wedding photographer! (grimaces, with shoulder shrug/two-
hand palms-upward gesture of “you know?”)” (B) Here “wedding photographer” is 
used as shorthand for someone whose artistic or creative integrity has been sapped 
by the need to make money and the demands of paying customers. 
Another participant told me  
“I mean, this last year, I hurt my back, and I wonder whether it’s a blessing 
in disguise! Cos it’s given me time to think. 
And I’ve realised.. I was going sort of flat out for four years, and thinking I 
was just.. making a scraping, really. Just getting by. And it’s killed the 





Within the context creativity is seen as having high status, and is linked to integrity. 
Both are construed by many within the context as being jeopardised by commercial 
concerns. PP has stopped “going flat out” making craft, and found another source of 
income to free him to make more ‘creative’ work. That is, ‘creative’ work beyond 
commerce (separate spheres) is seen as more desirable. What is construed as less- or 
non-creative work is sometimes spoken of apologetically, sadly, or defensively: “I’m 
only an illustrator” or “I’m more of a technician, not a creative”, or “I’m only a 
photographer”. 
In contrast, I never heard anyone say ‘I’m only an artist’. Instead, the high status of 
artist was reinforced by for example two highly respected local painters who both 
said that they were hesitant to call themselves ‘artist’. 
Within academia and the intelligentsia the alternative term ‘Applied Arts’ has 
become common, and is used to imply ‘not quite art but not as low as craft’. That is, 
applied art has an intelligentsia-ideal cerebral element which ‘craft’ does not. Some 
participants (ES and RM, for example) criticised the term ‘applied arts’, and 
described the drive behind the re-naming as an “over-intellectualisation” of craft 
when ‘craft’ should be respected and need not be tied to assumptions of folksiness 
and functionality. This variation of object categorisation and positional uses of the 
variation are discussed in more detail in the section Money Categorisation by 
source: the Art/Craft object divide. 
Viewed from the outside and from above, relative positions within the art/craft 
hierarchy appear fluid and negotiable. This fluidity was very publicly demonstrated 
by the judges of the prestigious Turner Prize, who in 2003 awarded the (art) prize to 
Grayson Perry for a body of ceramic vessels. This was a clear challenge to the more 
usual craft categorisation of ceramics. Within the research context a few participants 
apparently shared the judges’ view and contested the validity of the dominant 
art/craft divide and the limning criteria. One (RM) referred to the Turner Prize 
judges for legitimation of her own challenge, and in doing so positioned her critique 




and the presence of dissenters, the vast majority of participants appeared to see the 
hierarchy and the place of their work within it as immutable.  
The diagram below gives some idea of how the hierarchy is constructed within the 
data. The diagram should not be seen as representing the number of artists involved 
in each sector. The aim is to show that some types of art object are seen as having 










Figure 4 shows the dominant interpretation of the hierarchy by medium/approach 
within the research context. Two important points about this diagram and the idea of 
hierarchy are that 
a) it is a rough guide, not rigid – there are paintings which are considered 
‘illustration’, glass objects which are considered ‘art’, and so on. Hierarchical 
position may be contested, as object categorisation and positioning depends on 
knowledge of the conventions, and context-specific interpretation of the conventions;  
b) the construction and maintenance of the hierarchy is determined by and 
determines categorisation of art objects within the research context. This is turn 
shapes discourses of price of those objects, and categorisation of the money 
associated with pricing that object. That is, there are conventions of object 
categorisation, and money and price conventions associated with each object 
category: 
“Yes, it [pricing] is extremely difficult, because it depends on your… 
specific…. discipline as well, doesn’t it?” 
(BD) 
 
‘each product group may have slightly different pricing conventions’ 
(Ruston 2007, p.125) 
Which means that if a participant works in more than one medium,  
“All the prices need to make sense with each other” 
(MJ) 
 The details of the pricing relationships given by each of these participants are 
examples of the arbitrary cohesiveness of pricing practice within the data. Within the 




pricing relationships, such as the ‘rule’ that oil paintings are more expensive than 
acrylics, and that paintings are more expensive than prints, and that size matters. The 
strength of the ‘rule’ is visible in that although there are many examples in which 
these rules are broken, these instances are generally accompanied by an explanation 



















To return to the models of categorisation of type of object and associated discourse, 
the Romantic myth (dominant discourse) is that high status is determined by distance 
from commerce, low status by perceived overlap (Abbing 2002; Bradshaw and 
Holbrook 2007).  
Combining Figure 3 (separate or overlapping spheres) and Figure 4, (hierarchy by 
object type) produces a diagram showing the hierarchy of work by perceived degree 
of separation between the spheres: 
 
 
Figure 5: Hierarchy of work by perceived degree of separation between the spheres. 
Within the data the dialectical and co-constitutive relationship between perceived 
hierarchical position of the object and particular discourses of price appears strong. 
For example, MC talked about price and pricing very differently depending on how 
she categorised the object:  (Interview and notes, slightly annotated for clarity) 
MC told me about two pictures that she was currently working on in the role 




classified them as ‘art’. One of these pictures already had a would-be buyer, 
someone she knew socially, but she said that she was unsure how to price it 
for this buyer, and appeared unsure how to ‘do’ the price conversation with 
him.  
I asked what she would charge a publisher (thereby overlaying the category 
‘illustration’, which is associated with ‘craft’), as she is very experienced in 
pricing her work for that market. She immediately turned and rummaged on 
the shelf behind her, drew out a piece of paper, and spoke quickly and surely:  
 
“Its about this size.  
(…) 
I’d charge £250 for the smaller one, the one for him, and more for the 
bigger one [which is to go to a high status local gallery].” 
(MC) 
The ‘illustration price’ given above (that is, she was imagining pricing it for a 
publisher) was given very quickly, clearly, and with no fudging. Here there was no 
problem overlapping the spheres or using objective parameters such as size. Her 
clarity when using a ‘craft’ categorisation suggests that it is her decision to 
categorise the piece as art (rather than as illustration) which is causing her pricing 
dilemma.   
I asked whether she would charge the would-be buyer  (i.e. re-categorising 
the object as ‘art’) that £250 price, and her tone and body-language changed 
from assertive to unsure as she imagined herself in the artist:buyer sales 
conversation situation, and addressed the invisible buyer: 





She then said she’d be ok with one fifty (£150), but not very happy [with that 
amount] (…).So [she] tried again, again addressing and deferring to the 
invisible would-be buyer: 
“For a publisher I’d price it at that, so I’d like to sell it for something 
similar….What do you think?” 
(MC) 
This reticence (“I could say”. “I’d like to” and “what do you think?”) when naming a 
price, and her deference to the buyer, was very unlike her illustrator surety (“I’d 
charge..”). When in illustrator mode she was quick, clear and decisive re prices, but 
when she was in artist role (a move she sees as a step up in the artworld hierarchy) 
she became hesitant, reticent to apply her illustrator knowledge, and apparently 
unsure of art-pricing rules apart from that she should avoid talking about it. It 
appears that as a direct result of her desired to categorise her work as art rather than 
illustration her pricing speed and certainty evaporated, and the price became 
negotiable (downward). 
When I asked what she would do if the would-be buyer asked her to adjust the 
picture e.g. ‘a bit more blue in it’ , which would be a typical publisher request, but is 
widely deemed inappropriate when buying art, she sprang back into illustrator mode, 
and in a cross voice said: 
 “If that (?bugger) asks for that I’ll tell him ok. But that’ll be another 200!” 
(MC) 
There are a number of possible explanations for her change in pricing approach 
depending on object categorisation, but many of these were addressed elsewhere in 
the conversation. For example, MC had already considered that whereas she would 
know a publisher’s budget, she did not know what the buyer would be able to pay, 




Another possible explanation is that she might think he has greater artworld 
knowledge than her, but she had been thinking about that too, and elsewhere in the 
interview she queried this idea, in particular his ability to recognise what category 
her work was in (implying it was very good) and the going rate for that type of work 
(implying that she knew it, and that he would underestimate it). MC had been 
dropping the buyer hints about the standard of her work by mentioning the name of 
one of the publishers she does work for, and, as her husband had suggested, she felt 
she should “make [the buyer] pay for quality!”. Yet despite this reinforcement of her 
position, in her run-through of the conversation she had deferred to the buyer rather 
than make a clear pricing statement. 
The example of MC is very useful in demonstrating the importance of object 
categorisation in pricing practice, in that her change of discourse reveals that she 
understands that there should be a change of discourse to accompany (and perhaps 
reinforce) the change in object category from illustration to art. It appears that MC 
interprets an ‘artist’s discourse’ as being one of discomfort with pricing discussions, 
and therefore of pricing indecision and lack of confidence. Her interpretation of what 
pricing discourses are appropriate may be due at least in part to her years of teaching 
in and attending tertiary arts education: from discussions beyond the interview MC is 
very aware of an object hierarchy, and very familiar with the ‘separate spheres’ 
discourses and their use as a positioning tool. Her conversation suggests that she 
‘knows’ that the way an illustrator does pricing with a publisher is inappropriate for 
an artist selling art, and that conversations re money in an ‘art’ context are de trop. 
MC’s wish to move from being ‘just an illustrator’ to being an artist reflects the 
perception that art has a higher status than illustration, even though the move has 
clear ramifications for her ability to earn money from her work. In terms of 
maintaining the social and object hierarchy her behaviour is very useful to those who 
benefit from the status quo: although she is a very able artist she is shy about 
considering herself part of the ‘art group’, which performs the dual function of 




the higher status of art and art discourses through her use of the hierarchy rules 
which exclude her.  
I, like Adorno, like my art to be difficult 
A key source of distinction within the research context was the use of what I term the 
‘intelligentsia’ discourses. Here the focus is on complete rejection of the market and 
populist or “traditional” art, in preference for “difficult”, “challenging”, “visceral” 
work rooted in “key experiences”. In contrast to both the craft and the higher status 
bourgeois discourses (the ‘Clifton Ladies’ discourse, using an emic term), within an 
intelligentsia discourse the words “pretty”, “attractive” and “craft” are used as 
derogatory terms.  
“people who exhibit at art trails want to sell their work! And um, on the 
whole, um, they tend to produce work which is attractive, which will will 
look good on somebody’s sitting room wall, and that isn’t the kind of work 
that I’d been… producing, in the past , and um 
 
SS: (unclear..?which was?) 
 
RJ: Well, it was …..Because, a) I was at art college, I’d been at one kind of art 
college or another for the previous …… 5, 7 years, and… the tutors were 
trying to draw out of me…um key experiences, which I then used to 
….um..to make… art work.  
(…….)  
I’d done stuff around… the loss of my two grandfathers [pitch rises on 
‘grandfathers’]; stuff around my relationship with my sister [pitch rises on 
‘sister’], which is horrendous [pitch rises]; stuff around my mother’s death 
[pitch rises]; and more recently, um stuff about my experiences in the 




some of that stuff to the trail. Um, some of it which wasn’t for sale, but just I 
wanted to share it with people, a few pieces were for sale,  
SS: from that body of work?  
RJ: yeah. But um it was kind of ins installation-type  work that I’d done 
before, and it wasn’t… the kind of work people’d want to put on their sitting 
room walls.     
(…) 
from the point of view of the tutors, they they wanted it to be interesting, 
they wanted it to be thought-provoking, um and um to come from the 
heart, um, and.. gearing it, the tutors would never give you advice well if 
you did this or this it might be more saleable” 
(RJ) 
The intelligentsia discourse was very visible within the research context, probably 
because of the close contact many participants had with the local university art 
faculty. Within the intelligentsia discourse the rituals which mask overlap were to 
treat sales as an after-thought, or, better still, to avoid obvious selling and instead 
apply for grants and residencies. 
5.3    The co-constitution of categorisation of art object and money 
Within the research data art objects are construed as holding a position in the wider 
art hierarchy. That is, items categorised as ‘craft’ are understood to have a lower 
status than those categorised as ‘art’. Although there is a shared idea that there is a 
hierarchy, interpretations of the hierarchy vary, as does the categorisation of object 
and interpretation of the place of that object within the hierarchy. In this section I 
have given a brief overview of the hierarchy by object category, and its close 





Within the research context there appears to be a shared interpretation that a 
connection between type of object, hierarchical rank and the appropriate money-
related discourses exists. That is, the relationship between object categorisation, 
money categorisation and ‘correct’ pricing discourse is construed to be dialectic and 
co-constitutive, rather than uni-directional.   
For example, craft is generally deemed lower status because (to paraphrase) there are 
no tormented souls being poured into craft. There is ‘therefore’ no need to keep 
money and object apart. Because the commercial and art spheres then overlap, 
making the object is associated with money not soul, so the object is of lower status 
and lower price. 
Within the research data high status is constructed through an adoption of a separate-
spheres discourse, which rejects overlap between art object and commerce /money. 
From this position money earned from selling art is categorised as contaminating, 
profane, or dirty. At its extreme the effect on pricing is that any connection with 
money is avoided by showing un-sellable work such as site-specific installations (an 
intelligentsia discourse), or by labelling work Not For Sale.   
According to prior literature (e.g.Kopytoff 1986; Abbing 2002; Bradshaw, 
McDonagh et al. 2006; Bradshaw and Holbrook 2007) and the research data, art 
‘should’ be kept separate from commerce if it is to retain its high status. The 
perceived degree of separation or overlap is both informed by and informs object 
categorisation. This in turn appears to inform pricing discourses, as demonstrated in 
MC’s example above. As will be seen in the following sections, object categorisation 
has implications for categorisation of money earned by pricing the object, and for the 




CHAPTER 6   FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION: There is money in pricing, and its 
meanings matter 
Introduction 
A recent anthropological study which includes an examination of the money 
practices of the English (Fox 2004) suggests that in the wider context in which the 
research takes place  'there seems to be almost as much of a taboo on making money 
as there is on talking about it'  (p191), and that  we ‘obey the rules despite their often 
deleterious effect on our business dealings'  ( p192).    
In the research context pricing involves a consideration of pricing as an opportunity 
to acquire money, and a consideration of how much money is equal to the art object 
being priced. Here I examine in more detail the concept that there are multiple 
monies rather than one, neutral, money, and that objects are similarly subject to 
multiple categorisations. As a result, commensuration involves thinking about how 
much of a particular category of money is equal to a particular category of object. 
The associated commensurative rules (including whether the object and money are 
commensurable) are decided through a social process, and are a source of power 
(Espeland and Stevens 1998). 
Consider PP’s ease and delight with the idea of comparing money and art object, 
with RJC’s discomfort:  
“And I can remember thinking “money” “clay” “Money” “Clay” (pretending 
to holding clay in one hand, money in the other, lifting first one then the 
other, looking at each in turn, in wonderment. Growing smile. Both laugh). 






“… I can appreciate there [can] be lots of profound human issues tied in... 
with making a painting and all that you pour into making a painting and then 
selling it financially.”   
(RJC) 
Here PP is delighted by the idea that he can earn money from his art, whereas RJC 
constructs the idea as problematic. In order to explore the reasons for this difference 
Zelizer’s (1994) theory of money meanings is usefully invoked, as within the data 
the reasons for choosing or rejecting pricing and for choosing a particular approach 
to pricing appeared to be specifically to do with the categorisation of money earned 
from a particular source – art. The findings support Thaler’s point that people (he 
concentrates on consumers) mentally allocate money to different pots, and treat 
money differently depending on which pot it is in. However, the findings suggest 
that how money is categorised or allocated will vary from person to person, rather 
than necessarily shared. This variation in money categorisation and pricers’ 
interpretation of associated corollary behaviour supports Zelizer’s suggestion that 
money meanings have social roots and social uses. 
Zelizer (1994) suggests that money categories and their meanings depend on the 
form of the money, its source, who holds it, and how it is earmarked. These aspects 
are inter-linked, they mutually inform one another. That is, the source may 
substantially inform the earmarking, as discussed by Belk and Wallendorf (1990), 
and the earmarking can ‘allow’ a re-categorisation of the money despite the source.  
As an example, pocket money is generally legal tender, often coins (physical form of 
the money), which is given by a parent (source) to a child (holder), and earmarked 
through negotiation and shared understandings between child and parent regarding 
what is appropriate for pocket money. Some families might think sweets/treats is an 
acceptable earmarking, others might expect the money to be saved, and the 
earmarking is part of the categorisation of the money as pocket money.  The money 
categorisations, meanings, and the corollary rules are learnt from one’s parents and 




participants told me, the different ways she segregates, treats, and earmarks the 
monies she earns from various sources (including selling her art) had been learnt as a 
child: “You’re taught to do that” (M, 156).   
The longer I spent in the art pricing context, the more I became aware that pricing 
discourses have a meaning beyond the economic, they are a positioning tool which 
signals the participants’ understanding of ‘how someone like me does pricing of an 
object like this in a context like this’, and these discourses are underpinned by 
interpretations of what are acceptable meanings of money in this context. 
As with Zelizer’s (1994) findings, within my data money categorisation and its 
associated rules and behaviours appear to be used to demonstrate being part of the 
family or group. The categorisations and associated rules are presented as a logical 
practice, a representation of ‘how people like me do it’.  
Money Categorisations 
The table below (Fig. 7) outlines the variation in which categories of money are used 
within the pricing discourses. I take each section of the table in turn: I first look at 
similarities and differences in categorisations of the source of the money. I then 
move onto categorisations by earmarking, before moving onto a discussion of what 
Zelizer (1994) calls the rituals of category change. In this context the rituals of 
category change are used as ways of cleaning the money earned from pricing art. As 
discussed before, within the research context ‘craft’ is an emotive, often derogatory 











- Avoid discourse of selling 
object, or construct sales as 
incidental (cleaning discourse) 
- Not problematic 
Buyer 
- Good home', ‘gets it’, ‘like me’ 
- desirable biography 
(cleaning) 
 
- Dirty money, ‘doesn’t get it’ – 
avoid sale / barter 
- Irrelevant 
EARMARKING 
- Avoid mentioning earmarking.  
- ‘Money not important’ 
(cleaning). 
- Use of ‘what it is not’ 
discourses. 
- Art for art (cleaning) 
- Mundane.  
- Source of pride. 




- Avoid talking about £ and 
selling. 
- Use the ‘right’ discourse’ to 
mask £ element and clean. 
- Disguise £ exchange 
- Pragmatic money-handling 





Within the data the use of money-related discourses appears to depend on  
a. how the participant categorises the object being priced along the continuum 
from ‘art object’ to ‘craft object’, and  
b. the participant’s knowledge of what is considered an appropriate repertoire of 
money/market discourses for that object category. 
The money discourses are an important signal of how the participant categorises the 
object they are pricing, and appears to shape pricing possibilities as well as pricing 
discourses. Each element – money source, money earmarking, and money-related 
ritual, is discussed below, illustrating the difference between the art and the craft 
repertoires.  
Categorisation by Source 
Pricing an object turns it into a (potential) source of money. Given the importance of 
source in money categorisation (Belk and Wallendorf 1990; Zelizer 1994), it is 
perhaps not surprising that the main money categorisations within the data appear to 
be closely linked to categorisation of the object being priced.  
As suggested in the Stratification chapter, if the participant regarded their work and 
object as more Craft, then money was more likely to be categorised as unproblematic 
and money and pricing was more openly discussed. If the participant regarded their 
work and object as more Art, then money and commerce were likely to be 
categorised as unmentionable. Statements such as “but how do you put a value on 
the angst and torment that has gone in?” were a positioning discourse, used 
particularly at the beginning of the discussion to signal the maker as ‘artist’, the 
object as ‘art’, as it makes it very clear that the speaker knows the Romantic ideal 
discourse of the incompatibility of art with commerce/commensuration.  
In the research context there seemed to be wide awareness of the overarching 




years of observing artists, the topics of money and price were conspicuous in their 
absence.  
In art classes and their breaks, exhibition private views, staff room conversations, art 
trail meetings, money-related topics were occasionally broached, but then usually 
discretely pushed away or ignored. Where money matters were ‘acceptably’ 
introduced, it was tangentially. As an example of this side-stepping of direct mention 
of money, to say that an artist earns their living from their work, which makes the 
connection between the mundane, commerce, and art explicit, is considered rather 
gauche by the higher-status participants – one should say instead that they are a 
practicing artist. This has the same implications re substantial sales and prices, but 
shows that one knows that money should only be mentioned obliquely, and that one 
knows the correct way to do that. If someone asks for clarification, they clearly do 
not know this discourse, and will be understood to hold a lower position in the art-
related social hierarchy. 
The root of the discomfort with money conversations in this context appears to be 
the Romantic idea that money (commerce) and art should be seen as ideally separate 
spheres (Kopytoff 1986) , because money is dirty and contaminating.  In this 
research context, as in the wider art world, money is integral to pricing, but, 
according to the dominant ‘ideal’ view, should be treated as unwelcome, irrelevant, 
and dirty, if one’s object is to be considered Art.  
Purpose of Categorisation 
Comparing her anthropological work in Africa with her Western milieu, Douglas 
realised that she, her friends and other modern Western money-users attempt to 
‘primitivize’ (sic) their money by ‘placing restrictions at source, by earmarking 
monetary instruments of certain kinds for certain purposes, by only allowing 
ourselves or our wives certain limited freedoms in the disposal of money’ (Douglas 
1982, p.74). That is, in the same way that the Lele people used two different 




transaction (e.g. trading outside the clan or within it, or trading particular items such 
as brides), we create our own different currencies by mentally assigning legal tender 
– perhaps from different sources - to different categories, and these are treated as 
having specific earmarking and spending practices. Douglas says that we perform 
this primitivizing primarily because we wish to decrease the fluidity of money, we 
want to slow down its exit from our hands.  
However, whereas consumers may wish to decrease the fluidity of money, economic 
logic suggests that pricers would be interested in increasing the flow of money into 
their hands. If categorisation and associated rules only perform a slowing function 
one would not necessarily expect pricers to use similar practices.   
Rather than categorisation practices being solely an attempt to reduce liquidity, as 
Douglas suggested, Zelizer points out that we, (like the Lele studied by Douglas), 
create distinctions between different monies and associated practices because doing 
so is important and useful in maintaining and creating social relations. This is 
discussed in more detail in chapters 7 and 8. 
Rituals of category change 
The monies used within this context are generally differentiated through mental 
categorisations rather than variation in physical form. Changing money from one 
category to another involves rituals of category change such as those used in 
changing wages into pocket money, or into birthday money, or into a tip. Each of 
these category changes involves a discourse which is understood by the participants 
as performing the category-change function. Shared understanding of the need for 
and success of the ritual emphasises the relationship between the parties (Zelizer 
1994). 
Rituals of category change are important, because as I will discuss below, how the 
priced object and money are categorised informs pricing discourses and pricing 
options, and may influence whether or not there is a successful sales outcome. The 




object/money for example from craft to art, and from dirty money to clean money, it 
may be beneficial socially and economically. What is important is how the money is 





6.1    Money – physical forms and mental categories 
Introduction 
This chapter is divided into two main sections. Following prior work by Douglas 
(1982)  and Zelizer (1994) which suggests that form is important in money 
categorisation I begin with an examination of categorisation by physical money form 
(cash, cheque etc), and the effect on pricing. I then look at mental categorisation of 
money by source, holder, and earmarking within the discourses of price and pricing. 
In later chapters I consider the social positioning uses of particular categorisations 
and interpretations, and how they are learnt.  
It is important here to point out that within and across records participants may hold 
incompatible and inconsistent beliefs about money categorisations and their 
appropriateness. Categories are fluid, and throughout the data one can see what 
Zelizer terms rituals of category change. These rituals are used where participants 
interpret the money as belonging to an undesirable category, or perceive that others 
might interpret the money as belonging to an undesirable category, and the speaker 
therefore wishes to change the categorisation. The participants therefore perform 
what they understand to be a ritual of category change, in order to affect how they 
(and others) categorise the money. That is, assuming shared interpretation, they use 
discourses to show that they choose one category over another because it is 
understood as important to do so.   
In this pricing research the money received and discussed is money earned from 
selling the pricers’ art object. Prior research and data collected during this research 
suggests that money from pricing art may be construed as dirty money which needs 
to be cleaned through the use of discursive practices (e.g. of earmarking) which are 




Work by Douglas (1982) shows how different forms of money  - coins and raffia - 
were used by the Lele, and were used for specific types of transaction. The 
transactions and choice of money-type were shaped by and reinforced social 
relations. Zelizer’s (1994) work shows how, rather than being the preserve of 
‘primitive’ peoples, this is very similar to contemporary Western money practices. 
For example, she shows how American people use money categories and forms in 
their social relations. They create different forms of money through categorisation 
(e.g. pocket money, tips) and associated practices, and are also continually inventing 
new physical forms of money such as coupons and vouchers. Zelizer data shows how 
money-practices are used and interpreted as signals of cultural capital and social 
position. Within the data collected by my research we can see all of these practices: 
the use of different physical forms of money, the creation of new forms of money, 
the understanding of money as belonging to different categories, and the use of 
money practices within social relations. 
I look first at the different physical forms of money used within the research data:  
6.1.1   Money – Physical forms 
The physical form of money matters (Zelizer 1994), and knowing the context-
specific meaning of particular forms is an important social skill. For example, 
depending on context, to hand over a collection of random coins as a birthday 
present would generally be seen as an insult, whereas a crisp note in a special card (a 
ritual of category change) would generally be seen as more appropriate, that is, it is 
more socially acceptable, it conforms to ideas of ‘how it is done’.  Here I look at the 
variety of forms of money used within the art trails, discuss how they are interpreted 
by participants, and discuss the relationship between physical form and pricing.  
I begin with the smallest section, the creation of new forms of money, before moving 




New forms of money - vouchers 
During the research period no new forms of money were mentioned until this 
summer, when one of the trail committees announced that they would be introducing 
an art trail voucher, also referred to as the trail token. This development supports 
Zelizer’s (1994) suggestion that we are always creating new forms of money. It is 
not yet possible to see how the vouchers will be categorised by the participants, nor 
the effect (if any) on their pricing practice.  
Existing forms of money: cash, cheques, electronic, spread-payments 
The money used within the trails is generally in the form of cash or cheques. It is 
interesting that what could be argued to be the least obvious form, electronic money 
via a VISA machine, caused significant offence. I discuss each of these forms in 
turn: cash, cheque, and electronic money, followed by a brief note on spread-
payments. 
Cash 
During the trails I witnessed many slightly awkward and embarrassed exchanges of 
money, and handling cash seemed to be (by a small margin) the most problematic.  
Following precedent in the use of introspection by Becker (1991) and by Douglas 
(1982, p.57), in which she examines her own experience of money, introspection re 
my experience with handling cash provided some insights into the unease apparently 
felt by the artists:  
I have a friend who for the last couple of years has stayed at my house for two nights 
a week, as he and his family live too far away from his job for a daily commute. At 
my request he always leaves his cash payment on a window-ledge in the kitchen 
rather than handing it to me, even if we are in the same room. At the beginning there 
was unspoken query (raised eyebrows, him) and acknowledgment (a shoulder shrug, 




want the transaction to be too bare, although there is no ‘logical’ reason why it 
should not be. To me the money form – cash – is explicitly commercial, and as such 
threatens the friend relationship (what Zelizer terms the contamination model), and 
therefore the money needs to be converted through a ritual of category change. To 
me, putting the cash on the window-ledge performs a masking function, which 
cleans the money. 
Naturally I wondered how my friend interpreted the transaction and the ritual, and 
again from reflexion regarding my own experience I suspected that ease with money-
handling varies with whether one is the payer or the recipient. This matters, as 
pricing something puts one clearly in the role of recipient, and whereas Zelizer’s 
examples of the need to disguise money in recognition of the feelings of the recipient 
were primarily examples of money as a gift, in my research the money is being 
received as part of a market exchange, not as a gift; and yet a discomfort with the 
‘appropriateness’ of receiving money was very common. 
Again following precedent set by Becker and by Douglas (ibid), I considered my 
own experience as a recipient of cash in comparison with my experience as the 
donor/payer. My discomfort with receiving the money from my friend (discussed 
above) was in direct contrast to my unconcerned attitude to cash on two recent 
occasions in which I was the payer, not the recipient. On two occasions a handyman 
who does odd jobs for me has waived aside my query of how much I owe him, 
although I ask the question with my hand in my back pocket, ready to get out the 
cash. The handyman’s decision to waive the topic of price seems to be tied to the 
fact that on those occasions I have acted as his apprentice and we have done the job 
together. When I become involved in the work the relationship between us changes 
and becomes more social. It seems to me as though the handyman avoids money-
discussions and money-handling in these situations as he does not want to change the 
relationship from a friendly expert: learner situation to a ‘work’ situation. That is, the 
handyman used discourses of money to suggest a social relationship, even though I 




skill, and felt I could do so without undermining the nascent friendship. Importantly, 
the idea of price and cash was significantly less problematic to me when paying 
rather than when receiving it. 
This reflexion supports Zelizer’s point that perceptions of money and its use in social 
relationships is important, and extends her observation to consider how this may 
inform a market exchange. The handyman’s refusal to name a price and accept 
money does not make economic sense if, as is generally assumed, within a market 
transaction money is money. However, as Zelizer found, in many circumstances 
money exchange may be understood as being inappropriate between friends, so 
people find ways to remove the potential threat to the relationship by removing 
money entirely (as the handyman did), reducing the price (“mates rates”), or 
disguising the exchange /making the exchange less visible (as I do with my 
friend/lodger). Rather than money necessarily being contaminating, these money and 
pricing practices are a way of suggesting and/or affirming particular social bonds, 
and although pricing would generally be considered an economic activity it is clearly 
not purely an economic practice.  
As Zelizer (1994) illustrates in her examples of the lengths women may go to in 
order to disguise money presents so that people need not be embarrassed about 
receiving it, there is something about receiving money which is often not neutral.  It 
is not necessarily that the money is irredeemably dirty, it is that in particular contexts 
t is perceived as needing re-categorisation to avoid having an undesirable effect on 
social relationships, and the re-categorisation is a way of affirming that a social 
relationship is desired. As a result people find ways to achieve this which they 
understand to perform that function, such as my asking my friend to leave money on 
the window-ledge rather than put it in my hand. By doing this I am using a 
transaction-distancing ritual, a masking discourse, which suggests that the payment 
is incidental, and in doing so I am seeking to emphasise the friendship and minimise 
the potential interpretation of the situation as a lodger:landlady relationship. The 




transaction from commercial to social. However, by finding a way around the 
discomfort (using a masking discourse) I gain what I categorise as cleaned money, 
whereas my handyman goes away with empty pockets. That is, his understanding of 
money etiquette and its social meanings appeared to absolutely override economic 
logic.  
I observed similar awkwardness with money-handling during the data-collection 
period, and it was brought up without prompting in a number of the interviews. One 
participant (BR) started the discussion by saying angrily that the way she was 
brought up, in which she had been taught that anything to do with money was 
unmentionable, was “paralysing”. She said that she wished that she found money a 
more comfortable topic, and that she was struggling to undo this deeply-rooted 
aspect of her “ridiculous” and “middleclass” upbringing.  
Although in this instance BR was talking about money in general, from observation 
cash, and cash associated with art, are particularly uncomfortable for her. She seems 
to overcompensate for her awkwardness, making the cash more visible than many 
others do in the same type of transaction context. For example she pays her models 
in bare cash, whereas others artists frequently put the money in an envelope.  
Whereas the envelope is generally passed by the artist directly to the model, BR puts 
the cash down on a suitable surface between herself and the model. It seems that she 
over-compensates for what she calls her “ridiculous middle-class” discomfort with 
cash by making it very visible (no envelope), but she then cannot bring herself to do, 
or does not want the model to have to do, the hand-to-hand part of the bare cash 
exchange. Within the research context and the use of an envelope or neutral space to 
put cash in appears to be a common money ritual which can be used to reinforce the 
relationship between donor and recipient as one of friendship rather than commerce, 
or at least as ‘friendly commerce’.  
For BR, money is far from neutral – she said that she even found it difficult to think 
about money, which makes pricing her work “an enormous struggle”. Another trail 




“.. really awkward! Initially. It was as though…………….yeah. I I (feeling her 
way) found…it it difficult to sort of…... take money, I didn’t like it. Um . I’m 
not sure what (embarrassed short quiet laugh) it is.” 
 (HM) 
Using the local hierarchy by media, HM’s work could be described as craft. 
Although according to local norms money should not be a problem with craft objects 
(the art/craft object categorisation and its effect on money categorisation is discussed 
in the section Categorisation of money by source), HM’s discourse is about money 
discomfort. This may be because she is constructing her work as more art than craft, 
and/or may be to do with a more general discomfort with receiving money.  
If money from art is dirty, as the Romantic myth suggests, within the data cash 
seems particularly so. The categorisation of money as ‘dirty’ or unmentionable 
appears to matter to many of the participants. For example, one participant repeated 
a number of times that he was “bad with money, terrible”, and said that he does not 
like handling it. As with HM, this comment was accompanied by physical drawing 
in and squirming.  
One might expect craft artists to find money handling less embarrassing, and on the 
whole that may be the case, but two of the three interviews in which the 
embarrassment of money-handling was explicitly discussed were with what might be 
termed craft artists. The use of this discourse may be in part a construction of their 
work as ‘less craft, more art’ (showing knowledge of the object hierarchy by degree 
of separation), as well as a display of their knowledge of the middle class discomfort 
with money.  
 
Cash and price effect  
In terms of the effect of money form on price, within the interviews no participant 




markets such as plumbing. Within a variety of trades and contexts (e.g. see 
Venkatesh’s Off the Books(2006)) payment by cash would mean it need not appear 
on the official accounts, and so the plumber (for example) need not pay tax on it. As 
a result, a lower cash price may be offered by the seller.   
Although many of the artists I interviewed do keep formal accounts of their sales and 
costs (sometimes for tax purposes), no art trail participant talked about using or 
considering different prices for cash. There were however some ad hoc price 
changes for cash. For example, I was offered a slight price reduction when my £20 
note was not quite enough to cover a purchase. Although I was about to write a 
cheque for the full amount, the pricer said “That [£20] would be fine”. In this case 
cash (instant money) and a display of friendship/lack of concern about money was 
preferable to cheque, with its slight but unavoidable delay and suggestion of interest 
in economic maximisation. 
Cheques 
Many of the exchanges within the trails are made by cheque. Given the prices of 
much of the work for sale, the amount of cash most buyers are likely to carry around, 
and the lack of credit card machines, I suspect the preponderance of this form is 
largely down to practicality. However, it is possible that cheques may be construed 
as having some distancing effect by those who wish to keep money and art apart.  
Cheque and price effect 
No pricers within the art trail research context mentioned thinking about adjusting 
prices in terms of the money form of cheques. At one trail meeting someone asked 
what to do with cheques, and it was suggested that artists should ask buyers to write 
a series of post-dated cheques up to the cheque-guarantee card limit until the full 
amount was reached. At no time was it suggested that pricing might be adjusted to 
the cheque guarantee amount. This was in contrast to the practice of a pricer from 
another field, who told me that he kept his prices below £50 as that was the usual 





Within the trail context handling cash and cheques caused some recipients some 
embarrassment, and they found it “really awkward!”. The alternative – electronic 
money – seemed to be regarded with very mixed feelings. Rather than being seen as 
‘unreal’ and therefore more ‘clean’ money,  the use of a VISA machine in one of the 
art trails caused such offence that it was a major topic of complaint at the post-trail 
meeting, and it still crops up in conversation years later. A high-status member of the 
community publically criticised the artist for her inappropriate use of a VISA 
machine, and suggested that in subsequent years the artist should  not be allowed the 
prominent sales position she had had in the year in which she had committed her 
offence. In fact, it was mooted by the complainant that the offending artist should not 
be allowed to take part at all in future, and from observation she has indeed been 
excluded through a process of edging her into increasingly less desirable venues. 
In this example the physical form of the money seems to have been significant for 
the complainant, who saw the VISA-using artist as having got it very wrong in 
making the commercial intent so visible. To the complainant, electronic money 
‘meant’ visible wooing of commerce, and it appears to have been particularly galling 
that that artist sold a lot of work that weekend.  
The negative interpretation and strong reaction against the money form was not 
shared by all in that meeting, nor, I suggest, would it necessarily be shared by 
everyone in the other trails.  From years of attending meetings of the various trails, I 
suspect that in at least one of the other art trails the VISA machine would have been 
widely seen as a useful development.  
The VISA machine was not the only form of electronic ‘unreal’ money used within 
the data. Within the research data there was also a small group of artists who chose 
to apply for grants and funding (which would be transferred into the artists account 
by electronic inter-bank transaction) rather than price their work. Here ‘grants’ and 




type of money-acquisition is deemed quite different from pricing, which is seen as 
market-based, commercial and contaminating. 
Different interpretations of the meaning of electronic money is discussed further in 
the section ‘Getting it Right, Getting it Wrong’. 
Electronic money and price effect 
By offering a VISA payment option the artist was able to choose relatively high 
prices and make many sales. The VISA machine did not appear to put off buyers, 
and the artist appeared to be making substantially more sales (in terms of both 
quantity of items and monetary value) than any other artist on that trail. This was 
corroborated by the others in the meeting after the trail (“She was raking it in!”). It 
may be that by pricing in what buyers might categorise as ‘invisible/unreal money’ 
she was able to price and sell at higher prices than she could otherwise, and that for 
some buyers her higher pricers might have reinforced the ‘art’ categorisation of her 
work.  
As was pointed out by a third party at the meeting in which the complaint was made 
(the VISA artist was absent), the VISA artist earns and needs to earn her living from 
her art. The implication was that it was therefore appropriate for her to choose her 
prices and sales mechanism with economic considerations to the fore. The VISA 
artist may not have predicted the strongly negative interpretation of the meaning of 
electronic money in that context, nor the social and economic consequences of the 
difference in interpretation.  
Spread payments – credit / savings scheme 
The practice of promoting or allowing spread payments was not very visible within 
the art trails, but was mentioned by some artists selling higher-priced goods, and by 
some buyers. The acceptability of offering such schemes was constructed by 
participants as following high-status precedent – for example two of the three artists 




scheme (run by the Arts Council England), and that it is offered at the main gallery 
in the city.  The Own Art scheme is offered in many other galleries in the city, but 
they only mentioned the main prestigious gallery as precedent.  
Spread payments and price effect 
Offering spread payments may enable sales , as suggested within the behavioural 
economics literature (Welch 2010), but within the data it did not inform the choice of 
price amount. That is, there was no suggestion within the trail data that prices were 
chosen with spread-payments form of money in mind. Instead prices were chosen, 
and this payment method appears to be an after-thought, suggested by the buyer 
rather than seller. That is, within the data collection period I found one artist who, for 
one trail, had a small notice saying that payment could be made in instalments. No 
pricer had material suggesting something like “£250, or 10 monthly payments of 
£25”, as is common in advertisements for items such as cars or collectable plates. 
A member of staff in the city’s main gallery who administers the Own Art scheme 
told me that they make a significant proportion of their sales through that scheme. 
Although spread payments are seen as a way to boost sales volume, the administrator 
was not aware of this form of money affecting price levels: they said that they were 
not aware of any artists choosing to limit their prices to within the Own Art range 
(maximum £2,000), and did not mention the idea that spread payments might allow a 
higher price. 
Summary: Physical Money Form and Pricing Practice 
Whilst not necessarily restricted to a particular class, and may be more to do with 
wider cultural norms (“Friends from abroad think we Brits are hilarious because we 
don’t like to talk about money” (RM)), pricers’ degree of awkwardness with money-
handling may also be part of what is understood to be a largely “middle-class 




Given that exchange of cash can be awkward in many pricing situations (as in the 
examples of my lodger and handyman, above), it is perhaps not surprising that in an 
art context (where according to the Romantic myth money is ideally seen as 
tainting), use of the most explicit form, cash, appears to be understood as the most 
awkward or embarrassing, and cheques, which create some distance from cash, less 
so. However, the importance of physical form is secondary to the underpinning 
mental categorisation of money by source, and the way in which the participant 
interprets and uses the Romantic myth that money from art is contaminated and 
contaminating.  
Once a participant had decided to price their work rather than produce un-priced 
work or apply for funding/grants, the physical form of the money did not appear to 
affect prices chosen. However, rather than treating money forms as interchangeable 
and neutral, understandings of appropriate money form and appropriate practices for 
a particular form varied, and appeared to be shaped by and used to shape social 
relations (which is discussed in more detail later), as in the example of the VISA 
machine.   
Electronic money may be considered by some to be an ‘unreal’ and/or pragmatic 
form of money, and may be thought of as a means of making transactions 
conceptually and practically easier for both buyer and seller, however, within the 
research context the VISA machine was also seen as an offensive symbol of 
commerce and an inappropriate display of a desire for sales.   
The variation in interpretation of the credit card machine within the data is a useful 
reminder that meanings of money, as with meanings of other cultural items, are fluid, 
negotiable, and socially-informed. Having examined the variation in physical forms 
of money within the research context, in the next section the underpinning mental 
categorisation of money by source, holder and earmarking is discussed in more 
detail, in order to explore how legitimisation of particular categorisation and 
rejection of an ‘other’ within discourses of price may be used as a potent source of 





6.2    Money - Mental categorisation by source, holder, & earmarking 
Introduction 
Pricing something turns the object (here art/craft), and the buyer, into a potential 
source of money. As  Baker (1992, p.681) pointed out, ‘In virtually all societies, 
money is distinguished and labelled by source’, and yet as Belk and Wallendorf 
(1990) point out, the importance of source is often overlooked. Here I look at how 
money is distinguished and categorised by source within the research context, and 
how that informs pricing practice. 
As discussed in the Literature Review, prior research of mental money categorisation 
can be thought of as falling into two main areas:  a) behavioural economics, led by 
Richard Thaler, in which people are seen to have shared and predictable differences 
in money behaviours depending on which pot or category they mentally assign the 
money to; and b) socio-economics, in which money behaviours (as with other market 
behaviours) are understood as socially and culturally embedded, and therefore 
subject to variation, and the source of the money is key to how it is understood and 
used (Douglas 1982; Belk and Wallendorf 1990; Zelizer 1994; Welch 2010). The 
underpinning assumption of embeddedness of market actors is shared by the growing 
body of marketing research known as Consumer Culture Theory (Arnould and 
Thompson 2005). 
Within the research data conceptual money categorisations appeared to have a far 
more significant impact on participants’ understandings of possible pricing options 
than the physical forms did. Indeed, the ideal mental categorisation of money from 
art as ‘dirty’ money was alluded to by almost all involved in the research context, 
echoing prior artworld research by Velthuis (2005), Abbing (2002) and Bradshaw et 
al. (2006).  Within the research context, meanings of money appear to have a 




‘complex balancing act between art and commerce’ (Bradshaw, McDonagh et al. 
2006). 
As discussed by Abbing, Bradshaw and Velthuis (ibid), the major categorisation of 
money within the research context can be thought of as dirty money, led by the 
dominant Romantic discourse of the field. Broadly, those for whom money from an 
art object is ostensibly dirty either opt out of pricing (as in the case of the artists 
making site-specific installation work or performance art), or they appear to 
automatically use higher prices (their work is Art). Those for whom money is clean 
or non-problematic appear to automatically charge less (their work is Craft).  
Classifying the money earned through pricing as ‘art money’ appears to be a 
significant categorisation within the research context, and ‘art money’ appears to 
have a variety of meanings and corollary behaviours. 
To revisit the prior money categorisation research in a little more detail, behavioural 
economist Richard Thaler (1985/2008 [1985]) showed that consumers use what he 
termed mental accounting to categorise and handle money, and that this had 
implications for those doing pricing. The process of mental accounting means that 
consumers view money in one pot (or category) as no longer fungible with that in 
another pot, and calculations differ depending on which pot (or category) the money 
has been mentally assigned to. In contrast Belk and Wallendorf (1990) suggested 
that the apparently irrational ways in which people sometimes handle money can be 
understood by looking at historical meanings of money, its sources and its uses, 
particularly with respect to the idea of sacred or profane money. Sacred and profane 
are mental categorisations, not physically different forms which have 
cultural/historical foundations (Belk and Wallendorf 1990). As they are learnt rather 
than nature, whilst there may some degree of shared money categorisation and 
interpretation, there will be variation.  
Moving beyond the sacred/profane polarity, and rounding out Thaler’s idea of shared 
money categorisations and associated behaviours, Zelizer (1994) looked at a variety 




are socially constructed, geo-historically situated, and have important social as well 
as economic uses: money and its meanings are a medium of social relations. 
Whereas Dyer (1989) focusses on the ‘medium of exchange’ use and meaning of 
money, Zelizer examines a wide range of contexts and data sources in order to 
contextualises people’s money categorisations and spending rules. The socio-
historical contextualisation enabled Zelizer to identify and examine the social uses of 
particular money categories, and to illustrate how categorisations and interpretations 
of rules are shaped by what one understands as appropriate. These are used in social 
sifting of ‘like me’ and ‘not like me’. This sifting is possible because categorisations, 
associated behaviours and ideas of appropriateness vary. 
Zelizer points out that although there may be dominant interpretations of ‘right’ and 
‘wrong’ ways to categorise and handle particular monies amongst different groups, 
these interpretations are learnt, not obvious or natural. She illustrates how money 
categorisations and behaviours are part of learnt etiquette, and signal class, relative 
position, and cultural capital.  There are similarities between Zelizer’s findings and 
Douglas’ (1982)  anthropological work on the Lele, in which different money types 
are understood as reserved for particular types of transaction, and correct usage 
shapes and reinforces social relations. Zelizer shows how Western people are always 
creating new forms of money (such as petrol coupons) which operate alongside legal 
tender, and which have their own purposes and rules. Importantly, however, in 
modern usage even when the money is physically one form (legal tender rather than 
the Lele’s use of two currencies, raffia and coin), it is signalled and interpreted as 
belonging to different categories through social practices.  
We know that the dollar on the café table is a tip because we have learnt to give and 
interpret tip-money cues such as the amount, the form, where it was left and when. 
Similarly, you know that the £20 note you receive in your birthday card is different 
from the £20 already in your wallet, and that you are expected to spend it differently. 
Rather than looking at variations in how people interpret birthday money (although 




are variations in the way pricers categorise and interpret money they would gain by 
selling their work, and what the pricing implications of those categorisations appear 
to be. In later sections I then explore why particular interpretations are used in 
certain situations, and how they are learnt and reinforced. 
Pricing their work turns participants’ artwork into a source of money. Corroborating 
Zelizer’s (1994) and Belk’s (1990) point that source matters, within the art trail 
research context the interpretation of the impact of source on the money 
categorisation is significant: it underpins the money categorisation for the vast 
majority of the research participants. To these pricers, because the money is from art 
it is discussed as tainted and tainting (ideal Romantic discourse). Pricing art, which 
requires an explicit consideration of turning an art object into a source of money, is 
therefore problematic for many. For some the idea of negotiating an overlap between 
the ideally separate commercial and art spheres is paralysing, for others it reduces 
their work to a mundane level. As one participant said, thinking about earning one’s 
living from one’s art (which is what pricing is, to him) is “about real and boring real 
life. It’s no longer arty.” Money from art means something different to money gained 
from other sources, which is why detailed examination of participants’ categorisation 
of money and rituals of category change is helpful in understanding some of the 
more puzzling ways people approach pricing.  
In order to examine money categories within the data, I use Zelizer’s framework of 
categorisation by source, holder and earmarking, as well as context.  
6.2.1    Categorisation of money by Source – the art object and the art buyer 
The higher status discourse within the art world in general and shared within this 
research context is that money from art is contaminating and contaminated (Kopytoff 
1986; Bourdieu 1993; Abbing 2002; Velthuis 2005; Bradshaw, McDonagh et al. 
2006). Art obviously for sale is understood as lower status art: “It wasn’t a selling 




Whereas Craft objects are largely defined by their perceived proximity to the market, 
to aim to earn money from pricing and selling your Art is constructed as “selling 
your soul”, as two participants put it. Anyone who is seen to behave in that 
commercial manner may be categorised as a different and perhaps lower status, as 
could be seen in the two artists telling me about a third: “she paints to sell” “She’s 
not like us”, or in another example of the ostracising of another trail participant 
because of their allegedly commercial focus, “I don’t want to name names, but you 
may know who I mean”. 
The source of the money is not just the object (art or craft) being sold, it is also the 
buyer. Although it makes little sense from a purely economic point of view in which 
money is neutral, for some of the Art pricers the categorisation and meaning of the 
money, and whether it can be considered appropriate for commensuration with Art, 
appears to change depending on who it comes from. Money categorisation and 
meaning-making by source, including the idea that buyer-as-source is important for 
Art pricers and irrelevant for Craft pricers, is not obvious or nature, it is learnt. Being 
seen to know those rules is an indicator of social position. 
Money Categorisation by Source: The art/craft object 
As discussed in the Stratification chapter, how the object is categorised has a big 
impact on money categorisation and pricing practice. If work is categorised as Craft 
rather than as Art, then there are shared understandings that there is a different 
‘appropriate discourse’. Depending on object category, the participants used a 
different pricing range, and different money categorisations and interpretations 
(primarily, Art prices are higher than Craft, or Art is priceless).  
Within the context (and more widely), certain types of work such as illustration, 
graphics, and photography were often termed Craft rather than Art, and had a lower 
status, and were given lower prices.  “I consider that illustration” was used as a 
derogatory statement, not praise. If the object is craft, then the buyer (source of 




– they did not make the money cleaner or dirtier. Craft participants rarely suggested 
a vetting process, in contrast to the common art-object discourse of vetting buyers 
and telling stories of having sold work to a particularly good home.  However, 
during the research period the source was sometimes seen to matter to craft artists, 
and this occurred when in conversation with other craft artists, and appeared to be 
used to elevate status through signals of commercial acumen or success. For 
example, an animator spoke of applying for funding to complete a project he was 
working on, and then corrected himself – he is seeking sponsorship: 
 “with the help of X [name of co] I hope to get funding, well, sponsorship, to 
complete [my project].”       
“Sponsorship” has connotations of commerce, and suggests a desire for connection 
with a company, whereas “funding” was used throughout the research context to 
mean money from non-commercial entities such as The Arts Council. 
It is difficult to pin down when and why something becomes categorised as Craft 
rather than Art, but from the years of conversations and observations within the 
research context the categorisation hinges on the perceived relationship to the 
market. That is, objects which were are already deemed to be in closer contact with 
the market, in that they are perceived as the type of work that is made to a paying 
brief, or which are made specifically because they will sell rather than being from 
the soul, are considered to be of lower status than Art.  
The word ‘craft’ was used regularly within the research context (particularly by 
those working in the university and those who had had recent close contact with the 
university), as a criticism of the work of others, particularly in the form “She sells a 
lot, but I consider her work craft” (NM).  
It was rare for someone to explicitly categorise their own work as craft – within the 
context, craft is understood to mean ‘not art’, and as art is the pinnacle, craft must be 




“[My husband told me] you don’t want to be seen… doing little craftwork 
shows anymore, which I don’t do – (unclear) it’s not worth it. It’s got to have 
‘contemporary’ in the [title of the craft exhibition or show]. 
Contemporary in the crafts, (unclear) otherwise its quite cheap. (laughs) 
Otherwise its, they’ll look at a pendant for [£]10, and they’ll say “Oh that’s 
quite expensive” sometimes.” 
(PJ) 
The excerpt above illustrates how although the perceived division between art and 
craft is a culturally-created divide which is far simple to define, it is a divide which 
matters, and has a direct effect on customers’ price expectations as well as artists’ 
understandings of appropriate price-range.  
Although the craft categorisation of her object is seen by PJ as indicating that her 
work is regarded as lower status and she thinks the pricing implications of the 
categorisation are undesirable and unfair, when in the role of consumer she too used 
this type of craft/art division and associated expectation of price:  For example, at a 
recent show she had seen 
“hand-woven textile wall-pieces, and they were priced… sort of 300 pounds 
for a 30cm ‘canvas’, in inverted commas, cos obviously it was a textile, um 
which, to me was a lot of money.” 
(PJ) 
She emphasises that the Art categorisation was desired but not achieved through her 
use of tonal and verbal inverted commas around ‘canvas’. Canvas implies a painting, 
that is, Art, and with it appropriately high prices. “‘canvas’, in inverted commas” 
implies that this was a piece of textile wanting to be seen as Art, but not achieving it. 
She therefore felt that the price of £300 was therefore inappropriate. 
Categorisation of object as Art or Craft has a significant effect on pricing discourses 




research context, art is seen as better and more expensive, and craft as lower in status 
and expected price. Categorisation of object as art or craft (as in “but I consider her 
work craft”, or “There were a few good pictures there, but an awful lot I’d call 
illustration” (field notes, M’s group) acts as a means of positioning self – that is, it 
has a social purpose as well as an economic impact. 
Craft is looked down upon by many, in an echo of the divisions taught at the local 
university which plays a key part in the art legitimating industry within the research 
context. In a very recent swing against the negative connotations, the term ‘Craft’ is 
being reclaimed by some participants, rather than avoided. However, at this early 
stage it appears that the lower pricing implications remain. 
As a participant pointed out, to someone from the outside, such as herself, the 
importance of the art/craft categorisation seems bizarre, and bizarrely powerful. As 
far as she knows, the division and its price and status implications are not currently 
shared elsewhere, nor was it used by previous generations in the States, where she 
comes from. 
“in the States, as I remember it and as I still look at the American craft 
magazines and the American art and craft magazines, there’s not a lot of 
difference.” 
 (RM) 
To RM, the art/craft categorisation is part of the laughable British habit of sorting 
one another by class, and she cites Grayson Perry, winner of the prestigious Turner 
Prize (which he won with a body of ceramic pieces), as evidence that one need not 
agree with the mainstream view that art and craft are different, and that craft is 
lower:  
“he [Grayson Perry] thinks it's rubbish that the difference….the um 





Grayson Perry’s 2003 Turner Prize success was particularly newsworthy because it 
bucked the widely shared understanding of the art hierarchy in which ceramics is 
more Craft than High Art. ‘As he commented at the time, critics spent more time 
discussing the fact that he chose to work with ceramics – indicative of the low value 
placed on clay works in the fine art context – than the content of the works 
themselves’   (Game 2011). 
The Turner Prize is news-worthy because the judges’ choice tends to challenge 
mainstream ideas of what is good art, and in this case the judges’ decision to award a 
ceramic work the prize surprised many.  However, that the judges’ choice was seen 
as a newsworthy aberration largely supports rather than challenges the finding that 
ceramics (or pottery) is generally seen as ‘craft’, and craft as lower than art. 
RM’s informed criticism of the local craft/art divide could be understood as a part of 
her positioning of herself as belonging to the cultural elite (in that she holds a similar 
view to that of the Turner Prize judges) and is therefore above the local bourgeois 
ranking-system. Importantly, she was able to support her use of the criticism through 
her rich knowledge of ceramics and her use of locally high status vocabulary such as 
‘visceral’ and ‘emotional response’. Through these references to legitimate 
authorities she was able to construct her criticism as part of ‘getting it right’. This 
positioning, which was supported throughout the interview (which covered a range 
of arts-related topics) enabled her to position her work as Art, and price accordingly, 
whereas other trail participants producing work using the same artistic technique 
were more likely to consider themselves restricted to a more ‘craft’ categorisation for 
their objects, and corresponding lower price range.  
Craft artists within the research context generally restricted themselves to a lower 
price range because they used (and appeared to believe) the mainstream hierarchical 
discourse and consider their work to be less ‘art’, more ‘craft’ and the corollary rules 
that craft is lower status, and therefore prices should be lower. On the whole, the 
hierarchy by medium and the associated pricing discourses and pricing ranges were 




very cost-based pricing approach, even though three of them noted that anyone who 
paints calls themselves an artist, and “they always seem to charge a lot more and 
they seem to get away with it” (AD).  That is, AD assumes that the interpretation 
paint=Art=higher prices was shared by makers and buyers, who will pay the higher 
prices. 
Although most participants seemed to accept their objects’ categorisation and the 
lower position of Craft, some explicitly tried to work out what was needed for their 
work to be taken as more ‘Art’. Sometimes this was for predominantly social reasons 
(e.g. PJ, who wanted her work to be taken more seriously by the field’s elite 
although she knew that it would mean that she would make far less money), 
sometimes for economic as well as social reasons (e.g. GT, who wanted his work to 
be priced at the same level as a painting, to emphasise its artistic parity). A few 
participants (such as RM, above) were also interested in reclaiming the ‘Craft’ 
categorisation, and these tended to be the more middle-class participants with a great 
deal of experience within and of the wider arts scene. Ownership of reasonably high-
status cultural capital appears to be important in determining whether the participant 
broached the topic of the renegotiation of the meanings of categorisation of objects, 
and therefore renegotiation of pricing expectations.  
In an example of renegotiation of object category, photographer (GT) was angry 
about the lower status and lower prices he is restricted to because, despite 
Benjamin’s (1999 (1936)) hope that the introduction of mechanically reproducible 
media (particularly cinema/film) would challenge the extant art hierarchy, 
photography is still categorised as ‘less art’. GT wanted his work to be understood as 
Art. In the interview and other conversations GT situated his work using what is 
generally understood as high-status discourses of art-history contextualisation and 
associated philosophy, which O’Toole (1994, p.182) describes as the conventions of 
hegemonic art-historical discourse. That is, in order to construct a case for 
repositioning photography he has to use the existing framework (‘the domain of 




Whereas GT used his discourse to negotiate re-categorisation of his photography 
from craft to art, PJ talked about changing what she made in order to conform to the 
current view of what constitutes Art. She said that she needed to move away from 
the market and her consideration of what would sell, and concentrate on another type 
of work – “more ‘concept’” -  which she knew from experience of attending many 
fairs would not sell but would have status and be included in exhibitions: 
“I mean, I think that I’d quite like, I’d I’d like to take it slightly more seriously 
and also , take a step back from selling and do more large-scale, not 
necessarily large-scale, but more ‘arty’ craft.   
(…) 
more ‘concept’ I think. I’d be taken slightly more seriously.” 
(PJ) 
Summary: 
On the whole, craft-makers were likely to confirm the lower status of craft by talking 
about money and the market. Artists were more likely to emphasise the 
cleaning/elevating discourses of money. Only those participants who are aware of 
the higher discourse and wish their work to be seen as more Art are likely to use 
pricing discourses which included categorisation of money as tainting, awkward, and 
embarrassing. It appears that the ‘tainted money’ discourses are deemed appropriate 
and necessary for ‘art’ objects, and inappropriate for ‘craft’ objects. Categorisation 
of money as tainted or non-problematic is interwoven with construction of the object 
being priced, interpretations of appropriate commensurative rules, pricing 
discourses, and other pricing practices.  
Money Categorisation by Source: The art buyer 
The idea that who the money comes affects how it is categorised and treated occurs 
in many contexts, as discussed by Zelizer (1994), Belk and Wallendorf (1990), and 




degree from Oxford because of the university’s acceptance of money from what 
Bennett construed as a tainted source or holder, Robert Murdoch.  Bennett made it 
clear that to him (legitimate source of authority, legitimated in part by the offer of 
the honorary degree), the source meant that the money was tainted and tainting, and 
the university should not have accepted it. To him the university had got it wrong, 
and the source does matter. 
Sitting in a lecture for MA art students, I was taught that who buys one’s work (i.e. 
the source of the money) matters, and in what way. The lecturer told a story, the 
function of which was to teach the students her (high status) interpretation of the 
money used to buy Hirst’s spot pictures. Drawing on current media criticism of the 
stock-market and bankers, the money was constructed as commercial new money 
earned from the “morally corrupt” stock-market. The source ‘meant’ that it is dirty 
money, and by association it tainted both the art and the artist. Whilst money from 
art is de facto bad, according to the Romantic myth, it can be seen as even more 
dirty, depending on the construction of the source/buyer. Do not sell to the wrong 
buyer, was the warning. 
Selling to bankers, which means being seen to accept (or seek) dirty money for one’s 
art ‘means’ that the art becomes less art. In her story,  the lecturer stated that she 
found art bought by Saatchi (a ‘super collector’, who made his money from 
advertising) to be less pleasing “easy” art. She implied that the work in the Saatchi 
gallery was ‘dirty’ art, because she had to “wash” herself after the visit to the gallery 
by visiting Tate Modern (implication: art in Tate Modern is clean and cleansing art). 
I suggest that her categorisation of the Saatchi gallery art as ‘dirty’ ‘easy’ art is 
informed by its proximity to commerce. Work in the Saatchi gallery was bought with 
dirty advertising new money, and is generally for sale, and therefore very much in 
the market, whereas work shown in Tate Modern was bought with ‘clean’ money 
(the source was Tate Modern, i.e. art world elite), is not for sale, and has been 




cleaned through the assumption of a shared understanding of the buyer (source) as 
cleaning.   
Within the data, construction of the buyer (the source of money) matters. Within the 
data “punters” was a term used frequently amongst a subset of a group of affluent 
artists when discussing the art trail, although its use was primarily by one very vocal 
participant. However, ‘punter’ was seen as inappropriate and offensive to some other 
artists who constructed themselves as higher status because they would not use a 
term like that. This second group appeared to consider the term as offensive because 
of its explicit reference to the market aspect of the trails, and in its construction of 
hierarchical division between artist (higher cultural capital) and buyer (lower cultural 
capital). It was also deemed likely to be offensive to potential clientele. In assuming 
offence the buyer is constructed by these artists as sharing their interpretation of the 
term ‘punter’ and its associations, and therefore as having similar cultural capital, 
and to therefore be ‘a good home’, and source of clean money.  
Changing of categorisation of the art and money by teaching an interpretation of the 
buyer as a bad or good source of money is what Zelizer terms a ritual of category 
change, in that the ritual is understood to be needed, and to work in a particular way. 
The construction and interpretation of the money source matters, as they are used to 
change the money categorisation. Sometimes, as in the example of Tate Modern and 
‘punter’ above, construction of the buyer can be used to clean the money and thereby 
move the pricing and transaction closer to the ideal Romantic separation of the 
commercial and art spheres.  
Good Home:     Within the research context buyers who were constructed or who 
are able to construct themselves as a good home for the piece, and therefore as a 
source of ‘clean money’, enabled a smooth and status-building or status-affirming 
transaction.  A ‘good home’ is constructed through signals of cultural capital, 
perhaps through demonstration of knowledge of the field (as in Tate Modern), or a 
suggestion that emotional connection rather than interior design requirements is the 




to go to people who “get it”, that is, to people for whom the art “means something”. 
This was widely used and interpreted as a cleaning discourse, changing the 
categorisation of the money earned through a change in the meaning of the 
transaction from market transaction to emotional or intellectual connection.  
Sales were particularly celebrated when the emotional connection interpretation of 
the exchange was the centre of the story:   
ES told me excitedly that she had just sold a picture to someone. The buyer had told 
her that she had “no money” but had seen the picture at a trail and “just had to have 
it”. For ES this choice of discourse made the sale special, and made the money a type 
of special money – the money was more significant to that buyer than it might have 
been to someone else, and the picture was significant to her. The buyer’s choice of 
discourse of emotional connection meant to ES that the buyer ‘got it’, and the money 
and sale was cleansed sufficiently to become a topic of conversation. 
Another artist emailed me about a sale (not a normal topic or purpose of 
conversation within this context) because she was so thrilled about it: a young 
woman had chosen a picture as her twenty-first birthday present from her parents. 
Far from being a commercial and therefore unmentionable activity, the buyer was 
constructed as ‘a good home’, and by using this discourse rather than an 
inappropriate economic discourse, the news of the sale could be shared and 
celebrated. 
The opposite also occurred - sales were regretted if the commercial nature of the 
transaction rather than emotional connection was too clear: 
An artist (M) told me that some time after a sale of one of her pieces she had learnt 
that rather than having bought the picture “from a feeling” for it, as M had assumed, 
the buyer had bought the picture because she needed to quickly decorate a house. In 
fact, M told me, she had learnt that the buyer had bought quite a number of pictures 




pleased that someone had bought her picture, now that she knew the reason for the 
purchase she was less happy. The buyer’s motive had changed the categorisation of 
the object from Art to décor, and the money from ‘art money’ to tainted money. 
Whereas one might assume that pricers price their work in order to make money, in 
this case the artist was disappointed by the sale, and implied that she would rather 
have had no money than make a sale to the wrong sort of buyer for the wrong sort of 
money. 
For this research what is important about money categorisation by source is that it 
sometimes affects pricing practice. Importantly, prices were sometimes dropped if 
the source was seen as cleaning. For example, FW spoke of being willing to reduce 
her prices so that someone to whom the work meant something (construction of 
money as ‘clean money through emotional connection) but had little money (so each 
bit of money is more ‘special’ money), would be able buy it.  
Constructing the buyer as a good home and therefore as a source of clean money 
involves appropriate discourses of emotional connection with the art object, 
appreciation of artistic aims, and discrete mention of money. That is, there is a 
display of knowledge of ‘how it is done’ by both buyer and seller. 
Not all participants within the research appeared to know the good home aspect of 
‘how it is done’ – that is, they did not appear to know that the source of the money 
‘should’ matter to someone selling art, nor how to construct or recognise a ‘good 
home’. For example,  a participant who makes art objects which are priced as ‘art’ 
(i.e. high prices) said that she does not care who buys her work, although she would 
like Madonna to buy one, as she admires her:  
“I think it would be nice for someone famous to buy my work. But they’d 
have to be someone famous that I like! (laughs)” 




Unlike FW,  who was willing to adjust her prices for ‘a good home’, from extended 
observation DK does not know the high-status interpretation of buyers’ subtle hints 
of cultural capital, that is, she does not interpret them as signals that they are a good 
home for her work, and therefore a sale worth pursuing, perhaps by offering a 
reduction. Instead of dropping the price for clean money (which would be getting it 
right according to the higher status rules), she rather brusquely suggests that those 
buyers should choose something else of hers that they can afford (getting it wrong). 
DK is using economic logic – all money is the same – rather than the higher status 
Romantic artworld logic. Paraphrasing, to DK people either like her work or they 
don’t like it, and either they can afford it, or they can’t. Reviewing the interview, it 
was interesting that I tried to bolster DK’s choice of Madonna as ideal buyer, 
constructing her as ‘a good home’ by talking about Madonna’s artworld cultural 
credentials, particularly her close connection with Basquiat and Warhol’s Factory, 
but DK was absolutely uninterested. For DK, the artworld construction of ‘good 
home’ appears irrelevant, both in terms of suggesting shared emotional connection 
(which is a group membership discourse and social rationale) or in terms of leading 
to future sales either directly or through influence (commercial rationale). 
For other pricers, knowing the significance of ‘good home’ and clean money was 
very important. At an extreme example of the effect on pricing of the ‘good home’ 
category of money source, DS refused a significant sale (£000s) and withdrew the 
piece from the market because as far as she was concerned the would-be buyer 
clearly did not “get it”: he had talked about the piece in what she termed a “crass” 
way, and then tried to haggle over the price. The buyer was not a ‘good home’, as he 
had used what the artist considered a totally inappropriate discourse for an art sale, 
and her withdrawal of the piece from the market suggests that she construed it as 
having been contaminated by the discussion and its contact with the market. The 
piece was later cleansed by being given away to ‘a good home’. 
DS’s economically irrational rejection of dirty money echoes the gallery owners’ 




discourse by a would-be buyer would mean that their money was instantly 
constructed as unwelcome dirty money which would contaminate the piece. DS’s 
rejection of the money and the sale, and her telling of the story to me, underlined that 
she, the artist, knew the correct interpretation of the buyer and his money.  
In this example the categorisation of money by source caused a significant price 
change (£’000s to Not For Sale) and significant economic loss for the artist, who is 
far from affluent. However, her economically irrational action was constructed by 
her as obviously correct, and she expected me to share her interpretation. I suggest 
that her story of the refused sale could be seen as a display of her knowledge of a 
high status ‘how it is done around here’, and therefore of DS’ desired or actual high 
status within the context. 
Money-cleaning discourses to do with categorisation by or of the buyer are not 
restricted to the research context, they are common in the wider art world. As already 
mentioned, Velthuis (2005) found that the New York and Amsterdam art gallery 
owners he interviewed often talked of refusing sales to/money from particular 
sources. In corroboration of this observation,  Thornton (2008) states that in her 
study of the contemporary art world she rarely saw a hard sell, but that ‘the hard 
buy’ is much more visible. The ‘hard buy’ is a discussion in which a would-be art 
buyer (note, Thornton uses the term ‘collector’ rather than ‘buyer’, echoing standard 
practice in the arts media) tries to persuade the seller to part with a piece of art. This 
is done by the buyer constructing himself as a good home by talking about his 
artworld credentials such as his art collection and listing who he knows within the art 
world: “that’s when the collector starts telling the dealer why they should be allowed 
to buy the work. How they are on the Board of Trustees for this museum, how they 
have a collection that includes that, how they’re good friends with so-and-so.” 
In Velthuis’ study the gallery owners are at pains to emphasise that they vet their 
buyers, ensuring that they only sell to the right sort of people – by which they mean 
people who ‘get’ the work and share their knowledge of the ideal discourses, 




sell to people who just want to ‘turn’ the work (i.e. sell it again quickly) to make a 
profit. That is, a ‘bad home’ or source of ‘dirty money’ would be people who make 
the overlap between art and commerce visible, rather than discrete. DS could be 
therefore be seen to be following high status precedent. However, whereas in 
Thornton and Velthuis’ studies the owners retain the piece and it continues to be for 
sale, DS gave hers away, therefore losing the future opportunity of making economic 
capital from it. 
Summary 
From a Marketing Mix perspective it could be argued that for the pricer, positioning 
oneself as having high cultural capital within the field could have an economic 
purpose and benefit. Although this cannot be discounted as a reason for the 
dominance of the desirability of the ‘good home’ discourse, within the research data 
the good home/clean money discourses sometimes involved economic loss rather 
than gain. The effect of using the ‘good home’ often appeared to be more about 
social positioning and construction of oneself as an artist who knows that money is 
potentially tainting and needs to be clean(ed), than it was to do with maximising 
profit or covering costs. 
Participants demonstrated their knowledge of the ideal discourses by making work 
that was not sell-able, such as performance pieces, installations, &/or used ‘time-
based media’4 (film/video/dvd work, which is theoretically sellable but in practice is 
known to have no ‘domestic’ buyers), or they did not price their work, or they put 
NFS, (Not For Sale) on their work. Sometimes, as in the DS example above, 
economic concerns were outweighed to the extent that they gave away art to the right 
                                                 
 
4
 Cf Walter Benjamin’s essay The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction, in which he 
suggests that mechanically reproducible work (especially work in which such reproduction is central) 




sort/ a good home, rather than sell it to the wrong. Sometimes participants offered a 
discount to the right sort of buyer, even if it was not explicitly asked for or 
objectively required. What is different about this data compared to Velthuis’ (2005) 
findings is that whereas the gallery owners all used very similar discourses, within 
my research context there is variation in use and interpretation of money source 
discourses. Money categorisation by source, which is both art and the art-buyer, 
appears to have a significant effect on artists’ pricing practice, but only if the artist 
has learnt that it ‘should’ have this effect. 
Ritual of Category Change by changing object (money source) category 
As already discussed, the category of object – Art or Craft – is significant in 
determining how money earned from that source is categorised, and what pricing 
practices are understood to be appropriate for the object. Art is understood as ideally 
separate from the market and money, whereas Craft is largely defined by its more 
commercial consideration.  
Changing the categorisation of object from art to craft makes pricing much less 
awkward, as within the dominant understanding of the field craft objects are allowed 
or expected to be closer to the market. Market behaviours such as pricing (which 
implies an interest in selling) are therefore more acceptable. However there is a loss 
of kudos associated with the object category change (craft is lower than art in the 
hierarchy), and a reduction in possible pricing range because both pricers and 
customers expect craft objects to be cheaper than those of art objects.  
Craft and Art are not discrete simple categories, they are multifaceted and nuanced 
terms. To revisit an earlier example, as PJ explained, the word ‘contemporary’ is 
understood by many makers and buyers as raising the ‘craft’ category and prices 
towards (if not level with) ‘art’. The name of a particular selling opportunity 
therefore matters.  




Contemporary in the crafts, (unclear) otherwise [the assumption is that the 
work is] quite cheap. (laughs) Otherwise its, they’ll look at a pendant for 
[£]10, and they’ll say ‘oh that’s quite expensive’ sometimes. (She’s smiling, 
SS laughing). You feel like saying ‘Where do you shop?!’ 
(PJ) 
Putting ‘contemporary’ in the exhibition’s name acts as a ritual of category change 
because there is shared recognition that object category change is necessary, and 
there is a shared interpretation of the function of ‘contemporary’ in this context. 
‘Contemporary’ performs a similar function elsewhere. 
There were also examples of a type of inverse snobbery to emphasise high object 
category and status of the speaker. For example one of the UK’s top potters prefers 
to describe his work as ‘pots’ rather than ‘ceramics’, whereas within the research 
context most used the word ‘pot’ as a derogatory or functional term, and ‘ceramics’ 
as a more refined term, implying a movement towards (but not achievement of) the 
Art category. The high-status potter has no need to demonstrate cultural capital, as 
he is internationally recognised as a master in the field. When he, like the Turner 
Prize judges, says ‘pots’ not ‘ceramics’ it is a source of distinction, it signals that to 
people like him ‘ceramics’ is a bourgeois rather than high-status term. From other 
users ‘pots’ might signify a lack of knowledge of the generally higher status of the 
term ‘ceramics’. 
Choice of object categorisation is not always controlled by the maker/pricer. 
Although the choice of price and discourse may suggest how pricers categorise the 
object, other actors within the context may interpret the object differently, and may 
influence others. For example, in a room full of trail visitors an artist who holds high 
status locally described another artist’s work as “pretty” and “terribly commercial” 
(low status). In contrast, she described her own work as “meditative” and 




To some participants any object which is seen as having been made to sell is 
denigrated to craft, whereas art is understood as being made because it is ‘what the 
artist wants to do’, therefore coming from the soul, and having artistic integrity. 
Broadly, categories such as photography, illustration, jewellery, textiles, and 
ceramics are understood locally as more craft than art.  
Making what comes from the soul is a higher status discourse than making money 
(commercial success). However, it is implied (whilst at the same time explicitly 
denied as the reason for using this discourse), making work in which people can see 
‘the passion behind what you’re doing’ may also be a route to sales and to making 
money. Making the passion visible is good, making commercial intent visible is 
undesirable: 
“– if you really enjoy… what you’re doing that will show– I  - I think that 
shows in your work, that there’s a passion behind what you’re doing. Rather 
than you’re just painting it for someone to buy it.” 
(DK) 
“Yes, I make prints – NOT reproductions, although I did do giclees [a high-
quality reproduction print] one year…. (she and her husband catch each 




Summary: Money Categorisation by Source 
As Belk and Wallendorf (1990), Douglas (1982), and Zelizer (1994) suggested, 
although the way in which money is earmarked has been the focus of the bulk of 
prior behavioural economics research, the source of the money should also be 




art/craft object and the buyer) frequently informs categorisation of the money, and 
how it is construed. Those who appear to be treating Art like groceries in term of 
their prices (e.g. 99p endings), or their approach to price discounts, a focus on sales 
or a lack of reticence re money are getting it wrong. 
The dominant Romantic ideal of separation between the spheres of art and commerce 
requires that pricers demonstrate that they know they ought to treat money from art 
(or from the ‘wrong’ buyer) as contaminated and contaminating. Velthuis’ art gallery 
owners (Velthuis 2005) demonstrate a particular high-status shared set of practices 
which are understood to perform the distancing function whilst enabling a 
commercial exchange to take place.  
Source-category construals of money within this research context  - that is, ‘art 
money’ (which may be treated as dirty money) or ‘craft money’ (which is more often 
treated as non-problematic) underpins what objects are made (e.g. sell-able or not), 
whether the object is priced at all, understandings of possible price ranges (art 
objects are more expensive than craft objects), and what discourses of price and 
money are understood as appropriate and required.  
According to the local rules of money by source and understandings of object 
hierarchy, Craft can be priced directly, who the buyer is is irrelevant, money can be 
talked about, and the money aspect of the transaction is visible. This is in contrast to 
the ‘correct’ pricing of art objects, which requires display of understanding that the 
spheres should be kept separate and knowledge of how to do this – e.g. prices may 
be on a list, not directly on the object, and the exchange is constructed terms of 
emotional connection and ‘good home’, not money.  
Intriguingly, interpreting the source implications ‘correctly’ can have economically 
negative as well as positive effects. That is, for some participants the influence of the 
Romantic ideal of the impecunious artist and dirtiness of the market as so strong that 
they create un-sellable work (e.g. see Bradshaw and Holbrook 2007), or are 




experienced and able photographers priced their work at a tenth of the price charged 
by novice painters, because they (and perhaps their customers) understand that their 
work is “only” photography (commercial) but a painting is ‘art’ (from the soul).  
In terms of pricing, categorisation of the source (object and buyer) matters as it 
shapes categorisation of the money and which ‘rules’ are then thought appropriate. 
How one considers the money is interpreted as a signal of cultural capital and social 
position.  Treating money as neutral is interpreted in this context as a signal that one 
either does not know ‘how it is done’, or that one’s object is lower status.     
Having looked at the importance of categorisation of money by source (object and 
buyer) and the effect on price, I now turn to the next element in Zelizer’s framework: 
Categorisation of money by Holder. 
6.2.2    Categorisation of money by Holder – the artist 
Zelizer (1994) points out that money may be categorised differently depending on 
who holds it. In the previous section I discussed the idea that the buyer as holder 
(source) appears to have a sometimes significant effect on the participants’ 
discourses of price.  I now move from the buyer as holder of the money to consider 
what the research findings tell us about the pricer as (potential) holder of money, and 
whether and how this informs their pricing practice.  
Within the data the importance of buyer as money source (holder) in determining 
money categorisation and associated practices was very clear. However, the 
importance of the artist as holder seemed to be less so.  
In this first example categorisation by holder mattered, but did not affect pricing 
practice: Participant M used a ritual of category change learnt from her father to 
mentally categorise the money earned from her art into ‘my money’. M is the 
breadwinner in the family, so theoretically all money coming in could be considered 
her money; however, this was not the case. Instead, she only categorised the money 




category meant she could categorise it as ‘special money’ (earmarking), rather than 
‘money to keep a roof over our heads’ (earmarking).  
Using the ‘special money’ (to be used for art-related expenses) categorisation 
enabled her to control the money’s fungibility and liquidity, in direct contrast to 
money from other sources, which she saw as vulnerable to requests from family 
members, and as earmarked for mundane expenses. In this example, the source of the 
money (art) enabled the labelling as ‘mine’, and the holder category ‘mine’ 
supported her associated ‘art money’ earmarking.  The holder category ‘mine’ did 
not seem to affect her pricing choices. 
However, category ‘mine’ sometimes did appear to inform pricing. In this second 
example, PJ classified the money earned as ‘my money’, which meant that she could 
decide how to price her work.  
Although the pricing of the vast majority of her work was treated in a very business-
like way to maximise sales and profit (she was unusually cost-aware compared to 
other participants) in order to make a necessary and appreciated contribution to the 
household income, she explicitly chose to price one type of object in what she called 
“pin money” prices. She explained that what she meant by this was that for these 
objects she chose prices which were low enough for other women to buy the items 
with their pin money. She pointed out that although the profits from these sales were 
lower than they could and should be, it did not matter, because she had chosen to 
categorise this part of her income as her pin money. Her categorisation of the income 
as pin money (my special money) meant that it was withheld from the household pot 
and kept separate for her to acquire and use as she chose. 
As Zelizer (1994) points out, pin money is a particularly gendered category of 
money, and may, as in this case, be seen as ‘treat’ money. Treat money is understood 
as somehow worth more, it is more special, than standard money. In this example the 
pricer’s categorisation as pin money meant that maximising profit was no longer the 




the categorisation of the money by holder (my money) as well as source (other 
women’s pin money) and earmarking (my pin money) specifically informed her 
pricing decision. 
In another example of categorisation by holder affecting pricing, two participants 
spoke of choosing “serious prices”. They were both very assertive in their rejection 
of what they called “mates rates” (reduced prices) or any bartering (non-money 
prices). The ‘No mates-rates’ rule was interpreted by some other participants as anti-
social and elevating and was simultaneously admired and criticised. This effect was 
important to these artists: they did want to be seen as different from hobbyist peers, 
and both said that earning serious money from their art was important in order that 
their spouse take their work and the time they gave to it seriously. Here, the social 
uses of pricing discourse and money were important, as well as the economic effects. 
In cases such as these, the earning and holding of ‘serious’ art money was seen as an 
important part of the construction of both the holder– the serious artist, the object – 
‘art’, and, importantly, the relationship between the holder and their spouse. Whereas 
in the example above PJ purposely chose the category ‘pin money’ and a lower price 
in order to express solidarity with other women, the two ‘serious price’ artists 
sneered at those who they felt priced their work in pin money, and instead priced to 
be treated as equals by their spouses.  
In an alternative discourse, another artist who was debating whether to offer a 
discount to a friend (i.e. mates rates) said that when discussing the dilemma with a 
peer, they had pointed out to her “If your friends won’t pay the asking price, who 
will?”, which puts the onus of signalling friendship through price discourse onto the 
buyer, not the seller. In all four cases the pricing can be seen to be informed by 







It is useful to compare these examples of the importance of the holder in money 
categorisation with one of Zelizer’s (1994) examples: children’s money. Children’s 
money – pocket money or earned money - is generally treated very differently from 
father’s money or mother’s money, even though there may be variations between 
families in their understandings of the implications of those category differences.  
Zelizer points out that a child’s money is treated differently because it is a child’s 
money. For example, it would be considered rather low to use it for household 
expenses, as within the current affluent Western ideal a child (the holder) should not 
be required to contribute to household income. The way in which the money is 
construed by the other family members because it is classified as ‘child’s money’ 
also confirms the status of the holder as ‘child’ within the family. The categorisation 
by holder is a way of using money to shape and support familial relations. For a 
parent to then ask the child for rent money would be to signal a change in the 
categorisation of the holder from child to young adult, and a change in the 
relationship between the family members.  
The example of children’s money illustrates two parts to the holder categorisation – 
firstly, it changes how others treat the money and their expectation of how it will be 
spent, and secondly, in their use of a particular money-holder categorisation and 
associated assumptions and practices they affirm their relationships and positions 
within the family. The research data suggests this dual function may be important in 
informing categorisation choice and effect on price. It seemed to me that in the 
example above, choosing a price that would lead to being the holder of ‘serious 
money’ was seen as a requisite for proving their Artist status to their spouse, and 
seemed to be tied up with ideas of equality and respect.  
In PJ’s case being able to contribute to the household ‘pot’ was important (she said 
that her earnings were an appreciated and significant contribution to the household 




membership) and being able to give herself her own pin money was also important. 
Pin money is historically something given by the husband to the wife and which may 
be seen as a means of control and symbol of inequality. In PJ’s case she was able to 
control how the money was categorised because it was her money to categorise. 
Having placed it outside the household money category by calling it ‘my money’ and 
then ‘pin money’, she could then earn it/price her art as she wished. 
6.2.3    Categorisation of money by Earmarking 
Having discussed money categorisation by form, source (object and buyer) and 
holder, and I now turn to the main focus of money-practice research to date: what the 
money will be spent on (earmarking), in order to see if and how this type of money-
categorisation is included in pricers’ discourses, and if and how it affects price 
choice. 
Introduction 
Earmarking is the practice of mentally or physically separating and categorising the 
money as being reserved for a particular purpose. In the following section I give 
many examples of earmarking discourses used by the participants in the study. 
Prior research by Thaler (2008 [1985]), Belk and Wallendorf (1990) and Zelizer 
(1994) suggests that earmarking of money matters in consumption practices, and this 
research suggests that it also matters in pricing practice. Whereas Thaler suggests 
that pricers should be aware of consumers’ mental accounting practices and price 
accordingly, he does not mention the idea that pricers too may have their own 
earmarking practices which may consciously or unconsciously inform and constrict 
pricing practices. Within the research data some participants used earmarking as a 
ritual of category change, to alter the categorisation of money potentially earned 





“... I ask myself what would compensate for the loss that painting... basically 
what sort of experience could I buy instead of having that painting.”  
(RJC) 
Two of Thaler’s key points about earmarking are that firstly, earmarking or 
allocation to a particular pot affects its fungibility, and secondly, we use different 
calculations (mental accounting) depending on which pot the money is in. In terms 
of fungibility, the physical or mental allocation to a particular pot or category (i.e. 
earmarking) means that the money is not considered the same as other money – it 
becomes a special money, no longer available for other types of spending. For 
example, people save money in a holiday pot whilst owing money on a credit card 
which will almost certainly have a higher cost/rate of interest than would be gained 
in the savings pot – it does not make economic sense to allocate one’s money in this 
way. Thaler points out that whilst much of the mental accounting behaviour he 
examines is not economically rational, it does appear to be normal behaviour.  
As well as putting the money into different un-fungible pots whether it is rational or 
not to do so, the prior research shows that people treat money in different earmarking 
pots differently. For example, money from one pot or category may be construed as 
not appropriate for certain types of spending.   
Whereas Thaler seems to regard allocation/categorisation as predictable, work by 
Zelizer (1994) emphasises the cultural element of choice of pot or categorisation and 
construal of the corollary rules and social uses of a specific pot allocation. Belk and 
Wallendorf (1990) and Zelizer (1994) emphasise that how money is earmarked 
depends on where it came from – for example, Zelizer cites a study of the money 
habits of a group of prostitutes who earmarked the money they were given by the 
government (source) as ‘bill money’(earmarking), and earmarked money they earned 
from their prostitution work (source) as ‘pleasure money’(earmarking). That is, they 
created a clear distinction between the two categories of money, based on the source 




Zelizer discusses how earmarking can be used as a cleansing ritual to change the 
source-based categorisation of the money. For example money earned from drug-
running may be categorised as ‘dirty money’, but earmarking it for the church 
collection plate could be seen as a way of cleaning it. Others may think that money 
earned in this way should not be brought into church, implying that the money has 
more power to taint than the church has to clean. Earmarking and the effect of 
earmarking is learnt, not nature.   
Drug-running and prostitution may be seen as extreme examples of money source, 
but Zelizer shows that even common sources of money (e.g. employer/wages, 
customer/tips, parent/pocket money) are also not treated as neutral. Instead, how 
these sources and money are understood appears to affect the categorisation of the 
money and how the money is earmarked.  
 
Earmarking and hard circumstances 
As demonstrated by Zelizer (1994) , the practice of earmarking according to source 
is common, and, as earmarking practices and construals are social and learnt, there 
are differences in understanding of earmarking-by-source rules. However, research 
by Venkatesh (2006) suggests that earmarking according to source may not always 
occur. 
In her otherwise very favourable review of Venkatesh’s Off the Books, Zelizer 
(2008) queries whether Venkatesh is correct in suggesting that source of money does 
not affect earmarking within his research context: 
‘Venkatesh repeatedly claims that the source of a given chunk of money does 
not affect how people use the money. That claim runs counter to the 
widespread observation of two monetary practices: first, the earmarking of 
expenditures according to the source of income, and second, the use of ritual 




hear whether such practices simply disappear in the hard circumstances of 
Maquis Park.' 
(Zelizer 2008, p.192) 
My research data suggests that ‘hard circumstances’ may indeed play a part in 
determining whether money is earmarked according to source, and what rituals of 
category change are used, if any. However, it seems important to draw out a point 
that both Venkatesh and Zelizer make but do not emphasise, which is that ‘hard 
circumstances’ reflects more than just economic capital: the hard circumstances also 
inform cultural capital, which can be thought of as knowledge gained over 
generations regarding ‘how it is done’ in a particular context. Discourses of 
earmarking by source are learnt, as is the understanding of whether this type of 
discourse is desirable or necessary. Earmarking may be as much about the discourse 
as the actual movement of money, and whatever the practice (hard to observe), the 
discourse of earmarking-by-source may be absent unless it is seen as ‘natural’, or 
desirable. 
Whilst none of the participants in my study were in such dire straits as Venkatesh’s 
Chicago ghetto residents, there were some who were distinctly less affluent than 
others. Within my research three participants were notable in their discourses of 
being very close to the breadline: one told me that he was “just.. making a scraping, 
really” (PP 116). These participants talked explicitly of having bills to pay, and that 
selling their art was an important source of income for this humdrum purpose. Prices 
were chosen and adjusted based on need. For example, PP drops his prices on 
Saturdays if he needs to make more money that week, and DK keeps her prices 
relatively high because she has to make a living from her work.  
Unlike other participants, these less well-off artists did not talk of ‘art’ money as 
dirty money that needed cleaning, or special money, earmarked for special treats or 
art-related spending; instead they talked about their pricing and their art as a source 
of much-needed general money, used for whatever bills arrive. For example, one 




could earn money from his art. Here, in a very different discourse to the Romantic 
ideal, PP remembers the pleasure he felt when he realised that he could earn money 
in this way. Far from thinking that the Art and Commerce spheres needed to be kept 
separate (Kopytoff 1986), he was excited by the overlap: 
“I can remember, can remember, just taking it, taking it out of the kiln, and 
someone coming up to me and saying  “Do you sell them?” 
 
And I can remember thinking “money” “clay” “Money” “Clay” (miming 
holding clay in one hand, money in the other, lifting first one then the other, 
looking at each hand in turn, in wonderment. Growing big smile. Both laugh 
in his delight). 
And that was the first realisation [that my art could be a source of money].” 
(PP) 
I suggest that although for these participants their low overall income and lack of 
alternative sources of income may be a significant reason for their lack of discourse 
of special earmarking by source, the lack might also be that these participants do not 
know that their bill-paying discourses and lack of discourse of special earmarking 
would be interpreted within the field as a low-status ‘doesn’t get it’ discourse, 
especially if used by someone who appears to wish their work to be understood as 
Art.   
Two of these participants told me that they come from very working class families 
who have no interest or experience of the artworld. It is not just their economic 
capital that is low, but also, and possibly more importantly, that their cultural capital 
within the field is different to that of other participants. Their exposure to ‘how it is 
done’ has been very limited compared to other participants I spoke to. I suggest that 
they do not know that they ‘should’ be using a ritual of category change from tainted 
money (money earned from art) or mundane money to ‘special money’, as this is 




From the interviews, ad hoc conversations with participants’ friends, and 
observations of participants’ homes, there were other participants in my study who 
may have similarly low incomes, but have higher cultural capital. Although these 
other participants might equally need the money, and, like PP and DK, might use 
their art money for mundane purposes – after all, I have no way of checking -  they 
chose to talk about more special earmarking, using the artworld ritual of category 
transfer from tainted to clean money. 
Summary 
‘Hard circumstances’ may indeed affect the money practice of earmarking by source, 
not just because scarcity of money limits choices, but also because hard 
circumstances affect cultural capital, which underpins choice of object categorisation 





Earmarking and price 
Extrapolating from Zelizer’s (1994) and Thaler’s (2008 [1985]) point that we 
earmark money into non-fungible categories and treat the categories differently, I 
wondered whether the earmarking of monies potentially earned from art would affect 
the prices that people chose. That is, if the money will be used for something specific 
such as bills or fun- money, as in Zelizer’s example of prostitutes, would the prices 
charged be affected? 
Earmarking not affecting price 
As already mentioned, discourses of earmarking to create non-fungible pots did 
occur within the data – you may recall the example of participant M who saw her art 
money as her special money, and used this categorisation to keep it separate from the 
household money. The categorisation did not however seem to have informed her 
choice of prices. To check this, I asked her whether she considered her earmarking 
when pricing her work – for example, did she know the price of the next bit of 
framing she wanted done, and did that affect what she would charge for the next 
piece she sold? She seemed genuinely surprised by my question, and waved the idea 
aside.  
Although in this instance the discourse was that there was no link between M’s 
earmarking and her pricing, other participants implied or made explicit that the 
earmarking had affected the prices chosen. 
Earmarking affecting price 
The rejection by (M) above of the idea that her earmarking might affect her price 
choice is in direct contrast to the example of artists who chose a price specifically by 




case of SC the price was the cost of an art course she wanted to do. Other examples 
of earmarking affecting price choice are discussed below: 
ML said that he had chosen relatively high prices because  
“if I don’t… actually want to.. um keep [the picture] at all costs…., I will put a 
price on it…but I decided: How much money would compensate me for its 
loss? So it may not be at all realistic over…how much money other people 
would be prepared to pay for it, ….but… I didn’t care about that, because I 
wasn’t trying ..to make the transaction go ahead. I thought, I was thinking 
only of myself. I’ll either go home with a picture, and I’ll be happy. Or, …if I 
put some um large price on it like three thousand quid, I thought Ok, I won’t 
have that picture any more, but, I could do so much with the three thousand 
quid that I’d be happy about that.” 
(ML) 
Here ML is suggesting that what he could do with the money (earmarking) was an 
exciting idea, but only if the amount of money was sufficiently large to compensate 
for the loss of the picture and generate excitement. He is aware that he could easily 
sell his work at lower prices, but that smaller money does not generate exciting 
earmarking thoughts. He also is very aware that he is highly unlikely to sell his work 
at the prices he chooses, but that is ok – he explicitly rejects economic and marketing 
considerations, placing himself outside the group of ‘others’ who are focussed on 
earning money at the trails: 
“for most of them it was because it was a source of income, and they would 
very happily….have more space around the house getting rid of that stuff, 
and money in their pocket. Whereas for me it was for the craic! My kids 
carried the pictures up the road and round the corner (waving hands), and 
when the weekend was over they carried them back, and in between went 




laughs, and you can hear the smile in his voice as he describes the children 
carrying the pictures and the weekend), which is a fantastic puff to the ego! 
It was a, it was a nice thing to be at.” 
(ML) 
What seems to be important about discourses of earmarking is the social as well as 
economic effect of that discourse. In the case of SC, when she was asked the price of 
an un-priced painting her reply began with a consideration of costs. She then rejected 
that pricing heuristic, and told the prospective buyer that the price she would charge 
would be the price of an art course she wanted to do (art money earmarking). In 
other words, the transaction was cleaned by earmarking the money as special and 
non-fungible art-course money or ‘sacred’ purpose (Belk and Wallendorf 1990). 
Rather than a discourse of economic logic, the choice of price seems to have been 
largely informed by SC’s understanding of how to do discourse of price in that 
context, with that buyer.  
The discourse and its desirability is learnt, not nature, and SC’s demonstration that 
she knows this discourse, and the buyer’s apparent agreement with the pricing logic 
can be seen as a social rather than economic act, confirming that both parties think 
(or at least prefer to let it be thought that they think) that ‘art money’ rather than 
economic rationale is preferable.  The choice of discourse and price was about social 
positioning through an apparently shared interpretation of the pricing discourse.   
In another example of a ‘sacred’ earmarking, the artist cleans the commercial act of 
pricing art by talking of it as a form of artistic Robin Hood activity. The money 
source and earmarking affected the price chosen: she used high prices when selling 
to rich people buying art as an investment (not a ‘good home’, so tainted money), 
and earmarked the money for making other paintings and subsidising the low prices 
she charged a different type of customer: 
“and of course prices in London just continue to escalate and (unclear)... up 




barge pole really.  Actually I would, that’s not quite true, I did some 
paintings to sell ...  err ...  sold for quite a lot of money so I could... really get 
on with the paintings that I wanted to sell to people for reasonable prices 
(unclear, laughing)....... 
I don’t mind if people want to pay outrageous sums... or not [buyers] in that 
category, (laughing).” 
(RJC) 
In another example of social meaning-making through pricing and pricing discourse, 
two artists implicitly earmarked their money earned as ‘status-signalling money’, 
rather than suggesting any other earmarking (e.g. bill-paying, or ‘art-for-art’ 
earmarking). Both mentioned that “serious” money was needed to make their 
spouses take their Art seriously. In both of these cases, the participants’ earmarking 
had shaped their decision to only use “serious” prices (£1,000+), and to never offer 
“mates rates”.  
This is in direct contrast to PJ, who was commercially by far the most successful of 
all the people I interviewed. She had a range of earmarking and pricing practices, 
which were informed by notions of solidarity and partnership rather than a rejection 
of ‘mates’ and fight for marital equality. Importantly, PJ explicitly chose to use 
lower prices for part of her range than she would otherwise have chosen were it not 
for her earmarking. She chooses lower prices because she wants other women to be 
able to buy those pieces with their pin money, and their pin money becomes her pin 
money. Rather than being about economic maximisation, this pricing appears to be 
to do with gender solidarity with the buyers, and small intimate pleasures with her 
family - such as sharing a bowl of early-season cherries with her children.  She sells 
in volume, and makes a significant and appreciated contribution to the household 
income. Intriguingly, her partner was encouraging her to change to a different type 
of work which would have greater kudos with the intelligentsia (of which he is a 




Earmarking: needing the money (bill earmarking)/ not 
needing the money (treat earmarking) 
One might expect those earning their living from their art to be particularly price-
maximising, and indeed the artist who used the VISA machine could be said to be 
maximising prices and sales. However, maximisation was not necessarily the case, as 
PJ’s pin-money prices illustrated, and as can be seen in the example of PP below:  
PP proudly told me that for years he’d made his living and supported a family by 
selling his art. He sells through many galleries and from a stall that he takes to 
various craft/art markets in the region. However, he has a number of unusual money 
practices which seem to limit rather than maximise his prices.  For example, because 
he wants prices to be stable across all galleries, regardless of geographic proximity 
or other considerations, he tells the galleries what he wants his pots to be sold for, 
knowingly going against the normal practice of stating the minimum he would be 
happy with and letting the gallery choose the retail price.  
“So what I do, is before I go there, is I put my own prices on them. Just put 
my own stickers on all of them. And when I take them there I say 
“Don’t…They’re not to be removed, that’s the stickers. That’s the prices that 
they’re gonna be, and minus your...whatever you’re going to take. So its just 
the same all over the board basically.”” 
(PP) 
However, whereas he wants the gallery prices to be “just the same all over the 
board, basically”, he reduces the prices of the pots he sells from his stall at the end of 
each week if he needs to boost his cash flow (earmarking for bills).  
In his expectation that a decrease in price will lead to an increase in demand, and 
vice versa, PP was using classic Supply and Demand theory. However, he was very 




and his variable pricing on the stall is at odds with his pricing logic for galleries, in 
which he wants the same price across the board. His focus is short-term income 
rather than overall profit, and does not know the Veblen signalling use of price. PP 
attributed this short-termism to his upbringing: he was used to working hand-to-
mouth rather than thinking in the longer term because he had grown up in a very 
working class milieu where everyone did this, getting a weekly wage rather than a 
monthly salary.  
PP’s supply and demand interpretation has been supported by his experience, in that 
he has found that he makes his money from the cheaper ‘seconds’ he sells on the 
stall, which are bought in bulk:  
“..because they’re not quite right, they’re 6 or £5 a mug….they’ll go “I’ll have 
4 of those”. And you’d get that quite often during the day, (laughs) and 
that’s your money! 
Whereas your good stuff isn’t. Its, its really strange. And that’s [i.e. the 
money from seconds] what you’re living off of.” 
(PP) 
Whereas other pricers within the research context (e.g. GA, SH) saw high prices as 
signalling object category and position (marketing mix construal), participant PP 
seems unaware of this use of price. Although he interprets higher prices as partially a 
reflection of technical skill and customers’ understanding of the object as 
“investment” rather than “useful”, he sees the high price as primarily a reflection of 
the maker’s ability to wait, which he feels is based in them ‘not needing the money’. 
‘Not needing the money’ and higher prices 
PP wants to put out a teapot that “goes over the £100 mark” (line 540), a big 
increase on his current £50 price, but he is scared about doing so, as to him that 




“(…)And to move on to the next stage as well is…That’s frightening as well, 
actually. Because you think Well, do I put a teapot out there for say 200 
pounds? Do I put a mug out there for 20 pounds? And …sit back and be 
totally scared, and think God! (laughs) Is it going to sell?” 
(PP) 
To PP the idea of being able to wait, that is, of ‘not needing the money’, is the key to 
higher prices:  
“(…)  People can wait, can wait out the time, because…..they got another 
good job somewhere, and they don’t have to depend on that money coming 
in. So they can wait it out, they can bide their time.” 
(PP) 
He feels that not needing the money also underpins the higher prices charged in 
some of the galleries he deals with, in that he feels that the gallery is not the sole or 
needed income:  
“(..)  I shouldn’t say it………but they have a partner, who’s got a nice good 
job, and they’re subsidising their gallery, basically. So they don’t have to 
make a lot of money, or, you know…as long as they cover their overheads 
that’s ok. And…you find, in a lot…..its silly. But um….its like, a gallery, to 
some people, is like a hobby, its something they’ve always wanted to do, if 
you know what I mean? Whereas the places where I sell really well in, its 
their livelihood, and they’ve got no-one they can fall back on, and that’s it, 
they’ve got to make the money, they’ve got to cover their overheads, and 
they’ve got to make a living out of it as well. And that’s the ones that I 





PP briefly discussed the need for improvement in his technique before the higher 
prices could be warranted, but he kept coming back to the idea that higher prices are 
charged by those who are less in need of the money – “they’ve got another good job 
somewhere and they don’t have to depend on that money coming in” (PP, 429). To 
PP, his short-term need for money is the nub of what is holding him back from 
charging higher prices. 
PPs interpretation that higher prices were a result of not needing the money was not 
shared by all participants.  Instead, some suggested that not needing the money 
caused lower prices: 
‘Not needing the money’ and lower prices 
Like PP, DK and BD both earn their living from their work. In separate interviews 
they told me about the pricing problem caused by what they called hobby artists. 
Whereas PP (above) suspected that high prices were chosen by those not needing the 
money, to DK and BD hobby artist were seen as a problem as they choose low prices 
for their work, distorting customers’ perceptions of the market.  
“…I think there’s a lot of people under-selling their work 
………..considering..if you can see how much work has gone into it. And like 
the method they’ve used. They might be selling I don’t know, an original 
painting for about 20 odd quid, and you think ….“That’s ridiculous!” (laughs) 
Really.  
That don’t really make me (unclear) look good, ….I don’t think. But also, if 
you do talk to them they’re more likely to be the ones doing it for a hobby, 
and it does make, and I do think it makes people, who are trying to be 
serious about it - makes it difficult for them.” 
(DK) 
DK and BD implied that the hobbyists chose low prices because they were 




the lack of need of the money and resultant “under-pricing” that causes DK and BD 
to categorise the low pricers as hobbyists, not the artistic or technical skill involved 
in their work. Both DK and BD said the  low prices of hobbyists was a problem as it 
made it harder for artists like them who were “serious about” making a living from 
their art (earmarking as bill money) to charge and get “sensible”  or “decent” (i.e. 
higher) prices.   
“I’ve come across…. professional artists, who ….in some ways….don’t 
disapprove of under-pricing, but you know (unclear) there are people who 
…do it as a hobby, and then charge very small amounts, …and they [the 
professional artists]’re trying to make a living out of it, and …so have to 
actually charge decent prices” 
(BD, 76) 
The idea of ‘earning one’s living’ could be seen as earmarking to cover costs plus 
make a profit. It could be considered to be a very mundane discourse or a business 
discourse, which may be why it was generally considered an undesirable discourse 
within the context. I say undesirable, because those who knew the higher status 
Romantic discourses generally avoided mentioning costs or need, and often 
explicitly rejected it by using statements such as “I don’t need the money”. 
Discourses of earning one’s living and needing the money were much more likely to 
be used by those who were less familiar with the high status repertoire,  and 
discourses of covering costs were more likely to be used by those who were 
producing lower-status craft work such as illustration, photography, textiles, and 
ceramics. For craft objects costs are treated as measurable and relevant, whereas, as I 
was told on many occasions, for Art “you can’t think of it like that!” 
Earmarking: Irrelevant and/or Undesirable 
Within the research context, to talk about earmarking is to reveal that one is thinking 




seeking to emphasise their knowledge of the higher status Romantic discourse. One 
can also avoid an earmarking discourse by not pricing the work. Choosing to show 
un-priced or unsellable work could be seen as a clear expression of not being driven 
by the money (conforming to the intelligentsia version of the Romantic ideal 
discourse). 
The main examples of unsellable work within the trail were installation work (which 
is temporary and site-specific), or performance art. During the research period no-
one in an affluent trail area showed either of these two types of art. These unsellable 
(and therefore clearly distanced from the market) forms of art are encouraged by the 
Fine Art tutors at the local university and schools of art, in an echo of the choices of 
elite London institutions such as Tate Modern and Hayward galleries. Choosing to 
make that type of work therefore suggests a particular high status cultural capital 
within the field.  
Rather than an even distribution across the trails, or perhaps a skew towards the 
more affluent and cultured areas, all of the (intrinsically un-sellable) installations and 
performance art appeared in the trails in the less wealthy areas, and were made by 
artists with relatively little economic capital but with recent university contact. My 
assessment of economic level was based on visits to their homes, and on-going 
contact with the participants and their friends. 
The absence of money and price, engineered through the choice to make un-price-
able art such as installation or performance art, highlights the importance of 
meanings of money and their social uses, and how this might outweigh economic 
concerns. Here those with less economic capital are willing to forego the opportunity 
to gain some money (they could have chosen to paint and sell some pictures), 
preferring instead to use the trail as a (possibly rare) opportunity to demonstrate 
cultural capital to neighbours and artworld peers.  
Far from being neutral, through its absence money can be seen to be treated as 




having field-specific cachet and enabling social positioning. In the case of trail 
participants with lower economic capital and therefore fewer ways of demonstrating 
cultural capital (no fine furniture, art collection, grand piano….), the chance to 
demonstrate cultural capital through shunning of the market appears to outweigh the 
loss of economic capital. 
Earmarking: Special Money/ Not needed 
Avoiding money by removing one’s work from the market by making installation 
work or performance pieces is an extreme ‘separate-spheres’ position. However, if 
one knows them, there are alternatives which allow participants to price their work 
whilst communicating knowledge of and agreement with the ‘separate spheres’ ideal. 
For example, the discourse of earmarking the money earned from art to buy art is 
widely understood within the field as an acceptable way of mentioning money, and a 
cleaning discourse. This interpretation is supported in the wider artworld media. For 
example, there was widespread reportage of Hirst’s use of some of his millions to 
buy a painting by Bacon, which seemed to be suggesting that art-for-art could or 
should be seen as an ameliorating practice, akin to donating drug money to the 
church, or media money to Oxford University: perhaps one should not categorise 
Hirst and his money-earning as all bad, as he uses the money to buy ‘good’ art. That 
is, the earmarking ‘art-for-art’ seems to be used to clean what might otherwise be 
categorised as dirty money (money from art) and tainted art. As shown in the 
example in which SC charged a price that was the cost of an art course she wanted to 
do, an art-for-art discourse allows pricing, and may directly influence the amount 
chosen.  
An alternative earmarking is through a discourse of ‘not needing the money’, in that 
it implies an earmarking of any money earned as ‘special’ or ‘treat’ money rather 




For M the ‘special money’ categorisation meant that it was protected money, 
earmarked by her for spending on art-related things such as framing. For PJ her ‘pin 
money’ categorisation was her special money, kept separate from the household bills 
or production costs, and to be used for small treats and luxuries. For artist DS the 
choice of price put the money in a special category – she chose much higher prices 
than is normal on a trail or for someone with no art curriculum vitae, appearing to 
use the price to create special ‘enchanted’ money which did not erode the Art 
categorisation of her object in the way a more prosaic price would have done.  When 
a buyer made the overlapping spheres very visible through offering to buy the piece 
and haggling (a very wrong market-based discourse), the artist angrily removed the 
piece from the market. In doing so, she made the price ‘not needed money’. Here 
protection of Art and Artist category through evidence of high status interpretative 
repertoire was more important than economic gain.  
Although in DS’s case ‘not caring about the money’ was the overriding message and 
resulted in zero income, ‘not needing the money’ was frequently used within the data 
as a discourse which enables pricing and the acquisition of money whilst protecting 
or elevating social status. 
Earmarking: Not needed money leading to higher 
prices 
Whereas BD and DK (see above) interpreted low prices as the result of hobbyists not 
needing the money, from analysis of the data ‘not needing the money’ discourse did 
not necessarily lead to lower prices –instead it more often seemed to be used to 
support higher ones.  
Rather than talking about what they wanted the money for, some artists were at pains 
to point out to me that they didn’t need the money: “I’m blessed with not having to 




others working in the same media. “I don’t particularly need to sell ....” said RJC, yet 
she too chose substantial prices. 
Many participants said that the fact that they don’t have to earn their living from 
their art “kind of underpins things”, (GT). Some of the participants, like GT, spoke 
of ideally covering direct costs (e.g. the cost of the pitch at an art fair, or the framing 
and paper costs of a photographic print), but the idea of talking about needing to earn 
money from their work seemed anathema to many. This is perhaps not surprising, 
given the ideal separate spheres discourse, in which art should come from the soul, 
not be driven by market concerns. What should be visible is that   
“there’s a passion behind what you’re doing. Rather than you’re just 
painting it for someone to buy it.” 
(DK) 
I suggest that in order for the discourse of lack of interest in money to enable sales, 
one needs more than this discourse alone. It requires a surrounding discourse – 
words, behaviours and material artefacts – which support the idea that you do not 
need the money.  
By looking at those who price within that supporting context it is possible to see that 
rather than making high-status (but zero economic benefit) installation art, 
participants in the affluent areas showed sell-able work, and chose relatively high 
prices. They do not need to make unsellable art to show that they know the ideal 
Romantic discourse. They do not need to remove their work from the market to show 
that their work is art from the soul, because their discourse (words, behaviours, 
material artefacts such as the contents of their houses) shows that they are not 
making it for the money and that they are already economically and culturally well 
off. The message is that they make their art because it is what they want to do (i.e. it 
is from the soul), and it should be taken as clear that they are not making it because it 




the Romantic separate-spheres ideal frees them to make sellable art, and put it clearly 
for sale. And it sells, creating a virtuous cycle. 
There are a number of reasons why these more affluent participants might choose 
higher prices, including having the luxury of being able to “bide their time” (PP, 
429), the size of their own ‘treat/art money’ pot, the likely income of their friends 
and neighbours (who are invited to the trail) and their idea of what people like them 
are likely to pay.  I suggest that demonstrating ‘not needing the money’, which 
suggests economic and cultural capital is likely to support the realisation of higher 
prices, whereas serving Tesco ‘Value’ mince pies during the trail, as one artist did, is 
likely to undermine it. 
Earmarking and price Summary 
The data suggests that earmarking is an important part of some pricer’s discourses, 
and affects price choices in a variety of ways. Whereas Zelizer writes that source of 
money necessarily affects earmarking, my research corroborates Venkatesh’s (2006) 
finding that ‘hard circumstances’ may influence whether and how money is 
earmarked. However, I suggest that the effect of ‘hard circumstances’ on money 
categorisation and uses may be to do with cultural capital regarding what discourses 
are appropriate or desirable, rather than solely linked to economic constraints. 
In her citation of the example of prostitutes, Zelizer (1994) shows that they 
earmarked money from the government for bills, and money earned through 
prostitution was earmarked as a type of ‘fun money’. However, my research suggests 
that interpretation of the source (here art or craft object) and the money earned from 
it will vary – it is not consistently interpreted as clean or dirty money. The 
interpretation of source (art object/craft object), and associated interpretation of 
money gained from that source will affect the corollary discourses of earmarking. 
That is, the interpretation of money by source, the understanding of appropriate 





I had wondered whether a particular earmarking practice would affect pricing – that 
is, did the prostitutes charge differently if the money was earmarked as ‘fun money’ 
rather than ‘bill money’. Although I have not examined prostitutes’ source 
categorisation, earmarking and pricing practices, I extend Zelizer’s money-meanings 
research to suggest that the social meaning of earmarking discourses, as well as the 
objective elements of an earmarking (e.g. the cost of SC’s art course) may affect 
pricing, in that the desire to use an acceptable or desirable discourse of earmarking 
(including rejection of money altogether, as in the case of installation or performance 
art) may outweigh economic logic.  
Earmarking may be used to signal interpretation of the object being sold, and 
understandings of the ‘correct’ associated money practices. For example, use of ‘not 
needing the money’, which is a ‘correct’ earmarking discourse for an art object, 
enables participants to negotiate the art/commerce overlap, and (as it is evidence of 
cultural capital) supports higher prices. Earmarking discourses which construct the 
money as special money or clean money are a route to engaging with the market and 
pricing in a way that suggests cultural capital in the field, and high status. 
Earmarking can therefore be seen to be a money practice which has positioning as 
well as economic consequences.  
Using the wrong earmarking discourse may mean that one is excluded from social 
and professional circles, and may lead to loss of economic opportunity.  Using the 
right earmarking discourse (for Art, this is primarily avoidance of acknowledgment 
that money is potentially being exchanged, as demonstrated by Velthuis’ gallery 
owners; for Craft it is pragmatic money-handling) is part of the overall pricing 
discourses which enables categorisation of one’s work as Art, and this in turn frames 
the price range and the likelihood that one’s work will sell for ‘serious’ prices. 
6.3    Variation in interpretation of money categorisation: the importance of class. 
Although money is assumed to be neutral within price theory, from the more 




taken seriously, one can see that pricers draw on different interpretations of money 
when talking about price and pricing, and that this matters. Choice of money 
interpretation appears to be shaped by knowledge of available options and the 
pricers’ understandings of which discourses of money and commensuration are 
appropriate for their type of product in that context.   
Ideas of what is appropriate appear to be informed at least as much by social 
considerations as by economic ones, supporting Zelizer’s point that money is used in 
a ‘delicate social process, making cultural and social differentiation increasingly 
elaborate’ (Zelizer 1994, p.205).  Choice of discourse of price intentionally or 
unintentionally implies membership or distance from particular groups within the 
social and field’s hierarchy. As discussed in the Literature Review, the use of market 
objects and behaviours in social differentiation is not unique to money or price – the 
body of research known as Consumer Culture Theory focuses on the ways in which 
people turn material possessions such as their cars and their clothes into socially 
meaningful objects through negotiated categorisation. This research has turned the 
analytic focus to show that pricing, as well as consumption, can be considered to be 
a socially meaningful and socially-informed practice. 
Although Thaler’s (2008 [1985]) work on mental accounting assumes that people 
will treat money in predictable shared ways depending on which pot they have 
allocated it to, Zelizer’s work showed that categories of money, ‘pin money’ or 
‘wages’ for example, may be interpreted differently depending on geo-historical 
location, gender, and class. Variation in money categorisation and interpretation was 
also visible within my data, and appears to be associated with social group. 
Importantly, how money from pricing one’s art is understood informs how one 
approaches pricing, as participant BR explained: 
“Ah, but you haven’t mentioned family background. That must matter 





BR told me that her understanding that money is unmentionable was very class-
based (specifically, very middle-class). It was learnt from her parents, and, she felt, 
requires un-learning if she is to be able to earn a living from pricing and selling her 
work. Whereas her parents must have thought knowing the middle-class way it is 
done was important given how firmly it was drummed in (any mention of money 
was punished), she feels that her learnt interpretation of money as unmentionable –
even unthinkable- is “ridiculous”, and “paralysing” when it came to pricing.  
“One was actively discouraged [from talking about money]. For example, we 
were not allowed to ask for pocket money, and once it took ages – 17 weeks 
– for our father to realise that it was a while since we’d had any. He looked 
in the book and found it was 17 weeks! But we couldn’t ask for it. I learnt 
that very clearly. My sister (X) was told off for just looking in the direction of 
the cupboard which the pocket money was kept in.” 
So that was how I was brought up – money was not discussed, or even 
mentioned. Which is a real disadvantage!” 
(BR) 
The ‘dirty’ interpretation of money is very deeply rooted, BR felt, and she said that 
she recognises that other people have been taught to interpret money differently – 
that is, far more comfortably – and this makes it much easier for them to price and 
sell their work. 
“A friend of mine (Y), he’s an artist, he’s very good at self-promoting and has 
no troubles price-wise… he was brought up going to the market every 
Saturday with his father, and with his father saying things like ‘Oh, I 
wouldn’t pay that for that!’ and so on, so he was very used to the idea of 





Because BR associates discomfort with money so firmly with being middle class, the 
implication of Y’s family’s ease with money conversations and Y’s ease of pricing 
his art is that Y and his family are not middle class. Although BR’s “middleclass” 
upbringing in which money was interpreted as a taboo topic was “ridiculously 
inhibiting”, and she said that it puts her at “a grave disadvantage” when it comes to 
pricing her work, her discomfort with money does fulfil class-signalling function and 
is an artworld ideal-discourse, which may be useful in positioning her work as more 
desirable: she clearly ‘knows how it is done’.  
What is different in BR’s case compared to Velthuis’ (2005) gallery owners is that 
her money-discomfort, as with that of another participant ML (landed gentry family) 
appears very real, and pervasive. In contrast, for Velthuis’ gallery owners and some 
of the participants within my research money-discomfort appears to be a field-
specific strategic temporary discourse – as Velthuis pointed out, the gallery owners 
refused to talk about price and money when with the art, but later and away from the 
art they appeared to thoroughly enjoy the monetary aspects of their art dealings.  
In a similar manner to Velthuis’ gallery owners, many of the middle-class 
participants in my research appeared to use the separate-spheres discourse selectively 
(e.g. PR’s “muddy depths” and FW’s “good home”). This showed familiarity with 
the Romantic ideal and its contextual nuances, an expectation that it would be 
interpreted as masking money transactions and performing category changes, and the 
assumption that this would enable successful (socially and economically) pricing and 
sales. 
Rejection of money from art by choosing to make unsellable work is a positioning 
discourse which may be interpreted as signalling high status by those who share that 
interpretive repertoire. In the research context this approach to the market was 
notably used only in the less-affluent trails, and because of the high visibility of this 
discourses within the university and other art institutes, its use clearly signalled 




The intelligentsia discourse appeared to be used as a source of status when signalling 
status through resources which require economic capital (such as large house, fine 
furniture, etc.) was not possible. However, whilst using this approach may be a 
source of status within a sector of the field’s hierarchy, a rejection of the market 
generally removes opportunities to make economic capital unless one uses the 
solution of moving from art-making to art-teaching, or applies for funding through 
competitions and residencies. 
As discussed in the section ‘Apprenticeships: Pricing as Learnt Practice’, discourses 
are learnt, and although opportunities may exist to learn new interpretations, one’s 
background informs whether or not one does so (Bourdieu 1984).  For example, 
consider two participants with working-class roots, DK and RJ: 
DK told me that she was doing an MA to learn how to talk about her work to gallery 
owners, as she wants to sell more of her work and sees galleries as an obvious route 
to do so. However, ex-student RJ pointed out that she had been taught at university 
that sales was an unmentionable topic, so it seems unlikely that DK will learn the 
discourses she is hoping to learn :  
“I’ve been kind of doing it [making art] for the tutors, if you like, cos they’re 
the people who’ve been judging my work, and they’ve judged it not on its 
saleability, I mean, (small laugh) that that was almost a dirty word!” 
(RJ) 
Importantly, although saleability was “almost a dirty word”, RJ had also learnt from 
her university tutors the unspoken rule that making money through selling can be 
construed as acceptable if the sale is firmly constructed as a by-product, not the aim 
of the production of the piece.  
Rejecting or masking the importance of sales was a discourse used by many of the 
research participants, often appearing as a way of distinguishing between themselves 




see sales as an important source of validation, whereas her approach is “quite 
different”.  
“…it’s really important to some for my friends that they sell things, that’s the 
validation. I get the validation other, other ways you see. I get it other ways. 
Err... (unclear and quiet) ... quite different” 
(RJC, 218) 
RJ, an older participant, came from what she termed a very working class 
background. However, she has had far greater exposure to middleclass culture than 
DK or PP. RJ’s father was in service to wealthy employees, so he was familiar with 
some of their rules and expectations. Perhaps unusually for someone from her 
background she married a doctor and was used to his medical friends, and that 
became her social group. Having left school at an early age as was normal in her 
milieu, her contact with her husband and his friends brought it home to her that she 
was just as bright as they were, and so she studied for a degree as a mature student in 
a prestigious university, and has continued to access various forms of further 
education ever since. She was aware of and intrigued by the variations in interpretive 
repertoire, and more willing than other participants to learn and adopt alternative 
repertoires of ‘how it is done’. That is, unlike the Clifton Ladies at one end of the 
social hierarchy or DK and PP at the other, RJ seemed more aware of the 
construction and variety, rather than inherent nature, of ‘how it is done’. 
DK is from a very working class background in which no-one apart from her has any 
interest in the arts. After completion of her MA she seemed less interested in the 
intellectual discourses than she did before she started. Although she has rejected the 
conceptual/intellectual discourses, she sees herself as ‘artist’ (“It’s my vocation”) not 
a craft maker, although she esteems technique and ‘the work gone into it’ highly. She 
has relatively few opportunities to witness and learn the bourgeois discourse that 
allow participants to earn money from their art whilst maintaining the appearance of 




exists or might be important, so she does not look out for it when visiting galleries or 
when talking to more middle-class students/trail participants. In contrast, middle-
class participant AJ makes a point of chatting to gallery staff and senior personnel 
specifically to pick up the subtle communications re what language and work is ‘in’ 
and what is not, and she enjoyed unpicking the conversations with me later – an 
unpicking which she appeared to see as being for her benefit, not mine. DK, on the 
other hand, visits galleries less often, and only does so to look at the art, not to 
consider the gallery and its workers as exemplars of ‘how to sell Art’. 
RJ, with a wider cultural capital built through long exposure to different social 
groups, appeared to be aware of the option of using anti-market ‘dirty money’ 
discourses learnt at university to signal of membership of the higher status 
‘intellectual’ group.  She told me that when she joined the trail she had to negotiate 
the gap between the university-taught idea that saleability is “almost a dirty word” 
and her urge to sell her work. She chose DK as her mentor for the actual prices and 
heuristics (e.g. that there is a differential between framed and unframed work), but 
not for her discourses with potential customers. 
“And now, the idea of producing stuff that I think is going to sell is a 
completely different concept!..........And one which I’m, I’m, having,… a bit a 
bit of difficulty with. Because… you know, …you have to compromise. (294) 
If you, if you’re producing stuff that you think people are going to buy, 
there’s.. no.. point in producing.. weird and whacky stuff that you 
know,…..that uh that kind of um… expresses… some kind of uh esoteric 
concept …that people are just not going to get, and possibly are not going to 
be interested in anyway!  Um it would be very different producing work for 
a gallery, say, that um, that get put on exhibitions that were not necessarily 
going to sell, but which were…..of interest to the public. But this idea of 
producing to sell, is a new… idea for me, and just producing work to sell has 




This idea of the necessity of compromise between what art ‘should’ be and what type 
of art will sell is an important learnt intelligentsia discourse. However, whereas RJ 
(only recently out of tertiary arts education) is finding the idea of producing work to 
sell strange, the Clifton Ladies avoid this dilemma by using a different criteria of 
‘what is art’, in which work which “weird and whacky stuff that (……) expresses… 
some kind of uh esoteric concept …that people are just not going to get, and 
possibly are not going to be interested in anyway!”  is no more ‘art’ than work 
which is beautiful, representative and widely appealing, and may in fact be less art. 
Although working class DK uses some Romantic discourses for example “It’s my 
vocation” and emphasises that art should be done because it is what you have a 
passion for, not because it will sell, DK’s primary aim seems to be in selling more of 
her work without learning the pricing discourses (or ‘plinth’) expected from her by 
her main customer group, the middle classes.  She assumes that her categorisation of 
her work as ‘Art’ is sufficient, and that she is selling to people with the same 
interpretive repertoire as hers. From observation at many of her exhibitions, this is 
generally not the case, and she runs the risk of being seen as ‘not like us’ and of 
unwittingly undermining the ‘art’ categorisation of her work. 
As well as restricting economic opportunity by potentially losing customers, DK 
restricts her work and economic opportunities in a way that more middle-class 
participants do not because of her interpretation of the desirable discourse of not 
being commercial. For example,  
“SS: How about if you really enjoy doing it, and that’s what you want your 
work to be about, AND you know it will sell…is that being commercial? 
 





Whereas DK rejects the idea of making something ‘because it will sell’, other more 
middle class participants were able to construct their art as being ‘from the soul’ 
whilst still considering and making sufficient of what would sell to live on. For 
example, FW (middle class), and RM’s (middle-class) parents, were willing to make 
two different strands of work, one which they knew would sell, the other more 
experimental. They used discourses of the difficulty of maintaining integrity (an 
important artworld word), which displayed knowledge of and agreement with the 
ideal separate-spheres, whilst earning money.  
Intriguingly, whereas this offering of two types of work is discussed by Belk and 
Wallendorf, the pricing outcomes were different in my study. They suggest that 
‘Money  obtained  from  work  that  is  not  a  source  of  delight  is  profane,  
while  money  obtained  from  enacting  one’s  passion,  while  often  less  
when  evaluated  from  a  quantitative  economic  perspective,  is  nonethe-  
less  sacred.  One  artist  we  interviewed  paints  horses  and  deer,  but  also  
does  reproductions  on  t-shirts  to  keep  food  on  the  table.  Both  the  
paintings  and  the  t-shirts  are  offered  for  sale.  The  t-shirts  are  explicitly  
made  to  exchange  for  money,  whereas  the  paintings,  which  are  created  
as  an  expression  of  his  love  of  nature,  produce  other  rewards,  and  
money  is  secondary.’ 
(Belk and Wallendorf 1990, p.52) 
However, whereas the artist, echoing Morton and Podolny’s (2002) hobbyist wine 
producers, considers a non-economic gain (here described as “other rewards”) when 
pricing the paintings, and so (it is implied) chooses a lower price than he ‘could’, the 
small number of participants within my data those who produced two types of work 
(e.g. FW, mentioned above) and , and in so doing constructed their paintings as 
different from their commercial offering and therefore more ‘art’, were more likely 
to choose higher prices for their paintings. That is, the clear signalling of the ‘art’ 




cleaning the money. Although the base money categorisation may be the same as 
Belk and Wallendorf’s suggestion of profane (made for sale) and sacred (achieved 
through creative expression and ‘enacting one’s passion’), the difference between 
my findings and theirs suggests that understandings of corollary commensurative 
practices will vary and therefore the pricing outcome is not predictable.  
In another impact of class on pricing, middle-class participants with a greater 
knowledge of ‘how it is done’ in the artworld and other luxury markets signal 
‘enacting one’s passion’, and by implication ‘not in it for the money’, through the 
explicit consideration of the context of the sale of their art. For example these 
participants were willing to hire prestigious gallery spaces (e.g. GA), and during the 
art trail they ensured that they showed their work in a houses in wealthy areas which 
were large, warm, and recently decorated. They offered home-made or very middle-
class refreshments such as homemade (organic) cakes or Waitrose bakery goods (a 
common practice).  
Working class participants such as DK did not use these discourses. They were able 
to get some parts of the desirable Romantic discourse right (e.g. the spoken discourse 
that art is from the soul), but possibly because they are unfamiliar with the luxury 
market they got other parts wrong. For example, DK assumed a big house is better 
because there is room to hang big pieces of art (which to her implies higher prices), 
not because the house and its contents suggest that the artist already has wealth and a 
high status cultural group membership, and therefore that what is being displayed is 
Art from the soul, not art made to sell.  
As well as not considering selling space and what that says about her need for 
money, DK did not consider what message her choice of refreshments (Tesco 
‘Value’ mincepies) might give to her potential customers. Her use of bright red Sale 
stickers could, to revisit Ruston (2007), ‘annoy buyers of luxury goods and might be 
[interpreted by them as] more appropriate to groceries’. That is, DK does not realise 
that sale stickers, like 99p price endings, may be seen as a commercial discourse, and 




sales, depending on the viewers.  In her use of sale stickers DK’s background (very 
little familiarity with galleries and their norms) appears to limit her understanding of 
possible price interpretations.  
In another example of the importance of prior experience in shaping interpretive 
repertoire, DK’s reaction to the suggestion that someone might think something 
more desirable simply because it was more expensive was one of scorn: “That’s 
ridiculous!” In this she is ‘getting it wrong’, if wanting to be seen as being in the 
same group as the buyers of luxury goods. Rather than learning the interpretive 
repertoire of her customer base (as marketers often assume pricers wish to do), she 
expects the customers to use her interpretation.  
The only other person who found the idea of increasing price to increase desirability 
alien was PP. PP had grown up in a hand-to-mouth working-class milieu, and had 
spent much of his early adult life “working on the bins”. Like DK, PP’s interpretive 
repertoire has been shaped by his social class, in that he has had few opportunities to 
gain familiarity with the ‘how it is done’ in luxury markets such as the art market. 
Although PP felt that he had learnt a great deal about art and its prices – for example, 
he no longer thought that a £5 mug in a gallery (handmade, more art) was equivalent 
to a £1 (mass-produced, less art) mug in a supermarket, and he laughed at himself for 
having not known that earlier, he, like DK, was unable or unwilling to consider 
alternative interpretations of ‘how it is done’ as anything other than ridiculous. This 
meant that they continued to categorise money from their art as non-problematic, 
when the local higher-status norm is that money from art should be categorised as 
awkward, and associated with a variety of cleaning and masking discourses. 
As is the case with the other discourses, one interpretation of money is no more right 
or wrong than another, as meanings are not inherent properties of the discourses or 
objects. It is more that interpretation is deemed to be more or less appropriate within 
a particular context, and therefore choice of interpretation reveals social group. The 
interpretation is seen as right or wrong depending on who is judging, and their 




important part in the categorisation of money and awareness of the implications of 
that categorisation in terms of the choice of commensurative practice and discourse. 
That is, money-meanings and price discourses have social uses.  The social uses are 




CHAPTER 7   FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION: Social uses of money 
categorisation within discourses of price 
Introduction  
Prior research and this research data suggests that people categorise money, and that 
choice of category and interpretation of the implications of the category varies from 
person to person (Zelizer 1994). Having examined the importance of money category 
by form, source, holder, and earmarking in pricing practice, I now move the focus of 
analysis from consumers’ social uses of money categories  (discussed in prior 
literature) to examine the social uses of money categorisation within pricing 
discourses, which has only been minimally addressed.  
Using the example of charity money administrators and the recipients of the money, 
Zelizer (1994) demonstrates that interpretations of how the charity money should be 
used highlighted differences between groups, and signalled membership of a 
particular group. Using the same interpretation of the charity money and its 
appropriate uses (or at least not challenging them) positioned the actors as being in 
the same group, but using a different interpretation highlighted that they were not. 
The use of money-interpretation and associated price implications in creating an ‘us’ 
and ‘them’ occurs in many contexts. For example: 
In a discussion between two friends, J said that she had had an awkward 
moment the previous evening. She had agreed and was happy with a 
teenager’s baby-sitting rates, but to her surprise the teenager’s parent 
rather than the teenager had covered the babysitting duty. The price, the 
money, and handing over the money, now somehow seemed inappropriate. 
When paying a teenager £x had seemed fine, but the idea of giving it to a 
peer (the parent) “felt wrong”, and J had felt that she ought to offer a higher 
amount. The increase had been refused, but she felt she had done the right 




Throughout the story W had sympathised with J (“mmm, mmm”). W then 
told a story in which she had done an evening’s babysitting on her 
teenager’s behalf. Although the baby’s parents had, like J, apparently felt 
that the agreed rate was now somehow inappropriate, the baby’s parents 
had assumed that no payment was needed, as it was an adult peer (W) not a 
teenager! W was incensed. What was unspoken but hung in the air was the 
connection that J had assumed more money was needed, but the baby’s 
parents had assumed that no payment was more appropriate. 
(Field notes from an overheard discussion, slightly annotated for clarity) 
Although the topic of the conversation was babysitting money and price, the function 
seemed to be primarily one of reinforcing friendship ties through shared 
interpretation of money and associated rules. Through her body language and non-
verbal responses W had implied agreement with J’s interpretation that the money-
exchange became awkward and the price appeared too low. She had then reinforced 
her agreement through her story, which was a criticism of the interpretation of 
others. Through the money conversation J and W created an ‘us’ (with a shared 
interpretive repertoire) and a ‘them’ (different interpretive repertoire). The function 
of the discussion, which revolved on shared understandings of money categorisations 
and price implications, was to reinforce the friendship between J and W, and to test 
and gain support for interpretive repertoires.  
Although the babysitting money could be seen as a particularly domestic pricing 
situation, the importance of the social uses of the meaning of money does not 
disappear when pricing in a more ‘market’ situation. For example, the VISA 
machine complaint within my art trail data operated in a similarly social way, in that 
different interpretive repertoires were used to create an ‘us’ – those who interpret the 
use of the VISA machine in the way I do -  and a ‘them’ – those who use a different 




Within the research context although there are no clear or permanent demarcation 
lines, communities are created and differentiated through interpretive repertoires. It 
seems that in exchange for membership one may have to be willing to be constrained 
as well as enabled by the interpretive rules of that group. There are no hard edges or 
constant criteria, and there are a myriad of subsets and overlaps between 
communities depending on who is viewing. For example, in a situation set up to sell 
art (the art trails), to be seen to want to sell art appears to be seen by some as having 
lower status and implying a lower group membership, whereas for others high sales 
is interpreted as a sign of success and artistic validation. In the example of the VISA 
machine, the practice of using electronic money was interpreted as both 
inappropriate and warranting exclusion (by the complainant), and as non-problematic 
by the user and a defendant.  
As in the example of the babysitting money, analysis of discourses of price suggests 
that how money is categorised - and the implications one associates with that 
categorisation- is used to suggest group membership. Following the rules of the 
dominant/desired group appears to come at an economic cost for many; not 
following it can come at a social one, perhaps with economic repercussions. Those 
who are economically and socially successful are likely to be those who are able to 
gauge the interpretive repertoire of others, and are able to either use those repertoires 





7.1    Money and price etiquette: how it is done around here. Getting it right, 
getting it wrong, and social position. 
‘Another enthusiast need only utter two words to betray the vast amount 
of sharing that is possible for them both’  
(Douglas and Isherwood 1996, p.51) 
Introduction 
In this section I discuss the use of money categorisations and associated pricing 
discourses as affiliation signals, and examine the social and economic effects of 
getting it right and getting it wrong. That there should be pricing etiquette highlights 
the social element of what is generally considered an economic action.  
Cultural artefacts such as images, objects and language have meanings which change 
with the context in which they are found and interpreted (Barthes 1972; Bourdieu 
1984) . The meaning may be considered to be obvious or ‘natural’, but should 
instead be considered to be falsely obvious and a product of history rather than 
nature (Barthes 1972, p.12),  in that the meaning and its degree of correctness is 
socially constructed rather than an inherent property. Consider for example 
Duchamp’s urinal (known as ‘Fountain’) and the Objets Trouves movement, in 
which something ‘becomes’ art because the artist says it is so, and signals it as such 
by putting it on a plinth in a gallery (a ritual of category change working within an 
existing system of meanings).  
Although Duchamp may have signalled that the urinal should be categorised as ‘art’, 
object meanings may be overlaid with the meanings from the previous context, as 
viewers of this particular art object may have experienced. The overlaying of past 
meanings of consumption objects has been a topic of interest within Marketing 




work on inalienable goods  (Arnould and Epp 2006; Epp and Price 2010) and 
singularised objects (Kopytoff 1986).  
Zelizer’s (1994) work suggests that money is a cultural artefact rather than a neutral 
object, and that it too can have meanings which can be (but are not necessarily) 
transferred from one context to another. The important point that emerges from my 
research is that pricing and the act of earning money through pricing has meanings 
for those involved in the process, and that these meanings may have social uses. Just 
as choosing to construe the urinal as art aligns one with a different camp to those 
who object to attempts at re-categorisation, so choosing to construe money earned 
from art as a particular category of money can be interpreted as a signal of 
membership of one group rather than another.  
Within a pricing discourse using the ‘right’ two words and implying a particular 
interpretation of those words can suggest ‘the vast amount of sharing that is possible’ 
– that is, the ‘right’ discourses suggest shared social group. Using the wrong two 
words and/or interpretation could have the opposite effect. Choice of discourse can 
therefore be said to perhaps involve a strategic social element, and it is important to 
recognise that people may have multiple and even contradictory incentives and 
interpretive repertoires underpinning their discourses of price.  
In the same way that the art objects are placed within a hierarchy of legitimacies, 
discourses of art pricing appear to involve a process of legitimation which is 
controlled by the intelligentsia and the rich bourgeois. What meanings a participant 
uses implies knowledge of and preference for one source of legitimation over 
another. That is, money-meanings inform not just one’s pricing practice and 
discourse, but the use of particular meanings also tells others something about your 
cultural capital and how you see yourself. As can be seen in the example below, 
whether one intends this or not, discourses of price are used in social positioning.  
DW:  You must talk to X – she’s very different,  very clear about her prices. 




DW: You must talk to her! You know, she paints to sell, She…. 
FW: I can’t paint something because it will sell! 
DW: Selling your soul  
They both grimace, 
(DW, FW, field notes) 
Here DW and FW position themselves as a united front, sharing an interpretive 
repertoire in which one “can’t paint something because it will sell”, and X is “very 
different” because of her different and ‘wrong’ way of approaching art and the 
market. In distancing themselves from X, DW and FW are using discourses of price 
as a social tool, a source of distinction and therefore a source of power.  X is 
constructed as having ‘got it wrong’, the implication being that she does not know 
the correct etiquette, rather than that she is choosing a higher status alternative 
discourse.  
Shared ideas of appropriate etiquette are important signals of group membership, and 
these are taught and learnt. Zelizer gives many examples of sources of money 
etiquette such as magazine articles, advertisements from approved stores, and people 
who hold higher social position. Similar types of source are available within the 
research context. For example lecturers, institutions, promotional materials, and the 
example of higher-status peers were often cited as sources of ‘how to’, and these 
exemplars were sometimes visible within the data collection period. For example, a 
lecturer explained that when an artist had recently approached her for funding a 
lecturer using a new electronic route for touting for funding (called wefund.org), “It 
didn’t feel inappropriate” for the artist to have contacted her in that particular way. 
She then qualified this interpretation by explaining prior contact and relationship 
between that artist and herself. Money and pricing etiquette appears to be learnt by 
getting it wrong and realising that one has done so, as well as from exposure to (and 





“Two words to suggest the vast amount of sharing” 
As discussed earlier, there are modes of expression which are understood as 
signalling group membership through interpretive repertoire. Although there are 
words within the data such as ‘mark-making’ or ‘visceral’ which, depending on how 
they are used, demonstrate a particular knowledge of current vocabulary and values 
within the artworld, here I focus on the positioning uses of two words or phrases 
which are particularly pertinent to pricing: ‘commercial’, and ‘good home’. 
Commercial 
The use of ‘commercial’ as shorthand for ‘getting it wrong’ was repeated by many 
participants throughout the data collection period. However, it was also (if rarely) 
used as a term of approbation in situations in which the user felt that it could safely 
be used in that way. What is interesting is that in a market situation (pricing in an art 
trail) ‘commercial’ could be seen as ‘getting it wrong’, and that the interpretation of 
‘commercial’ appears to be used as a social positioning device.  
As demonstrated in Parks’ newspaper article previously cited, the idea that an artist 
should be scorned rather than celebrated for their commercial success is contested by 
an alternative hierarchy in which success in money-making is construed as a source 
of kudos: 
‘[A conference delegate suggested that] we shouldn't be gloomy about the 
dominance of big money in the art market, since it meant that, unlike the Van 
Goghs of the past, contemporary artists such as Hirst, or Jeff Koons, could 
get their just desserts and appear as the winners they were, something that 
could only be an inspiration to artists all over the world.’ 
(Parks 2011) 
Here two artists who are derided by many critics for being rampantly commercial 





Although one might expect ‘commercial’ to be a positive term in a pricing context, 
this was not necessarily the case. As a critical term - the more common usage within 
the research data – describing someone’s work as commercial placed the speaker as 
culturally above the maker. Again there appeared to be an expectation of shared 
interpretation of the term; that is, when used in an interview or conversation with me 
the speaker expected me to recognise that they meant it as a criticism, not 
approbation: the art object involved does not fulfil the Romantic ideal of being the 
result of ‘months, sometimes years, [of] distilling on to canvas the emotions of a 
particular experience’ (Storey 2011), and the money earned from a commercial 
practice is tainted and tainting. The effect is circular: the art is tainted because it 
sells, and it sells because it is lesser (i.e. easy) art. The money from people who like 
lesser art is tainted money, and so the art is tainted….  
Participants’ use of ‘commercial in a critical way signalled particular group 
membership (the intelligentsia), and that the ‘vast amount of sharing’ (Douglas and 
Isherwood 1996, p.51) which could follow between parties would ideally work 
within the intelligentsia repertoire, although there might be some testing for 
acceptability of alternative discourses. 
As a term of approbation, which occurred occasionally in conversation between two 
makers, ‘commercial’ signalled that the speaker recognised the work as more craft, 
and likely to be economically successful within that realm. It therefore signalled that 
the speaker was perhaps a craft artist themselves (same-group membership, perhaps 
with market expertise), and/or that they assumed that the object’s maker would be 
pleased with the term (shared interpretive repertoire).  
For example, when talking about her own art work JRC was very ambivalent about 
the market and critical of the involvement of money in art-making, but after the 
interview she told me very proudly about her artist son’s commercial acumen and 
success, and how, from his student days, he had purposefully marketed himself and 
his art work as a brand. Whereas other participants in the research had excluded ‘the 




and pride in her son appeared to make JRC more willing to consider the commercial 
repertoire as desirable, despite her deep reservations about the involvement of money 
in art. 
What then might be considered commercial? It is not only the objects which were 
termed commercial, it was also the whole approach, the discourses of selling, which 
could be categorised in this way.  
From my discussions with represented artists, the conversations they have with 
gallery owners is less about nurturing and more about supplying the gallery with 
what the owner thinks they can sell, which is a commercial discourse. However, 
based on Velthuis’ findings and my own experience of interactions with gallery 
owners, when gallery owners talk to people other than their artists they appear to use 
a different, anti-commerce, discourse. That is, the ‘how it is done’ varies with 
context. What is considered an appropriate discourse with an artist is inappropriate 
when talking with a gallery visitor. 
From Velthuis’ (2005) research with gallery owners in New York and Amsterdam, 
to talk about buying a piece in order to sell it for a profit (“turning the piece”) is 
understood to be commercial and inappropriate. The gallery owners explicitly said 
that they did not sell to people who talked in that way, implying that the gallery was 
not being run as a commercial concern in which pictures were taken on and sold to 
make a profit. Instead, the gallery owners emphasised discourses of nurturing, and 
supported their non-commercial spoken discourses by removing money transactions 
and conversations to another room or space apart from the art. These apparently ideal 
gallery discourses are understood to adequately and correctly mask the commercial, 
money-making, aspects of running a gallery, which necessarily involves selling art.  
This suggests that in this context it is not commerce per se which is bad: commerce 




Good home/gets it 
Within the research data few participants had room to create a separate money-
handling area, but amongst art participants other discourses were used to mask the 
commercial aspect of the transaction, such as the widespread practice of using ‘good 
home’ discourses. Selling to ‘a good home’ is constructed as a non-commercial 
discourse, and one which cleans the money. ‘Good home’ is conferred by showing 
expertise (e.g. by discussing what art one already owns and what exhibitions one has 
recently been to, and therefore how one is contextualising one’s judgment of the 
piece in question), or by emphasising emotional connection with the piece.  
Buyers who knew this as a desirable discourse often constructed themselves as ‘good 
homes’, and/or were sometimes constructed by the artist as such. For example, an 
artist who had been coerced (the buyer’s wife felt) into giving a significant price 
reduction later told others that she was pleased that that buyer had bought the piece, 
as she was pleased that her work was to be part of his collection. The buyer, like 
Thornton’s (2008) would-be buyer, had constructed himself as a good home through 
mention of his art collection, and, as was frequently observed within this research 
data, used the shared interpretation of it as signalling high positioning to negotiate a 
discount.  
In another example of the buyer using the ‘good home’ construct for their own 
benefit, an artist told me about her experience with a trail visitor: 
“Last year a lady came in, she was very keen, the first at the door. She was 
on the doormat at 10 o’clock in the morning, on the Saturday, and she came 
in and went (mimics the lady pointing to different pictures on the walls) 
‘That. And that’. (Pause, reviewing what she’d just said………) 
Actually, she was here for ages, talking about the work, how was made, and 





[Note, here the artist is re-framing the impression she might have just given of the 
buyer, by re-constructing the buyer’s ‘good home’ indicators. However:] 
“She wanted two [pictures], and said “What discount can you give me if I 
buy two?”  I was really taken aback, I was caught on the hop, you know, it 
was the first day, and I didn’t know what to say! So I found myself saying “I’ll 
give you 10% off”!!! (unhappy laugh, remembering her discomfort and 
outrage). At £220 a picture that was £40, more than 40! And if you take the 
cost of framing and whatnot off, and then £40, there’s not a lot….. She was 
being really cheeky! I don’t know why I didn’t just say “That’s the price they 
are. That’s a reasonable price.” But I didn’t. I gave her 10% off! And do you 
know, when she was writing out the cheque she said to me “Oh, I would 
have paid the full price, I really love them”!!! She was really cheeky. I was 
really cross about it afterwards. 
(MJ) 
In Thornton and Velthuis’ work price reductions were rarely mentioned, possibly 
because in those studies the gallery owners are emphasising their own higher status 
to the researcher, rather than because reductions for ‘good home’ buyers do not 
occur.  
Within the research, ‘good home’ discourses were frequently used at the time of 
confirming amounts and handing over payments, and reminded me of the common 
retail practice of handing the goods over in a satisfying container (such as an 
expensive-looking carrier bag) to reassure the customer at the point of sale and 
immediately afterwards. However, rather than reassuring the buyer, within the art 
trails the ‘good home’ discourse seemed to be used to reassure the seller that they 
had made the right decision in selling their “baby” (as a few participants called their 
work) to that buyer. This discourse appears to be understood as appropriate for art, 
and as performing the function of masking the commercial element and changing the 




A number of participants told me about sales by telling me that they were 
particularly pleased that a particular person had bought it. By emphasising the 
emotional connection with the piece, the ‘good home’ discourse suggested cultural 
similarity of the parties. As shown in the example above, emphasising the buyer’s 
expertise ‘good home’ can become a signal of recognised higher status of the buyer. 
The artist’s construction of the buyer as a good home may be thought to socially 
(and perhaps later financially) benefit the artist (status by association), as well as 
immediately financially benefit the buyer, and reaffirm their higher status. 
Importantly, correct use of the ‘good home’ discourse requires a particular 
knowledge of ‘the right way’ to do it, which was not shared by all participants. Nor 
is ‘good home’ thought to be appropriate in all exchanges. For example, ‘good 
home’ appears to be seen as an important anti-commercial discourse for ‘art’, but as 
inappropriate or less common for ‘craft’. It also seems to be a very middle class 
discourse. For example, working-class DK said that she does not care who buys her 
work, thereby positioning herself in the ‘not like us’ category. 
An important variation on the ‘good home’ discourse is ‘gets it’. ‘Gets it’ appears to 
be a form of ‘good home’, used primarily by those who espouse the intelligentsia 
interpretive repertoires and priorities. Whilst its meaning and range is rather 
nebulous, its function is clear. ‘Gets it’ is used within the research data as a 
particular group-membership signal, implying recognition of the importance of 
concept and viscerality in art (which require a particular cultural capital). This type 
of art-appreciation is constructed as being very different from appreciating the 
technical skill or beauty of a piece, which is constructed by the intelligentsia group 
as a more ‘Clifton Ladies’ discourse. 
 If a potential buyer uses what the artist or seller construes as the wrong discourse, 
then the sale may be denied (as Velthuis’ gallery owners described). In a more 
extreme version, as in the case of DS, rather than the piece being retained for sale to 
another buyer later on (which is what the gallery owners would be doing), the piece 




In this way, DS was able to keep the art ‘in the realm of the sacred’ (Belk and 
Wallendorf 1990, p.60). Either way – sale denied and/or piece given away - there is a 
loss of the income which would have been gained had the sale gone ahead. DS is a 
political agitator with traditional bourgeois cultural capital (from her upbringing) and 
the intelligentsia cultural capital (from her tertiary education and on-going deep 
involvement with that group). Given the anti-bourgeois message of the intelligentsia 
anti-market discourse - and its desirability within certain circles in the city and wider 
artworld - it should perhaps not be surprising that despite her relative lack of 
economic capital, for DS economic gain appears to be substantially less important 
than maintaining desired group membership and kudos. After the incident with the 
‘crass’ buyer, DS decided to reject the market altogether, and concentrate on making 
and exhibiting price-less installation pieces (high kudos within the group). 
Good home / ‘gets it’ and Craft 
Although ‘good home’ and ‘gets it’ seem to be important discourses when making an 
art transaction, it appeared that neither phrase were seen as necessary or appropriate 
masking for the pricing and sale of craft objects.  For example, consider BD, a craft 
participant who earns her living from her work, primarily from business-client 
commission. When taking part in the art trail she wanted to do something to ensure 
money transactions were not too bare, perhaps particularly as a novice exhibiting 
with her was finding the money-handling very awkward. Rather than using a ‘good 
home’ discourse to soften or mask transactions, which was a common practice in Art 
transactions but very rare in craft transactions, BD’s solution was more business-
based and “professional”, and did not involve giving any discounts. As she said, in 
what I understood to be a description but also an instruction to the novice,  “you’re 
giving out receipts”, but you are also balancing that with a recognition that for some 
trail visitors it may be more a social than purchasing occasion:  
..You want to be professional, you want to come across as not being flaky, 




you know, you don’t want to be…standoffish, and just to be sort of a 
business transaction…it’s a lovely thing just to come and see you, you know, 
and so you’ve got that…dynamic. 
(BD) 
In terms of signalling group membership it seems important that BD is not worried 
about it being a business transaction (which is masked by art pricers using high-
status discourses), and (unlike art pricers) she did not mention particular buyers and 
their status/group membership. However, as she felt was appropriate for an art trail - 
if not art transaction - she did not want it to be ‘just’ a business transaction. 
In using receipts and wishing to be seen as ‘professional’ BD is demonstrating an 
understanding of what she sees as the correct way to talk about money and price in a 
craft transaction. Rather than (inappropriately) using an art discourse, BD positions 
herself as an expert within the craft social hierarchy, using a craft-appropriate 
discourse:  
 “you know, I’ve done… [this type of work] professionally, and I’ve been paid 
for my [work], and I’ve been commissioned to do [that work], so, … you 
know, and I’ve made my living through [that type of work]…”  
(BD, 70) 
Her status is constructed through a non-problematic interpretation of commerce and 
money, and, because of her commercial success in the field, i.e. validation by clients, 
her discourse is constructed as a correct interpretation for her type of object.  
In contrast to BD’s discourse above, from the years of observation in the field an 
artist wanting to position themselves as an expert within the art hierarchy would be 
unlikely to talk about the money they have made, although third parties might do so 
by using the term ‘practicing artist’ to describe them.   Instead, in order to position 
themselves as an expert an artist is more likely to talk about where they’ve exhibited 




and who owns their work (validation). Rather than say they’ve been commercially 
successful, they might imply it even whilst rejecting that as an undesirable discourse, 
as one participant did: “Oh, I don’t know about things like that, you’ll have to ask my 
agent”.  
Legitimation 
‘Right’ and ‘wrong’ are cultural constructions, so theoretically open to negotiation. 
However, within any one context there are some interpretive rules which are so 
widespread that to not know them, or to use them incorrectly, is widely understood 
as getting it wrong. This is because dominant interpretations are sanctioned by 
historical precedent and those in a position of power (Barthes 1972). 
As a guest speaker said in her university lecture titled ‘Unprofessional Practice’, 
instances of ‘getting it wrong’ discourses are very useful, in that it is easier to point 
out how not to do it  than to explicitly say what is the right way. I suggest that 
‘getting it right’ may involve the ‘correct’ agreement re what constitutes ‘getting it 
wrong’. Interpretations of right and wrong are legitimised by construction of the 
source (such as the guest speaker) as an expert. 
In the research context, as seems likely within any pricing context, there is a range of 
competing interpretations of right and wrong ways to do pricing. Although the 
Romantic myth of the ideal separation of art and commerce is very strong, there are 
other construals. What is important is who is legitimising the alternative construal, 
and whether they are construed as a legitimate legitimator. For example, in an article 
in The Guardian newspaper it is implied that art professionals and money-market 
professionals have differing opinions re art prices, money, and the art market. At a 
conference in which attendees included ‘the governor of the Bank of England, the 
chairman of Lloyds TSB and similarly important figures from the ECB, the Federal 
Reserve and the Swiss National Bank, not to mention 70 or so hedge-fund 
managers, entrepreneurs, policymakers, academics, curators, art dealers, artists 




‘we shouldn't be gloomy about the dominance of big money in the art 
market, since it meant that, unlike the Van Goghs of the past, contemporary 
artists such as Hirst, or Jeff Koons, could get their just desserts and appear as 
the winners they were, something that could only be an inspiration to artists 
all over the world. 
A fantastically heated argument ensued.  
(…) 
Another [conference attendee] remarked that when the public knows a Koons 
has fetched $1m or more, it clouds their experience of the work. They can't 
see it clearly any more. Maybe Hirst's rise to stardom was more the 
consequence of excellent Saatchi marketing than a school for excellence. 
Hirst's champion was hearing nothing of it. Did an artist have to be 
poverty-stricken before we could enjoy their work? In the long run, 
someone insisted, the money price was always a fair reflection of an artist's 
achievement. 
So, I thought, while the 15th-century banker turned to art because it 
represented a value that couldn't be expressed in money terms, now the artist 
himself was to be admired for creating a work collectors could purchase 
as a sound financial investment. Money ruled.   
(…) 
In the end it was a highly respected gallery dealer who sorted us out (…) 
as far as art in general was concerned, experience told him that the reasons 
artists made it and collectors bought it were unspeakably various, and 
mostly had nothing to do with money at all.’ 
 (Parks 2011, added emphases) 
The implication is that we do feel ‘gloomy’ about big money and its involvement in 
the art market. As far as the writer (Tim Parks, author, translator and essayist) is 




supported by the ‘highly respected gallery dealer’ Parks cites, who said that art 
‘mostly had nothing to do money at all’. But this view was not universally shared, 
hence the ‘heated argument’. In the high status artworld view, art and money should 
be kept separate as it ‘clouds’ the ‘general public’s’ perception of art. This is an 
elevating discourse, as it implies that the speaker and company are above the general 
public, and it also perhaps suggests that the artworld elite are higher than the pro-
money attendees. As Bourdieu (1984) and Zelizer (1994)  pointed out the 
interpretations of legitimators exist within the hierarchy of construals of the field, 
and society in general, and are used to create distinction between the groups.  
As prior price research by Velthuis (2005)  and Morton and Podolny (2002) 
suggested, ideas of the right and wrong way to interpret and perform money-
acquisition and spending are group indicators. In British society having 
money/financial success is generally admired, as long as it is handled in the right 
way (Fox 2004). The artworld exists within wider society, and there is overlap 
between the upper classes’ view of the ideal treatment of financial success in 
general, and the ‘ideal’ treatment of seeking financial success in art. Although the 
construal of money and markets as contaminated and contaminating is particularly 
visible in an artworld context, interpretations of what is an ideal treatment are 
contestable and contested.  
As in Park’s article in The Guardian (above), the jostling is for the right to determine 
legitimacy. It is a jostle for authority, for social power and position which depends 
on expert judgement, and this occurs within the existing hierarchy and its system of 
rules and interpretations. Categorisation and interpretation are part of the group 
membership and social sifting function of money and price discourses – they are part 
of “the way you guys like to sort people out”, as one participant put it. Whilst the 
artworld and banking elite debate the ideal relationship between art and money, there 




7.1.1    Moral dimension 
Although one might assume that what is considered to be right or wrong in a pricing 
discourse would be determined by economic logic and commercial rationale, this 
would be to assume a very narrow range of heuristics. Instead, within the data as 
already discussed there appears to be a variety of discourses of price and a variety of 
interpretations of their degree of aptness. In some cases there appears to be a 
predominantly moral (rather than economic) dimension in the categorisation of right 
and wrong ways to do pricing, as suggested by Kopytoff (1986, p.64) and discussed 
by Venkatesh (2006, p.155).  
The moral dimension of art pricing is founded in the Romantic ideal of the 
separation of art and commerce, in which art is constructed as a ‘holy’ or sacred 
object (Abbing 2002) through its denial of the market. Within the data the idea of 
making art for money was frequently constructed as morally wrong, as well as 
indicative of a lack of high status cultural capital.  
The moral dimension does not appear to be restricted to art pricing. For example, 
Bourdieu (2000) and Douglas (1982) discussed the distaste with which the 
encroaching ‘modern economy’ and those who make the best of it were viewed by 
traditional Kabyle society and the Lele. Examining a more contemporary context, 
Zelizer (1994) discusses the moral objections to pricing the priceless child, or putting 
a monetary value on the environment (see also Hornborg 1999).  
Moral aspects were also visible in my pilot study of pricing discourses in other 
fields. For example, a carpenter and a plumber both told me that when they are doing 
contract work (when they are paid a pre-arranged daily rate as a sub-contractor), they 
charged £x per hour for any unrelated ad hoc evening work. However, they knew 
others who charged double that hourly rate, even when they had already earned a full 
day’s wage “doing contract”. There seemed to be a moral dimension to my 




maximisation is understood as greed (“They already had a day’s wage!”), rather than 
an assumption that economic maximisation is good.  
This moral dimension was repeated by the owner of a firm of electricians: Alan had 
been advised by his father, who was a business consultant, to give an overall price, 
and to price as high as he could, but Alan was not happy with this, preferring instead 
to use detailed “transparent” cost-plus approach that felt “more honest”. Alan 
recognised that he might make less money that way (because his prices were lower), 
but he felt better about it, and clients told him that they appreciated the transparency. 
His dislike of “opaque” high pricing, which he saw as sharp business practices, 
stemmed from his years working as a pricing analyst within a major FMCG 
company in an industry he had come to despise. Being seen to be “not like that” was 
as important to him as making the biggest possible profit, as the biggest profit 
would, for him, be a type of dirty money.  As with the carpenter and plumber, there 
appears to be a differentiation of monies earned, which affects their pricing decisions 
and is used in their signalling of group membership. That is, through their discourses 
of price they are signalling “I’m not like them, I’m like this, and therefore above 
them”. 
In another example, a senior business consultant told me that he charged less to do 
work with the National Health Service than he would for other clients because he felt 
that charging a high fee would be taking money which could be better used internally 
by the NHS for the greater good. That is, choosing a high price would change the 
category from good or sacred money (earmarked for making people well) to tainted 
money.  
Although one might think that the lack of business logic amongst artists is due to 
lack of knowledge of those heuristics, from these examples it appears that even 
amongst those such as the electrical company owner and the business consultant 
above, who have had a great deal of mainstream business training and therefore 
might be expected to use economic logic, the social effect of using a particular 




distancing oneself from avaricious and individualistic behaviour may be understood 
as a more ‘correct’ or desirable discourse. 
7.1.2    The jostle for authority 
In a reflection of the on-going debate higher up the artworld hierarchy (e.g. Hatton 
and Walker 2003; Game 2011; Parks 2011) within the research context there is more 
than one version of the ‘right’ way to treat the relationship between the art and 
commercial spheres. Pricers influence each other, and are influenced by what are 
perceived to be sources of authority within the media, local art establishments, and 
by trail visitors/customers. However, source status is constructed, and therefore 
subject to a degree of contention. The discourses they use may be seen as an example 
of ‘how it is done’ depending on how one views the legitimacy and authority of the 
source.  
How one is constructed or constructs oneself as a source of expertise varies with 
which group one belongs to. For example an art critic in a major newspaper or media 
company, or a university lecturer has authority conferred by their position and peers. 
They may bolster their expertise with references to higher authority, and who they 
choose will vary. For example, art journalist Parks (2011) referred to the art buyers 
and religious texts of 15
th
 Century Florence; a Fine Art lecturer referred to Adorno 
and Tate Modern, and rejected the ‘other’ (both the corrupt stock market fat cats 
with their taste for art that signals ‘I’ve got money’ rather than ‘I understand art’, and 
the easy-art preferring bourgeois). In contrast, an Illustration tutor referred to 
feedback from publishing clients, implying that the client (source of money) should 
be considered an expert.  
Many of the participants referred to lecturers and tutors as sources of expertise, 
despite the fact that very few of the art tutors and lecturers are engaged in pricing 
and selling their work, as they have an alternative source of income. Some 




through use of use particular art-historical conventions, assumptions and modes of 
expression, and a rejection of ‘other’. 
The rejection of ‘the other’ and what the other considers to be expertise appears to be 
an important part of the construction of one’s own expertise, as the excerpt below 
illustrates:  
‘Of course, we don’t have to read [the explanatory] labels [on pictures] – 
often peppered with that arcane meta-language so beloved of artists.’  
(Richard Story, Managing Editor of RWA Magazine, Winter 2011) 
Here a senior member of staff (the managing editor) from the magazine of the major 
traditional or bourgeois arts venue in the city (as opposed to the other major arts 
venue, which focusses on the promotion of conceptual contemporary work) publicly 
rejects an important group-signalling convention of the intelligentsia group: the 
‘arcane meta-language’. 
Rather than using such ‘arcane’ language, bourgeois ‘how to price’ art/art-market-
expertise is constructed through signals of artworld knowledge (e.g. of current 
exhibitions and artists) and use of a taken-for-granted familiarity with mainstream 
high-status how-it-is-done. That is, they, like the intelligentsia, use particular (but 
different) art-historical conventions, assumptions and modes of expression. 
However, unlike the intelligentsia, bourgeois participants mask rather than reject 
market considerations, and so are able to earn money through sales of their work, 
rather than through funding and grants.  
Within the data the craft expert, in contrast to the intelligentsia and bourgeois expert, 
is constructed or constructs themselves primarily through stories of commercial 
success, or through wider recognition. This validation of status could be having their 
work on the cover of a prestigious journal such as Ceramics Review, or inclusion in 
prestigious exhibitions such as Jerwood Makers Open, which is ‘part of the Jerwood 




For pricers, the experts they have access to, whether they interpret them as valid 
experts, and whether and what they learn from those experts is affected by what 
group they already are, and wish to be, part of.  Learnt discourses, which are shaped 
by categorisation of the object, money from the object, and relationships with the 
market, affect pricing practice.  
As discussed in the Literature Review, ‘Cultural value is not just an economic act but 
instead part of an intense social process of valorization and legitimization. 
Art/culture is socially consumed and socially aware. Economic value is determined 
by intangible (and ephemeral) social value formed from and within specific contexts 
by particular people, the 'scene', so to speak’ (Currid 2007).  Each of the main parties 
– the intelligentsia, the bourgeoisie, the craft artists, construct themselves as ‘the 
scene’, and therefore a source of categorisation ‘how it is done’ expertise. 
Within the research data, the most vigorous defenders of the ideal separate-spheres 
artworld discourses of the field were lecturers (who therefore had an alternative 
source of income), especially the Fine Art lecturers, and participants with relatively 
low economic capital who knew and used the artworld intelligentsia “I, like Adorno, 
like my art to be difficult” discourse in which money is dirty, and concept is king. 
The discourses of this small but influential group separated and, they felt, elevated 
them from ‘others’, and their discourses included sniping criticisms of the artistic 
and pricing practices of others. They were particularly critical of the practices of the 
local affluent artists, who were disparagingly termed ‘Clifton Ladies’, after the 
wealthiest and historically genteel section of the city.  In contrast, the Clifton Ladies 
- affluent cultured middle-class participants, who are mostly, but not necessarily 
female – were less likely to adopt the ‘difficult art’ discourse, rarely mentioned the 
artistic or pricing of other participants when interviewed, and rarely criticised 
someone for being commercial. 
For the Clifton Ladies there appears to be nothing wrong with painting something 
they term ‘traditional’, which might be seen as sell-able – after all, no-one could 




acknowledge the importance of the conceptual within the artworld in general, but 
reject ‘conceptual’ as the sole or primary indicator of Art. Their discourses of art and 
price were a demonstration of taken-for-granted familiarity with artworld rules and 
gallery practices, and their discourses often included a knowing distancing from 
commercial practices, a sort of tongue-in cheek ‘Look, I know how to play the 
game’. For example, when I asked PR about his previous work in the head office of a 
large retail organisation, and whether he’d had much to do with pricing there, he said  
“No,  no” (pushing away with his hands in one direction, leaning away from 
them, creating a big distance, face in exaggerated expression of distaste), 
“We didn’t descend to those murky depths! (smiles)” 
(PR. Field notes, slightly edited for clarity. His emphasis.)  
PR knows the focus of my research, and knows that I used to work in the buying 
department of a similar large retail organisation, so “murky depths” functioned as a 
socially-joining leg-pull (of my leg and of his) as well as a statement of knowledge 
of the ideal anti-commerce artworld discourse. Although he was in the middle of 
working out prices for the next day’s art trail when I began the conversation, by 
talking of “murky depths” he is perhaps disingenuously constructing himself as a 
pricing amateur who is normally above such practices. By doing so he constructed 
himself as being familiar with artworld discourses: he knows that discourses of 
separation are necessary, and he is able to perform that separation. That is, he was 
using an ideal artworld discourse in which he was saying two things at once. 
Through my collusion with the meaning of the discourse, this enabled him to price 
art in acceptable way, without loss of status.  
What the cultured affluent participants such as PR share is knowledge of an artworld 
etiquette which allows them to price and sell their art work. Rather like the “highly 
respected gallery dealer” in Park’s conference article (2011, see quotation above), 
the participants use the discourse that making art has nothing to do with money, 




discursive practices effect money category change, and signal social status/group 
membership. Whereas Duchamp put a urinal (functional object) on a plinth (ritual of 
category change) to change its category to art (new object category), this group of art 
trail participants used a shared interpretation that dirty money (ideal interpretation of 
market money) is changed into clean money by certain discursive practices which 
are seen by others like them to work in that way. For example, in conversation with 
me PR spoke of pricing as “murky depths” (ritual), which meant that he could then 
acceptably perform pricing. ‘Good home’ discourses work in a similar way, 
signalling a particular understanding of the way it is done which enables a market 
practice whilst masking it. 
Velthuis’ (2005)  research suggested that the gallery owners shared a particular set of 
rituals and interpretations of the rituals, but within my research data one can see 
alternatives being used. The differences signal (intentionally or unintentionally) 
which group the speaker is in, or wishes to be seen to be in. For example, the Clifton 
Ladies and their sell-able work were sneered at by those who are constructing a 
parallel hierarchy of the field in which conceptual anti-market work is the apogee of 
what art should be. However, the Clifton Ladies do not judge themselves using the 
conceptual hierarchy. Although one part of the local artworld may feel that the 
Clifton Ladies are ‘getting it wrong’, in the wider society in which the bourgeois are 
the dominant class, they are getting it right’. Because they are the dominant class, 
they are able to sustain that interpretation, and they continue to make work, sell it, 
and accrue economic and social capital.  
Authority in pricing ‘how it is done’ requires believers. That is, as with other areas 
of etiquette, authority is co-created not intrinsic, but can be very powerful. As a critic 
of Thornton’s book Seven Days in the Art World pointed out, ‘she [Thornton]’s 
without a vision of how things could be different. Like the art world itself, she 
assumes only a loser would challenge the system.’ 
(http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2008/oct/18/art1).  




In a local echo of the conference attended by Parks (2011) in which art professionals 
and money professionals debated the role of money in art, within the research 
context art professionals such as the tutors who taught that saleability was a dirty 
word, and the lecturer with her rejection of ‘easy’ art and ‘immoral’ stock-market 
money,  are jostling for artworld authority against those with wealth, and against 
alternative construals of the hierarchy. That is, although money significantly shapes 
the art market as Hatton and Walker point out in their Marxist critique (Hatton and 
Walker 2003), alternative hierarchical structures exist if one acknowledges them, and 
may be seen as more desirable. 
7.1.3    Apprenticeships: Pricing as learnt practice 
It is tempting to think that those doing pricing will have the same range of paradigms 
as oneself, or to assume that they will be particularly adept in maximising economic 
return (as assumed in Poundstone 2010). However, in much the same way that 
consumer research suggests that consumption behaviours are socially embedded and 
complex, this research suggests that pricing behaviours are also embedded and 
complex. Pricing practice and interpretation is, like the interpretation of other socio-
economic practices, shaped by a ‘long series of often infinitesimal experiences’ (, see 
also Horwitz 1992, p.198; Bourdieu 2000, p.23), and therefore depends on 
environment, access, and one’s prior interpretive repertoire. 
Given the negotiation of meaning within a normal conversation, and the tension 
between two conflicting value systems – capitalism and Romanticism - within this 
particular context, it is perhaps not surprising that there are instances where 
respondents appear to use contradictory interpretative frameworks. As Thompson 
points out, ‘Cultural knowledge is by no means a monolithic and internally 
consistent system. Rather, it is a heterogeneous network that offers a multitude of 
interpretive positions and endless opportunities for context-specific combination, 
juxtapositions, and personalised transformations of established cultural meanings.’ 




From the data one can see a range of sources of expertise from specific individuals to 
the wider artworld and social world in which the participants are embedded. Many 
participants have access to more than one source of expertise or opinion, and may be 
aware of alternative, sometimes conflicting, interpretive repertoires. For example, 
PJ’s understanding of the success criteria for high status within her media is based 
on three alternative sources of interpretations of relationship to the market:  
a) conversations with her husband, who is an art academic, b) her years of working 
within her artistic discipline, during which she has seen many types of work, talked 
to their makers, and seen how they are responded to by exhibition visitors c) her 
experience of being unsuccessful in her recent applications to take part in what she 
sees as high-status shows and selling opportunities. Her analysis of the work that 
was accepted for these shows supported the interpretive repertoire of a) and her 
experience at b).  
This data suggests that discourses of money and price, the rules surrounding them, 
and their social uses, are learnt and therefore vary. Interpretation, as in the example 
that prices ending in 99p or 95p signal ‘grocery’ rather than ‘art’ (Ruston 2007), are 
taught, they are not nature. Importantly, as discussed in the previous section, there is 
more than one ‘right’ way to do it. Pricing need not be understood as requiring the 
logic of war (Bourdieu 2000, p.20) or as involving a spirit of calculation that requires 
the apostasy of previously held beliefs. 
For example, PJ had been taught by her husband (art academic) how ‘Art’ kudos is 
achieved, including the rule that where you show matters: her husband has told her  
“you don’t want to be seen… doing little craftwork shows anymore” ( PJ). In 
contrast, two jewellers PJ constructs as experts (thirty years in the business, on the 
cover of prestigious journals) told PJ that they don’t care where their work goes, 
which galleries stock it, as long as it sells. “She was saying “I don’t know what 
[they’re like]…most of the places I sell. Never seen them, don’t know anything 




PJ told me that these jewellers have achieved peer recognition for excellence 
(evidenced through the magazine covers) although they use a very different logic to 
her husband’s. He is concerned about artistic reputation and being seen in the right 
places, whereas in the conversation reported above the successful jewellers (a source 
of authority legitimised through peer recognition) are commercially orientated. 
However, jewellery, however beautifully made, is more likely to be construed as 
craft than art, hence the acceptability of a commercial discourse. It should also be 
borne in mind that the conversation with PJ may have been context-specific. The 
jewellers might have chosen to use a different discourse had they been talking to 
someone to whom they wanted to demonstrate ‘art’ credentials, in which case an 
interest in sales might have been masked. What is a more ‘correct’ pricing discourse 
depends on context. 
It is a social construction, not nature, that art pricing ‘should’ be different to the 
pricing of groceries, although it may be taken as an obvious truth (Ruston 2007). 
Knowing that art pricing should be different, and in what way, depends on having 
had the opportunities to learn these ideas, and who one learns from. For example, the 
sympathetic literature accompanying a university exhibition of Bob Cobbing’s ‘use 
of the book as a medium for visual poetry’ explained,  
‘Cobbing resisted the notion that his books were “artists’ books”, which 
might seem strange; but his policy was (..) “enabling most people who 
wanted to buy poetry not to be drastically out of pocket.”   To that end, he 
often published at below cost price.’ 
(Literature accompanying exhibition) 
The mention of pricing is very unusual in the university context (high status source), 
and it is perhaps significant that in this rare example the message or construction of 
the artist is that he was clearly ‘not in it for the money’ (he “published at below cost 
price”) but for emotional and aesthetic connection with others. Price is mentioned in 




implicit approval of what is understood by most research participants as a high status 
context. 
Whilst it is tempting to assume that all art pricers know and use a range of discourses 
that separate the spheres, or perhaps that all pricers will be economically driven, in 
this research it is possible to see a range of pricing discourse. As one might expect 
following Zelizer’s research in which money is treated very differently depending on 
sociological factors, ways of interpreting money and pricing within this research 
context appear to vary with desired and actual social group, as well as opportunities 
to learn and who one chooses to learn from. 
7.1.4    Sources of expertise, and access 
Learning interpretations of right and wrong ways to do pricing depends on learning 
opportunities and construals of legitimate sources of authority. That is, social 
conditions give rise to different modes of constructing ‘how it is done’ and reality, 
and there will be socio-cultural and historical variability. Knowing a range of 
possible discourses and interpretations allows flexibility, and increases one’s ability 
to convince others that one’s interpretation is valid and high status.  
For example,  participant RM had told me:  
“Friends from abroad think we Brits are hilarious because we don’t like to 
talk about money”.  
Many months later during a lecture the visiting lecturer - who holds a senior position 
in the art space used by participant RM (above) - told a group of students : 
“Friends from abroad think we Brits are hilarious because we don’t like to 
talk about money, but I like to look at how this funding works.” 
It is not clear where the “we Brits are hilarious” phrase initially came from, but it is 
interesting that these discourses should be so similar. The second speaker holds high 
status within the local art world due to her job, in which she has contact with many 




and she is highly visible to those connected with the art space. The first speaker 
could also be said to hold high status, but less visibly, and in the view of fewer local 
artworld participants. That is, her status is not conferred by her job title, and few or 
no art students or art faculty would know of her. Instead she constructs her status 
through discussions of her family’s high status in the field, and her resultant depth of 
knowledge of artworld discourses: she knows ‘how it is done’.  It is possible that the 
‘we Brits are hilarious’ is a common discourse amongst those working in that 
particular art space, and it is important that it is used and taught by those with high 
status and many contacts within it. It is also important that both speakers then avoid 
talking about money and price. ‘Funding’, the term used by the second speaker, is 
treated as clean money or as an acceptable way to talk about money. It is a term 
which allows her to talk (although very briefly) about ways of acquiring money for 
one’s art (acceptable discourse) rather than about making money from one’s art 
(unacceptable discourse). 
As Douglas points out, people sometimes ‘want to say two things at once or to 
maintain two contradictory attitudes’ (Douglas 1982, p. x). Within the artworld 
higher status is signalled by a) an awareness of the need to maintain two 
contradictory attitudes, and b) the ability to achieve it. That is, successful gallery 
owners are able to run a business selling art (i.e. a commercial enterprise), whilst 
using discourses which suggest that they are not at all interested in money and avoid 
people who are (Velthuis 2005; Thornton 2008). Within my data some participants 
chose to use a discourse very similar to the gallery-owner (ideal) discourse, whereas 
others did not (and possibly were not able to).  
Just as the two participants discussed above share a social space, all of the research 
participants are embedded within the world, rather than abstracted. They have access 
to a range of other people, and to the media, and whether they interpret a discourse 
as important, obvious, wrong or irrelevant will vary. Friendship groups and peer 
groups are key sources of ‘how to’, as Jason Bowyer, President of the New English 




successful, lifelong career as an artist you must continue to learn and to meet the 
practicing community, maintaining lasting links’ (Withers 2011, p.28). However, 
there is more than one practicing community, and more than one discourse, and each 
of these communities may jostle for a position of authority. For example, Jason 
Bowyer’s comments were elevated by the explanation that "The New English Art 
Club has existed for over a century and is one of Britain's foremost exhibiting 
societies and the bastion of figurative painting.” 
The Fine Art faculty of the local university appears to have significant influence 
within the research context, and uses a similar anti-market discourse to that used by 
two of the city’s main galleries/education centres which focus on ‘cutting edge’ art. 
Theirs could be termed the ‘intelligentsia’ discourse, aligned with those of major UK 
galleries such as Tate Modern, Saatchi, Gagosian, and schools of art such as 
Goldsmiths (University of London). It is art and art-discourse for the cognoscenti, 
not the bourgeois or the hoi polloi. The discourse is also a way of creating an 
alternative to the wider social hierarchy. For example, I overheard an exhibition-
attendee explaining to another that  
“[The exhibiting artist]’s not taken seriously,… because the Queen likes him. 
Anywhere else they’d ….[take him seriously]”. 
 
In the past royalty would have been seen as the arbiter of good taste, and that is 
probably still the case for many now. However, this attendee’s comment illustrates 
the idea that there are multiple hierarchies, jostling for position. Although few would 
deny that the Queen is currently head of state, nor would they contest her high 
position measured in terms of wealth, the speaker suggests that the UK artworld 
contests the Queen’s position at the top of the cultural hierarchy, and that it does so 
by treating her taste and art knowledge as to be ignored or conspicuously opposed 
rather than emulated. In his loud and plummy-toned public criticism of this artworld 




higher than the UK artworld cognoscenti, and possibly aligned to the traditional 
hierarchy, although his other point is that ‘anywhere else’ whether or not the Queen 
likes that artist’s work is seen as irrelevant. That is, the speaker appears to suggest 
that the UK cognoscenti or intelligentsia protest too much in their fight for cultural 
status and power. 
The intelligentsia’s high-status alternative to traditional art is art and art discourse for 
those who (to paraphrase) like their art to be difficult. Through relatively easy access 
to tertiary education, civic galleries and media in which the Fine Art discourses are 
used it is possible for many people to have access to these distinctive formal 
intellectual discourses, but not all will choose to access, learn or use them. 
The other main source of price-discourse expertise could be said to espouse the more 
bourgeois or traditional approach to ‘what is art’, in which art should be spoken of as 
from the soul, but that it need not be removed from the market by being 
difficult/cutting-edge/unsellable/undesirable to be considered Art.  Here technique 
matters as much as being from the soul, and the end result need not be ‘difficult’ to 
be Art. As the article about the influential NEAC suggests, a key strand within the 
discourses of this group is that  
‘the shared artistic language is one in which pictorial statements are slowly 
and intricately constructed, but when completed can be understood quickly 
and easily by everyone. It is ever evolving and capable of great spiritual 
depth, and this language is the Club’s main concern’    
(Withers 2011).   
Note the difference between the NEAC’s stated aim of being understood quickly and 
easily by everyone and the use of elitist vocabulary (e.g. ‘pictorial statements’). This 
is a good example of what Douglas (1982, p.x) calls the wish to say two, sometimes 
contradictory, things at once.  
Also note the difference between the NEAC’s stated aim that work should be 




terms such as “easy art” or “advertising art”, terms which were also used by a 
number of participants who had studied at the university. These are limnal 
discourses.  
Within the magazine article the NEAC as source of expertise is positioned as 
‘traditional’ and high status, validated by longevity and recognition by other 
traditional high-status institutes such as the RWA; the lecturer and Fine Art 
discourse is positioned as ‘cutting edge’ and high status through rejection of 
traditional and easy art, and validated by academic approval. In both examples the 
speakers use their discourses to construct a ‘truth’ about the artworld which includes 
types of art, groups of people, and their place in the hierarchy, and to suggest that 
their construction of the hierarchy has high status. 
Within the research data the more traditional group is the most visible source of 
influence and expertise in ‘how it is done’, in that it is made up of the large swathe 
of the affluent middle class who are visiting galleries, buying art, attending art 
classes, making art,  and talking about art. Their formal discourse is visible in the 
mass media, through long-established artistic organisations and galleries such as the 
NEAC, the Royal Academy, and the National Gallery (London) and their 
publications. The participants who fall into this group are aware of the Fine Art 
discourse, and some are interested in learning more about it – for example, 
participants told me about radio and television arts programmes, and about attending 
university evening lectures on contemporary conceptual artists such as Emin and 
Koons. Some have attended the Fine Art university course at degree and Masters 
level. However, few adopt the ‘intelligentsia’ discourse of rejection of the market. 
I suggest that the reason that few of the Clifton Ladies participants used the 
intelligentsia discourses is perhaps because they have no need of the particular field-
specific status that would confer, given their high status within the wider society. 
Knowledge of the intelligentsia-approved art and the market-rejecting discourses 
was often part their repertoire, available to be used if appropriate, but it does not 




Importantly, although the bourgeois discourse is pervasive and very visible, the 
detail of ‘how it is done’ requires close and repeated contact. Unlike the 
intelligentsia’s clear ‘reject the market’ or craft’s ‘embrace the market’ discourses, 
the bourgeois how-to-talk-about-art-price rules are less explicit, and involve 
negotiating the two contradictory attitudes. Unless one already is part of this social 
group it is hard to learn their implicit rules of discourses of pricing.  
For example, when working-class DK wanted to know how to earn her living from 
her art she turned for advice to a local small-business advisor who offered an art-
business service. Here she learnt useful practical advice on running a business, but 
she did not learn the detail and nuance of ‘how it is done in the artworld’. There were 
however alternative sources of information available which she could have but did 
not use. For example, a founding artist of an affluent-area art trail gave a seminar to 
the trail’s members on how to sell your art, but DK chose not to attend. Although she 
met the entrance criteria (you had to be a trail member), she did not think that 
attending might be useful. This learning opportunity covered some of the 
practicalities that DK had learnt from the business advisor, but much of the discourse 
used and was about more subtle elements of selling art. Importantly, this talk relied 
on attendees sharing and valuing the speaker’s interpretation of ‘how it is done’ and 
of what is and is not appropriate. It also relied on them knowing context-specific 
rules such as what discourses may be appropriate within a learning context such as 
that one, and what things should be left unsaid or expressed differently when with 
potential customers.   
As Velthuis found when he began his study, as an outsider one is likely to only get 
the ‘gallery-speak’, not the ‘back-room discourse’, so one only learns that customer-
facing positioning facet of the discourse; that is, one does not learn how to make a 
living whilst stating that money is not the object of the exercise. To broach the 
subject of money and price incorrectly means that, as participants AJ and LM found, 
all one learns is that to talk about art price and pricing is considered to be in poor 




The third main source of expertise is to do with Craft. Although some research 
participants contested the division between art and craft, and called upon sources of 
expertise and authority such as Grayson Perry and the Turner Prize judges (see 
section the Art/Craft Divide), or Barthes, for support, within the research context it 
seems widely assumed that craft is different from art, and that makers want to make 
a living from their work. Craft makers discuss how to achieve this, whereas the ‘art’ 
discourse is that artists want to make their art, not that they want to make a living. 
Whereas a rare piece of explicit pricing advice given to a group of art students by 
their tutor was “The First Rule is Never Price Your Own Work! NEVER.  The second is 
Never sell your own work”, in the craft sector sources of pricing information are 
visible and accessible, as money and pricing are socially non-problematic. The craft 
lecturers and tutors are generally involved in practice – that is, as well as teaching 
they are or have recently been actively engaged with making their own work and 
selling it. Their market knowledge seems to be an important part of the education 
offered on these courses. For example within his seminars an animation tutor 
regularly mentions the pricing and marketing implications of obtaining particular 
skills or of using particular approaches, and these points are illustrated with 
examples from his own experience. In another example an MA animation student 
was asked by their assessors “How much do you need to raise [to complete that 
piece]?” and another student was asked “Where do you want to show this? What are 
you going to do with it?”.   
There are many other sources of market expertise available for craft artists both 
within and beyond the university. For example there are many books on the subject: 
during the research period the arts faculty library used the two-wall display by the 
library entrance to display books about pricing and marketing for photographic and 
other ‘craft’ work (e.g. Profitable Portrait Photography, and ethics: a graphic 
designer’s field guide ). This public promotion and ease of availability of 




discourse re fine art, in which “saleability, I mean, (small laugh) that that was 
almost a dirty word!” (RJ).  
Within the research data the primary sources of craft-price discourse expertise are 
other craft practitioners met through the art trails or events such as classes, 
association meetings and exhibitions/fairs. In contrast to ‘artists’, who were reticent 
about broaching price-related conversations with each other, craft makers such as PJ 
are open and willing to talk about their sales, pricing, and market considerations, and 
to give each other opportunities to learn ‘how it is done around here with an object 
like this’.  For example, as a response to HM’s discomfort with handling money her 
more senior co-exhibitor implied that re-categorisation of the money from “money” 
to “professional fee” might be helpful.  
In this suggestion the co-exhibitor was giving HM the opportunity to learn a possible 
ritual of category transfer, and illustrating how important categorisation may be to 
practice. However, the suggested term - ‘professional fee’ - , and the source of the 
knowledge (more senior exhibitor and expert in the field) belong more in the ‘craft’ 
than ‘art’ category. It reminded me of an animator tutor who praised a group of 
graduating students for having “come a long way. I don’t just mean technically, I 
mean as practitioners”, in that whilst this professionalism, market-awareness and 
technical skill may have value and status within the craft hierarchy, it does not have 
status within the wider art hierarchy.  Although the use of the term ‘professional fee’ 
might facilitate ease of money-handling for BD, for some participants, and possibly 
for HM, this term implies membership of what is generally seen as a less desirable 
group (craft artists rather than artists), although it does imply high status within that 





7.2    Pricing discourse and group membership 
In the same way that pocket money has different positional and relational 
associations to wages, and is treated differently, within the data money earned from 
or spent on art is often categorised as a particular type of money. How it is 
categorised, and the implications of this categorisation appear to inform discourses 
of the commensurative process and pricing decisions. Through these price/money 
discourses artists suggest their desired or actual group membership, and group 
membership informs their discourse choice – the relationship is dialectic and co-
constitutive. 
Discourses of art pricing as well as art objects appear in a hierarchy which involves a 
process of legitimation which is controlled by the intelligentsia and the rich 
bourgeois. Rather than behaving as disembodied homines economici intent on 
maximising fiscal return, it appears that for some pricers – e.g. those with lower 
economic capital - it may be more important to talk the right talk and gain or sustain 
a higher social position than it is to maximise economic return and risk losing face.  
One can see a similar positioning and group membership/distancing effect in other 
pricing arenas such as the airline industry, in which a newcomer with a different 
‘how to price’ rule book is seen as an outsider. Existing industry members can 
choose whether to adopt some of the new pricing approaches (signalling a move 
away from their traditional cohort and a move towards the new paradigm), or 
retrench. Pilot-study conversations with participants pricing in other fields, 
(including solicitors, carpenters, electrical company owner and business consultant, 
amongst others), support the finding that pricing practices may be used as group 
membership signals, and this is not restricted to an art context. 
A few research participants queried why various pricing approaches are understood 
as inappropriate or appropriate, but for others the way they do pricing is not seen as 
negotiable or a choice. Rather than being seen as their interpretation of a convention, 




associated pricing rules is the way it is – “people who do paintings, they always 
seem to charge a lot more and they seem to get away with it”, (photographer AD, 
line 626).  
This photographer appears to interpret painters’ suggestions that he should charge 
more for his work as an inappropriate application of ‘painter pricing’ to his 
photographic work, and to understand that the artists do not really expect him to 
follow their advice. Instead, the pricing suggestion made by the artists should be 
understood as a complement, and perhaps as slightly patronising: we both know your 
work is not art (shared interpretation), but let us pretend it might be taken as such. 
The painters’ suggestion is founded on and supports the dominant understanding of 
hierarchy by medium in which painting is art, and higher status, and photography is 
not (Bourdieu 1990), and confirms the group membership and unequal status level of 
the two parties and their objects. 
 
Catch 22: Getting it right/getting it wrong  
Catch 22 is a phrase based on a novel by Joseph Heller, used to describe a 
paradoxical situation in which the person cannot win because of rules over which the 
person has no control. Within the book, by asking for a psychological test to avoid 
doing military service a pilot was considered sane enough to fly. The Catch 22 was 
that if he did not ask for a test he would have to fly, and if he asked for a test he 
would have to fly. 
Within the data, ‘getting it right’ was sometimes seen as complicated, and a number 
of the participants found themselves in a Catch 22 situation: 
Although from a methodological point of view there is a ‘problem of interpretation 
that arises from ambiguous intentions’ (Douglas 1982, p.x), for the pricers in this 
research context being able to construct ambiguous statements is a key benefit. In the 




were sought and made, despite protestations to the contrary. Within the artworld and 
for many  participants within the research context the ability to negotiate conflicting 
discourses is ‘getting it right’ economically and socially. However, it is a difficult 
negotiation. 
DK constructs her work as being ‘from the soul’ (using the Romantic discourse to 
construct her work as Art), but it does not make enough money for her to live on, 
which is problematic. She appeared to feel it necessary to conform to her 
interpretation of separate spheres ideal in return for object categorisation status, 
despite the corollary loss of income: 
“DK: I don’t want to um start doing abstracts and landscapes because I think 
the gallery will represent me … better, if I did that. Cos I’m not really 
interested in doing that. 
 
SS: Although you do want to earn your living as an artist. 
 
DK: Yeah. And that’s the catch two three two six eight 
SS: 22? 
 
DK: (laughs) yeah, that’s the one.  
Its my ‘vocation’ (uses self-conscious tone, and laughs). Yeah, I’m not, I’m 
not going… 
I’d feel I’d be commercialising myself if I did that [i.e. abstracts and 
landscapes in order to get better gallery representation] … And I’m not 





DK’s primary concern appears to be with ‘getting it right’ within the Romantic 
framework. DK knows the ‘rule’ that art should be from the soul, not made for 
commercial gain, but also recognises that following that dictum means that she is 
less likely to gain gallery representation – that is the Catch 22. DK’s Catch 22 is that 
she wants artworld status of Artist, and wants to earn her living from her art, but 
does not want to make art that will enable her to earn a living as she sees that as 
undermining the ‘artist’ criteria. For DK being seen to reject ‘what will sell’ as her 
motive for making art is a source of desirable group membership which outweighs 
economic rationale. 
PJ is in a slightly different position: her work sells very well, and possibly because 
of that commercial success her work is not considered to be Art, and she would like 
it to be, as this has higher status. Although her work is appreciated by gallery owners 
and personal buyers, she feels that more academic connoisseurs see her work as 
‘craft’, and that is why it has been excluded from high-status exhibitions she has 
applied to be part of.  
It is frustrating for PJ that her work is apparently seen as less worthy of inclusion in 
those particular exhibitions given that historically, when exhibiting side–by-side 
with accepted artists, PJ regularly sells as much as ten of those around her put 
together. If sales were the criteria, her work is much better than those whose work is 
accepted for the high status exhibitions.   
The Catch 22 is that whatever she does she will lose out: she can either move away 
from making what will sell towards more conceptual work, and be “taken more 
seriously” (achieving membership of the intelligentsia group, which she and her 
husband see as desirable), or she can continue to be excluded from that group but 





Getting it wrong: the consequences 
Although there were many ways of getting it right and getting it wrong, within the 
data the area of price reductions seemed to be the most sensitive, perhaps because it 
drew attention to the commercial and monetary aspect of the exchange.  
“I was part of a group which had an exhibition last year at [relatively high 
status gallery space, hired by the week]. One of the artists, on the last day, 
wanted to put up big signs (waves her arms to demonstrate the size)… ‘Buy 
One Get One Free’!!! (tone of despair and outrage). Awful!  
We tried to persuade her [not to], it doesn’t look good for all the other work 
[i.e. theirs], but she said she really just wanted to shift some work, clear 
some space.”   
 




Here the ‘Buy One Get One Free’ artist showed herself to be following a different 
set of interpretations and rules of ‘how it is done’ than the other artists in the group, 
and therefore not part of that group. Whilst the group tried to impose constraints at 
the time, their attempts to dissuade the artist from using what they felt was an 
inappropriate pricing discourse were unsuccessful. However, they will impose 
constraints in future by excluding that artist from group shows. From the interview it 
was not clear whether the offending artist would have other sales opportunities 
elsewhere, but it was clear that an opportunity to share a selling venue with this 
group of artists was unlikely to reoccur, as she had been clearly told that she had ‘got 




As previously discussed, the use of red Sale stickers was seen by the vast majority of 
participants as inappropriate. To them, the red Sale stickers signalled that the artist 
‘didn’t get it’ and that the work was more ‘craft’ or ‘grocery’ than art. Similarly, a 
participant who said “D’you know what? I could offer you a bit of discount today” 
was getting it very wrong in his use of overtly commercial language, and in using 
this he threated the ‘art’ categorisation of his objects. In contrast, reductions given 
discretely to ‘a good home’ were considered to be perfectly acceptable.  
Although reductions were a particularly fraught area, there were other money-related 
discourses which were construed as getting it wrong. Participants who talked of 
wanting money, especially for mundane (profane?) purposes such as paying bills, 
were generally seen to be getting it wrong, with social and economic effects. 
However, simply being understood as being interested in sales could be problematic. 
For example X, an artist who had been good friends with others within a particular 
circle, was increasingly excluded because of what they considered her inappropriate 
interest in the market and in producing work which would sell: instead of being like 
us, she became “very different”. 
“DW:  You must talk to [X] – she’s very different,  very clear about her 
prices. 
FW: But she’s got a totally different approach to us. 
DW: You must talk to her! You know, she paints to sell, She…. 
FW: I can’t paint something because it will sell! 
DW: Selling your soul  
(They both grimace)” 
(DW, FW, Field notes) 
Another artist (LM, non-British but long-term resident) told me how upset she had 
been when she had been cold-shouldered by the others in a group show (reasonably 




because she had suggested that they should have a conversation about pricing before 
the exhibition started. She had felt that this was an obvious conversation to have, but 
was made to feel that she had done “something terrible” by suggesting it. Rather 
than a conversation about price being unproblematic, their reaction told her that they 
felt she had ‘got it wrong’, that she had bad manners, and she was ‘not one of us’. It 
surprised her that talking about price was clearly a touchy subject in that context, and 
her surprise revealed a lack of knowledge of that group’s ‘how it is done’.  
In the research context, for an ‘artist’ to discuss pricing is ‘getting it wrong’: the first 
rule appears to be that if you wish your work to be understood as ‘art’, you don’t talk 
about pricing. Although pricing conversations may happen between artists, during 
the research period I observed no instances of this, and within the data there was 
only one instance in which an artist (as opposed to craft maker) reported discussing 
prices with another artist, who was described as “my mentor” (RM). On the whole, 
artists priced on their own, but sometimes with a short discussion with their partner. 
The absence of price as a topic of conversation suggests that for artists – even those 
involved in creating a market opportunity, as in the research context - pricing is a 
socially sensitive topic. The strong rule that to talk about pricing is wrong is easily if 
painfully learnt (cf LM’s experience above) even if not accepted as rational. The 
invisibility of price in conversations means that for artists there are few opportunities 
for a more useful ‘how to price’ apprenticeship of the type so readily available to 
craft makers. 
There was only one instance within the data in which a group of artists had willingly 
and explicitly discussed prices. In this case they were all middle-class women who 
had recently completed the same MA, and were taking part in their first art trail, and 
were all showing together. I suggest that the price conversation perhaps occurred 
because within this particular group and pricing context it was considered 
appropriate and desirable to talk about pricing, rather than seen as a form of ‘getting 
it wrong’ - they were more interested in emphasising their similarities and cohesion 




and authority. It was noted by them that emphasis on similarities may have restricted 
an individual from using higher prices, but may also have raised modest prices. 
From the data one can see how economic effects are linked to the social: by using the 
wrong discourse and so showing that they are ‘not like us’, artists such as X and LM, 
and the artists who used red stickers or ‘Buy One Get One Free’ posters are far less 
likely to be included in future group shows organised by the people they have 
alienated. Group shows are opportunities to sell with lower costs than a solo show, 
and with more visitors. That is, by getting it wrong in DW/FW’s eyes because they 
interpret the work as being painted to sell (undesirable), rather than from the soul 
(desirable), X may have reduced the likelihood that DW/FW (and their friends) will 
buy her work, and she has lost some opportunities to sell to the public.   
The effect of group exclusion can spread further. For example X may find it harder 
to get support for her application for membership of one of the local elite art 
institutions for which one needs sponsorship.  As X explained to me, membership of 
this institute is highly desirable and matters to her. She would like the kudos of their 
recognition of her work (they are legitimate legitimators), and she would enjoy being 
associated with them, and it would be beneficial on her art curriculum vitae. 
Membership would enable high-status sales opportunities, and from experience she 
expects membership to change buyers’ price expectations. She may have damaged 
her chances of getting in because she has been understood by a locally influential 
artist to be using the wrong discourses – she does not know ‘how it is done’, and 





CHAPTER 8   SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
8.1    Pricing as embedded action 
In this research the market is considered a social institution (Baker and Jimerson 
1992; Arnould and Thompson 2005; Peñaloza and Venkatesh 2006). It moves the 
focus of analysis from consumers to producers, and examines their pricing practices. 
As Penaloza and Venkatesh (2006) suggested, it is important that one consider the 
whole of the market as being made up of social beings inhabiting communities, 
rather than assuming that the supply-side is less influenced by social and cultural 
context, or that the supply-side meaning-making is less important in the construction 
of market meanings. The data from this research shows that pricers learn about 
pricing through an on-going communicative process, and that ‘how to price’ includes 
a range of possible pricing options which are deemed more or less appropriate for ‘a 
pricer like me with an object like this’. Whereas the vast majority of prior research 
has assumed that pricers use an economic or strategic rationale, this ethnographic 
study builds on and extends the small amount of previously published research 
which focusses on the sociological aspects of modern pricing practices (Espeland 
and Stevens 1998; Morton and Podolny 2002; Velthuis 2005). It extends that 
literature by showing that pricing discourse options and interpretations are construed 
as having social meanings (which Velthuis suggests), and that, as in Douglas’ 
‘primitive’ pricing contexts (Douglas 1982), the rules of ‘how to price’ are shaped by 
the existing elite and used as affiliation signals. 
As discussed in the Literature Review, within Marketing there has been a significant 
and growing interest in exploring the social and cultural aspects of consumer 
behaviour. In this research stream consumption behaviours and their interpretations 
are construed as having social uses, including their use as affiliation signals. 
Luedicke (2006), for example, examines how brand communities work as social 
systems, and that how consumers use interpretation of the meanings of objects and 




In contrast, Thompson and Tian (2008) exploration of supply-side meaning-making 
processes assumes that the primary drivers for the use of particular discourses is to 
promote commercial gain. This view of the marketer as economically-focussed and 
outward-looking reinforces Poundstone’s (2010) assumption that pricers have 
evolutionary advantages over consumers. My data suggest that although some 
pricing discourses may ostensibly be underpinned by commercial motivations, what 
the pricers/marketers know, and whether, how and why they use that knowledge, 
may not be driven purely by economic concerns, and that this matters.   
Whilst those trained in the current Western academic approach to business practices 
may assume economic rationality or strategic intent on the part of the 
supplier/producer, a review of actual pricing practice suggests that this assumption 
should be treated cautiously. For many within the art world context of this research 
to use discourses of economic rationale and maximisation for art would be to be 
getting it wrong, and badly. That is, for the majority of participants the affiliation 
signal of rejecting economic rationale is more desirable than signalling that one 
embraces commerce.  
Morton and Podolny’s (2002) research suggests that some pricers (such as the 
hobbyist wine producers in their study) may choose a lower price for their object 
than they could, because they gain a utility (i.e. a non-economic benefit) from the 
production of the object being priced. This is an important finding. My primary 
study of art pricers reveals the possibility of varied constructions of ‘utility’, and 
examines how this non-economic concern informs pricing practice. 
From my data it is possible to see some pricers using a similar approach to that used 
by Morton and Podolny’s (2002) hobbyist wine producers, in that they choose lower 
prices than they ‘could’, because they gain some other utility. The discourses of the 
art participants suggest that the utility gained from particular price discourses 
(including price chosen) includes, but is not necessarily restricted to, social kudos 
amongst those the participants are or wish to be associated with, or at least a 




Podolny’s (2002) work in which they suggest that hobbyists choose lower prices 
because they ‘love’ making good wine, and that to pricers such as these the 
recognition  of their wine-making skill by experts and peers is reward in itself, 
counterbalancing the lower economic profit. My findings suggest that it is not just 
the recognition of production skill which is important to pricers, but also the group 
membership that implies. This sociological reading of Morton and Podolny’s (2002) 
data suggests that the hobbyists’ lower pricing is as much a learnt practice  used to 
signal knowledge of elite ‘how it is done’ and thereby signal group membership, as it 
is a considered weighing up of the balance sheet. That is, the hobbyist wine makers 
are constrained in their pricing by their understanding of the (to them) desirable 
‘how it is done’. 
Whereas Morton and Podolny (2002) found that the pricing practices of the hobbyist 
wine pricers drove commercial (i.e. profit-orientated) producers from the higher-
quality end of the wine market, in the pricing context of this study the market 
structure was not skewed in this way: within my study although some pricers 
appeared to use a similar logic to those used by the hobbyist wine makers 
(associating high status with low or no prices), participants with higher status 
cultural capital (the Clifton Ladies) were able to gain the ‘utility’ of kudos and high-
status social group membership as well as choosing (and achieving) higher prices for 
their work.  That is, rather than it being an either/or situation in which pricers have to 
choose to gain either social status or economic gain, as in Morton and Podolny’s 
study, in my research (as in Velthuis’ study) interpretations of discourses of price 
were constructed so that elite participants (but not other participants) are able to 
achieve both kudos and economic gain.  
The pricers in this study are embedded in their social context, rather than acting as 
abstracted economic actors. They have learnt their categorisation(s) of object and 
associated money, as well their interpretive repertoire, from family, friends, artworld 
peers, local institutions and mass media. ‘How to do price’ is learnt, and subject to 




As Velthuis (2005) found and Morton and Podolny’s (2002) study suggested, 
whereas economic theory assumes market actions are informed by a logic of 
individualistic economic maximisation, in real world contexts such an approach may 
be construed as being ‘wrong’, even immoral, rather than ‘logical’ or ‘rational’. My 
research shows that such interpretations are shaped by the pricer’s knowledge of 
interpretive options, the possible social meanings of those options, and their choice 
of expertise/precedent. In an artworld pricing context an overtly economically-driven 
discourse or perceived interest in earning money may be considered “crass” or dirty 
(“I had to go and wash my mouth out”), and/or indicative of lower social status of 
the speaker and the art object. The art object may be, by association, categorised as 
“popular”, “populist” or “easy art”, which were used as negative terms in this 
context. 
Within the research context and the wider Western artworld in which it sits, the 
dominant construal that money and commerce is dirty and problematic, and should 
be kept apart from art.  This interpretation of commerce and money underpins the 
pricing discourses of the vast majority of participants, but (unlike Velthuis’ study) it 
appears and is negotiated in a variety of ways. The variation is perhaps not 
surprising, as interpretive repertoires are learnt, and therefore depend on from whom 
one learns, and the context. Unless they can compensate in other ways, participants 
who treat money as neutral and commercial discourses as non-problematic are 
demonstrating a lower or different cultural capital than those who demonstrate a 
“middle-class discomfort with money” (BR). Alternatively, their discourse may 
suggest acceptance of the hierarchical rule that their type of work is less art, and that 
they are part of a different, lower status, social group (“I’m just an illustrator”).  
8.2    Money matters - Money categories and transformations within discourses of 
price 
In practice, one cannot think about pricing without thinking about money, yet this 




or meaning-less. However, previously published research has suggested consumers 
separate monies into different categories, and that the categories of money are 
meaning-full, and that the meanings are socially constructed and used within social 
relationships. This study contributes to previously published price research and 
money research by showing that pricers distinguish between different categories of 
money, and treat money as a meaning-full construct within their commensurative 
considerations and discourses of price. 
As Thaler(2008 [1985], reprint of 1985 paper) suggested in his seminal paper 
‘Mental Accounting and Consumer Choice’, consumers use different money 
heuristics and calculative practices (which he termed mental accounting) depending 
on which pot or category they have allocated the money to. My research shows that 
pricers also create distinctions between monies rather than seeing money as 
ostensibly equal and neutral. It also shows that the different categories of money 
have associated practices. That is, just as consumers’ choices and money practices 
are informed by their interpretation of money categories in Thaler’s research, so 
pricers’ choices and pricing practices are shown to be informed by their 
interpretations of money distinctions. 
However, whilst Thaler shows that people create distinctions between monies and 
use different heuristics for different ‘pots’ or categories, the participants in my 
research, as in Zelizer’s (1994), can be seen to be using varied 
categorisations/distinctions, and varied associated practices. Zelizer showed that 
money categories matter in relational practices, and that conforming to particular 
etiquettes is a means of signalling group membership and social relations. She also 
showed that if one looks at people’s money-handling practices one can see categories 
and meanings of money being transformed (Zelizer 1994), because to do so is part of 
the learnt ‘how it is done’, and has social uses. Zelizer shows that these 
transformations are achieved through rituals of category change and shared 
understandings of the rituals. Whereas her focus was on domestic money practices, 




pricing (which would generally be construed as a market practice). I show that 
money categorisations by source (the object being priced and the buyer), form, 
holder, and earmarking affect pricing practice, and that transformation of money 
categorisations and meanings through discursive practices is an important, 
sometimes necessary, part of the practice of pricing. 
Rather than thinking ‘a dollar is a dollar is a dollar’, within the data money is 
understood by the research participants as having different categorisations and 
meanings. The participant’s pricing discourses and price choices appeared to be 
informed as much or perhaps more by category meanings and perceptions of the 
need (and means of effecting) category change than they were informed by economic 
considerations. This pricing practice is very different from three foundational 
constructs within marking price theory, which are that money is a neutral element 
within the price consideration, that pricers will seek to cover costs (costs + profit), 
and that pricers are aiming to maximise returns (“what the market will take”). 
Within the data, money from art (source) was frequently construed as dirty and 
tainting. As a direct result of this socially constructed meaning of money, pricing 
may be avoided, or the pricer’s discourse may involve re-categorisation of the 
money from dirty to clean through discourses of source and earmarking, and to a 
much smaller extent, form (e.g. through use of cheques rather than cash), because 
these discourses are interpreted as performing necessary rituals of category change. 
For those who hold a higher social position and high status cultural capital, such as 
the art gallery owners in Velthuis’ study (2005), or the bourgeois (Clifton Ladies) 
participants in my study, pricing art involves using discourses and practices which 
emphasise knowledge of the dirtiness of money whilst simultaneously enabling a 
transaction/commerce to take place. The masking discourses of the elite implicitly 
convey to the visitor/buyer: “we know money is dirty, that’s why we handle it in this 
way. And we handle money in this way, so you can tell we know it is dirty.” 




money sufficiently for pricing and sales to be achieved whilst the high status of the 
art object, seller, and buyer, are maintained.  
The idea of collusion is an important one, in that it is only possible when there are 
shared (or sufficiently shared) ideas of what particular practices ‘mean’. This is 
discussed more fully in the following sections. Here I discuss the shared and varied 
interpretations of money categories. In the research context the dominant construal 
of money was that money from art (source) is dirty, and that overlap between art and 
commerce (such as selling and pricing) should be avoided. This categorisation of 
money by source underpinned almost all of the pricing discourses during the data 
collection period. As an outsider, I had expected people who were involved in setting 
up a market to be interested in commercial discourses, but this was not the case:  I 
clearly ‘didn’t get it’. 
When I started to research the pricing practices within the art trail context I was 
surprised by how rarely price was mentioned when the conversation was left up to 
the artists. Although these artists had chosen to set up and take part in a market (the 
art trails), what I considered a key driver for taking part in a market – that is, sales, 
and therefore a consideration of price and how to price - were conspicuous by their 
absence.  
Having established that the topic of price was largely avoided within this context, I 
began, tentatively, to ask people directly about their pricing. I had another surprise: 
rather than considering my question to be a faux pas, as I had suspected (I had 
investigated previous research regarding data collection for sensitive topics) most 
participants when asked directly and privately about their pricing seemed very happy 
to talk about it, at times overwhelmingly so.  
However, there seemed to be an extraordinary lack of what I had hitherto considered 
general knowledge about pricing. Whilst most of those pricing within this context 
have had little or no formal business training, all of the pricers within the art trails 




assume that consumers are reasonably savvy about pricing practices, perhaps 
because discussions of prices and how to understand prices are a familiar if small 
topic within the mass media. For example, The Guardian newspaper’s Money pages 
has been carrying an on-going section in which readers send in their photographs of 
pricing labels and stories of pricing scams/anomalies in supermarkets; Mainstream 
radio uses terms such as ‘loss leader’ and the acronym BOGOF as though we all 
know what they mean; Magazines and online consumer forums remind us to do the 
maths and compare prices. Therefore, even if the pricers had no formal training, it 
does not seem unreasonable to expect them to use pricing discourses which include 
pricing concepts learnt as consumers. However, within this research study this was 
rarely the case. From my prolonged immersion in the context I suggest that the 
paucity of commercial discourses was not necessarily due to lack of pricing 
knowledge, but instead was shaped by an understanding of how pricing art is done. 
That is, the commensurative options are shaped by interpretation of object (art) and 
categorisation of money associated with art (dirty).  
During the data collection period, where commercial pricing ideas were used, the 
speakers mentioned elsewhere in the conversation that they knew they were getting 
something wrong. This, combined with the general absence of discourses of price 
suggests that not mentioning price or money (commercial considerations) is often 
understood as ‘getting it right’ in this context. The tension between the art-pricing 
‘rules’ and commercial pricing logics (in which economic success is desirable) 
caused problems for many pricers –in fact for all pricers except the elite and those 
who were unaware or happy with the low social status implied by their 
(inappropriate) commercial discourses. 
For example, one participant who had a sale (explicit price reductions with red Sale 
labels), and discussed 3-for-2 offers (another overtly commercial practice associated 
with groceries rather than art), said that she didn’t know how to talk properly to 
agents or galleries, and wished she did. Another participant said sadly that she put a 




budgets, and this commercial effort paid off: her work sells very well. However, she 
felt that selling well (and being seen to do so) meant that her work was considered by 
the elite to be not quite art, and she was excluded…and she would like it to be taken 
more seriously (ie included in the elite group). However, at the same time, she was 
proud of her sales. 
Meanings of money, price, and price-discourses are shaped by and shape social 
practice, and the affiliation-signal uses of discourses of price appear to be an 
important element of price-related behaviours, sometimes outweighing economic 
rationale.  
Within the data there were buyers who refused to buy a picture because it was 
reduced ‘incorrectly’ (red Sale stickers, rather than through a ‘good home’ 
discourse), and examples of relatively poor artists choosing to produce unsellable 
installation works rather than make some (dirty) money. Artists reduced their prices 
because the buyer ‘has a feeling for’ the piece, even when a reduction was neither 
requested nor required, because this this practice is seen to have a money-cleaning 
and social-positioning effect. Although these practices happened in a market-place, 
none of them make economic sense.  As mentioned by Ruston (2007), rather than 
being purely economically driven, money and pricing practices are interpreted by 
both the pricer and the consumer as being more or less appropriate for particular 
types of object. What Ruston does not draw out is that the interpretations or 
meanings associated with particular types of money or pricing practice are used as 
one of the ways “you guys like to sort people out” (RM) in the social and field 
hierarchy.  
There appear to be rules which pricers need to know, either because they wish to be 
seen to belong to a particular group of producers/pricers, or because they are pitching 
at a particular customer group. This is because pricing and discourses of price are 
understood as signalling that one ‘gets it’ or ‘doesn’t get it’, that one knows the 
‘correct’ rules and how to apply them, or one does not. For example, do not use Sale 




gallery practices, or be able to counterbalance the use of Sale stickers with a display 
of cultural capital equal to or higher than that of the buyer.  
Although there are social benefits to using the correct pricing discourse, pricers need 
to be aware of the potential constrictions of working within ‘the way it is done 
around here’, and that there is more than one way to interpret ‘the way it is done’. 
Although the choice of discourse may signal membership of a desirable group and 
therefore have positive social consequences, conforming to the rules of that 
discourse may have negative as well as positive economic effects. 
Knowledge of the rules of how it is done is cultural capital. To succeed in sending 
the right art signals (with associated social positioning) and make clean money 
requires a specific cultural capital. Knowledge of the nuances of interpretation 
depends not just on what one has learnt recently, but on how one was brought up, 
and how one’s parents and their parents were brought up (Bourdieu 1984). 
Importantly, university courses are more accessible than knowledge accumulated 
over decades of artworld contact through gallery-visiting and art-buying.  
It appears that pricers with a partial knowledge of the range of possible interpretive 
rules (for example those who have attended art college but whose parents are 
working class) may know and be willing to use the anti-money and anti-market 
discourses they have been taught by their professors in order to be seen to have 
accumulated that cultural capital: the art trails are a chance for less economically-
advantaged to be culturally snobby. Membership of the high-status social group (the 
intelligentsia) is achieved through classification of money as dirty and ideally kept 
separate from art, and desire for membership appears to outweigh economic logic for 
these participants. Other more affluent middle-class participants were able to earn 
money during the art trails, as the participants know how to ‘clean’ the money. That 
is, rather than use the ‘rejection’ discourses used by the intelligentsia, the ‘Clifton 
Ladies’ use masking discourses which suggest no interest in making money but 




Although most pricers within the data know the broad art-pricing principles which 
are visible in the mass media and are taught by lecturers and tutors (generally 
implicitly rather than explicitly), some pricers do not have sufficient cultural capital 
in artworld practices to find a way round the Romantic ideal discourse of rejection of 
the market. The data suggest that these participants accept the myth of the starving 
artist as the primary source of integrity because they cannot sustain the ‘art’ 
categorisation for their object and price and sell their work. Because of their lack of 
long-term exposure they do not know the ways in which gallery owners and the 
cultured classes are able to use a set of discourses of money, commensuration and 
object which are understood as effectively maintaining a façade of the separate-
spheres position whilst allowing a financial transaction to take place. Perhaps it is 
not surprising that a common wish amongst the non-elite pricers was for an agent or 
gallery to do the selling for them. 
The lack of knowledge regarding the appropriate way of talking about money, price, 
commensuration and object appears to often have deleterious economic effect.  At its 
extreme, full adoption of the Romantic ideal separation of art and commerce 
encourages the participant to make unsellable work such as installations, the loss of 
money outweighed by the kudos gained by having shunned the market. At a slightly 
less extreme position the desire to conform to the Romantic ideal means participants 
make sellable work, e.g. paintings, and they exhibit that work, but the work is not 
priced or for sale. As one such participant said “I can just take in my two paintings 
[and] get a response from people” (RlJ). The stated aim of these participants is to 
gain an intellectual and emotional connection with others, not money, and this is 
used as a social-positioning discourse. 
A few participants within the research context had purposefully and visibly chosen 
an economic goal, thereby gaining a different kudos – making money is generally 
admired in our society, if not within the art fraternity. However, as a direct result of 
their commercial drive and success they have been excluded from both the 




who are economically very successful compared to the other participants said they 
felt that their work was not taken seriously by the cognoscenti. They talked of the 
need to change their practice in order to gain artworld kudos, even though they 
associated the change with a substantial economic loss.  That is, even when the 
participant needs the money, social aspects and aims such as group membership and 
status may outweigh economic logic. Pricing discourses are seen as a social signal, 
and the desire to send the right signals affects discourse choice.  
Rather than pricers simply thinking about profit, a key consideration appears to be 
how others like me, and how others higher up in the field’s hierarchy, do pricing – 
that is, how do pricers like me, or pricers I wish to emulate, interpret the rules. How 
do these others talk about and interpret object, money, commensuration and price?  
Rather than being based in abstracted economic rationale (“It’s supply and demand, 
isn’t it?”), pricing can be seen as a socio-economic practice which involves 
construals of money, and creating, knowing and maintaining right ways and wrong 
ways to do pricing within a particular context.  Pricing is about commensuration and 
relationships, and, as is already happening with consumption research, needs be 






8.3    Readerly and Writerly texts – contested meanings 
Using the Romantic discourses in which art and commerce are treated as ideally 
separate is rather like the artist Duchamp’s use of the plinth for the urinal: the 
discourses are understood to ‘make’ the object ‘art’. However, although the plinth 
may be widely understood to generally fulfil that signalling function, its efficacy 
may be contested. That is, although it was widely understood that Duchamp was 
using the plinth to signal the ‘art’ status of the urinal, not all viewers felt that it was a 
correct use of the plinth, or that it succeeded in changing the object category. The 
intended meaning of the plinth may be widely understood, but its context-specific 
meaning may be contested. That is, as meaning is constructed by writer and reader of 
the discourse, all texts should be assumed to be writerly texts (Barthes 1972).  
Whether one is able to construct an adequate plinth through discourse depends on the 
writer and the reader, and the categorisation is fluid and subject to on-going 
hermeneutic analysis by the various parties involved. That is, although a pricer may 
be able to (and choose to) use or not use a discursive plinth to signal the ‘art’ 
category for their work, the categorisation and degree of success of the 
plinth/discourse will be constructed as being more or less art by the viewers as much 
as by the makers. That is, the viewers’ categorisation will depend on their 
interpretive repertoire, their knowledge of the artist’s previous work and discourses, 
the artist’s current practice, and how others have categorised their work and those 
discourses. 
Informed dispute regarding the function and meaning of particular discourses and 
objects was used by participants as a way of suggesting higher status for oneself and 
particular price discourses. However, in order to challenge the accepted meaning the 
challenger needs to draw upon extant legitimate aesthetic theories, which requires 




making the challenge the participants drew attention to and confirmed rather than 
subvert the dominant view and their place in the social hierarchy.  
For example, Duchamp’s challenge regarding the meaning of the urinal and 
associated challenge of extant ‘what is art’ theories relied on the use of an extant 
discourse (the plinth) and its meaning to ‘make’ the urinal art.  In making the 
challenge Duchamp gained notoriety, but the degree of success of the challenge was 
not (and still is not) agreed upon. Within the data one can see criticism of what the 
participants saw as the general view of the object hierarchy in for example RM’s 
critique of the current UK divide between art and craft, and GT’s critique of the 
status of photography in the art hierarchy. In being willing and able to contest the 
dominant view from an alternative, perhaps outsider, position, these participants 
suggest their own high status and that their interpretation is high status and 
legitimate. However,  the higher position of the support and expertise they draw on 
depends on extant legitimation theories. This means that although interpretations are 
not nature and are theoretically open to challenge and change, they may be very 
long-lived, especially if the existing interpretations benefit the elite. 
Within the art market the dominant (if contested – e.g. see Parks (2011)) discourse is 
that commerce and ‘commercial money’ is tainting. Commercial success 
(overlapping spheres) is both admired and vilified in many of the arts (Bradshaw and 
Holbrook 2007), depending on context. The discourse of the tainting nature of 
commerce is both implicit and explicit across a range of sources including the mass 
media, but its dominance and longevity does not mean that it is nature. Nor is the 
rule and its nuances necessarily understood in the same way by all actors, as 
interpretation of a discourse as ‘getting it right’ or ‘getting it wrong’ is learnt.  
Although much of one’s interpretive framework – including interpretation of money 
and market practices -  is learnt from one’s parents (who learnt it from their parents 
and so on), some is shaped by outside sources – although how one values and uses 
that new information is informed by one’s upbringing (Bourdieu 1984).  That is, 




(know that) and the context-specific choices (know-how). Meanings are unstable, 
they may be contested and contest-able, but the dominant groups and classes are 
likely to be able to shape interpretations of what is right and what is the wrong 
meaning. 
In pricing, as in other situations, ‘Another enthusiast need only utter two words to 
betray the vast amount of sharing that is possible for them both’ (Douglas and 
Isherwood 1996, p.51). That is, discourses of price, which include discourses of 
money, are socially important in that they suggest similarities and differences 
between people.  
Douglas and Isherwood state that ‘In the protracted dialogue about value that is 
embedded in consumption, goods in their assemblage present a set of meanings more 
or less coherent, more or less intentional. They are read by those who know the code 
and scan them for information’ (ibid, p.xv).  
From the research data I suggest that pricers’ discourses of price and their prices are 
also part of the ‘assemblage’ used by participants to show social position and group 
membership. The social meanings of discourses of price are similarly more or less 
coherent, more or less intentional. These meanings are ‘read’ (or written, as Barthes 
suggests) by those who know a code, but this will not necessarily be the same code 
as the one used by the writer.  
Whilst Douglas and Isherwood focus on consumer readings of meanings, the data 
shows that pricers also read/write meanings, and that they seek to influence others 
and gain approval for their interpretive repertoire. For pricers as for consumers, 
group-membership is signalled through a particular vocabulary and interpretive 
repertoire, and in a dialogical relationship group membership also informs the 
construction, reading and response. Importantly, group membership may have 




8.4   Community imposes constraints 
Choice of discourse is as much a social as an economic one – it depends on access, 
what options one is aware of and has the cultural capital to carry off, as well as 
which discourses one sees as more desirable (Bourdieu 1984). Rather than 
necessarily being obvious that a choice had been made, many participants appeared 
to feel that there was an obvious way to do pricing, e.g. “It’s very formulaic, isn’t it?” 
(MRf). This is reminiscent of Barthes’ concept of the ‘falsely obvious’ (Barthes 
1972, p.12) , and Bourdieu’s suggestion that groups (particularly class groups) ‘are 
separated by systems of differences’ (Bourdieu 1984, p.259). In other words, the 
assumption and implicit message embedded in phrases such as “It’s very formulaic, 
isn’t it?” is ‘This is the way people like me do pricing’. Rather than maximise 
economic benefit, the pricers may prefer social benefit, or may not examine their 
assumptions of ‘the way it is done by people like me with an object like this’.  
Within the data it was notable that the bourgeois participants tended to make ‘art’, 
use gallery-type discourses, and set and achieve higher prices. That is, they were 
enabled by their understanding of appropriate discourses. Craft artists in contrast 
tended to assume their work had a lower status (“I’m only an illustrator”) and to 
expect that visitors/viewers would therefore expect it to have lower prices. These 
participants used commercial discourses (signalling the ‘not art’ categorisation of 
their objects) and used lower prices. That is, they were constrained.  Although the 
vast majority of participants did not express their pricing discourse as a choice, a 
choice to conform to rather than examine and challenge their assumptions of ‘how it 
is done’ has been made.  
A small number of participants spoke of their awareness that there was a variation in 
what was considered appropriate, and seemed to be feeling their way through a range 
of possible options with a less clear idea of which approach was more ‘correct’ or 
more desirable. For example, RJ spoke of learning different approaches from 
different people, resulting in a set of conflicting ideas about the appropriateness of 




tutors and from observation of elite art institutes was very different to the example 
set by the actively-selling artist she chose as her mentor for the art trails. In another 
example, PJ’s husband (an artworld academic) espoused the Romantic view shared 
by the field experts who legitimise work through acceptance or rejection from 
exhibitions, whereas the artist, PJ, was proud of her notable commercial success, 
which she felt she would have to compromise by making less sell-able work in order 
to gain field kudos. As PJ had found out, choosing to use a more craft discourse may 
result in rejection by those who have adopted the criteria of the academic 
legitimators, who “like Adorno, like [their] art to be difficult”, and who want 
saleability to be “a dirty word”. 
It appears that choice of pricing discourse and art practice can directly inform 
financial success. However, choice of pricing discourse is constrained by options 
available, and entails a consideration of social as well as economic impact. 
From the data there is an on-going jostle for authority re the art hierarchy and what 
pricing discourses are appropriate for different categories of object. Whether a 
source of authority is accepted as such depends on who is viewing the source. For 
example, the art industry experts in the article by Parks (2011)  seemed unlikely to 
be swayed by the opinions of the money experts as this would suggest a merging of 
hierarchies and potential loss of social position. As Espeland (1998) pointed out, 
commensuration is a social process: deciding what is equal to what, how much of 
what is equal to what, whether it is acceptable for those things to be compared, and 
even whether it should be considered price-less, is a mode of power. It is perhaps not 
surprising that there are competing sources of authority re the commensurative 
‘rules’ of a particular field. This finding in discourses of price extends Zelizer’s 
(1994) point that within domestic money practise there are etiquettes, not a money 
practice etiquette. 
In this study, as in Zelizer’s research, participants used different rules depending on 
which community the participant is or wishes to be seen to be part of.  Within the art 




economic success cannot be underestimated. Social connections frequently affect 
where one shows one’s work (it need not be one’s own house), and who one shows 
with. They also affect who one invites to the Private View, and whether they come 
or not. This is not pricing as an isolated individual as in economic theory, this is 
pricing in a social context. If the participant can show their work in a large house in 
the wealthiest district, in the middle of the trail area, with a group of other artists 
who are also able to invite wealthy arts-oriented visitors, they are far more likely to 
make sales, and at higher prices. The visitors and their use of the correct discourses 
also confirm the construction of the objects as ‘art’ (which warrant a higher price 
than craft), and ideally the effect ripples out to influence how others understand the 
object and its price.  For the artist, being understood as belonging to a particular 
group may significantly affect economic opportunity, and their choice of pricing 
discourse informs group membership.  Intriguingly for a pricing context, the 
economic effects of using the ‘right discourse’ can be negative as well as positive. 
The economic and social are not mutually exclusive, although they were often 
constructed as such by the participants. 
Amongst the participants, the choice appears to be:  
Get it wrong – treat sales and earning money from your art as non-problematic 
(overlapping spheres). Money is earned, but economic benefit is restricted: because 
the participant uses these inappropriate discourses their work is less Art, so what is 
considered the appropriate price range is lower. Membership of higher status groups 
(social benefit) is less likely, thus reducing chances to learn the higher status 
discourses and interpretations. Exclusion from the higher groups also reduces 
chances of influencing those using the higher status separate spheres discourses so 
that they too see commercial discourses as acceptable and appropriate. 
OR 
Get it right – a) avoid talking about price and money, find pricing and sales 




choose not to price (signalling that the object is Art, and therefore 
incommensurable), feel part of the group who ‘get it’(social gain), but rarely make a 
sale (economic penalty).  
OR 
b) If one’s cultural is higher still, that is, for participants who were very familiar 
with the higher status discourses used by Velthuis’ (2005) gallery owners, one will 
be able to use the separate spheres discourses and mask, rather than reject, 
commerce. For these participants commercial activity can be achieved whilst status, 
group membership and economic capital is maintained or enhanced. Through 
collusion in the correctness and high status of their discourses of ‘how it is done’, 
this group of participants was able to achieve the ‘necessary’ de-contamination of 
money through shared interpretations of rituals of category change, whilst sustaining 
the construction of money and commerce as contaminating.   
Getting it right: the consequences 
Because of her knowledge that art should be what you have a passion for, rather than 
being made because you know it will sell (Romantic discourse, signalling 
membership of the ‘artist’ group), DK refused to make the type of work which 
galleries might sell, although she wants to earn her living from her art. Although DK 
is using a discourse which to her means that she is getting it right, other participants 
with a greater knowledge of high status ‘how it is done’ and therefore different group 
membership were able to produce two types of work, one which sold well, 
supporting the continuation of their art practice, and another type of work which is 
more experimental. As RM explained, the experimental work supported artistic 
reputation and demand for the cash-flow-generating less expensive more iterative 
work. That is, the iterative ‘easier’ work brought in buyers. Part of the artist’s job, 
she explained, is to educate the buyers of iterative work so that they recognise the 
higher status of the experimental or “more challenging” pieces, and might in the 




Although middle class participants such as RM, FW, and RJC were able to benefit 
from ‘getting it right’ because they knew masking discourses, others like DK were 
economically constrained.  
In another example of a negative economic effect of using the ‘right’ pricing 
discourse, for those who wish their work to be seen as ‘art’, particularly for middle-
class participants, there is a tendency to reduce prices for ‘good homes’.  
The recognition of the ‘meaning’ or implication of the buyer’s ‘good home’ 
discourses demonstrates that the pricers share that interpretive repertoire and signals 
shared group membership, but the recognition of ‘good home’ has an economic cost.  
The ‘good home’ criteria appear to change depending on the artist’s actual or desired 
group membership: higher status artists (actual or desired position) were notably less 
likely to experience economic loss from this discourse, as what they consider a ‘good 
home’ requires the would-be buyer to show evidence of substantially greater cultural 
capital. They therefore rarely drop their prices: there were no ‘good home’ or 
“mates-rates” during the art trails from these artists.  
Whereas as the “No mates-rates” artists charge and protect their high prices, high 
group aspirations may also have the opposite effect on choice of price. In one 
example a participant had had on consecutive years two of her pieces accepted in an 
internationally-recognised annual show in London. However, she did not feel her 
work was comparable to others in that show (which she constructed as a higher 
status group). As a direct result, she purposefully chose low prices, reflecting the 
lowly relationship to the elite group. Unusually within this context, she compares her 
work against national, rather than local, standards, and uses that pricing framework. 
Her choice of reference meant that her prices were far lower than the local norm for 
that type of work. Her group membership (aspiring member of nationally-recognised 
group of artists) affected her prices, and, like the work itself, sets her apart from her 
parochial peers. Her prices might have been higher if she had seen herself primarily 




In another form of economic constraint through community membership, 
membership of the ‘intelligentsia’ community appears to influence pricers towards 
making unsellable work, or to refuse to work to gallery pressure for more pieces, or 
to prefer to sell their work to those who ‘get it’ – all of which have an economic cost. 
Unsellable work generates no money, galleries cannot sell what they do not have, 
and those who ‘get it’ tend to be in short supply, and seem to belong to a less 
affluent group who are less able and therefore less likely to buy work that requires 
space and ‘art’ settings.  
Within the research context, those who are free to address the market commercially – 
i.e. craft makers – are also economically constrained, because if they know and 
accept their place in the hierarchy they can only choose relatively low prices 
compared to items judged to be ‘art’: “I’m only an illustrator” or “I’m more of a 
technician, not a creative”, or “I’m only a photographer”, so I price like this. They 
may sell in sufficient quantity to override the effect of lower prices, although the 
pricer may find that economic success is not sufficient to counteract the loss of 
artistic kudos, as PJ had discovered. Economic success, and economic success 
stemming from selling to the wrong sort of buyer (“Joe Public”) may in fact 
contribute to the loss of art kudos, an interpretation visible in for example the 
widespread media criticisms of work by Jack Vettriano, which always seem to 
include reference to the fact that his work sells particularly well, particularly to those 
with little art knowledge – “your granny will have a print of one”.  
“The Singing Butler is the most printed [picture] in the UK.” 
“People like Ferguson [a football manager, not a renowned art critic] own 
one” 
“[Vettriano] gets as much from the royalties from the prints as he does from 
the sale of actual pictures.” 
“That his work is on an M&S [biscuit] tin ‘says it all’, one of my friends said 




Getting it right, in terms of rejecting ‘commercial’ popular work such as Vettriano’s, 
appears to be very important for some within the artworld, and may come at a cost – 
for example, the President of the RWA recently resigned over this matter.  
According to the BBC, he stated during his resignation speech that “it would be 
"foolish" to believe the only way of bringing visitors in was to put populist art on, 
and that he was resigning in protest at the way he said the artistic direction of the 
academy was going.  
(Source: BBC Bristol, 29th June 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-
bristol-13955024, accessed 19th Sept 2011). 
Although pricers may lose out economically from their construals of appropriate and 
inappropriate discourses, which is closely linked to categorisation of the art object, 
buyer’s construals of getting it right may have positive economic benefits for the 
pricer. For example, when I asked an upper middle class buyer whether he had 
negotiated a lower price for the object he had just bought he recoiled from me, 
appalled by my bad manners and the suggestion that he would behave in that 
inappropriately commercial way. Buyers such as these are unlikely to ask for a price 
reduction, so if the artist can resist the urge to offer one, the sale may proceed at the 
asking price. 
Getting it wrong: 
Within the data there were instances in which a participant clearly lost out 
economically and/or socially because they were seen to have ‘got it wrong’ by 
someone. For example, DK lost a significant sale because she had used red Sale 
stickers – an overtly commercial discourse more suited to groceries -  which tainted 
the viewers’ categorisation of the object. Another artist who had used similar stickers 
was gradually pushed into less and less desirable trail venues by the organisers. In a 
third example an artist reported that in a recent group show one of the other artists 





From the data one can see how economic effects are linked to the social: by using the 
wrong discourse and so showing that they are ‘not like us’, artists such as X and LM, 
and the artists who used red stickers or ‘Buy One Get One Free’ posters are far less 
likely to be included in future group shows organised by the higher status group of 
people they had alienated. Group shows are opportunities to sell with lower costs 
than a solo show, and with more visitors. That is, by getting it wrong in DW/FW’s 
eyes because they interpret the work as being painted to sell (undesirable), rather 
than from the soul (desirable), X may have reduced the likelihood that DW/FW (and 
their friends) will buy her work, she has lost some opportunities to sell to the public, 
and she has lost some support for her application for membership of the elite 
bourgeois art institute.   
However, interpretations and categorisations of discourses of price depend on the 
recipient as well as the sender, and on interpretation of the context. They are 
therefore fluid and can be renegotiated. That is, getting it right and getting it wrong 
and the consequences are not ‘nature’, they are socially agreed and therefore 
contestable. Also, although group membership may impose constraints and punish 
non-conformity, there are other social groups that may be constructed as equally or 




CHAPTER 9    REFLECTION – limitations of the research, and 
suggestions for future work 
Introduction 
As discussed in the Methodology section, ethnographic research, as with all research 
methodologies, is necessarily subject to a number of limitations. These vary from the 
philosophical (Does interpretive situated knowledge count as knowledge or data?), to 
the methodological problems of participant/observer data collection and interpretive 
analysis. There are also necessary limitations inherent in choosing particular 
theoretical constructs and lenses over others.  However, the aim of the research is to 
provide a description and critical analysis of rich data of the reality of pricing as a 
practice in order to broaden received notions of prices, how they come to be as they 
are, and how discourses of price are used.  
9.1    Methodological limitations 
Methodological approach 
As discussed in the Methodology section, small-sample interpretive qualitative data  
and analysis may be viewed as different from or less useful than positivist 
‘objective’ knowledge or knowledge gained from theoretical cogitation. However, in 
using an ethnographic methodology I am following in the footsteps of senior figures 
within both the marketing canon such as Douglas, Arnould, Thompson, Elliott and 
Shankar, and within the socio-economic canon, such as Zelizer and MacKenzie. As 
suggested by these key users the limitations of the research methodology are 
outweighed by the insights gained from thick descriptions of cultural and social 




Importantly, reproducibility and expansion are not expected – instead the research is 
offered as a guide, not a detailed map or predictive tool. A close ethnographic look at 
a particular site tells a more open-ended, complex and ambiguous story than macro 
or micro economic theories of price are able or expected to do, and should be 
considered a useful companion to, not a replacement for, economic theory. 
The data limitations within this research are those common to much ethnographic 
research: the research involved only one researcher, with a corollary restriction in 
opportunities for data collection (although this was mitigated by the length of time 
and depth and breadth of involvement), and the increased likelihood of idiosyncratic 
collection and analysis. As with any ethnographic research there is a danger of 
overvaluation of personal experience as a source of ‘real’ and ‘authentic’ knowledge. 
I therefore sought to ground personal opinions and subjective feelings through a long 
period of immersion in the context which covered a wide range of data-collection 
opportunities. I also regularly tested and triangulated my understanding of both emic 
and etic meaning-making through conversations with participants and academics.  
Despite this, there will have been unconscious prejudices and cultural barriers within 
the choice of data and the interpretation.  
As with other ethnographic research, the context is small and the data historically 
and culturally specific, and therefore difficult to generalize from.  However, working 
within the traditions of CCT and the strand of socio-economics on which I build, the 
aim was not to provide a theoretical model of generalized ideal behaviour but rather 
to produce a thick (Elliott and Jankel-Elliott 2003) or rich description of the actual 
practices of pricers, developed through ‘deep hanging out’, in order to add to the 
extant body of literature on price and pricing. 
Theoretical lens 
A necessary theoretical limitation is that this research has to focus on a relatively 
small facet of what is a complex body of data, using a restricted theoretical lens. I 




how these are involved in pricing practice, and ignored other facets, constructs and 
literatures which could also be useful in the analysis of what are complex dialogical 
behaviours.   
The necessary process of narrowing the focus of the research does not mean that 
other aspects were not present within the discourses, nor does it mean that I consider 
them to be unimportant. By concentrating on the constructs of money, object and 
commensuration, related facets of pricing discourse such as identity construction, 
enchantment, gift-giving, value and meaning (such as through an in-depth semiotic 
examination of how the meanings within discourses of price are made) were 
unexplored. Social class and power are included, and play an important element of 
the research findings, and I suspect that much would be gained from a more detailed 
examination of these aspects.  This is discussed briefly in the section Future Work. 
 
Summary 
Price is a topic traditionally seen as the purview of economics and marketing. Extant 
theories from these disciplines are important, but may to an extent be seen to be 
performative rather than reflective. That is, marketing price theories such as 
skimming or penetration are, as MacKenzie (2006) put it, an engine, not a camera – 
by describing consumer responses and understandings of price they initially shape, 
rather than describe, pricing practice. 
The type of knowledge of money and price I derive from my ethnographic data is 
limited, but whilst having an ‘engine’ element (in that I hope it will provoke pricers 
to examine their interpretive repertoire and assumptions), it does so by being 
reflective of pricing as actual practice. It contributes to more abstracted consumer-
focussed micro money research such as Thaler’s laboratory-based studies of 




My research draws on literature from both marketing and socio-economics. It shares 
the philosophical base used by Consumer Culture Theory and socio-economic 
theorists such as Zelizer, Venkatesh and Douglas in its emphasis on the usefulness of 
context-specific research and thick descriptions of practice. It extends the literature 
relating to Bourdieu and social practices by showing that within pricing, as within 
consumption, participants used a range of differing position-taking strategies in 
differing contexts, and that there was considerable variation in discourses around 
pricing in relation to the co-existence of economic and symbolic capital.  The aim of 
the research was to gain a rich understanding of actual pricing practice and the role 
money categorisations play in pricing through examination of a specific context, 
rather than to generate a generalizable ‘this is so’. However, my pilot studies in other 
pricing contexts suggest that categorisations of money and pricing discourse as more 
or less appropriate occur in contexts beyond the artworld, and that here too they are 






9.2    Suggestions for future work 
Whilst this research does not draw explicitly on semiotic theory, it, like the literature 
it draws on and other CCT work, shares a number of assumption and interests, such 
as the importance of context to meaning-making and interpretation, sliding 
signification, and the use of meaning-making within social relationships. Future 
work may, but need not necessarily, build on semiotic theory. 
Future research could usefully examine the two main findings of my research: first, 
that money meanings matter in pricing, in that the ways in which money is 
categorised informs pricing practice, and that this varies; secondly, that discourses of 
money and price are informed by ‘know that’ and ‘know how’, and are a form of 
cultural capital (which is part of the class condition). Use of particular discourses of 
price is both informed by and informs others of one’s group membership and social 
position.   
Here I group suggestions for future research into three areas: Money meaning-
making and group membership; Money meaning-making as learnt practice, to 
include an examination of the money meaning-making interface between 
pricer/marketer and consumer; Other areas for further research. 
Money meanings and group membership: 
Comparative examination of pricing discourses within 
other fields 
I can only speculate to what extent my findings from an examination of a short chain 




small amount of previously published literature addressing pricing as practice 
suggests that it is a more difficult and complex matter than most marketing or 
economic literature suggests. A pilot study of pricing discourses used in other fields, 
which involved  conversations with carpenters, electricians, plumbers, burlesque 
dancers, teachers, intellectual property developers, independent financial advisors, 
business consultants and lawyers suggests that, in a similar way to the artists in the 
primary study, within these varied pricing contexts pricing practice is informed by 
understandings of desirable ‘how it is done around here’ discourses, and this 
includes the use of money distinctions. Importantly, many participants appeared to 
feel that there was a correct way that pricing should be done, but that they did not 
know it. As a director of an international organisation told me, he was “Not sure 
there is enough substance [to the the organisation’s pricing approach] for 
examination, but [I] can try to tell you more!”. 
 My preliminary examination of discourses in other pricing contexts suggests that the 
study of artworld pricing could usefully be extended and developed through 
examination of pricing discourses in other fields, in order to increase understanding 
of the dialogical relationship between social position and pricing discourse, and the 
potential importance of money distinctions within this.  
 
Comparison with other short-chain pricers 
I suggest that it would be useful to compare my research findings with a study of 
pricers in other similar short-chain markets but with different categories of object. 
This would include an examination of the social purpose of pricing discourses and 
the role money-meanings plays in those discourses.  
It would be useful to compare the art pricing discourses of this study with discourses 
in other short-chain markets where what is being priced is constructed as a similarly 




art, the item being priced is constructed as unique yet can be seen as an example of a 
larger category. 
 
These findings could be compared with an examination of pricing discourses within 
short-chain markets involving more ‘commodity’ products, e.g. the discourses of 
vegetable sellers in farm shops and farmers’ markets, or discourses of salesmen in 
used-car dealerships.  
 
Comparison by organisation size 
It is possible that the importance and perhaps variation of money meanings may vary 
with distance between the pricer and the transaction, and the extent to which the 
pricer’s practice is shaped by organisational rules.  My study examined participants 
who were pricing their own work for direct sale to customers, when the money 
potentially earned was very real, and there were no organisational pricing rules, only 
the participants’ understandings of ‘how it is done’. I suggest it would be useful to 
compare my findings with a study of pricing discourses in large institutions where 
the money associated with that pricing may be, for the pricers, purely conceptual 
rather than tangible, and the earmarking of the money may be determined by 
institutional and accountancy norms. To dig more deeply, it would be useful to 
compare mass FMCG retail pricing discourses to B2B pricing discourses. From 
preliminary discussions with a small number of B2B pricers, categorisation of source 
(here the object, the customer and the customer’s ‘pot’), and the earmarking (that is 
the categorisation of pot which the money would be going into, i.e. the pricer’s pot) 
often does inform pricing practice, because of assumptions about what particular 
money categories mean.  
 




This study strongly suggests that money meanings and price-discourse meanings are 
a learnt, rather than natural or obvious practice. I suggest that a focussed exploration 
of participants’ attributions for particular money practices and meanings would be 
particularly fruitful.  
Although in this study it was possible to explore meaning-making apprenticeships 
and some key sources of ‘how it is done’, this was not the focus of the interviews. 
Zelizer’s research gives many examples of sources of money-related etiquette but 
there is scope for much further work in both domestic and commercial contexts. That 
is, whereas MacKenzie’s (2006) study discusses workplace networks as conduits of 
‘how it is done’, my study suggests that it would also be important to systematically 
collect data related to social class and cultural capital, such as level of education of 
participants and their parents, as cultural capital seems to inform the likelihood of 
knowing and using particular sources of information and discourse.  
 
As well as focussing on pricer’s meaning-making, a deeper exploration of the co-
creation of meanings of price and money across the pricer/consumer divide would 
be of particular interest, as research hitherto has emphasised the producer-producer 
and consumer-consumer meaning-making relationships. This exploration could be 
through a detailed conversation analysis showing patterns of interaction including 
order, structure and sequence, although this level of examination would necessarily 
constrain the amount of data included in the study. 
 
Although within this price-discourse study I was able to observe some instances of 
price-related conversations between pricer and consumer, and was involved in a 
few, instances of conversations between marketer/pricer and customer could be 
specifically sought. Material artefacts such as advertisements and newspaper articles 
could also be used to promote discussion. Given the fluidity of meaning, it is 
unlikely that there is one ‘truth’ regarding the source of particular interpretations, 
and any discussion which examines something as complex as logics and 




desired response. However this art pricing research suggests that participants may 
choose specific attributions as a form of desirable discourse, and this in itself is of 




Money distinctions as desirable discourse vs. as actual 
practice  
Although anthropologists have provided useful insights into the differentiation of 
primitive monies, there is still little research regarding modern money practices 
(Zelizer 1994, p.21). There is therefore much scope for research regarding the ‘what 
is said’ about contemporary money practices, and the ‘what is done’. 
I suggest that it would be useful and interesting to compare a detailed examination of 
contemporary Western money practices with Zelizer’s historical findings based on 
secondary data and Venkatesh’s ethnographic study of the money practices of those 
living in the hard circumstances of a Chicago ghetto.  Although money handling may 
be difficult to observe as it is currently construed to be a private practice, and may be 
especially hard to observe where cash plays a smaller part in overall 
income/expenditure, research participants are likely to use material artefacts which 
would indicate actual practice, such as bank statements, spread-sheets, other paper-
based accounting practices, and varied storage receptacles such as different bank 
accounts and piggy banks or jars. From a discussion with participants about these it 
might be possible to see evidence of situated real-money practices to compare with 
Thaler’s (2008 [1985])  lab-based mental-accounting research and Venkatesh’s 
(2006) extreme-context ethnographic data.  
Additionally, it would be interesting to see whether in the current credit-based 




and/or retrospective form of accounting rather than the more physical linear source-
up earmarking suggested by much of Zelizer’s work.  Participants may use a 
discourse which suggests a ‘modern rational approach to money management’ 
(Zelizer 1994, p.119), perhaps in order to create an impression of order and control 
over the degree of liquidity (Douglas 1982, p.74), but this art pricing study suggests 
that the choice of discourses used to create that impression would vary, that other 
impressions might be preferred, and that the discourses used may be very different 
from actual money-management practice.  
 
Other areas 
Money-meanings and pricing is an under-researched and potentially very rich vein 
for further study, and therefore there are many aspects other than those covered 
above which could be very useful avenues for further research. I discuss these below 
briefly. 
Money-meanings and identity: This is closely linked to the group 
membership/social positioning and relational uses of money distinctions discussed in 
my research, but would draw on a different literature within the CCT canon, such as 
the growing body of work to do with tribes. This literature has so far concentrated on 
the idea that identity may be constructed and signalled through particular 
consumption practices which are associated with tribal membership, but my research 
suggests that identity and tribal membership may also be constructed through 
production/pricing practices. 
The moral dimension found within the art pricing discourses  could be usefully 
explored in other pricing contexts, building on the sacred/profane money distinction 
suggested by Belk and Wallendorf (1990), Zelizer (1994) and Hornborg (1999).  As 
discussed in Chapter 7, within the pilot study I found a carpenter, plumber, 




construct themselves as “not like that”. These findings suggest that pricers in other 
fields may use discourses which indicate a choice of moral high ground and 
associated group membership over economic rationale or economic advantage.  
Within the research data there were suggestions that gift-giving and power could be 
significant elements within choice of price, although this is only lightly touched on 
here (in section 6.1.1, see also Key Terms section on Exchange). Whereas Zelizer’s 
research focuses on the etiquette of giving money as a gift, it would be useful to also 
consider the choice of price as a gift especially in cases where the price is reduced or 
when a priced object given rather than sold.   The data collected in this research 
suggests that Baudrillard’s observation that ‘power belongs to the one who can give 
and cannot be repaid’ (Baudrillard 1981, p.170) may prove an insightful lens for 
exploring pricing practice and money handling. Sadly there was not scope within the 
current research to discuss the gift literature nor the social positioning and relational 
use of price discounts, but there was sufficient data to suggest that it would be a 




The research discussed in this thesis is a small step in expanding knowledge of 
contemporary Western pricing and money practices. In the iterative hermeneutic 
process of moving between data collection, analysis and theory I considered a 
variety of alternative theoretical lenses which could be applied to the data to give 
alternative interpretations. This ranged from considering producers as tribes to a 
consideration of the concept of enchantment, and how producers, as much as 
consumers, may engage with markets through a willingness to create new realities 
and identities through suspension of disbelief. That the focus is on applying Zelizer’s 
concept of money distinctions to pricing is a reflection of the richness of the insights 
gained from this particular approach. As can be seen from my suggestions for future 




The social and relational foundations and uses of category distinctions of money is 
what I found (and still find) fascinating given the widespread acceptance of the 
assumption that pricers treat money as neutral. Many of us assume that all pricers 
have a range of logics or interpretive repertoires similar to the ones we have been 
taught by university business schools and have absorbed through experience. It is 
clear that pricing and money, key elements of market exchanges, are rather more 










CHAPTER 10    CONCLUSION: Pricing is a learnt and meaning-full 
socially embedded practice. 
Rather than treating price as the outcome of supply and demand, or costs-plus-profit, 
or examining consumer responses to prices, which are areas which have been 
thoroughly (but far from exhaustively) investigated in the existing price literature, 
the aim of this research was to explore how pricers respond to and approach pricing. 
To that end, this study uses ethnographic methodology and examines actual, or 
substantive, practices of pricing.  
Working from the premise that price and pricing discourses are chosen, and that the 
choice matters, this research proposes an alternative model of pricing. In this 
alternative model price is construed as involving learnt categorisation of object, 
money, and commensurative options. I draw on Consumer Culture Theory (CCT) 
insights re the social construction and social use of the meanings of objects, and 
Zelizer’s insights re the social meaning of money (a type of object), but turn the 
focus of research from consumers towards producers and their meaning-making. 
The research context (the Bristol Art Trails) was particularly useful in the 
examination of differences and similarities in pricing practice in that whereas in 
many pricing contexts the pricing practices are shaped by organisational protocols 
and are therefore likely to show a high degree of homogeneity, pricers in the 
research context were not constrained or enabled in this way. Also, the context 
allowed deep and extended access to pricers with a wide range of socio-demographic 
backgrounds, and a range of experience of the field. In addition, the choice of what 
might be thought of as an extreme type of pricing context made differences in 
pricing discourses more visible than they might have been in a more mainstream 
pricing context. My pilot study of pricing discourses in a wide range of other fields 
shows that insights developed from this artworld field and context usefully point 
towards variation and social uses of pricing discourses connected with other types of 




In the three sub-sections below I briefly revisit the main contributions: 
The first is that through a sociological analysis of thick ethnographic data this 
research shows that pricing is a socially embedded meaning-full action, informed by 
and used to signal social position and group membership. In doing so, it extends the 
marketing literature relating to Bourdieu and social practices by showing that 
variation in position-taking strategies is not restricted to consumers. As such it is a 
small but important counterbalance to the largely abstracted and economically-
maximising construal of pricing within the existing literature.  
The second contribution is to research regarding money meanings: this study shows 
that pricers use varied interpretations of money, and that money-meanings play a key 
part in pricing discourses. This adds to the money literature by moving beyond 
consumer’s money meaning-making to focus on producer meaning-making, and in 
so doing answers calls within the marketing literature for research which considers 
production-side meaning-making.  The research findings extend Zelizer’s (1994) 
important work on the social meaning of money in domestic contexts by showing 
that relational uses of meanings of money also matter in pricing practice, and that 
they affect pricing choice. 
The third contribution is the analysis of pricing as learnt practice. This involves a 
consideration of opportunities to learn, as the data shows varied sources of pricing 
expertise and validation. The findings show the importance of social position to 
choice of discourse of price, because social position informs range of learning 
opportunities and degree of interest/acceptance of specific interpretive repertoires. 
That is, because pricing involves the categorisation of object, money, and 
commensurative practice, the social origin of categorisation mechanisms (Bourdieu 





10.1    Pricing as socio-economic action 
There has been a shift in how we understand market practices in that rather than 
assuming economic rationale, there has been growing interest in micro-level 
examination of cultural and social aspects of market practices using ethnographic 
methodology (Arnould and Thompson 2005).  Although the focus so far within the 
marketing literature has been largely on examining consumption behaviours, there is 
increasing awareness of the need to consider the cultural and social aspects of the 
supply-side of the transaction. Whereas the vast bulk of marketing price research is 
focussed on consumer interpretations of price, this research contributes to the 
growing calls to consider supply-side interpretations and practices and their 
contribution to market-place meaning-making (Peñaloza and Venkatesh 2006).  
Whereas price research has concentrated on consumer behaviours, economic 
maximisation and abstracted macro theory, this research finds that pricing, like 
consumption, is practiced by embedded economic actors, and, like consumption, is 
eminently social, relational, and active. That is, rather than the market happening 
separately from social, cultural and relational practices, there is a dyadic relationship 
between the market and society. Discourses of price are shaped by extant social 
structures, but are also potentially a means to affect change in social structures. That 
is, rather than being a purely economic activity, this research suggests that pricing is 
political ‘in the broad sense of relations, assumptions, and contests pertaining to 
power’ (Appadurai 1986, p.57).    
The study supports and examines in more depth the construal of commensuration as 
a social process and a mode of power (Espeland and Stevens 1998). It finds that the 
commensurative process involves sometimes competing constructions of the object 
being priced and the associated money. It also involves a consideration of the 
‘appropriateness’ of comparing one with the other, and the ability to successfully 




Within the research data what is considered to be an appropriate pricing discourse 
involves a consideration of what category object (broadly, art or craft) is being 
compared with what category money, and how that specific commensurative process 
‘should’ be treated in that context.  
Because meanings are learnt, not an inherent property of the object, money, 
commensurative process or discourse, pricing discourses are used and interpreted as 
a signal of cultural capital (Bourdieu 1984) and social group. That is, pricing 
discourses are important because they do something, and are sites of power. The 
uneven distribution of knowledge about what objects (and here I include money) and 
discourses ‘should’ represent matters because power-relations are produced, 
maintained and challenged through particular versions.  
The research shows that rather than pricers behaving as atomic economic 
maximisers, discourses of price are shaped by learnt, shared, and socially important 
money categorisations and understandings of corollary rules which reflect and are 
used in social positioning. Categorisations and ideas of appropriateness appear to be 
part of the ‘moral economy that stands behind the objective economy' (Kopytoff 
1986, p.64). That is, there are learnt and varied ideas of what are ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ 
ways of doing pricing for different categories of object. These involve learnt object 
categorisation and an understanding of the object hierarchy (here art and craft, and 
that art has higher status than craft), and also learnt and varied ideas of money 
categories, such as clean and dirty money, or to push it further, ‘sacred’ or ‘profane’ 
money (Belk and Wallendorf 1990). This research shows that interpretation of the 
effect of money categorisation on the categorisation of object and on perception of 
the social position of the speaker is learnt, not nature, and matters. 
Although meaning-making is fluid rather than fixed it both represents and is used to 
indicate group membership. How one construes a group and what one thinks 
constitutes signals of membership depends on prior knowledge of established norms, 
and knowing that discourses of price may be read as signals of social group and rank, 




is, the means and style of expression employed, are all part of social sifting. 
Discourses of price and the integral issues of object and money categorisation are 
part of “the way you guys like to sort people out”, as one participant put it. 
This study shows that the social uses of discourses of price may mean, as it does in 
Velthuis’ (2005) study of art gallery owners, that a participant’s display of ‘know 
that’ and ‘know how’ within pricing discourses is not necessarily focussed on 
economic maximisation: pricing discourses are also to do with cultural capital, 
distancing oneself from others who “don’t get it”, demonstrating and teaching ‘the 
correct way to do it’, and suggesting that one belongs in a high-status group.  
Importantly, as suggested by a sociological reading of Morton and Podolny’s (2002) 
wine-pricing study, this positioning use of pricing discourses occurs beyond the art 
research context. As a lawyer with what seemed to me an unexpectedly non-
maximising pricing structure told me, “this is the rate all successful and busy 
solicitors (like me) charge.”   
Within the data, as in the legal example above, interpretive repertoires regarding 
appropriateness and associated group membership can be seen to restrict, as well as 
enable, pricing options and economic success. For example, whilst the elite used 
discourses which enabled economic gain through the pricing and selling of art, 
without loss of social status or degradation of object status, most participants were 
restricted by their understandings of ‘how it is done’. Some participants were 
planning to trade their economic ‘craft’ success for the chance to be “taken more 
seriously” by experts (such as competition judges and academics), by changing the 
type of work they made, even though this does not make economic sense. They 
acknowledge the illogicality:  “there’s lots of people, (…)  at the top of their field, 
but would kill to make as much money [as I do]….” , but are constrained by the ‘how 
it is done’ rules set by the elite.  
These participants’ willingness to exchange their substantial economic success for 




hypothesis that pricing is a socially embedded practice. By accepting (however 
reluctantly) the need to conform to the dominant view rather than challenge it, these 
participants are involved in the perpetuation of a system of meanings in which they 
lose out economically whilst others already in a higher social and economic position 
continue to benefit and continue to set the rules by which they benefit. 
This research shows that pricing can be seen to be informed by socially-constructed 
ideas of what are correct and desirable pricing discourses, in much the same way as 
Bourdieu’s research showed that consumption discourses are used as a source and 
reflection of distinction. Whereas one might assume that pricers would use the most 
economically-beneficial discourses, within the research context this was rarely the 
case. Instead, as was also suggested in the study of hobbyist wine pricers (Morton 
and Podolny 2002), the social benefits of certain discourses were seen to outweigh 
economic concerns, even and especially amongst those who were arguably most in 
need of economic capital. 
10.2    Money meanings and pricing 
The research proposes a model of pricing in which rather than being the outcome of 
an abstracted economic behaviour, an outward-facing signalling tool, or the outcome 
of a theoretical model of simple commodity markets, price is construed as the 
outcome of pricing, an embedded and therefore social practice, which involves a 
consideration of the object, the money, and the ‘appropriate’ commensurative rules.  
Consumers’ distinctions between material possessions have been a rich research area 
within marketing, especially Consumer Culture Theory. This research shows that 
pricers similarly create distinctions between objects, categories of money, and 




Consumers’ money category distinctions have proved an exciting and useful area of 
research, with implications for pricing recognised by theorists (Thaler 2008 [1985]) 
and marketing practitioners (Welch 2010). However, previously published literature 
has largely neglected to consider pricers’ money category distinctions. Instead, 
within the price and pricing literature ‘modern’ money has been generally treated as 
neutral element – a dollar is a dollar is a dollar. By focussing on the meanings of 
money within the discourses of those doing pricing this thesis builds on and 
contributes to both the price literature and the emerging money research trajectory in 
which money is increasingly being examined as a cultural object (Baker and 
Jimerson 1992). 
This research supports the proposal that money meanings, including the dominant 
assumption of the neutrality of money, are socially constructed: they are not ‘true’, 
commonsense or ‘nature’. Importantly, the research shows that pricers may hold 
varied understandings of pricing etiquette associated with different money and object 
categories, and in doing so extends the literature relating to Bourdieu and the uses of 
meanings of consumption objects and consumption practices. Within the research 
data meanings of money and price are used to create social distinction, and this 
meaning-making matters in that it affects pricing choices.  
My research suggests that it may therefore be useful for marketers and pricers to 
consider their own money and pricing category distinctions and the meanings they 
associate with those categories, as it appears that pricers’ received knowledge of 
pricing ‘how it is done’ has a significant effect on pricing practice.  
Unlike previously published price research, in this study pricers’ categorisation of 
money is seen to play a significant part in pricers’ discourses. Whereas price theory 
to date assumes money to be neutral and fungible and that pricers treat money in this 
way, this research contributes to the small but growing body of sociological money 
research (Baker and Jimerson 1992). It does so by showing that pricers use a variety 
of money meanings and that these influence pricing choice. This research  builds on 




object and buyer), form, holder and earmarking, and that these categorisations are 
interlinked. That is, pricing involves a dialogical interpretation of a particular 
category of object with a particular category of money. Importantly, money is shown 
to be treated by pricers as far from neutral, equal, or meaningless. This is a 
significant addition to the price literature. 
The research also supports and extends Zelizer’s findings and adds to the price 
literature by showing that the money meanings within discourses of price are used 
within social relationships. This is in contrast to the widely-held view of money as 
de-personalising. Simmel (1978 [1907] (1907)) suggested that although obligations 
between people still exist in a money economy, they are impersonal or held at bay by 
the use of money as a means of exchange, rather than an onerous and constricting set 
of personal obligations as is found in more primitive societies: ‘Money as abstraction 
is understood by Simmel to be the root of impersonal relations between people’ 
(Miller 1987). However, research by Zelizer (1994) and Douglas (1982) shows that 
rather than eroding personal relations, money has social meanings and is used within 
rather than to negate relations between people. Whereas their research focusses 
primarily on consumers, this study shows that socially constructed meanings of 
money are included within and significantly (but not necessarily predictably) inform 
pricers’ discourses of price. The research shows that the social foundations and 
relational uses of money meanings extend beyond consumption behaviours: money, 
and that it has meanings and relational uses, matters in pricing practice.  
Although discourses of price have relational uses, these are not ‘nature’ or inherent 
properties of the discourses. The research data show that meanings of discourses of 
price are learnt, and open to challenge. Importantly, perceived legitimacy of 
particular interpretations depends upon the reader and their interpretive repertoire, as 
well as on the writer and their interpretive repertoire. Through their different 
interpretation of money meanings, the research participants and sources constructed 




truths. Instead, there are multiple truths, and multiple constructions of the 
legitimating hierarchy. 
The research data was collected from a group of participants with a range of socio-
economic backgrounds, which allowed an examination of the connection between 
social position and money categorisations/meanings. This enabled an exploration of 
the link between money source and earmarking suggested by Zelizer (1994) which 
was un-supported in Venkatesh’s (2006) study of money practices in hard 
circumstances. The data in my study suggest that whereas source and earmarking are 
frequently intertwined (for example as a ritual of category change), as expected by 
Zelizer, this is a learnt socially-desirable discourse, rather than a predictable, 
necessary, or actual-practice connection. Whether participants use discourses which 
suggest a link between source (here the priced object) and earmarking 
(categorisation by what it will be spent on) appears to depend on knowledge of ‘how 
it is done’, rather than necessarily a reflection of actual practice. 
The choice of pricing approach and money categorisation can be seen to be 
underpinned by varied interpretations of what money means within the pricing and 
discourse context, and has a direct effect on prices chosen. Money-categorisation 
rituals were seen to be considered by many but not all pricers, ‘experts’, peers and 
buyers to be important in determining whether the object’s art category is supported, 
the higher art price supported, and whether the sale goes ahead.  Within the data 
there were examples where using the wrong discourse, such as the wrong 
earmarking, could be detrimental to sales and social position. There were also 
instances where getting it wrong in the ‘experts’ view was not detrimental to sales, 
as the pricer had ‘got it right’ in the buyers’ view. However, ‘getting it wrong’ in the 
‘experts’ view was shown to potentially have social and economic repercussions in 
the longer term. 
Importantly, within the data the meanings of money category, object category and 
price are determined through a dialogical relationship in which each element informs 




appropriate prices and pricing discourses vary with interpretation of category of 
object and the associated money, and, importantly, interpretations are learnt, not 
‘nature’. 
 
10.3    Pricing as learnt practice: Apprenticeship and 
sources of expertise 
Whereas the choice of monetary price is often talked of as being ‘generated by the 
process of exchange’, which suggests the supply and demand model of pricing, it is 
also ‘knowledge about saleability – and other subjective preferences and valuations’ 
(Horwitz 1992)  which is generated in a wider process of social exchange. In this 
research pricing is construed as a socially embedded economic action performed by 
socialised people, rather than as an individualistic abstracted economic calculation or 
the outcome of aggregated supply and demand. Whereas much of the prior literature 
assumes economic rationale and focusses on consumer understandings of price, this 
study supports findings suggested by prior research in which social uses and 
understandings of ‘how it is done’ appear to both constrain and enable pricing 
practice (Espeland and Stevens 1998; Morton and Podolny 2002; Velthuis 2005).  
Although many pricers within the research context and pilot study treated ‘how to 
price’ as obvious, logical or formulaic, the data show that how to price is learnt, and 
therefore what is construed as ‘obvious’ may also be construed as ‘falsely obvious’ 
(Barthes 1972), in that choice is shaped by a particular interpretive repertoire of ‘the 
correct way for someone like me to price an object like this in a context like this’. 
Bourdieu (1984) suggested that learning and interpretations of codes and practices 
are mostly unconscious acts, and depend to a large extent on upbringing. That is, 




context and ‘the class condition’. The parallels discovered in this study between the 
considerable variation in the content and uses of discourse of price and those of 
consumption discourses in the literature relating to Bourdieu and social practices is a 
useful contribution to both the CCT literature and the pricing literature, and helps to 
explain why for someone from outside a pricing context the ‘how it is done’ may 
seem peculiar, irrational, and an indicator of different social group.   
This alternative, critical interpretation of the ‘how it is done’ is important because it 
highlights the assumptions of both the insider and the outsider, and the fact that 
assumptions are learnt. The data shows that differences in interpretation occur 
because the outsider has a different interpretive repertoire and set of assumptions, to 
those used by the pricer. Sharing codes and agreeing with the pricing logic makes 
one an ‘insider’, a member of the group who ‘get it’; using different codes betrays 
one as an ‘outsider’. Importantly, the data show that even when pricing (which is 
generally construed as motivated by individualistic economic maximisation) it may 
be more desirable to demonstrate shared knowledge of ‘how it is done’ than it is to 
maximise economic gain. That is, collusion in ‘how to do price’ and meaning-
making may be considered a better option than contention. 
Because the categorisations and associated meanings within discourses of price are 
learnt rather than nature or inherent properties of object, money, and 
commensuration, pricers’ categorisations and meanings both reflect and shape social 
position – as participants pointed out, the way money is interpreted and the choice of 
pricing discourses reflect “family background”, and are used as “part of the way you 
guys like to sort people out”.  
Within the art trail research context what is considered an appropriate pricing 
discourse involves distinctions between degrees of overlap or separation between the 
spheres of art and commerce, and the category of object being priced. The data show 
that these money and object distinctions play an important part in discourses of price, 
and are used by participants to position themselves and others, and are therefore a 




understanding that one interpretation has a higher status (is more correct or 
appropriate in a particular context) than another. As the meaning of a pricing 
discourse is not an inherent property of the discourse, the pricer’s interpretation, and 
the interpretation of the interpretation by other parties is socially constructed, taught 
and learnt. Although there is a theoretically unlimited diversity and multiplicity of 
meanings, meanings are sufficiently shared for society to function, and for pricing 
discourses to be used an important indicator of social group. Interpretations of the 
social meaning of pricing discourse within a particular context may be influenced, 
and it is this influence which is both a reflection of power and a source of power.  
Within the data participants referred to a variety of sources of artworld expertise, 
such as critics and artists on television, radio and in newspapers, national and local 
galleries, lecturers and tutors, family, and local peers, all of whom are involved in 
complex competition and collaboration re taste and distinction. Importantly, whether 
a source of pricing expertise was understood to be an expert and whether the 
discourses was interpreted as an example of getting it right or getting it wrong 
depended on the reader as well as the writer of the message, because all texts are 
writerly texts (Barthes 1972). That is, meaning is created as much by the reader as by 
the writer. This means that although a participant’s pricing discourse may be 
interpreted as ‘getting it right’ by some, others may interpret it as ‘getting it wrong’. 
Within the data interpretation of pricing discourses is used as a source of power and 
social positioning, and may have economic consequences.   
Consider the example from the research data of the discussion surrounding the use of 
a VISA machine. The unusually public example of competition and collaboration in 
determining the meaning of that pricing discourse was a useful demonstration of the 
learnt and contested nature of the meanings of money and price, the social uses of 
pricing discourses, and the possibility of multiple meanings, fluidity and change.  
This example demonstrates the important point that one should not assume that there 
is only one desirable pricing discourse which the participants could and should learn: 




be constructed as more right or logical. Within the research data, there were high-
profile disagreements about how money and the object being priced ‘should’ be 
categorised, and what commensurative discourse was therefore appropriate. 
Whereas the gallery owners in Velthuis’ (2005) study had a very homogenous 
interpretive repertoire, which is reflected in much of the previously published art-
pricing research and mass media, my study suggests greater variation is possible. 
The data in my study was gathered from a wider cross-section of participants, and 
show that there are multiple repertoires and multiple sources of expertise teaching 
those alternative repertoires, who jostle for positions of authority.  The research data 
show that how a discourse is interpreted, and whether the discourse is understood as 
appropriate or inappropriate, higher status or lower status, depends on knowledge of 
precedent and choice of supporting sources of expertise, and an awareness of the 
potential social impact of choosing to use one over another.  
Whilst support for the high status of particular interpretations may be called upon 
from higher-status sources outside the local context, such as the lecturer’s reference 
to Adorno, interpretations may also be challenged by outside sources, as in the 
example of the elevation of ceramics to fine art by the 2003 Turner Prize judges, 
demonstrating that the interpretive rules provided by ‘experts’ may vary with time 
and context, and are not fixed. Indeed, as Bourdieu (1984) pointed out, the on-going 
variation is important in that it is a means of maintaining the distinction between the 
higher classes and those who seek to imitate them. As suggested by Appadurai 
(1986, p.31), ‘élite tastes, in general, have this “turnstile” function, selecting from 
exogenous possibilities and then providing models, as well as direct political 
controls for internal tastes and production.’   
The research data shows that because pricing is a learnt practice, apprenticeship 
choices matter. Because interpretation is learnt, being able to construct oneself as an 
authoritative source of ‘how it is done’ is both a source and a reflection of power and 
social position. A pricer’s choice of exemplar may be a source of further power for 




apprentice nor their chosen ‘expert’ have sufficient status within the field of 
discourse context, have the opposite effect. 
 
10.4    Pricing and social position 
Enriching Thaler’s (2008 [1985]) suggestion that money categorisations matter, and 
will have shared, predictable effects, Zelizer’s (1994) work on the social meaning of 
money shows that money is variably categorised by source, earmarking, form and 
holder, and the categories have varied meanings and varied consequences. Zelizer 
demonstrated that money practices are shaped by and therefore signal social 
relationships, social position, social similarities, and differences.  
This research shows that the social meaning of money extends beyond consumption 
practices into modern pricing practices. The body of data collected in this research 
shows that how pricers categorise object and money and how they interpret those 
categorisations and the effects of using / not using particular category-linked 
behaviours, is socially-informed and has social and relational uses. Whilst 
recognising the limitations of the data collection methodology, in that it is not 
possible to collect the full range of discourses within the context, only those that 
participants chose to use or reference, the data is useful in that it includes 
participants with a variety of socio-economic backgrounds. This data strongly 
suggest that discourses of money, object and price are both informed by and inform 
interpretation of the user’s cultural capital, and therefore of their social position and 
group membership.  
This study shows that social position matters in pricing because it informs choice of 
pricing discourse and choice of price.  Discourses of money and price should 




hierarchy. The data suggests that political and social concerns may be equally or 
more important that economic logic when pricing. Whereas prior price research has 
assumed that ‘getting it right’ means economic maximisation, this study shows that 
getting it right means that the pricer is understood to have used the ‘correct’ pricing 
discourse for their object, and has not signalled a paucity of the correct cultural 
capital.  
That is, even in pricing, getting it right and getting it wrong appear to be related to 
social milieu (contact with legitimate legitimators) and cultural capital built up over 
years and generations (Bourdieu 1984). Despite the broadening of access to a variety 
of discourses and their interpretations through the mass media and widened access to 
education and the arts, cultural capital (built up over generations) and economic 
capital remain intertwined. Learning depends on social milieu and prior interpretive 
repertoires, as well as access to explicit learning situations. 
Within the research data the rich get richer, because they know the ‘right’ way to talk 
about art and money, so can sell their work for high prices, and the poor (or less 
affluent) get poorer, because they do not have the economic or cultural capital 
required to construct their work as ‘art’, or they choose to construct it as art through 
adopting an ‘incommensurable’ discourse – a discourse which signals membership 
of the intelligentsia and therefore implies social kudos, but which precludes 
economic gain. That is, as Benjamin (1999 (1936), p.234) suggested, the elite have 
given the masses the chance to express themselves, whilst preserving property 
inequalities. Pricing discourses can therefore be seen to be both a reflection and a 
source of social position and power, and pricing etiquette can be seen as a means of 
perpetuating inequalities. 
However, although social structure shapes interpretations of appropriate discourses 
of money, object and pricing, social structure is also shaped by those discourses. 
This research suggests that discourses of price are a source and mode of power, and 
construals of what discourses and categorisations represent may usefully be 




findings of this research will hopefully provoke marketers and pricers into 
considering their own assumptions regarding ‘how it is done’, and to examine the 
social underpinnings of their own interpretations of the meanings of money, object, 
and commensuration when performing the core market activity of pricing. 
 
10.5    Summary 
In the Introduction I asked the questions Do money categorisations affect pricing 
practice? How and why do pricers make distinctions between monies? What insights 
are gained by using this approach to examining pricing practice?   These questions 
were triggered by a combination of the conspicuous and curious absence of pricing 
discourses in the conversations of the art trail artists, and reading Zelizer’s 
discussion of the social meaning of money, particularly her example of the money 
categorisation practices of a group of prostitutes in which they earmarked money 
from the state as being for bills, whereas the money earned from prostitution was 
earmarked for clothes and having fun. This clearly illustrated Zelizer’s point that 
money has meanings, and that source and earmarking are connected. However, what 
I wanted to know was unanswered. 
I had wondered whether the prostitutes’ money differentiations were an example of 
‘how it is done’ amongst that group, and therefore whether that money discourse 
performed a social purpose. I had also wondered whether their discourses reflected 
actual practice, and, importantly, whether the money differentiations affected pricing 
choice – that is, if the money from prostitution is categorised as ‘fun money’ are the 
prices different from the prices of those who categorise that money as ‘bill money’? 




Rather than an exploration of prostitutes’ discourses of price, artists and their milieu 
proved a more accessible group of research participants, and offered an opportunity 
to collect data from pricing participants with a range of socio-economic backgrounds 
and a range of interpretive repertoires. The participants were pricing in a field with a 
widely-known ideal model – the Romantic myth – but no organisational protocol. 
The research findings show pricing to be more complex and socially-informed than 
previously published price research has indicated.  
Building on prior research by Zelizer (1994) and Consumer Culture Theory, in 
which objects are understood as being endowed with social meaning, this research 
suggests that pricing is not simply a comparison of neutral object with neutral money 
with the aim of economic maximisation, but that instead it involves a comparison of 
a particular (but variable) category of object with a particular (but variable) category 
of money, and a consideration of whether and how those two should be compared. 
The research data suggest that the social origin of categorisation mechanisms 
(Bourdieu 1984)  plays a key role in the social regulation of discourses of price.  
Whereas there has already been substantial work on the importance of social 
structure in object categorisations (Bourdieu 1984; Douglas and Isherwood 1996), 
there has been very little which examines modern money as a cultural object in this 
way (Baker and Jimerson 1992; Zelizer 2007). This research contributes to the 
growing body of sociological money work. It does so by showing that even when 
performing pricing, which is generally considered to be an economic rational action, 
money is not neutral and fungible. Importantly, within the data discourses of price 
and pricing can be seen to be crucially affected by ideas of appropriate 
categorisations of money within that context. This study shows that how pricers 
categorise money from particular sources (the priced objects and their buyers), and 
how they interpret that categorisation, depends on social group and context. That is, 
the categorisations and discourses around pricing are used to create and maintain 




have ‘know that’, one also has to have ‘know how’ if one is to ‘correctly’ use 
differing position-taking strategies in differing contexts. 
As suggested by cultural consumer research (e.g. Arnould and Thompson 2005; 
Arnould and Thompson 2005; Luedicke 2006), market practice choices – and we 
should now include pricing -  are learnt and often emulative/aspirational, and are 
chosen through exposure to a variety of options and interpretations. Rather than 
treating social structure as necessarily ontologically superior to discourse and object 
categorisation, within the study the two may be seen to be co-created in a dialogical 
relationship. The findings suggest that the existing structure of property ownership is 
at least in part maintained by restricting the earning potential of those at the bottom 
of the hierarchy through the use of socially-constructed understandings of the ‘right’ 
and ‘wrong’ way to do pricing in differing contexts. 
As well as showing that Bourdieu’s research regarding the social stratification of 
consumption practices can be extended to pricing practices, this research also draws 
attention to the social stratification of money-discourses and money-practices which 
underpins, but is generally invisible in, the consumption literature. It is important to 
note that the discourses of participants may not reflect actual money practices. For 
example money spoken of as earmarked as ‘art money’ (sacred) may in fact be spent 
on paying the electricity bill (profane). What matters is that the discourses were 
chosen by the participant as ‘the right thing to say’. That is, the discourses are seen 
to do something.  
Following the literature relating to Bourdieu and social practices, the findings of this 
study suggest that pricing discourses and categorisations matter because they are 
understood by the participants as being socially important because they are a means 
of creating distinction, a distance between higher-status ‘us’ and lower-status ‘them’. 
For example, participants were construed as socially different and excluded from 
friendship groups and opportunities to sell because their discourses of price (and 
money categorisations within this) were deemed to be ‘wrong’: “she paints to sell” 




mean”.  There is social as well as economic pressure to approach pricing in a 
particular (but varied) way, and this is underpinned by specific interpretations of 
categorisations of money by source and associated rituals of money category change.  
In the art trails the dominant pressure amongst participants was to be seen to not be 
driven by commercial aims, and this meant that conversations regarding pricing and 
earning money were notable by their absence. However, whilst the Romantic myth 
of the tainting effect of money is dominant within the artworld, not all participants 
knew it or felt it was appropriate, and so ‘appropriate pricing’ was interpreted in a 
variety of ways. Whereas Velthuis’(2005) research involving gallery owners in New 
York and Amsterdam suggests that there is one ‘right’ way of (not) talking about art 
prices, within my data (which involved a greater range of participants) participants 
used varying pricing discourse depending on actual, perceived, and desired group 
membership and interpretation of the discourse context,  and their interpretation of 
their art object. Interpretations within the research context were subject to flux and 
challenge between the groups, as in the example of the heated discussion regarding 
the ‘inappropriate’ use of a VISA machine.  
By looking closely at money categorisations within a range of pricing discourses 
collected through deep immersion in an specific art context for three years, it has 
been possible to show that despite that dominant economic theory in which money is 
neutral and fungible, and the alternative context-specific Romantic discourse in 
which money is tainted and tainting, participants used a variety of ways of 
categorising money by source, earmarking, holder and form. The participants’ choice 
of pricing discourse was informed by their categorisation of the object being priced 
and how categorisations should be interpreted, but also, importantly, informed by 
their interpretations of money category and rituals of category change. The 
interpretation of object and money and the social significance of particular discourse 
choices played an important part in enabling and restricting pricing practice. That is, 




are socially-informed, socially important context-specific practices, and they affect 
pricing choice.  
By focussing on substantive aspects of pricing this research adds to existing price 
and money knowledge by suggesting that pricing should be considered as a 
meaningful interpersonal socially embedded practice involving variable (sometimes 
competing) and important understandings of money categorisations and their 
corollary appropriate/inappropriate discourses, rather than as an abstracted 
economic-maximisation exercise. 
As MacKenzie (2006) so vividly illustrated, theory may shape as well as describe 
economic activities. This is a PhD thesis, not a significant tract, yet the activity of 
researching, discussing and disseminating is, albeit within a small sphere, not 
neutral. The research is therefore a critical examination of discourses of price, money 
and pricing. It aims to promote reflexion and examination of pricing and money 
‘truths’, their uses and why they are maintained, rather than to merely describe and 
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1. Art and the Market: A brief introduction and 
discussion 
This research has a very specific geo-temporal context, but it is important to 
recognise that how art and artists have been seen has changed over time, and varies 
geographically. As Abbing points out, ‘some social groups have a larger say in the 
establishment of the definition of art than others have’, and over time ideas of what 
constitutes art varies (Benjamin 1999 (1936); Abbing 2002). Here I give a very brief 
introduction to the Western art market based on a series of MA lecture notes and 
critical reflection during the research period.  
When art work was made to meet the requirements of the Church or aristocracy (the 
only people with sources of sufficient excess money to buy art), it was specified by 
size, materials to be used, and other objective measures – e.g. one Madonna in lapis 
lazuli robes with three flowers and two birds. Art was commissioned as a 
commodity, and the artist was seen as a craftsman. 
Then, in Holland, due to the overthrow of church and aristocracy, the mercantile 
class became the main buyers, which meant that pictures were smaller, to suit 
domestic settings rather than churches or grand palaces, and the number of potential 
buyers increased. So, along with the flower market and the fish market there were 
picture markets, where artists had stalls, and where they specialised in (for example) 
landscapes, animals, or still life.  At this stage art was very much a commodity, and 




Over many years, in a process which had begun in the Renaissance, the way the 
artist was seen began to change. Instead of the client giving instructions regarding 
content and form, the artist would be asked for ‘something about’ a particular subject 
matter. This was in recognition of the idea of ‘artistic genius’, which has become one 
of the central ideologies informing the separation of art and commerce, ‘artist’ and 
‘craftsman’.   
Although the lecturer constructed the separation of art and commerce as being in the 
control of the ‘artist’ or ‘craftsman’, I suggest that to some extent (and possibly to a 
large extent) the power to construct what types of work (and therefore which artists) 
has status was largely in the hands of the patron. That is, it would have been a 
patron’s decision whether to give explicit instructions, thereby constructing the 
supplier as ‘craftsman’ and of lower status, or to give more freedom, thereby 
constructing the supplier as ‘artist’, and as higher status than a craftsman. Although 
the buyer (that is, the holder of economic capital) would probably have a substantial 
degree of power, the artist or supplier may also have decided to construct themselves 
as more artist than craftsman. That is, there would co-construction of the change of 
meaning of the term ‘artist’, and collusion in the interpretation of the title. 
Within the research context the rules of separation between artist and craftsman were 
far from clear. As was pointed out to me, in terms of the relationship between buyer 
and producer and degree of instruction there may be very little difference between 
work by those who are seen as ‘Old Masters’ such as Titian’s painting ‘Diana and 
Actaeon’, a contemporary iron-worker’s development of a design for a church grille 
or door, and a modern illustrator’s work for a publisher. In each case the work was 
commissioned with a brief and a budget and a timescale – which would all, now as 
then, vary depending on the maker’s reputation. Yet despite the similarities Titian is 
widely cited as an artist genius, and  modern illustrators, even those with as high a 
profile as Quentin Blake, are currently seen as lower-status craftsmen rather than 




The hierarchical continuum from artist (pinnacle) to craftsman (lower status) seems 
largely constructed by those in power (i.e. holding comfortable positions within the 
artworld hierarchy) who wish to maintain the hegemony which sustains their role, 
rather than risk considered argument. The current hierarchical differentiation 
between art and craft is a widely accepted and supported norm reinforced through 
the education system, but it is not the only possible interpretation.  
In art schools in many other European countries craft, as in skill with materials, is 
valued much more highly than it currently is in the UK. For example, based on 
conversations with many overseas students and UK students who have taken a year 
out to study abroad, an art degree in Spain, France, or Poland would include the 
development of technique through many sessions of observational drawing, painting, 
sculpture etc, depending on discipline followed, whereas a student on a UK Fine Art 
degree course would be taught little or no technique, but encouraged to look at 
philosophical approaches to the definition of ‘art’, and to be able to talk about their 
work within the context of specific art-philosophy precedent – what one participant 
described as the need to display “conceptual rigour” . In so doing the students are 
learning a specific positioning practice, which they are told is required by “top end 
galleries”, and they are encouraged to reproduce and so sustain the status of the 
discourses of those who have already been successful, rather than challenging the 
success criteria or the precedent. 
When examining the development of the view of artist as genius rather than artist as 
craftsman, it is difficult to untangle the different strands of how artists were seen, as 
it varied by source, geographical region, time, and depended on the local culture as 
well as the skill and reputation of particular artists. However, as mentioned before, 
ideas of what is ‘good’ art and the construction of individual reputations are 
interlinked constructs rather than separate – the artist only has a reputation because 
sufficiently high-status sections of society agree to elevate him. Reputations and 




The picture known as ‘Flaming June’, which was painted in 1895 by the then 
President of the Royal Academy of Art, and treated at the time as a high status 
example of Fine Art, is now, a hundred years later, roundly ridiculed by many, 
particularly amongst the intelligentsia within the research context as an example of 
bourgeois ‘easy-art’. In this critical discourse regarding ‘Flaming June’ and what are 
seen as its peers (work by the Pre-Raphaelites), the research participants placed 
emphasis on the buyers of the art, who were constructed as the less educated and 
newly-wealthy industrialists in the North of England and Midlands (the wrong sort 
of buyer, the wrong sort of money), whereas the provenance - that it was painted by 
the President of the RA -  was not mentioned within the data. I suggest that the 
current practice of demotion and ridicule of Pre-Raphaelite work such as ‘Flaming 
June’ continues because it is useful, because it does something: it is a source of 
distinction, and separates and elevates the users of this discourse from those who, 
like the industrialists, are less educated about ‘what is art’. As the rules of ‘what is 
art’ is learnt and becomes mainstream, it is important that the criteria should evolve, 
keeping the elite at least one step ahead of the bourgeoisie and the plebeians. 
The intelligentsia discourse is an alternative if related view of the dominant 
traditional hierarchy of art, and appears to be rooted in the early twentieth century 
philosophies and work by artists such as Duchamp. It appears to offer an alternative 
to the established social order, but it works within it, both because it needs already-
powerful champions in order to be successful, and because it constructs itself as not 
being like the social layers above or below it. For example, whilst visiting a 
retrospective exhibition of representative paintings and drawings in a high-status 
gallery I heard the loud plummy voice of someone connected with the exhibition, as 
he explained/complained to a visitor that “He (the painter)’s not taken seriously,… 
because the Queen likes him. Anywhere else they’d …. ( take him seriously).”   
That is, the speaker suggests that the UK artworld cognoscenti have decided that the 





Within the research data the term ‘easy art’ tends to be associated with other 
people’s work, and connected with high sales. I suggest that this is so because using 
market success as a source of status is a dangerous interpretation for the 
intelligentsia elite, as success in the market may be interpreted as being due to the ill-
educated choices of the ‘wrong sort of buyer’ with the wrong sort of money’: 
consider the nearly universal negative response by art critics to the artist John 
Vettriano’s work, which has achieved enormous commercial success through sales 
of originals and reproductions of what is termed his ‘populist art’. That is, allowing 
commercial success to become the dominant signal of artistic success would erode 
the cultural power of the intelligentsia elite, and is therefore an interpretation to be 
fought against.   
In a critique of ‘populist art’ within the data, lecturer TS pointed out that Saatchi is 
an example of a contemporary patron, but his ‘Sensation’ artists (and his more recent 
protégées) all make “advertising art”. In this she was alluding to the source of 
Saatchi’s wealth (advertising) and implying that he has lower status artworld cultural 
capital. To paraphrase the lecturer, this art has one point, it is too easy, too 
unsatisfying for someone with her cultural capital. After seeing a recent Saatchi 
exhibition she went to Tate Modern to “wash her mouth out” (the implication was 
to remove a nasty taste) with something more intellectually challenging, with some 
good art. Maybe, she said as a side-comment, maybe she, “like Adorno, feel(s) that 
art to be good should be difficult.” 
The lecturer then pointed out that Hirst’s work, especially his ‘spot’ pictures made 
“by teams of people”, are bought by “those people who have just lost lots of 
money” (said in a smug tone of schadenfreude) those “morally corrupt bankers”, 
who have no taste but who recognise the symbolic power of a Hirst picture – it is 
instantly recognisable as a Hirst, and therefore as having cost a lot of money.  
This idea that art must be difficult to be any good, which the lecturer implied comes 




artworld myth which is used (in both its adoption and rejection) as a source of 
distinction between social fractions in a way which chimes with Bourdieu’s analysis 
of distinction (Bourdieu 1984). As used by lecturer TS, approving use of the 
‘difficult is good’ myth links high status group membership (the intelligentsia) with 
a shunning of commerce. Her ‘money source matters’ comments are similarly 
associated with high status. 
The constructed nature of the view that art ‘should’ be beyond the market, and that to 
think so implies higher status, is important when considering discourses of price 
within the research context, because discourses of price are a potent site for the 




2. Context data 
The map below is an example of the type of socio-economic data available for the 
research context city. This map shows the percentage of census respondents with no 
educational or technical qualifications, aggregated by neighbourhood. Within any 
one area there will be a mixture of people and wealth, but data such as this gives a 
clear idea of the aggregate differences and similarities between areas.  My perception 
of relative wealth and education levels of the different art trail within my data is 
supported by census data (such as in this map), my knowledge of relative house 
prices, and years of conversations with a wide range of people living in different 
parts of the city.  
 
  
Figure 7: Context data from census: Quality of Life, Education; Percent respondents with no 











3. Example of money meanings in everyday use: 
source and earmarking 
This example of money-meanings was sampled from the internet, and was 
chosen to demonstrate the way money is understood differently by different 
people, and how particular categorisations are seen as more or less 
appropriate. Here the source, form and earmarking are seen to matter to the 
blog writer and others involved, and the source, form and earmarking can be 
seen to be linked. The act of finding money is treated by the author as a 
“magic moment”, and the money is treated as special. 
It Makes My Day When....... 
A blog dedicated to the smaller pleasures in life that make you smile, sqeal with 
delight, pump your fist in the air or simply marvel at your own good fortune. Your 
day just got better..... 
Sunday, June 5, 2011 
#38: You find money on the ground 
#38: It makes my day when………..You find money on the ground. 
Another day past by and another moment of good fortune has come my way….wow 
I am really started to think that writing this blog is good karma. 
So yesterday was another “No Post” Sunday and I happened to be down in the 
South West of Perth enjoying a weekend away with my fave friends. On Saturday 




export – WINE! Feeling a bit sore, shaky and under the weather, a few of us girls 
thought a bit of a stroll and some sunshine would help with our recovery. So we 
yanked ourselves off the couch, out of our pj’s and set off at a very relaxed pace. 
Then 10mins into the walk, I perhaps overexcitedly let out a yell of excitement, bent 
down and grabbed my treasure………a $2 coin. Now perhaps my excitement may 
not have been what others may have expected in this situation with both Janelle & 
Rach jumping back in shock at my squeals of delight. They almost seemed to be let 
down by the fact that it was only $2………perhaps believing that my excitement was 
more appropriate to a $50 note! 
However this led to reminiscing about the excitement involved when I was with 
Janelle the day she did find a $50 note on the ground (Although to be totally 
honest, her excitement levels were more akin to what I would expect from finding 
50c not $50). We were on our way to watch the Eagles play at Subiaco oval, I had 
free tickets so I invited Janelle & her husband to be Chris along. On the long walk 
from the car to the ground, Janelle managed to pick out a $50 note hidden amongst 
the fallen leaves…..What a find it was! With no-one around looking to claim it we 
had no other choice but to take it before someone else did. So excited and always 
gracious, Janelle decided that she would use the money to buy us all Chicken Treat 
at the game. And do you think we have ever enjoyed a Chicken Roll as much as we 
did that day???? 
Anyhow the morale of the story is…..finding money = awesome! 
Keep your eyes peeled on the ground as your next magic moment could be just 








ground.html   (accessed 29
th
 Feb 2012) 
Note the variation in reaction to finding the money (Janelle seems to be notably 
sanguine about money-finds compared to blogger Becstar), the happiness $2 gave 
Becstar (“finding money=awesome”), and the way in which her friend Janelle’s 
earlier find of $50 had been earmarked as ‘treat’ money to be shared by everyone. 
………………… 
  
